INTRODUCTION

The Long Shadow of Tiananmen: Political Economy of State-Civil Societal Relations in the People’s Republic of China Twenty-five Years On

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Abstract

At the 25th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and June Fourth crackdown in Beijing, this article examines the legacy of the tumultuous episode unprecedented in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and scrutinizes the prospects and challenges in the struggle of post-1989 Chinese dissent and nonviolent action (NVA), both exiled and domestic, in the context of State-civil societal relations. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Party-State domination has so far continued to be stable, with the NVA movements being disadvantaged by both a low degree of internal solidarity and organization as well as numerical weakness to effectively engage in concerted action, vis-à-vis the same factors on the side of the State. Without any impending national economic crisis, military defeat or internal power struggle severe enough to destroy the CCP’s ruling echelon from within and with no sign of the weakening of the State’s will and machinery to suppress those who dare to challenge the CCP’s self-justified legitimacy to rule without being elected to do so, the Party’s rule looks set to continue to stay strong and political democratization of China seems destined to be long in coming.
Ironically, the CCP’s present consensus-based collective leadership, while supposed to prevent the rise of another disastrously strong leader like Mao Zedong, will count against quick democratization too. Against this backdrop, taking into consideration the divergence and convergence of the strategic and ideological approaches of the democracy movement and civil rights activism as well as the corresponding factors of instrumental activities, bargaining power and ideology on the part of the Party-State, the article analyses the conflict and reluctant symbiosis across the unfortunate State-society divide, assesses the tribulations and prospects of contemporary Chinese dissent and NVA, and ponders on the potential for political change.

**Keywords:** June Fourth, Tiananmen, Chinese Communist Party, authoritarianism, Party-State, dissent, non-violent action, democracy movement, weiquan activism

**JEL classification:** H11, H12, K49, Z18

... while I recognize the dangers to truth of relating scholarship to life, I also believe that we who live by the pen bear some measure of obligation, however tenuous, to those who die by the sword.

Alan Wood, “Preface” to Limits to autocracy (1995)\(^1\)

1. Introduction

On 17th April 2014, Gabriel José de la Concordia García Márquez (6 March 1927 – 17 April 2014), Colombian laureate of Neustadt International Prize for Literature (1972) and Nobel Prize in Literature (1982) and author of *One Hundred Years of Solitude* (1967), *The Autumn of the Patriarch* (1975) and *Love in the Time of Cholera* (1985), passed away at the advanced age of 87. “In *One Hundred Years of Solitude* by Gabriel García Márquez the banana company [...] massacred three thousand striking workers in the main square of Macondo. After the killings there was a cleanup so perfect that the incident could be flatly denied. It never took place, except in the memory of José Arcadio Segundo, who saw it all”, notes Salman Rushdie, the 1981 Booker Prize
laureate and 1999 Commandeur de l’Ordre des Arts et des Lettres, in *Joseph Anton* (2012) while referring to the 3rd-4th June 1989 Beijing massacre. “Against ruthlessness, remembering was the only defense”, adds the fugitive writer who was the thirteenth on *The Times’s* 2008 list of the fifty greatest British writers since 1945, “The Chinese leadership knew this: that memory was the enemy.”

The massacre in García Márquez’s story is fictitious, just like the fictional village of Macondo where it happened. That occurred in June 1989 is not, although the Chinese Communist Party’s government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has spent the last twenty-five years trying to convince a generation that has grown up after 1989 that it is. Yet, “certain events are so monumental, so symbolic, so glorious, and speak so eloquently to our highest ideals that they transcend the immediacy of the news”, as Howard Chapnick observes in his foreword to *Beijing Spring* (1989), “History demands that they be preserved.”

This special issue of the *International Journal of China Studies* – *June Fourth at 25: The quarter-century legacy of Tiananmen* – represents a collection of papers in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the poignant events in Beijing in 1989: the hundred-day demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, as the world watched as “incredulous spectators as the Chinese students dared to dream what became an impossible dream”, culminating in the bloody crackdown on that fateful night of 3rd-4th June, when a besieged regime finally responded with a massacre to reclaim the capital from the unarmed peaceful protesters. Chang’an Avenue/Chang’an Jie (literally “Street of Eternal Peace”) was the main theatre of the June Fourth massacre that spanned across Beijing when People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops fired into the crowds blocking their advance towards Tiananmen Square during that fateful night of 3rd-4th June 1989. Massacre along Chang’an Avenue/Boulevard (with heaviest casualty on the night of 3th-4th June 1989 but as a whole lasted from about 10 p.m. of 3rd June to the midnight of 5th June) mainly occurred along the route of PLA advance at the Wanshou Lu junction, Muxidi intersection, Fuxingmen 复兴门 (Fuxing, i.e, “revival”, Gate) outside Yanjing Hotel (燕京饭店) and Minzu Hotel (民族饭店), and Xidan.
Bei Dajie (Xidan North Street) junction along West Chang’an Avenue at Xinhuamen (Xinhua, i.e. “new China”, Gate) and Nan Chang Jie 南长街 junction onto Tiananmen Square (天安门广场) from the western side and from the eastern side of the Chang’an Avenue near Hongmiao 红庙 to Jianguomen 建国门 (Jianguo, i.e. “nation founding/building”, Gate), along East Chang’an Avenue near Beijing Hotel (北京饭店) and Nanchizi Dajie 南池子大街 (South Chizi Street) junction onto Tiananmen Square. In addition, massacre also occurred along Qianmen Dajie 前门大街 (Qianmen, i.e. “front gate”, Street – PLA’s southern approach to Tiananmen that night), at Chongwenmen 崇文门 (Chongwen, i.e. “culture/civilization revering”, Gate), between Jianguomen and Chaoyangmen 朝阳门 (Chaoyang, i.e. “sun facing”, Gate), the approach to the university district and around Peking University (北京大学), Yiheyuan 颐和园 (Summer Palace imperial garden) and Tsinghua University (清华大学). Outside Beijing, similar massacre at that time mainly occurred in Sichuan Province’s capital city of Chengdu 成都.

While the official death toll stood at four hundred and forty-three, 223 of whom were soldiers and police officers, plus 5,000 soldiers and police officers and 2,000 civilians wounded in the crackdown, exiled dissidents estimated the number of civilians, workers and students killed in the Beijing crackdown during the night of 3rd-4th June 1989 to be from 2,000 to 3,000⁹, while Soviet sources in 1989 put the number massacred in Beijing as 3,000, as cited by Mikhail Gorbachev at a politburo meeting in 1989¹⁰:

Not only is Peking a nightmare streetscape awash in atrocity and anguish; the nation at large has become a haunted land. This howling, lurching megahost is the Chinese Communist Party. In one staggeringly brutal stroke, it shot itself through the heart. It will not recover. A regime that professes itself to be the distillation of popular will has turned on the Chinese people, committing the ultimate sacrilege of eating its own children. Hundreds of China’s brightest, most idealistic sons and daughters, their movement commanding wide public sympathy, were nakedly sacrificed to the cause of preserving an élite.

(Asiaweek, 16th June 1989, p. 16)
While *Asia week* in its 16th June 1989 editorial “The Rape of Peking” lamented a Goya-esque landscape, these lines seem today, by hindsight, a gross underestimation of the resiliency of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the effectiveness of authoritarian power, given the stark asymmetry in power relations and one-sided monopoly of violence.

In the process of maintaining a tight grip on political power in ensuring the CCP’s perpetuation of its Party-State monopoly while delivering on the economic front and bringing prosperity and wellbeing to the long-suffering people of this giant country, the neo-authoritarian developmentalism followed since June Fourth could be leading the country on a path threaded before by various East Asian countries like Taiwan (Republic of China) and Singapore – a model sometimes termed “State corporatism”. When the enraged and desperate Beijing citizens yelled “fascists” at the rampaging People’s Liberation Army (PLA) armoured vehicles on that murderous night of 3rd-4th June 1989, when Chai Ling in hiding screamed “fascists” in her taped condemnation of the massacre shortly following that night of terror, when that lone individual stood in front of and blocked a column of tanks signifying terrifying State power in that poignant image reminiscent of Pablo Picasso’s *Guernica*, when melancholy and despair descended upon and the tune of *Xueran de Fengcai* 14 surrounded the hunger strikers in the Tiananmen Square, there was little telling of the course to come to pass in China’s subsequent political evolvement. “Fascism” could eventually prove to be an overstatement – other than that night’s slaughter and subsequent arrests and executions, nothing that came in this one-party state in the aftermath of June Fourth remotely approached Franco’s repression against the defeated Republicans and their supporters in the dictator’s “no-party” State immediately following the end of the civil war, though the term could still be in a certain way fitting if it is defined as the requirement for the faith in and unquestioning loyalty to the one-party State (or in the case of Franco’s Spain, in particular to the Caudillo). The post-June Fourth State corporatism, or referred to by some observers as “Leninist corporatism”, could provide a closer resemblance to Franco’s *Nuevo
Estado (New State), and the “harmonious society” vision declared in recent years does recall Franco’s vision of social cohesion and harmonious relationship between employers and workers via corporatism that would promote a close collaboration between them under the direction of the State and his corporatist policies to regulate the economy by controlling the conditions of work, wages, prices, production and exchange. What has turned out to be is that decades after the June 1989 massacre, notes Jean-Philippe Béja (2009), China represents “doubtless a post-totalitarian regime [continues to be] ruled by a ruthless Party [which] seems to have reinforced its legitimacy”:

[The CCP] has not followed the communist regimes of the Soviet bloc into oblivion. Its policies of elite cooptation, subtle response to social contradictions, and instrumental support for the “rule of law” have become major complements to its continued control over the press and the political system. It has made concessions to prevent discontent from crystallizing into social movements that might challenge its rule, and it has sent in the police to silence dissidents. Over the course of the same two decades, the opposition has had to wrestle with the trauma of the June 4 Massacre and the huge difficulties that it has raised for anyone who would challenge the CCP’s primacy.

(Béja, 2009: 14-15)


Facing an entrenched CCP looking increasingly formidable, China’s democracy movement by contrast has been seen to be mired by organizational disorder and lack of institutional construction, short of leadership talent, lack of true democratic organizational framework and spirit of devotion, over-reliance on external power and short of pro-activeness, according to Ch’en (1995: 131-134). In other words, the movement is characterized by relative weakness not only in bargaining power but also in the instrumental activities which of course affected its bargaining power too, as portrayed in Figure 1.
While the earliest democracy movements germinated in the PRC around 1978, may it be the “Beijing Spring” Democracy Wall/dazibao 大字报 movement or the democracy movement organized by Fu Yuchua 傅月华 and Wei Jingsheng 魏京生, strictly speaking these could not be considered organized movements; and well-known intellectuals like Liu Binyan 刘宾雁, Li Honglin 李洪林, Wang Ruoshui 王若水, Yan Jiaqi 严家其, Fang Lizhi 方励之, Su Shaozhi 苏绍智 and Wen Yuankai 温元凯 who were either social thinkers or critics of CCP’s bureaucratism were rarely involved in matters of movement organization, Ch’en remarks, whether due to political implausibility or perception as unnecessary by personal objective (Ch’en, 1995:128-129). Two Chinese democracy movements that take matters of organization seriously are,
according to Ch’en, the Chinese Alliance for Democracy (中国民主团结联盟) and the Federation for a Democratic China (民主中国阵线). The Chinese Alliance for Democracy was founded in the United States on 27th November 1983 (developed from the “China Spring” movement initiated earlier in the year), i.e. six years before the Beijing massacre, by Wang Bingzhang 王炳章, Liang Heng 梁恒, Huan Guocang 官国苍 and Li Lin 李林 and has since developed into a large China political pressure group overseas with over 2,000 members and over 50 divisions and branches in places such as Japan, Hong Kong, France, Germany, United Kingdom and Australia. The Federation for a Democratic China, proposed on 2nd July 1989 by the intellectuals and activists just escaped from China immediately after the June Fourth massacre including Yan Jiaqi, Örkesh Dölet (Wu’erkaixi 吾尔开希), Wan Runnan 万润南, Su Shaozhi and Liu Binyan, and officially established on 22nd September 1989, is also a large organization with about 1,500 members, headquartered in Paris with liaison offices in America, Europe and the Asia Pacific. *(ibid.*) 129-130


Nevertheless, effectively the history of the major part of the Chinese democracy movement in exile should be traced back to the June Fourth Beijing massacre of 1989. Many pro-democracy organizations were born during that tumultuous hundred-day mass protests and these included the China Support Network (CSN), Human Rights in China (HRIC) and the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS). New groups emerged in the years following the massacre: besides the abovementioned Federation for a Democratic China, these include the Party for Freedom and Democracy in China (PFDC) founded in 1991, the Wei Jingsheng Foundation and the Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition, the Free China Movement founded in 1998 led by Lian Shengde 连胜德, as well as the new anti-CCP news outlets formed at the turn of the new millennium – *The Epoch Times* (*Dajiyuan 毀紀元*), the New Tang Dynasty Television and the Sound of Hope Radio – during the beginning of the crackdown on Falungong 法轮功. However, the core of the democracy movement in exile which is still mainly made up
loosely of such US-based organizations like China Alliance for Democracy, the Federation for a Democratic China and the IFCSS appears fragmented and suffers from internal disputes, factional strife and in-fighting, and has little impact against CCP’s continued one-party rule in China, owing in no small measure to the miraculous economic performance and impressive poverty reduction record of China since the bloody crackdown of 1989, the liberalization of the Chinese society accompanying the no-holds-barred market reform and increasing degree of intra-CCP democratization even while the party’s monopoly of political power remains ruthlessly non-negotiable.

2.1.1. Organizational effectiveness

In terms of organizational structure, the Chinese Alliance for Democracy consists of the coordinating tiers of headquarter, divisions, branches and smaller groups, supervising committee produced by elections, and tripartite division of power between its alliance committee, supervising committee and headquarter for legislation, supervision and administration respectively in mutual cooperation and restraint, as well as eight departments of information, contact, theoretical study, action planning, organization, finance, magazine (Zhongguo zhi Chun 中国之春 / China Spring) and radio (ibid.: 129-130). The Federation for a Democratic China, on the other hand, is made up of the representative assembly (top authority), executive council, supervising council and secretariat, and seven specialized committees under the executive council overseeing foreign policy, mainland policy, Taiwan relations, students overseas, human rights, consultation and fund collection. While admitting that movements such as the Chinese Alliance for Democracy and the Federation for a Democratic China do exhibit proper organizational structure, Ch’en is doubtful of their structural effectiveness given their loose and encumbering nature and hence the lack of precision and compactness, a trait which he describes as having a structural “shape” but without structure “contents”, hence without any significant political effectiveness (ibid.: 130-131).

In terms of organizational purpose, the Chinese Alliance for Democracy’s stated objectives include breaking through news blockade
and strengthening propaganda offensive towards PRC, enhancing contacts inside PRC, rescuing and providing long-term assistance to democracy activists, formulating strategies in fighting for freedom and democracy, studying steps of nation-state construction, strengthening international relations, doing well internal contact work, cultivating democratic quality, strengthening internal construction and enhancing alliance abroad for the possibility of forming a party (ibid.: 129-130). The Federation for a Democratic China's basic ideals, on the other hand, consist of protecting fundamental human rights, defending social justice, developing private economy, ending one-party political monopoly, with the ultimate objective of establishing a democratic China. All these objectives and ideals showcase the typical strategic direction of long-term struggle for systemic change (revolutionary objective of bringing down CCP's one-party authoritarianism) as shown in the second column of Table 1, and the ideological orientation of viewing the movement's and the Party-State's interests as incompatible (thus rejecting the compromise solution of a dictablanda\textsuperscript{18} or a benevolent ruler within the

| Table 1 Chinese Democracy Movement and Weiquan (Civil Rights-defending) Activism: The Strategic Dimension |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Criterion                                     | Democracy Movement                  | Weiquan Action                  |
| Analysis of Social Framework                   | Transformative, revolutionist         | Reformatory, involutional        |
| Relatively structural; focusing on a structural analysis of overall sociopolitical relationships | Revolution (planned change of system) | Reform (planned change of elements within a system) |
| Aim                                            | Long Term                           | Short/Medium Term               |

Source: Yeoh (2013a: 322), Table 12.5. Based on framework from Weber and Burrowes (1991); Vinthagen (2010).
Table 2: Chinese Democracy Movement and Weiquan (Civil Rights-defending) Activism: The Ideological Dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Democracy Movement</th>
<th>Weiquan Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Commitment</td>
<td>Instrumental, practical</td>
<td>Fundamental, ideational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means and Ends</td>
<td>Despite lack of progress, still committed to NVA as the most plausible and effective means to effect change</td>
<td>Despite State persecution under the pretext of weiwen, still committed to NVA as ethically best in fighting for social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to Conflict with the Party-State</td>
<td>Incompatible interests; aiming at terminating one-party political monopoly and replacing it with multiparty free and fair electoral system; rejecting the compromise solution of a dictablanda or a benevolent ruler within the Party-State</td>
<td>Shared interests, at least with the more liberal, reformist and moderate faction within the Party-State; looking more for synergy of action together with “enlightened” members of the central Party-State against local corruption and abuse of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to Opponent (Party-State)</td>
<td>Disillusioned with the traditional idea of waiting for an “enlightened ruler” (mingjun 明君 ) within the system (imperial court in the old days; the one-party State today), hence in a competitive relationship with ruling Party-State to destroy the Party’s political monopoly</td>
<td>Seeking cooperation at least with the more liberal, reformist and moderate faction within the Party-State to zuozhu 作主 (enforce justice) for the people</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Party-State) and aiming at terminating one-party political monopoly and replacing it with multi-party free and fair electoral system, as shown in the second column of Table 2. Such strategic direction and ideological orientation also places the post-1989 democracy movements far toward the “transformative” end of the “reformative-transformative” spectrum of nonviolent action (NVA) matrix in Figure 2.

Further on the democracy movements’ organizational effectiveness, Ch’en (1995) attributed the internal strife, susceptibility to infiltrating control and potential for breaking up (e.g. power struggle between the former presidents Wang Bingzhang and Hu Ping 胡平 of the Chinese
Alliance for Democracy and Wang Bingzhang’s breaking way to form the China Democracy Party (中国民主党) to the movements’ encumbering and loose organizational structure (Ch’en, 1995: 131). Not only that these movements are accused of lacking in grassroots participation, they are also criticized for being headed by “celebrities” who lack skills of organization, administration and leadership especially those formed by exiled activists after the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, lacking in devotional spirit despite the emphasis on democracy in organizational structure taken at face value, and lacking in power of mobilization and influence leading to over-relying on the hope of external shocks in the form of China’s domestic disturbances and upheavals which are more often than not only reflecting the movement leaders’ simplistic personal subjective evaluations and whimsical predictions (ibid.: 132-134). Such an unenviable situation is reflected in the imbalance in the democracy movement’s assertion (right vertical axis) vs. the Party-State’s domination (left vertical axis) configuration in Figure 1 earlier, and the contrast between the Party-State and the exiled democracy movement in terms of the degree of organization (with the exception of the similarly exiled Falungong movement and ethnoregional movement for self-determination) as shown in Figure 3.

2.1.2. Leadership conflicts

In contrast with cases such as Burma, it is a fact that contemporary Chinese dissent and NVA suffer from a lack of leadership – the lack of a “centre”, an Aung San Suu Kyi. While the Tibetan resistance movement has its 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, and its Uyghur counterpart has Rebiya Kadeer, there is no single figure in the democracy movement for the exiled democracy activists or their counterparts within China to coalesce around – neither Wei Jingsheng nor Dr Liu Xiaobo 刘晓波, nor any of the exiled former Tiananmen student activists or former labour leaders like Han Dongfang 韩东方. Neither is there any such figure among the relentlessly harassed weiquan 维权 (civil rights-defending) activists in the country. Chen Guangcheng 陈光诚’s indomitable spirit underlined by his disability and accentuated by his incredible escape might make him the much needed symbol of struggle.
but he is now also exiled, with little hope of returning to China. It can of
course be argued that the democracy movement’s fragmentation and the
squabbling between Chinese dissidents could also have the potential of
being turned into an advantage. After all, democracy is and has to be a
messy business, in contrast with an authoritarian system – a “China
model” as such – where decision making is usually very much facilitated
by the existence of a strongman or a party that monopolizes political
power by force. “You pays your money and takes your choice”, as

Source: Based on Zhao (2008: 767), Figure 26-1.
Aldous Leonard Huxley says in his 1946 foreword to *Brave New World* (1932). That said, the lack of solidarity and a united front, nevertheless, still make the movement look weak or even pathetic. Xu Zhiyuan 許知遠 in his book *Weizhuang de shengshi* 伪装的盛世 [feign flourishing age of prosperity] (2012) attributes the endless squabbling between Chinese dissidents to their being products of a totalitarian system and their terrifying experiences under the system, their language and behaviour being a continuation of the system. Witness the astonishing reversal of attitude from Wei Jingsheng's calling in the *International Herald Tribune* on President Barack Obama to exert pressure on China to release Liu Xiaobo when the latter was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment to Wei's later scathing attack on the Nobel Committee and Liu whom he deemed was unworthy of the Peace Prize, citing Liu's denial of seeing massacre occurring “on” Tiananmen Square during the crackdown on the night of 3rd-4th June 1989 besides accusing him of being too moderate. It is noteworthy that in a commentary essay in May 1989 Liu had accused the Chinese intellectuals of being hypocritical and servile in their outpouring of accolades towards the just deceased Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 – the tidal wave of grieve being chock-full of the longing for a benevolent, enlightened ruler (*mingjun*) – in contrast with their cold, unconcerned attitude towards the decade-long incarcerated Chinese democracy activist and human rights and freedom fighter Wei Jingsheng. (Xu, 2012: 53-55) One could not help but wonder whether the Nobel Committee’s ignoring Wei Jingsheng, the grand avant-garde of post-Cultural Revolution Chinese democracy activism whose era-shaking manifesto “The Fifth Modernization” (i.e. democracy) in 1978 landed him a 15-year jail term followed by continuous subsequent persecution before being exiled in 1997, to bestowed the Peace Prize on the newly jailed Liu Xiaobo instead of, more fairly, making the two joint laureates was inadvertently sowing the seed of discord between the two most likely towering leaders of a future post-CCP China should one-party authoritarianism finally give way to multi-party liberal democracy. Such internal strives and disarrays are also evident, for instance, in Feng Congde 封從德’s *Liu-si riji* 六四日記 (*A Tiananmen journal*)
published in 2009, one of the latest first-hand accounts of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and Beijing massacre in print, whose postscript and chapter notes reveal a dismal web of scapegoating, intrigue, clash of egos, personal agenda and even insinuations of planted moles and agents provocateurs.

Indeed, Wei Jingsheng’s attack on Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel award of 2010 was just a repeat of a past episode, as Xu reminds us, when Wei himself was first exiled to Washington and was subjected to public denunciation by a furious Wang Xizhe 王希哲 who was exiled much earlier than him for the tidal wave of attention which greeted Wei in 1997 had deeply hurt the much earlier champion of Chinese democracy, by then largely forgotten by the public (Xu, 2012: 54-55). It was the same playing out of histrionics came 2010. Xu asks us to understand such intriguing phenomenon by looking at the CCP’s brutality, since Mao Zedong 毛泽东’s time, of thought reconstruction, of destroying personality, and the inhumanity in Chinese prisons and labour camps (ibid.: 55) – just witness how Li Wangyang 李旺阳 was tortured and broken and stripped of all dignity of a human being over the 23 years’ repeated imprisonment since the June Fourth massacre.

At the time in 2012 when the image of Li Wangyang broken by long years of beating and torture and his suspicious death was brought into the world’s limelight, attention was also directed to the plight of those still in jail since participating in the demonstrations in 1989 or in fighting back against the rampaging PLA across Beijing. According to the San Francisco-based watchdog Dui Hua Foundation (中美对话基金会) in 2012, of the 1,602 people thus jailed, seven has still not been released and long years of imprisonment and ill treatment had not only led to a broken body like the case of Li Wangyang but also mental disease, like the activist Yu Rong 余蓉. Li Yujun 李玉君, a hawker who fought the PLA with a burning oil cart during the June 1989 crackdown, who was released in May 2012 after his 23-year long imprisonment, but placed under surveillance for another 8 years, was also said to suffer from mental illness and a broken body after long years of ill treatment and beating in jail.22
While the 23-year imprisonment, beating and torture, and ultimately death, of Li Wangyang could be seen to epitomize the fate of Chinese democracy movement and the inhuman extent to which the Chinese State machinery could be used to crush any expression of dissent and defiance, the suicide of Zha Weilin 朱伟林 truly symbolizes the increasing dejection and despondency of those who are struggling to hold on to their principled but forlorn fight for justice in an environment devoid of political morality and decency, where two decades of relentless censorship and GDPism have resulted in the prevalent political apathy, acquiescence and resignation among the citizenry. As a response to such a reality, to the great masses now with improved living standard under CCP’s brave new world of rugged capitalism, money-making and free-market hedonism represent the rule of the day, while for the powerless intellectuals who still have a principled commitment to social justice founded upon political freedom and human dignity, what lies ahead is a bleak future for the ruminating selves of “human reflexivity […] in situations that were not of [their own] making” (Archer, 2003: 342), “[…] a tremendous void. A pale gray nothingness that is all [one’s] future holds”, as that grimly described in a recent dystopian novel, Suzanne Collins’s *Mockingjay* (2010).

According to an *Apple Daily* (苹果日报, Hong Kong) report in February 2014 citing Beijing artist Wu Wenjian 吴文健 who as a seventeen-year-old youth was sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment for the crime of “anti-revolutionary propaganda instigation” during the June 1989 crackdown, there is still one last known death-row “June Fourth” inmate called Miao Deshun 苗德顺, sentenced to death for helping to burn a tank during the 1989 Beijing massacre but with two years’ probation, who has spent the last 25 years in prison suffering from repeated beating by prison guards with electric baton for unrepentant insubordination and rejecting hard labour correction. According to his relatives, Miao is still presently being incarcerated in Beijing’s Yanqing 延庆 jail, and as Yanqing is a prison for the old, sick and disabled, Wu is not optimistic about the health condition, after a quarter of a century’s ill treatment in jail, of this valiant youth who stood up in 1989 against the army of a government that shot its own citizens.
Looking at such State brutality, it is not difficult to concur with Xu that Wei Jingsheng, Liu Xiaobo, Wang Xizhe and countless other less well-known dissidents are not personalities in a beautiful fairy tales. So aren’t the exiled survivors and Tiananmen student leaders of the 1989 massacre. These dissidents who have at least valiantly stood up for freedom and justice at the respective critical junctures also have their respective personal shortcomings and tragic experiences at the hands of a ruthless State, and squabbling and mutual accusations, cautions Xu, are but part of a long journey without an always clear direction and not necessarily leading us towards a conclusion we would expect (ibid.: 55).

2.2. The Other Track of Chinese NVA since 1989: Weiquan Activism

Sending the prominent dissidents into exile – be they democracy activists like Wei Jingsheng, leading Tiananmen student leaders or well-known weiquan activists like Cheng Guangcheng – has always been a way out for the Chinese government if it deemed continued persecution too damaging in terms of its diplomatic and economic relations with the West and the rest of the world community. Nevertheless, a different tactic is usually employed to deal with dissidents especially dissident movement leaders who are less well-known. These key organizers of dissident movements are usually charged with crimes like endangering state security or revealing official secrets and sentenced to long imprisonment. At the same time, the government would act as a benevolent patriarch to attempt to address the grievances that had given rise to the movements in the first place. In this way, the government takes back the control of public discourse and makes the movements and their leaders irrelevant and hence nipping any sign of “deviation-amplification” in the bud before it could take the first step to trigger systemic change, all under the façade of territorial unity, political stability and a “harmonious society” (hexie shehui 和谐社会), the key conceptual cornerstone since the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2006 passed the “Resolution on Major Issues Regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society” (关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定).
This is how modern dictators work, in contrast to the despots of the yesteryears, notes William Dobson in *The dictator’s learning curve* (2012), “in the more ambiguous spectrum that exists between democracy and authoritarianism. Most strive to win their people’s support by making them content, but failing that, they are happy to keep their critics off balance through fear and selective forms of intimidation.” (Dobson, 2012, ppb 2013: 6) By sending the leading activists of the New Citizens’ Movement to prison and with the detention of another dozen of activists similarly involved in pressing for asset disclosure by officials, the Xi Jinping administration is warning the civil society that his CCP
one-party State remains the sole authority to implement the anti-
corruption campaign and it has its discretion to do it in its own way (see
projectable changes in Figure 4, as against the societal emergent
changes\textsuperscript{27}) even if that means doing it with selective investigation and
prosecution very much tied to intra-CCP factional rivalry, and pressure
from societal activism in this regard would never be tolerated and would
continue to be seen as organized challenge to the CCP rule.

The CCP’s current treatment of \textit{weiquan} activism is intriguing, for a
distinction between system-threatening and non-system-threatening
protests has always been important for explaining State response in the
PRC. Referring to Muslim marchers in 1989 protesting the publication
of a Chinese book entitled \textit{Xing fengsu} 性风俗 [sexual customs] that
they claimed denigrated Islam, Dru Gladney (1991) drew a parallel with
the other, more well-known, protest of 1989:

Just prior to the bloody suppression of the 1989 democracy movement
in China, in the midst of the flood of protesting students and workers
who, for a remarkably lengthy moment in history, marched relatively
unimpeded across Tiananmen Square and the screens of the world’s
television sets, another comparatively unnoticed, but nevertheless
significant, procession took place [...] the protest began with mainly
Hui Muslim students who were joined by representatives of all 10
Muslim nationalities in China, including some sympathetic members
of the Han Chinese majority [...] this procession was on its way to
Tiananmen Square, the so-called “Gate of Heavenly Peace”, which
soon opened on to a hellish nightmare of indiscriminate warfare in the
streets of the terrorized city. This procession to the Square also made
its way along Changan Jie, “the Avenue of Eternal Peace,” that shortly
thereafter was to be renamed “Bloody Alley” by Beijing’s citizens [...] (Gladney, 1991: 1-2)

Gladney moved on further to draw an interesting picture of stark
contrast in State responses between this case of “protest to the
government” and the other case of “protest against the government” in
those same days staged by the students and workers and their supporters
from all walks of life around Beijing and other Chinese cities who
eventually paid dearly by blood:
Remarkably, and in another dramatic contrast to the crackdown on the student Pro-Democracy Movement, the state took the following actions in response to this Muslim protest over an insignificant Chinese book: The government granted full permission for all the Muslim protests, often despatching police to close streets, stop traffic, and direct the marchers [...] By stressing the legality of the Muslim protests, what Barbara Pillsbury noted as their "protest to the government," rather than against it – the fact that the Muslims had permission and were often escorted by police – the state-controlled press sought to juxtapose the legal Muslim protest with the illegality of the student protests.

(ibid.: 3-5, italics in the original)

One of the most prominent student leaders who led the pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square was Örkesh Dölet (Wu’erkaixi). It is interesting to note that Örkesh Dölet was then a Beijing Normal University student of the Muslim Uyghur nationality. However, unlike the protesters in the parallel State-permitted demonstration in Beijing at that time against Xing fengsu, Örkesh Dölet’s involvement in leading the pro-democracy movement since the Tiananmen days till today transcends ethnicity, and it was notable that his condemnation – jointly issued on 7th July 2009 with Taiwan’s China Human Rights Association (中國人權協會) – of perceived government repression in the July 2009 Xinjiang disturbance was issued, while not denying his ethnic identity, as a civil rights activist28, in comparison with some pronouncements made by former Nobel Peace Prize nominee Rabiyä Qadir (Rebiya Kadeer), chairperson of the World Uyghur Congress29. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the Party-State during those turbulent days of 1989:

The students [demonstrating on Tiananmen Square in 1989 against corruption and for democracy], as an unrecognized voluntary association, were considered unlawful, riotous, and a threat to the state’s order. For that they were met by a military crackdown. The actions of the Muslims [marching against the book Xing fengsu], as members of state-assigned minority nationalities and believing in a world religion approved by the state, were considered permissible. For
that they were inundated with state-sponsored media and assisted in their demands. The difference, from the Chinese state’s standpoint, was one of order and disorder, rationality and confusion, law and criminality, reward and punishment.

(Gladney, 1991: 5-6)

Successful it might seem to be, the CCP regime’s reassertion of its legitimacy and unassailability has in reality not been immune to a series of challenges, some rather severe and unexpected, since June Fourth, exemplified by the horrific events of March 2008 in Tibet and July 2009 in Xinjiang. Regrettably, in facing such challenges, the regime has never been able to grow out of the tendency to recycle the “black hand” (heishou 黑手) theory – the “shopworn conspiracy theories that blame mass protests primarily on the CCP’s foreign and domestic enemies, reflecting the classic Leninist insistence that social protest in a Communist country cannot just happen, it must be instigated” (Tanner, 2004: 143) – which is unfortunately so apparent in the ruling regime’s response to the Xinjiang crisis or the Tibet riots. For this “black hand” theory, Murray Scot Tanner (2004) gave an example from the 1989 Beijing massacre:

In the days after the Tiananmen demonstrations, this Leninist conspiratorial worldview was typified in a report on the protests issued by Gu Linfang, the Chinese vice minister of public security who was in charge of “political security.” To document a conspiracy in 1989, Gu painstakingly listed dozens of allegedly nefarious contacts among protest leaders; reformist Communist officials; foreign academics; and, of course, Western and Taiwanese intelligence agencies. The vice minister railed against party reformers for coddling schemers who fomented rebellion. A Leninist to his marrow, Gu refused to concede any acceptance of what social scientists have known for decades, that whenever a society grows and changes as rapidly as China has, an increase in political protests is a normal development.

(ibid.)
Similar State response can be observed following the 5th July 2009 Xinjiang riots when Nur Bekri (Baikeli 白克力), chairman of the Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu, declared on 18th July 2009 the source of the riots being “the triumvirate of terrorist, secessionist and extremist forces”\textsuperscript{30} and Wu Shimin 吴仕民, vice-chairman of China’s State Ethnic Affairs Commission, stated on 21st July 2009 that the July Fifth riots had absolutely nothing to do with China’s nationality (ethnic minority) policies. Without the courage to face up to domestic realities, any solution to the root problems leading to either June Fourth or July Fifth would remain illusive.

Coming back to weiquan activism, the Party-State’s stance is clear: the State welcomes protests to it but it retains the full discretion of how to deal with the grievances. Organizing campaign to force the hand of the State like what the New Citizens’ Movement was doing is equated to protesting against the State for the action is tantamount to questioning the ability, discretion and ultimately the power, authority and legitimacy of the State, and the action will not be tolerated. Such crackdown on the weiquan activists is in spite of the fact that most of their protest activities are expressed in single-issue demonstrations which the one-party State has apparently so far found tolerable to a certain extent. Contrary to the democracy movements, weiquan activism does not call for eliminating CCP’s one-party authoritarianism and weiquan activists do not deny the possibility of just relying on reform from within the CCP rather than to subject themselves to persecution by the State for the severe crime of “inciting subversion of State power”. Unfortunately, as we have seen earlier, such prudence did not prevent a host of weiquan activists from being convicted and given heavy sentences under the charge, though others like the leaders of the New Citizens’ Movement were convicted on a different charge.

In an interview by the Yangguang Shiwu 阳光时务 magazine\textsuperscript{31} shortly after she assisted Chen Guangcheng to escape from house arrest, Her Peirong 何培蓉 (“PearlHer”/Zhenzhu 珍珠) reiterated that she was not a pro-democracy activist but just a simple person who felt the need to assist those other civil rights activists who were being persecuted by the authorities ever since, as a volunteer helping the child survivors of
the 2008 Sichuan Province earthquake, she got to know about the injustice done to Tan Zuoren and Huang Qi because of their exposure of and investigation into the real death toll of students and the “tofu dregs” schoolhouse scandal. Despite her apparent contempt for the Shandong government that perpetuated the injustice towards Chen Guangcheng, Her Peirong said during the interview that she was more concerned with effectiveness of her action than unending rhetoric criticizing the government, for it is always important to leave “face” for the government, i.e. to be realistic in order to open space for positive interaction with the government in solving problems, and that she would rather believe in gradualism in building a democratic society. Such utterances of moderation of course also reflect the vulnerability of the civil rights activists, especially those less known internationally and hence more helpless in the face of State persecution and abuse, who desperately need to protect themselves against the recurring severe charge of “inciting subversion of State power” that the State has been unfailingly using to put them away.

Such divergence in strategic approach and ideological orientation is illustrated in Table 1 and Table 2 earlier. Nevertheless, in the light of the recent arrest and conviction of Xu Zhiyong and other leaders of the New Citizens’ Movement and the earlier persecution of Chen Guangcheng, Huang Qi, Tan Zuoren, Zhao Lianhai and others, though some on a different charge, there are apparently points to ponder in veteran artist-civil rights activist Ai Weiwei’s expression of disdain for such naivety on the part of the weiquan activism: “Xu Zhiyong is representative of many young scholars who focused on social issues and sought practical ways to bring about reform. I know many of them and consider them friends. But when they say they have no enemies, I fear they are being unrealistic.”

Finally, related to such a divergence, there has been a debate recently even among the pro-democracy activists and June Fourth survivors over the conventional use of the term “pingfan” (i.e. to rehabilitate or to redress a mishandled case) in the demand “to pingfan June Fourth”. The concern is understandable as the demand for the CCP
regime “to pingfan June Fourth” is rightly, as argued by those opposing the use of the term, tantamount to admitting the legitimacy of the CCP regime who is merely asked to rehabilitate the 1989 protests as a patriotic movement, to release those remained jailed for the protests and to apologize to and compensate those injured during the brutal crackdown or persecuted thereafter and families of those who were slain on the Chang’ an Avenue and elsewhere in Beijing in June 1989, and to allow the long-exiled former protesters to return home. Hence, while no one doubts the political defiance shown by the exiled democracy movement, the continued use of the word “pingfan” could probably explain the internal dilemma concerning the determination and the ultimate aim of the movement and its leadership, as well as throw light upon the current disarray of the movement.

2.3. Necessary Conditions for Assertive Action and Institutional Domination: Democracy Movement and Weiquan Activism vis-à-vis Party-State

The three factors of instrumental activities, bargaining power and ideology, according to Vaughan and Archer (1971), represent necessary (though might not be sufficient) conditions of success for assertive groups. On the other hand, facing these assertive groups is institutional domination whose success also depends upon the existence of three necessary conditions, namely monopoly, constraint and again, ideology. Juxtaposing Vaughan and Archer’s two constructs gives the composite schema as shown in Figure 5. Monopoly is used here in the Weberian sense of the word, referring to CCP’s monopoly of political power. The corresponding feature on the side of democracy movement or civil rights activism comprises instrumental activities defined as the sum of actions to devalue the political monopoly of the authoritarian ruling party on which domination is based.

For the dissidents, instrumental activities are not enough, whether for successful civil rights assertion or striving for political liberalization. Bargaining power, according to Vaughan and Archer, is as necessary as “an alternative to the use of violence and yet implies a degree of
Figure 5 Assertion, Constraint and Institutional Conflict

Source: Yeoh (2013a: 288), Figure 12.2. Schema based on Vaughan and Archer (1971: 16-32).

organization which would make revolt effective if reform were denied” (Vaughan and Archer, 1971: 27). However, its two components of numerical strength and organization are crucial to its effective use and success – the two elements which both the democracy movement in exile and the weiquan activism are presently lacking. The fragmented democracy movement in exile has not been able to command any credible bargaining power in an environment of astounding economic power and international clout of CCP-ruled China as well as the collective amnesia on the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and Beijing massacre resulted from more than two decades of successful information wipe-out inside China for those born or educated after 1989, and nationalism and national pride that came with increasing national strength – sentiments that the CCP has been unabashedly relying on to justify its continued unchallengeable political monopoly as the “party that delivers”.

Most importantly, with the absence of both the elements of numerical strength (referring more to actively mobilized members of a movement than simply to sympathizers and moral supporters in general) and organizers – despite the emergence of Falungong as an exiled
resistance group which has shown impressive solidarity, numerical strength, organizing skill as well as focused dedication to a cause that the wider democracy movement lacks – the NVA movements’ pressure on the Party-State as the dominant group still remains insignificant in terms of making the latter relinquish some of its position-related advantages, the success for which necessarily depends on the conjuncture of these two elements (Vaughan and Archer, 1971: 27). Under this situation, the Party-State domination has continued to be stable, with the NVA movements being disadvantaged by both a low degree of internal solidarity and organization as well as numerical weakness to effectively engage in concerted action, vis-à-vis the same factors on the side of the State (ibid.: 27-28).

According to Margaret Archer, each mode of human reflexivity “is a distinctive way of deliberating about oneself in relation to one’s society. It is the modality through which the active agent continues to align her personal concerns with her social context.” (Archer, 2003: 349) The method of alignment varies, though, directly with the mode of reflexivity being exercised, adds Archer, while conclusions are being reached on the prioritized concerns which are in turn crystallized into determined projects, and certain orientation has been arrived at towards the reflexives’ encounters with constraints and enablements, while “the internal conversation, as the fundamental process mediating between structure and agency, also canalised the personal-societal relationship in different directions, according to its mode – thus articulating the precise form of the micro-macro link” (ibid.).

Such canalization of personal-societal relationship, or in the present context the relationship of the civil society (reflecting the stance of particular reflexives) with the Party-State, would result in the divergences not only within a movement, e.g. the disarray in the exiled democracy movement, but also between movements. The latter, for instance, can be seen in the contrast between the current state of relationship between the weiquan activism’s assertion and the Party-State’s domination (which while coercive, does exhibit certain degree of tactical flexibility as in the case of the Wukan uprising and the Shifang incident) that could at the risk of oversimplification be
probably described as a reluctant “mutualistic symbiosis” (see Figure 6), i.e. to a certain extent benefiting both sides, and the relationship between the exiled democracy movement and the Party-State which – probably with the exception of the particular cases of ethnoterritorial resistance movements which have been able to maintain continued influence on events in the particular territories – could probably be described as a “commensalistic symbiosis” (see Figure 1 earlier), i.e. a fluid relationship of association yet at the risk of indifference and oblivion, if not, as observed earlier, for the injection of the more focused and better organized element of the Falungong resistance movement. Such divergence of course could not solely be attributed to the mode of reflexivity, but also to a higher degree to the variations in the properties of State domination and NVA assertion, shown by the left and right vertical axes of Figure 1 and Figure 6, which with reflexivity, form a complex nexus of micro-macro, agency-structural factors and influences. This is of course not to mean that a possible better synergy between the democracy movement and weiquan activism in putting aside strategic and ideological differences to pursue a common goal of political freedom, civil liberties and social justice (as depicted in Figure 7) has to be precluded, though the objective environment currently in existence in the country would make an imminent realization of such synergy rather implausible.

2.4. The Ambiguous Role of Political Violence

George Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-four (1949) talks about a totalitarian Party-State that controls life and creates human nature: “We control life [...] at all its levels. You are imagining that there is something called human nature which will be outraged by what we do and will turn against us. But we create human nature. Men are infinitely malleable. Or perhaps you have returned to your old idea that the proletarians or the slaves will arise and overthrow us. Put it out of your mind. They are helpless, like the animals. Humanity is the Party. The others are outside – irrelevant.” (Orwell, 1949, re-pub. 1954: 232) Irrelevant – as probably often felt by the exiled Chinese democracy activists in their individual real “ruminating self” that intervenes in between the field and the
habitus (Bourdieu, 1990, 2008) while constructing in foro interno their existential projects for sociopolitical change the effectiveness and pertinence of which are contingent upon “human reflexivity; namely, our power to deliberate internally upon what to do in situations that were not of our making.” (Archer, 2003: 342) Truly, in the interplay between the State and the civil society, much like what Kristensen’s law in public choice theories postulates, the negotiation between human agencies tends to be asymmetrical. In entrenching and expanding its power, the ruling regime as a rule would resort to exploit such power asymmetry not only through the overt repression of dissent in the preservation of stability as an ongoing stalemate – one of the possible results of social conflicts from the neo-Marxist perspective – but also by forging and re-forging alliances with societal groups based on common interest and the
Figure 7 State Domination and NVA Assertion: Institutional Reconfiguration

Source: Yeoh (2013a: 337), Figure 12.10. Schema based on Vaughan and Archer (1971: 16-32).

cooptation of the societal élite including segments of the intelligentsia. All these, of course, depend on the State’s ability to monopolize the concentrated means of coercion and violence. In this, China is not unique, as Charles Tilly (1985) observes:

At least for the European experience of the past few centuries, a portrait of war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief alternatives: the idea of a social contract, the idea of an open market in which operators of armies and states offer services to willing consumers, the idea of a society whose shared norms and expectations call forth a certain kind of government.

(Tilly, 1985: 169)
While that brings to mind Thomas Paine’s iconoclastic dictum that “government even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one”\(^{35}\), Tilly notes that apologists for a government usually argue that the government offers protection against local and external violence and these apologists call people who complain about the price of protection “anarchists”, “subversives”, or both at once. Tilly basically finds an analogy of such a government that perpetuates its power through violence, in one sense or another, with a racketeer:

Back to Machiavelli and Hobbes [...] political observers have recognized that, whatever else they do, governments organize and, wherever possible, monopolize violence. It matters little whether we take violence in a narrow sense, such as damage to persons and objects, or in a broad sense, such as violation of people’s desires and interests; by either criterion, governments stand out from other organizations by their tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of violence.

(ibid.)

Witness the 3rd-4th June 1989 Beijing massacre.

But as veteran Tiananmen student leader Dr Wang Dan 王丹 says in his Ph.D. thesis “A comparative study of state violence in mainland China and Taiwan in the 1950s” (Harvard University, 2008), “under totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, violence is not simply a means to maintain control. Instead, it provides an institutional support for the regime [...] Violence is effective because it creates omnipresent fears in society – fear of mutual-accusations between colleagues, fear of being watched by the secret police, and fear that personal opinions might lead to punishment. Such fears lead to self-censorship, first by individuals and then by the entire society. State violence establishes a prison in every individual's inner consciousness, and this prison is the secret to the success of the dictatorship.”\(^{36}\) With violence being an integral component of the Party-State since the Mao years, it would not be realistic to hope for an imminent change in the CCP’s approach in ruling the country.
Nevertheless, a new worrying phenomenon that is emerging recently from the opposite side of the Party-State vs. civil society divide, albeit restricted in its origin to ethnoregional peripheral nationalism – namely the increasingly violent backlash against CCP’s central authoritarian State dominance in the frontier ethnic region of Xinjiang which seems to be turning from attacking State apparatus to terrorism targeting innocent citizens – inevitably raises the question of the effectiveness of such approach in forcing changes in State policy. Table 3 shows the spate of attacks, lately increasingly on civilians, throughout China, during the first five months of 2014, all believed to be linked to Xinjiang’s ethnoregional nationalism. It has been a widely observed phenomenon that while government responds to challenges from ethnic community organizations that seek to influence public policy, “within an inverted and complementary paradigm [...] ethnic communities take shape as response to stimuli which induce a process of ethnogenesis” (Gheorghe, 1991: 842-843). Such an inverted paradigm, as shown in the lower flow line in Figure 8, wherein State policy has induced reethnicization and polarization among ethnic minorities or even ethnogenesis in places like Spain’s Andalucía or some other imagined communities, as described by Benedict Anderson (1983). This is exactly what is occurring in China’s ethnic frontier regions of Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia where the CCP central State’s repressive, uncompromising and inflexible political paradigm verging on internal colonization, coupled with massive Han demographic and economic invasion leading to resource exploitation and local cultural and environmental destruction, is pushing local resentment, reethnicization and polarization to an extreme of desperation (as reflected in the horrifying Tibetan self-immolations) or to a boiling point (as manifested in the regional unrests and Xinjiang-based cross-province terror attacks).

Xinjiang, of course, is not the only trouble spot among the ethnic regions. In mid-July 2011, for instance, over a thousand ethnic Mongolian herdsmen demonstrated against alleged government-business collusion in an ethnic Han Chinese businessman’s low-price purchase of over ten thousand mu of grazing land, according to the New York-based Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center.
Table 3 Terrorist Attacks in China in the First Five Months of 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Attack</th>
<th>Casualty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24th January</td>
<td>Xinjiang police, while dealing with terrorist incident in Xinhe County</td>
<td>6 suspects died by suicide bombing; 6 suspects killed by police; 5 suspects arrested; 1 policeman slightly injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>(新和县) were attacked with incendiaries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th February</td>
<td>Attack on police in Xinjiang’s Wushi County (乌什县).</td>
<td>3 suspects died by suicide bombing; 8 suspects killed by police; 1 suspect arrested; 2 policemen and 2 civilians injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st March</td>
<td>Knife attack on civilians in Kunming 昆明 train station, Yunnan Province.</td>
<td>29 civilians died; 143 civilians injured; 4 suspects killed by police; 4 suspects arrested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th April</td>
<td>Bomb and knife attack on civilians in Urumqi 乌鲁木齐 train station,</td>
<td>3 civilians died; 79 civilians injured; 7 suspects arrested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Xinjiang.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th May</td>
<td>Knife attack on civilians at Guangzhou 广州 station, Guangdong Province.</td>
<td>6 civilians injured; 1 suspect killed by police; 1 suspect arrested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd May</td>
<td>Car crashing and bomb attack on civilians at Urumqi’s morning market.</td>
<td>31 civilians died; 94 civilians injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 Interrelationship of Ethnic Fragmentation and State Policy

Source: Yeoh (2013b: 537), Figure 20.3.
subsequent development of the purchased land had allegedly brought in hundreds of ethnic Han workers with trucks and bulldozers whose brutal intrusion into the ethnic Mongolian village concerned had resulted in the death and injury of over a hundred livestock and the injury of over 20 herdsmen who were trying to defend their rights. Another 20 more herdsmen were injured in the thousand-strong demonstrators’ clash with the police in mid-July.\(^{41}\)

This, in fact, is not the first such incident in 2011. Earlier, on 25th May, over two thousand ethnic Mongolian students and herdsmen demonstrated in front of the government building in Xilinhot (Siliyinqota) following the death of a herdsman after being hit by coal truck on 10th May while protecting his grazing land against destruction by ethnic Han’s economic development drive that has caused increasingly acute resentment among ethnic Mongolians who see themselves as the oppressed people of Inner Mongolia, devoid of political power and falling prey to the insatiable rapacity of the Han Chinese migrants – an extension of the dominant central Han political power of the country – who are destroying their traditional economy, culture and environment. Also, in May, demonstrations erupted in the regional capital Hohhot (Kökeqota) ending with the arrest of 50 students and other citizens, and according the Southern Mongolian Information Center, by early June at least 90 students, herdsmen and other citizens had been arrested in Inner Mongolia’s demonstrations, with many students seriously injured in their clash with the police.

The herdsman’s death was not an isolated case in Inner Mongolia. There was another case occurring also around that time that involved the death of an ethnic minority young man being hit by an excavator in a fight with the miners over issues related to environmental pollution due to mining activities.\(^{42}\) The Inner Mongolia troubles came at a time when tensions were high due to that year’s approaching anniversary of the June Fourth 1989 Beijing massacre, and when this multiethnic nation\(^ {43}\) was still reeling from the shock of the 14th March 2008 Lhasa riots and the 5th July 2009 Xinjiang ethnic conflict. There are indeed many similarities between the newer incident in Inner Mongolia and the 2009 ethnic violence in Xinjiang, as shown in Table 4.\(^{44}\)
Table 4 “Mass Incidents” in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang: Comparison and Contrast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trigger</th>
<th>Inner Mongolia, 11th May 2011</th>
<th>Xinjiang, 5th July 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rights-defending herdsman killed by coal truck</td>
<td>Uighur workers killed by Han Chinese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back-ground</td>
<td>Herdsmen’s livelihood in great difficulty and poverty blamed on mining activity on their grassland</td>
<td>Poor development in Uighur areas leading to acute poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Way of protest</td>
<td>Peaceful demonstrations</td>
<td>Violent Uighur backlash killing Han Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slogan of protest</td>
<td>“Remembrance of the killed! Stop mining!”</td>
<td>“Blood for blood! Han Chinese get the hell out of Xinjiang!”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Mongolian students and herdsmen</td>
<td>Uighur youths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State response</td>
<td>Suppression with army and riot police; making arrests before situation worsened</td>
<td>Suppression with army and riot police; making arrests after conflict</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Yeoh (2011: 427), Table 11.

Hence, it can be seen that public protests in the ethnic “autonomous regions” have been growing alarmingly in recent years, though only in the case of Xinjiang’s Uyghur nationalism has an ethnic self-determination movement which is initially a legitimate protest against an authoritarian central State and the State’s collusion with capricious, exploitative ethnic Han business interests been apparently veering into terrorism against non-Uyghur innocent civilian targets. However, to advocates of nonviolent action, political violence against an authoritarian State or a dictatorship could be counter-productive:
Armed resistance, even for a just cause, can terrify people not yet committed to the struggle, making it easier for a government to justify violent repression and use of military force in the name of protecting the population. Even rioting and vandalism can turn public opinion against a movement, which is why some governments have employed agents provocateurs to encourage such violence. The use of force against unarmed resistance movements, on the other hand, usually creates greater sympathy for the government’s opponents. As with the martial art of aikido, nonviolent opposition movements can engage the force of the state’s repression and use it to effectively disarm the force directed against them.

(Zunes, 2009)

This is indeed something that the democracy movement and human rights activism in general and advocates of ethnic self-determination especially in the frontier regions need to take heed of, as evident in the world support for China’s anti-terrorism declarations after the increasing incidents of attacks on civilians by suspects with background of ethnoregional nationalism, specifically Uyghurs.

Moreover, while political violence tends to increase along with government violence, political scientists have observed the relationship between government violence and most types of political violence to appear to be curvilinear (as depicted in Figure 9), i.e. a threshold will be reached “where increased government violence coincides with a rapid decline in the collective violence of citizens” (Greene, 1990: 143). The threshold varies from case to case and depends on the intensity of the citizens’ hostility for the particular regime in question, while the cohesion of the political élite on both sides remains key to the citizens’ revolutionary potential vis-à-vis the authoritarian regime’s capacity for counter-revolutionary violence (ibid.) in a process referred to by Irwin and Faison (1978) as a “political jujutsu” in which shifts of attitude are important as well as shifts of behaviour “because both sides adjust their actions according to how they gauge their support”, as illustrated in Figure 10. On all counts, the current situation seems to be absolutely more favourable on the side of the Party-State.
Ever since the party hardliners shot down Hu Yaobang’s bold suggestion in 1980 of moving Tibet policy from what he perceived as what was then equivalent to colonialism to more satisfactory ethnic autonomy partly by allowing ethnic Tibetans to have more than absolute two-third majority in cadre proportion ("mianshui 免税、fangkai 放開、zouren 走人")\(^{47}\), government violence in the form of draconian suppression as in Xinjiang and Tibet has always been the way of the Party hitherto in dealing with unrests in the ethnic regions – an ironhanded approach that can be traced back to the Cultural Revolution brutalities including the attack on the so-called “Inner Mongolia’s February Counter-Current” (内蒙古二月逆流)\(^{48}\) and the Shadian 沙甸 massacre.\(^{49}\)
Judging from the current trend and in view of Xi Jinping's hardline approach to the escalating Xinjiang tension and the regime's continued inflexible policy towards Tibet in these remaining years of the moderate spiritual leadership of the 14th Dalai Lama (which might not last for too long) of the Tibetan government in exile, political violence looks set to escalate in these ethnic regions. However, contrary to what happened in Romania in 1989, such ethnic uprising against the authoritarian government of the CCP would not look likely to spread into the Han-dominant China proper; instead the Han majority's State-cultivated ethnocentric, xenophobic and chauvinistic patriotism and nationalism as well as the deep-seated fear of China breaking up will continue to be useful for Beijing in avoiding effective challenge to the CCP's enforced strict political monopoly in the Xi Jinping era of "benign" free-market, anti-corruption authoritarianism.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that reaction to State violence in the ethnic regions does not necessarily mean a prelude to ethnic cessation. With a common cause for liberation from the clutch of a common enemy – the authoritarian Party-State – a spark in an ethnic region could well ignite a cross-ethnic nation-wide uprising. The Romanian Revolution
that ultimately resulted in the violent overthrow and execution of longtime Romanian president Nicolae Ceauşescu and spelt the end of both the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) which, unlike other former ruling Communist parties in Eastern Europe that reconfigured themselves into social democratic or democratic socialist parties during the anti-communist “Revolutions of 1989”, just melted away in the wake of the revolution, first started in the form of a protest among the ethnic Hungarians of the city of Timişoara in the country’s ethnic Hungarian region of Transylvania in response to an attempt by the government to evict Hungarian Reformed Church pastor László Tőkés whom the government had alleged of inciting ethnic hatred after an interview of Tőkés by the Hungarian television. The ethnic Hungarian protest soon expanded into a furious backlash against harsh government crackdown and spread throughout the country. Situation went out of the regime’s control when in the capital Bucureşti (Bucharest) in the morning of 21st December 1989 the supposedly politically frightened and apathetic crowd spontaneously coalesced into a revolutionary critical mass during Ceauşescu’s speech condemning the Timişoara uprising. Such an unexpected development then led to Ceauşescu’s flight the next day and arrest and execution three days later that signaled the fall of Communist Party dictatorship in Romania. It is apparent that the fate of the Ceauşescu regime was sealed when the rolling waves of event first emanating from Timişoara began to unthinkably change the attitude of the traditionally politically frightened and apathetic “neutrals” among the masses.

2.5. Politicizing the Apathetic, Winning over Neutrals

With economic success and mesmerizing projects showcasing astounding national strength and glory to negate the desire for regime change, may it be that of the weiquan activism, Falungong resistance or the wider spectrum of the democracy movement, the CCP’s Party-State domination has continued to be stable. In view of that, ideological or institutional “attractiveness” is all the more important in the struggle against authoritarianism, as winning over uncommitted third parties (as seen above in the Romanian Revolution) is absolutely crucial for any
chances of success in NVA assertion, in a process of “political jujutsu” (Irwin and Faison, 1978) referred to earlier in which shifts of attitude and behaviour are both important because the respective support gauged by both sides would determine the adjustment in their actions. Above the “third parties” in Figure 10 are “opponents” who, from the perspective of the NVA proponents, represent potential converts especially among State-coopted intellectuals, emerging middle class, disgruntled working class but also moderates and reformers in the ruling echelons and bureaucracy, and from the point of view of the Party-State, the dejected and demoralized leaders and members of NVA who feel lost outside the country’s economic success and who are at the edge of losing conviction in the movements that they feel are increasingly becoming irrelevant in the eyes of the world while facing the continuously growing strength of the Party-State and the China it rules, just like the perceived outcast described in Salman Rushdie’s reflection in Joseph Anton: “Dead, he might even be given the respect due to a free-speech martyr. Alive, he was a dull and unpleasantly lingering pain in the neck.” (Rushdie, 2012, ppb 2013: 415)

Such tactics as described above are crucial for if “the assertive group has limited members willing to engage in concerted action and a low degree of internal organisation, while the dominant group has a strong and highly organized portion of its membership engaged in applying constraints, domination is likely to prove stable” (Vaughan and Archer, 1971: 28). However, while such variations in relative numerical and organizational strength on the two sides could significantly account for their relative degrees of success in this process of “political jujutsu”, as Vaughan and Archer caution, a parameter inevitably influencing this power interplay that has to be taken into consideration is “the alliances either group can form in order to acquire wider support for either domination or assertion” (ibid.), i.e. not only the active and passive opponents but also the “neutrals”, the uncommitted third parties, to win over as we see in the example of the Romanian Revolution, as portrayed in Figure 10. This is where “soft power”, backed by “hard power” together forming what has been called “smart power”, comes in to count. This is where the present China’s rising next-superpower status is
making the CCP’s authoritarianism continue to look unassailable. This is where the analogy between the legacy of 1989’s hundred-day mass protests and June Fourth massacre and that of Emperor Kuang-hsü 光緒’s Hundred Days’ Reform (戊戌變法 / 百日維新) of 1898 and the martyrs of the Yellow Flower Mound (黃花崗七十二烈士) of 1911 fails. The CCP today is not similar to the decrepit and ineffectual Ch’ing 清 court in its waning days; the PRC today does not resemble the “Sick Man of East Asia” (東亞病夫) at the turn of the last century. This shows how difficult it is in reality for the side of NVA to politicize the apathetic, win over the neutrals and to galvanize diverse social forces into joint action against a formidable, frighteningly ruthless one-party regime. Contemporary China is no basket-case Romania of Nicolae Ceauşescu, and there is not going to be a spark from a Chinese Timişoara to ignite a conflagration.

3. Hong Kong and the Spirit of Operation Siskin: Protecting Mainland China’s Last Corner of Free Speech and Civil Liberties

Nevertheless, there is an earlier example of how at a critical juncture in contemporary China diverse social forces were galvanized into an almost inconceivable joint action against a ruthless central State: the now legendary “Operation Siskin” or “Operation Yellowbird” (黃雀行動) in the wake of the June Fourth massacre of 1989.

Known as “Secret Passage” at an earlier stage, “Operation Siskin” was a loosely structured Hong Kong-based rescue syndicate hurriedly put together by some key members of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China (the Alliance / 香港市民支援愛國民主運動聯合會 / 支聯會), Hong Kong actors-cum-filmmakers John Shum Kin-fun 岑建勳 and Alan Tang Kwong-wing 鄧光榮 and businessman and triad boss Chan Tat-ching 陳達銘 ("Brother Six"/ 六哥) in the immediate aftermath of the June 1989 Beijing massacre. While the United States and Hong Kong’s British colonial government were undoubtedly involved in the rescue missions to various degrees and the costly and highly dangerous operations were financed mainly by Hong Kong businessmen and its underworld among other
benefactors, Operation Siskin owed much to the organizing strengthen and network of the Hong Kong underworld, mainly the smuggling triads, which successfully rescued, by one estimate, more than 300 to 400 wanted student leaders, democracy activists, scholars and writers, mainly from June to the end of 1989, but with sporadic operations lasting till June 1997, just before the “Handover” of Hong Kong to China.51

3.1. Lesson One: Operation Siskin as a Textbook Example of
Galvanizing Diverse Social Forces in Facing a Ruthless State

In an interview by the Sunday Telegraph (UK) of 18th May 2014 as the 25th anniversary of the Beijing massacre was approaching, Chan Tat-ching, now retired, gave an account of how it all began with a meeting with Alan Tang Kwong-wing and Shum Kin-fun in a hotel in Kowloon 九龍 arranged by Hong Kong activists in which he was asked whether he was willing to participate in a dangerous mission to rescue the students and he agreed and plunged into action. Chan put the final amount spent as 10 million Hong Kong dollars, mainly used to pay the speedboat operators and some to bribe mainland Chinese officials, in the incredible secret operation “that spirited at least 150 people out of China under the noses of the authorities”, according to the Sunday Telegraph.52 For the protection of lives and careers, many details including the identity of those involved have remained unrevealed. During the past two decades, most of the well-known figures in the Operation and various other possible participants53 have since passed away, including Szeto Wah 司徒華, chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China from 21st May 1989 till his passing on 2nd January 2011 and a member of the Hong Kong Legislative Council from 26th September 1985 to 12th September 2004, Alan Tang Kwong-wing, singer-actress Anita Mui Yim-fong 梅艷芳, and the Hong Kong democrat Leung Wah 梁華 whose mysterious death in neighbouring Shenzhen 深圳 was alleged by some to be the work of the Chinese security agents. While government officials in southern China appeared to be keeping an eye closed towards Operation Siskin, the rescue action which was mainly carried out in the dark nights was
still highly dangerous and in fact resulted in the death of four of Chan Tat-ching’s operatives during rescue action and three others being arrested by Chinese police.54 According to Lee Cheuk-yan 李卓人, current chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China, the French Consulate provided the major assistance in issuing about a hundred visas to the fugitives even without approval from Paris.55

3.2. Lesson Two: Urgency in Guarding and Supporting Hong Kong as the Last Corner of Mainland China where Political Freedom Is Still Possible

While Operation Siskin represents a brazen joint effort of a response at a critical juncture in the yesteryears which is slowly fading into oblivion in collective memory, Hong Kong continues to stand proud in the Greater China area – just like China’s “renegade province” across the Taiwan Strait today with a vibrant liberal democratic political system and a free and decent civil society brimming with vim and vigour – with her uniqueness in being the only corner of China under PRC’s jurisdiction where large-scale public demonstrations against China’s one-party authoritarianism are still possible. This is manifest in the annual large-scale remembrance of the 4th June 1989 Beijing massacre and the annual “Handover” anniversary demonstrations – in which from 150,000 to over 510,000 Hong Kong people56 took to the streets upon this year’s 17th anniversary on 1st July 2014, just after about 22 per cent (787,767 in number) of Hong Kong’s registered voters in an unofficial referendum organized by the pro-democracy activist group Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) voted for full democracy and free elections for the city’s next leader.57 These are besides other specific demonstrations like that in 201258, the year of the suspicious “suicide” (or “being suicided”/bei zisha 被自杀?) of Li Wangyang, in defense of freedom and democracy, protesting against “party-official-business collusion” and calling for a thorough investigation of Li Wangyang’s cause of death, as well as gatherings and demonstrations against the CCP regime’s encroachment into the enclave’s political and civil liberty, e.g.
its introduction in 2012 of “brainwashing” curriculum into the Special Administrative Zone’s education institutional framework. “We have the freedoms we fight for, and we lose those we don’t defend.” (Rushdie, 2012, ppb 2013: 528) It is heartening to see that this is a point still well understood by the Hong Kong society, almost two decades after the “Handover”.

The “brainwashing” curriculum encroachment, nevertheless, is but just part of the long-running, on-going process of consolidating China’s hegemony in the local Hong Kong society through the former’s United Front Work which includes, according to Lam and Lam (2013), “the soft tactics of integration, cooptation and collaboration, as well as the hard tactics of containment and denunciation”. Lam and Lam summarize China’s treatment of different political players in post-“Handover” Hong Kong – through “education, persuasion, threats and inducement” and in the case of denunciation, outright political exclusion – in terms of integration (developing common instrumental interests as well as “common wills and feelings”) and cooptation (with Chinese Communist agents actively and selectively recruiting and appointing “supporters to political institutions and power positions, so that alternative views of its supporters can be put in line with those of the Chinese authorities”) in dealing with the majority and supporters; collaboration (ensuring “that the targets do not join force with the opposition, whether or not they explicitly support Beijing”) targeting the moderate, wavering middle; and containment (with Chinese Communist agents checking the democrats’ expansion or influence and fragmenting the opposition camp to neutralize its influence) and denunciation (with China publicly condemning and accusing, outright rejecting and verbally threatening the democrats and refusing to communicate with them in order to “halt their influence immediately and permanently”) excluding or constraining the influence of enemies (ibid.: 306-307). For a diagrammatic depiction of such strategic moves by the Party-State, see the right panel of Figure 10.

Within such an atmosphere overshadowed by China’s United Front Work, a question presents itself, as Yeung (2013: 163) asks: should Hong Kong’s chief executive “be a political leader, in its full sense, or just an administrator?” Yeung then gives his take on this regarding Donald
Tsang, Hong Kong’s second chief executive (2005-2012):

That Tsang saw his appointment as a job he would strive to get it done is widely seen as indicative of the mind-set of civil servants [...] His “boss-servant” mind-set has been manifested in his body language when he met with mainland Chinese officials and leaders in Beijing. Television news footage of him listening attentively and taking down notes carefully on what state leaders such as President Hu Jintao had to say has reinforced the public perception of him being a loyal servant. It is also open secret that he had addressed to the former Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office Director Liao Hui as “laoban”, or boss, when they met although they enjoyed a similar rank in the Chinese hierarchy.

(ibid.: 163-164)

The sad implication of this situation is that, sighs Yeung,

The excessive show of humbleness of Tsang when dealing with Beijing officials has weakened his role and position as a champion of the interest of Hong Kong people when it comes to issues such as democratic development where the city and the central government do not see eye to eye.

(ibid.: 164)

It is against such backdrop that the spirit of the Hong Kong people in fighting for their rights and freedom has come out to be so noble. Upon the 25th anniversary of June Fourth, while looking back at that critical juncture in 1989, the passing of Hong Kong’s democrat stalwart Szeto Wah on 2nd January 2011 seemed to signal the closing of a chapter on the memory of the valiant Siskin Operation of the yesteryears. Yet the spirit of Szeto Wah and of Operation Siskin live on. Seventeen years after “Handover” and a quarter century after the launching of the almost inconceivable Operation Siskin, the Hong Kong people have not only persisted in standing up for their rights and freedom but also continued to hold on to their fight for justice and freedom for all China with vim and vigour in this last corner of the country where speaking one’s mind is still possible – the latest gesture in this regard being the setting up of the world’s first permanent June 4th
Located in a commercial building in Hong Kong’s Tsim Sha Tsui district in Kowloon, the 70-ft² museum sponsored by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China during its launching on 26th April 2014 was met with confrontation from pro-Beijing organizations and threat of legal action from the building’s owner while other occupants of the same building want the museum shut down, citing safety concerns – actions which the museum's backers believe are being orchestrated by CCP officials. Undaunted by such threats, Szeto Wah’s successor Lee Cheuk-yan, the current chairman of the Alliance, said that among the groups of visitors to the museum were Hong Kong students and mainland Chinese tourists, in line with the purpose of establishing the museum, i.e. to break through the information blockade and memory wipe-out and distortion imposed by the Chinese government over this quarter century, to remind people what really happened in 1989 in order to urge on the struggle for a liberal democratic China.

Yet the prospects could be grim. Just shortly after the 6,500-person rally organized by Hong Kong journalist in February 2014 to decry against increasing levels of coercion against the Hong Kong press and the candlelight vigil on 4th June 2014 in Victoria Park to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the 3rd-4th June 1989 Beijing massacre which was attended by 100,000 to over 180,000 people, on 10th June the CCP government released an unprecedented, alarming 14,500-word White Paper – which was described by Hong Kong’s pro-democracy advocates as “sending a shiver up the spine” and representing a sea-change to their understanding of what “one country, two systems” should be – affirming Beijing’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong and stating that Hong Kong must be run by “patriotic” people of Hong Kong, as stated in item 3 (“The Hong Kong People Who Govern Hong Kong Should Above All Be Patriotic”) under section V:

There are lines and criteria to be observed in implementing “Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong,” that is what Deng Xiaoping stressed, Hong Kong must be governed by the Hong Kong people with patriots as the mainstay, as loyalty to one’s country is the
minimum political ethic for political figures [...] In a word, loving the country is the basic political requirement for Hong Kong’s administrators. If they are not consisted of by patriots as the mainstay or they cannot be loyal to the country and the HKSAR, the practice of “one country, two systems” in the HKSAR will deviate from its right direction, making it difficult to uphold the country’s sovereignty, security and development interests, and putting Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity and the wellbeing of its people in serious jeopardy.63

There is nothing strange for this White Paper issued by the State Council in emphasizing patriotism, but the catch is: in the befuddled realm of the CCP State = China = Chinese people cognition of the one-party monopoly of her Beijing overlord, what is being asked of the Hong Kong people is not just patriotism towards China as a nation, but also loyalty to the CCP who has continued to stifle dissent and deny citizens’ free political choice with brutal coercion while justifying itself with economic achievements as the only rightful political party to have absolute, effective rule over the country in perpetuity.

4. Top-Down Political Change Is a Real Possibility, but Unfortunately Not around the Corner

For an authoritarian country like China, William Dobson, author of The dictator’s learning curve (2012) was rather pessimistic about the prospect of huge revolutionary change in the short and medium term.64 As organization, preparation and good understanding of the authoritarian regime are absolutely essential to bring down an authoritarian regime, we have already seen that China’s (exiled) democracy movement as a whole is desperately weak in these aspects, and the symbiosis depicted in Figure 1 earlier (or Figure 6 in the case of the weiquan activism) is at best an unbalanced one or worse one characterized by the almost absolute domination of the Party-State vis-à-vis the NVA whose survival very much counts upon the State’s willing tolerance for diplomatic goodwill and pretension of progress in human rights.

Would changes come as top-down in the PRC? Dobson sees no encouraging sign that the CCP is seriously working on that, for the
current priority of the Party seems to be a single-mindedness in strengthening and protecting its one-party political control. Referring to the view that the first 30 years of the PRC were spent on Mao’s “class struggle” and “perpetual revolution”, the second 30 years on economic development, and the third 30 years would be on how to achieve good governance, Dobson indeed sees the possibility of a top-down transformation, but as the country is now in the very early stage of the third 30 years, future development is very uncertain and very much depends on how the CCP would view the whole process of change.\textsuperscript{65}

**4.1. Opportunity Missed for Top-Down Political Reform**

Besides that of the Tiananmen crackdown, the year 2014 also sees the 25th anniversary of the passing of Hu Yaobang, the late reformist chairman and general secretary of the CCP purged by Deng Xiaoping and other Party elders in 1987 for being too tolerant of the wave of their perceived threat of “bourgeois liberalization” among intellectuals in the late 1980s. Hu’s passing away on 15th April 1989 triggered the student protests in Tiananmen Square that eventually led to the June Fourth massacre that shook the world. Hu Dehua 胡德华, the third child of Hu Yaobang, in a recent interview by Hong Kong’s *South China Morning Post*, lamented the lack of political reform and press freedom in China and regretted that, with the purge of his father (who had ironically been highly respected both in and outside of the Party for executing the reversal of the internal Party purges of the Mao years, including the rehabilitation of Xi Zhongxun 习仲勋, the current president Xi Jinping’s father), China lost the opportunity for political reform in the 1980s, given that Hu Yaobang who believed in the need for simultaneous political and economic reform had planned in 1986 for the launching of the news and publication freedom laws which were scuttled by the Party after he was purged a year later.\textsuperscript{66} “Reforms have their specific windows in history,” lamented Hu Dehua, “Once missed, how do we know when will the next window arrive?” Being the first step and the most fundamental legislation in political reform, press and speech freedom laws’ dismissal 27 years ago meant that such legal protection of Chinese citizens’ basic rights might just forever remain an unattainable dream.
How ironical this renders Xi Jinping’s talk of a “China Dream”? Just a dream of the glory of China standing tall among nations, a China continued be under the iron grip of a CCP intolerant of all political competition and dissent, a China in which the dream of her citizens for the freedom of speech and political choice continues to be trampled and quashed as the errant ways of “bourgeois liberalization” seen as but a curtain raiser for the concerted effort on the part of the enemies of the State to eventually bring about the grim scenario of a “Peaceful Evolution” (à la John Foster Dulles).67

Among the legacies of Hu Yaobang, Hu Dehua was proudest of his father’s promotion of democracy and rule of law, staunch principled objection to rule by repression, rehabilitation of victims of Mao’s political campaigns, ending of discrimination against the so-called “black five types” (hei wu lei 黑五类) and other political enemies and abolition of the practice of individual’s class entry in the filling up of government forms, thus for the first time giving PRC’s citizens freedom from fear. As the University of Science and Technology Beijing (北京科技大学) professor Zhao Xiao 赵晓 sums up in an essay posted on the Internet on 14th April, Hu Yaobang had repeatedly proclaimed his remonstration: “How could it be possible for an unfree people, shackled and repressed spiritually and in organization, to freely compete with the world’s developed nations?”68 After the purge of Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳 – who became the Party’s general secretary and first vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission – at the 13th Party Congress in October 1987 proposed the one and only political reform package in the history of the Chinese Communist Party which attempted to introduce reforms such as the separation of powers between Party and State (Zhao, 2009a: 286; 2009b: 315; 2009c: 364)69. Zhao passed away in 2005, being under house arrest for sixteen long years until his death for his refusal to repent his decision to oppose the 1989 Beijing-Tiananmen crackdown and to urge for the accommodation of the hunger-striking students’ demands. In his letter to the 15th Party Congress in 1997 during his house arrest, Zhao lamented the halting of the political reform he initiated: “Because of the impact of the [Tiananmen] incident, the political reform initiated by the 13th Party Congress died young and
in midstream, leaving the reform of the political system lagging seriously behind. As a result of this serious situation, while our country’s economic reform has made substantial progress, all sorts of social defects have emerged and developed and are rapidly spreading. Social conflicts have worsened, and corruption within and outside of the Party is proliferating and has become unstoppable.” (Zhao, 2009a: 79; 2009b: 97; 2009c: 112)

The tragedy of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, the two rare embodiments of the “conscience of China” from within the CCP’s ruling politburo, reflected a recurrence of the fate of the Hundred Days’ Reform of 1898. Hu and Zhao are the 1980s’ version of Emperor Kuang-hsu70, their think tankers like Yan Jiaqi and Bao Tong 鲍彤 are the new K’ang Yu-wei71 康有为 and Liang Ch’i-ch’ao72 梁啟超, Deng Xiaoping Deng Xiaoping the butcher of Beijing is Empress Dowager Tz’u-hsi73 (慈禧太后) resurrected, and the violently suppressed students of Tiananmen Square and the valiant people of Beijing who stood up to give their lives in protecting the students and the cause they championed are the new martyrs of the Yellow Flower Mound. It would be natural to move forward with this analogy to equate the CCP with the Manchu imperial court of the Ch’ing Dynasty (满清) on the wane in the early 1900s, but the fact would then be flying in the face of such generalization, for the CCP of today is nothing like the Ch’ing court of the early 1900s in a China that was decadent, poor and backward and humiliated internationally, ripe for a revolution to break out.

As Samuel Huntington points out, “modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability” (Huntington, 1968: 41)74, admittedly thirty years of economic reform, by bringing about a sea change in economic life and rule of game, has unleashed forces and momenta – whether in March-June 1989 in Beijing (as depicted in Figure 11), March 2008 in Tibet or July 2009 in Xinjiang, whether with or without an ethnoregional content – that had caught the ruling establishment by surprise and overtaken its ability to catch up and understand and to effectively accommodate. On the conception of revolution as a process, it has been observed that “conditions which produce a revolution are no
different in principle from those that produce a smaller or even an unsuccessful protest movement.” (Geschwender, 1968: 128) Raised expectation of what is now perceived to be possible has fuelled the passion for speedier targeted change and in the context of ethnicity or ethnoterritoriality brought back the long-suppressed ghost of identity investment which the ruling establishment could be ill-prepared to
accommodate. However, whether they be the 1989 anti-corruption-turned-pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing or the 14th March 2008 riots in Tibet or the 5th July 2009 riots in Xinjiang (which precipitated the rising terrorist attacks of the subsequent years), they were at best one-off and did not spell the doom of CCP’s rule, much unlike how the Empress Dowager Tz’u-hsi and her conservative Manchu aristocrats’ suppression of Emperor Kuang-hsü’s organic reform campaign had precipitated Sun Yat-sen’s revolution that completely overthrew the Ch’ing monarchy – due to a host of developmental factor variations resulting in (see Figure 12):

[…] a curvilinear relationship between revolutionary potential and economic development or – in all its social and political ramifications – “modernization.” […] Revolutionary potential is low in traditional societies because of the low incidence of economic change that consequently exerts minimal pressures for adaptation on established political and social institutions. Revolutionary potential increases with the development of a market economy in agricultural production, with urbanization and industrialization, and according to the rate of economic change, the extent of foreign control, and the coincidence of the developmental crises associated with modernity. Revolutionary potential then declines as new authority patterns, welfare institutions, and the social norms related to modernization are firmly established at an advanced stage of economic development.

(Greene, 1990: 166)

Similarly, in their work “Modernization: Theories and facts” (1997), Przeworski and Limongi contended that an increase in economic modernization, and thus an increase in the per capita income of a country increases the possibility of a democratic transition to occur, but only until the per capita income of the said country reaches US$6000. Above that level, authoritarian governments grow stronger and the possibility of the country’s democratic transition becomes weaker as per capita income increases. To put that plainly, the American political theorist Robert Kagan argues that, contrary to the prediction of the “modernization theory” that economic modernization, liberalization and prosperity would propel political liberalization too, the richer a country
4.2. The Retreat of NVA Assertion and Lack of Urgency for Party-State To Compromise

Facing a strong, ruthless regime, there is a prevailing view of acquiescing to a “democracy, Chinese style” and of giving up challenge against the CCP regime, and talk of letting the increasingly “catch-all”

Source: Greene (1990: 167), Figure 11-1.

gets “the easier it may be for autocrats to hold on to power. More money keeps the bourgeoisie content and lets the government round up the few discontented who reveal their feelings on the Internet.” (Kagan, 2008, cited in Chu, 2013: 81)
CCP to take its time to move along its “intra-party democracy” path to eventually evolve into popular democracy for the country. However, Nobel Peace Prize nominee Professor Gene Sharp warns us that when fundamental issues such as those related to human freedom or the whole future development of the society are at stake, “negotiations do not provide a way of reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. On some basic issues there should be no compromise. Only a shift in power relations in favor of the democrats can adequately safeguard the basic issues at stake. Such a shift will occur through struggle, not negotiations [...] The point here is that negotiations are not a realistic way to remove a strong dictatorship in the absence of a powerful democratic opposition.” (Sharp, 2010: 10)\(^7\) This is not to say that an authoritarian regime as strong as the present CCP would actually negotiate in any realistic way with its political opponents, including those in the country’s restive frontier regions whose desperation is recently increasingly translating into terror action striking the China proper – witness the latest Kunming, Beijing, Urumqi and Guangzhou attacks. “Negotiations, of course, may not be an option at all”, Sharp remarks, “Firmly entrenched dictators who feel secure in their position may refuse to negotiate with their democratic opponents.” (ibid.)

Even if the all-powerful authoritarian regime is willing to embark on a certain extent of democratization at its own pace in a best-case scenario for the democracy advocates, as Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986) opine, while a transition from authoritarian rule could probably produce a democracy, it could also terminate with a liberalized authoritarian regime (dictablanda) or a restrictive, illiberal democracy (democradura) (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 9)\(^7\). While shadows of the remnants of her ghostly past still linger to haunt the one-party State, there are already telling signs that the continuing transformation from a dictadura (dictatorship) into a dictablanda leading further to a highly restrictive democradura in the near future is the most possible direction the CCP regime is heading to and indeed planning to head to, given the fact that the Western, “bourgeois liberal” multi-party competitive electoral democracy (democracia), together with its notion of separation of powers, has already been ruled out of the cards, or at
least not until mid-2000s. In fact, following Professor Zhou Tianyong from the Central Party School, China’s authoritarian one-party political system will and should remain unchanged until at least 2037 (Zhou, Wang and Wang (eds), 2007: 2, 6, 45-46). This is in line with what Deng Xiaoping stated in 1987, that direct general elections could only be held after half a century had passed in the 2000s, and at the moment the country had to make do with indirect elections above the county level and direct elections only at county and below county level, given the colossal population and inadequate level of cultural quality of the people (Hu, Hu, He and Guo, 2009: 19-20).

4.3. Top-Down or Bottom-Up: It Could Be a Long Way To Go

Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國 has often been referred to as the best dictator China has ever have (at least for those who are not bent on severing completely the history of Taiwan, Republic of China, from the overall history of China) for his willingness to end the authoritarianism of Kuomintang and bring multi-party competitive liberal democracy to Taiwan. In short, a top-down political institutional change. Such a change, as has occurred in the former Soviet Union, in Taiwan, in the Republic of Korea, could yet happen in China, though the process could be slow, given the present national economic and military strength which would make such top-down fundamental change seem less urgent. Yet one could be overestimating the CCP regime’s staying power and underestimating its inherent weaknesses. Just look at the surprising level of jitteriness of the regime in late 2012 as the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China ( 中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会 ) was approaching, just look at how a government ruthless as such could virtually tremble at its citizens holding a flower in the street, how a government could basically declare a war on a flower or on words like “democracy”, “freedom” and “human rights” on the Internet – one can then realize to what extent a government’s lack of self-confidence could be, and to what extent a government could see in every person in the street a potential agent of subversion.

Nevertheless, taking note of the hypothesis that a society’s revolutionary potential is directly related to the severity of military
defeat, economic crisis and fragmentation of the ruling élite but inversely related to the regime’s political legitimacy (Greene, 1990: 150), without any impending national economic crisis, military defeat or internal political struggle severe enough to destroy CCP’s ruling echelon from within and with no sign of the weakening of the State’s will and machinery to suppress those who dare to challenge CCP’s self-justified legitimacy to rule without being elected to do so, the Party’s rule looks set to continue to stay strong. Political democratization of China is destined to be long in coming. Ironically, China’s present consensus-based collective leadership, while supposed to prevent the rise of another disastrously strong leader like Mao Zedong, will count against quick democratization too. Counting on a benevolent strong man (China’s millennia-long notion of a mingjun) might sound ridiculous in other parts of this modern world, but ironically at least a Chinese Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev who is strong enough to push for real political reforms might just come in handy.

In a recent interview by Voice of America just prior to this year’s June Fourth anniversary, Wang Dan, who holds both a Master’s degree in East Asian history (2001) and a Ph.D. (2008) from Harvard University, was asked the hypothetical question of what he would tell or wish to tell President Xi Jinping’s daughter Xi Mingze 习明泽 who is presently studying at Harvard if he happened to meet the latter. After expressing his lack of personal interest in Xi Mingze, Wang Dan said that, nevertheless, since her father was Xi Jinping, he would hope that she would talk properly to her father about the importance of democracy to the feeling of honour and pride of every Chinese. If Xi Jinping considered himself a Chinese, he should hope that China would be more democratic, and as the daughter of Xi Jinping and also feeling the honour of being a Chinese, added Wang Dan, Xi Mingze should persuade her father not to continue obstructing the tide of history. This would be the only way to enable every Chinese, including Xi Mingze herself, to have the true honour and pride of being a Chinese.80

Such hope for a closet Gorbachev who could be persuaded to eventually come out to do what is right when the time is ripe (or when the older and more conservative members of the politburo have retired)
is real. Without economic crisis, without military defeat, any discretionary decision to move away from the current one-party authoritarianism towards multi-party competitive liberal democracy could well be coming from a strong man’s personal political will. Contrary to all hopes and dreams of the democracy movement, such political reforms would most likely not be bottom-up because the objective urgency for such changes simply does not exist at the moment in this rising superpower whose economic (and military) power advancement continues to be the object of both envy and apprehension of the world. In a country full of unprecedented hope of prosperity under a ruling Party that is ruthlessly protective of its absolute, unassailable political monopoly, yet executively efficient and currently even showing good political will in bringing corruption down to a tolerable level, why should the people at large risk chaos and bloodshed in fighting for a liberal democratic dream that has been seen to turn sour in Russia, Thailand, the Philippines, the Arab world, and even India? Why would the masses still not be contented with this, as Aldous Huxley calls it in his 1946 foreword to *Brave New World* (1932), “welfare-tyranny of Utopia” – a totalitarianism “called into existence by the social chaos […] and developing, under the need for efficiency and stability”? “You pays your money and takes your choice”, shrugs Huxley, metaphorically.\(^{81}\)

However, ultimately, so long as Mao’s portrait is still hanging high on Tiananmen, where is the hope for China’s political liberalization? Until the perpetrator of some of worst horrors of China’s long torturous history is final taken down from the altar and the Party through which such horrors were being perpetrated is finally prepared to face the verdict of the people through electoral choice, all talks of a “China Dream”, of a China standing proud among the modern nations would forever ring hollow, for a mark of infamy continues to hover over the empty pride maintained by brutal internal repression on dissent, trampling on human rights, and self-justified monopoly of political power by naked coercion. Meanwhile, in a new take on Bertrand Russell’s analogy between Judeo-Christian eschatology and Marxist socialism – Dialectical Materialism = Yahweh, Marx = the Messiah, Proletariat = the Elect, Communist Party = Church, the Communist
Revolution = the Second Coming, Punishment of the Capitalists = Hell, and the Communist Commonwealth = the Millennium (Russell, 1946) – this is all that is being asked of the masses of today’s PRC: to be contented with the “China Dream” wherein Mao remains in the messianic pantheon; a rejuvenated, increasingly catch-all and technocratic Communist Party continues to be the umbrella Church to all societal groups religious or otherwise; and a CCP-ruled, stability-above-all-else, high-growth economic and military leviathan constitutes the centre of the imminent Pax Sinica, or to the ever unrepentant devil’s advocate at least “a spectacular vision of a happy hell” (Ryan, 1988).

5. Structure of the Volume

Following this editor’s introduction, this IJCS special issue of June Fourth at 25: The quarter-century legacy of Tiananmen consists of eight articles preceded by a special commentary from Merle Goldman, and closes with a review of the 2014 edition of Philip J. Cunningham’s Tiananmen moon: Inside the Chinese student uprising of 1989 (2010).

In her special commentary for this issue, “The reemergence of public intellectuals in late Twentieth-Century China: Reflections on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Tiananmen”, Merle Goldman traces the development of intellectual dissent in the People’s Republic of China from Mao Zedong’s totalitarian rule through the authoritarian administrations of Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao, bringing into focus, the ebb and flow of the plight of dissidents, the uneasy co-existence of pluralistic discourse and openness to foreign ideas and continued tight surveillance and purges and persecution of dissenting intellectuals, including Liu Xiaobo, the key founder of Charter 08. Nevertheless, Goldman notes that while persecution of dissident public intellectuals continues even after the country’s transition from a totalitarian to an authoritarian polity, the rule of the CCP is today admittedly less repressive than during the Mao era, and together with China’s increasing participation in the international community, making it possible for intellectuals to speak out periodically and publicly on political issues, with an impact beyond their immediate
Following the editor’s introduction and the special commentary are eight articles which, opened with Arif Dirlik’s haunting epigraph of Murong Xuecun’s personal reflection upon the State’s lens on the “tank man” of Tiananmen84, focus from various perspectives on the quarter-century legacy of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and fatal June Fourth crackdown, with the exception of two, namely Guy de Jonquières’s article “The problematic politics of China’s economic reform plans” which concentrates on the politics of the latest economic reform programme under the new Xi Jinping administration and Roy Anthony Rogers’s “Xinjiang in the aftermath of Tiananmen: Prospects for development and challenges for the new administration” on the PRC’s perennial Xinjiang dilemma. While de Jonquières critically points out the central State’s fundamental paradox created by maintaining the right to exercise unfettered power over every aspect of Chinese society, as the raison d’être of the CCP, while simultaneously seeking to free up the economy by expanding the role of markets, Rogers brings to our attention another paradox, here related to ethnoterritorialism in one of China’s most restive ethnic frontier regions, wherein granting greater autonomy will not receive much appreciation but rather create more demands for political and ethnic autonomy – “a terrible paradox the Chinese have created for themselves”85 – and higher level of education and higher socioeconomic status among the Uyghurs may not ensure the dampening of the Uyghurs’ desire of seeking independence for Xinjiang86.

Among the other six articles in this special issue, contemplating China’s political future by reviewing the grim post-Tiananmen period in terms of political rights and civil liberties of the citizens of PRC are Arif Dirlik’s article “June Fourth at 25: Forget Tiananmen, you don’t want to hurt the Chinese people’s feelings – and miss out on the business of the new ‘New China’!” and Joseph Yu-shek Cheng’s “Whither China and the Communist Party regime? – Reflections on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Tiananmen incident”. Also portentous are Dirlik’s piercing observation of foreign complicity in the CCP State-enforced “forgetting” of Tiananmen and Cheng’s highlighting the liberals’

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disappointment with Xi Jinping who looks keener on following the example of Vladimir Putin rather than that of Mikhail Gorbachev, including Xi’s ostentatious exploitation of “forever holding aloft the flag of Mao Zedong Thought” to enhance his own administration’s legitimacy. The reason for Xi’s tolerance for the neo-Maoists could probably be found in Bo Xilai 薄熙来’s failed challenge, riding the crest of the popularity of his alternate platform of “Chongqing model” ( 重庆模式 ), against the central leadership which serves, despite the fall of Bo, to reveal the depth of popular resentment against social injustice and official corruption – sentiment well reflected in the results of a survey conducted by the Renmin Luntan 人民论坛 [people’s forum] magazine at the end of 2009 widely circulated among the micro-blogs in China. Soon after the exposure of the Bo Xilai incident, according to Cheng. The “enforced forgetting” of Tiananmen, on the other hand, which involves exacting “pain and punishment for remembering”, in service of the “combined pressures of business interest and the ideology of globalization” has been aided in the West, notes Dirlik, by a “reductive multi-culturalism [which] demands that “the other” must be respected – no matter how despicable.” Looking at how educational institutions, including those in the U.S., will more than likely view Tiananmen “as a nuisance dragged out of the past”, it is noteworthy, says Dirlik, that Hong Kong, as reflected in her academic publications and press, will remember the tragedy. Indeed, attended by a truly impressive number of 100,000 to over 180,000 people was the commemorative gathering this year upon the 25th anniversary of June Fourth that was held in Victoria Park on the night of 4th June 2014, whose poignant image of over a hundred thousand candles burning in vigil of those slain in the brutal repression two and a half decades ago makes the cover of this special issue.

Also highlighting the role of “pragmatic Western political and economic elites” in the PRC’s “powerful memory politics” over the June 1989 massacre and the continuing silence over the country’s human rights issues in the environment of “a slow convergence of logics of authoritarian power in global politics” is Johan Lagerkvist’s article “The legacy of the 1989 Beijing massacre: Establishing neo-authoritarian rule,
silencing civil society” – the Western élites to whom the benefits are paramount in cooperating with PRC’s authoritarian capitalism and neo-authoritarianism which are serving to win back the Party-State’s legitimacy through impressive economic growth and selective appropriation of the 1989 student movements’ discourse on corruption, as well as appealing to State-sponsored Chinese nationalism. Focusing on the issue of CCP’s quest for legitimacy, though from an different angle, is the subsequent article, “Revisiting the role of the media in the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimation strategy in post-Tiananmen China: Case study of News Corporation” by Chin-fu Hung and Stuart Dingle which uses the case of the News Corporation’s repeated failure to gain entry into the Chinese market to examine the central position of the media in the CCP Party-State’s post-Tiananmen strategy for regime legitimation. Ensuring tight control of the media sector is a core requirement for CCP’s maintaining control of the population’s ideological lens, observe Hung and Dingle, for allowing the development of an open media would place pressure on CCP’s strategy of legitimation via the ideological framework it has promulgated domestically that attributes socioeconomic progress to the ruling party’s monopoly over political power.

Harking back to Arif Dirlik’s article that emphasizes a global context earlier in the special issue are the last two papers of the volume: Barış Yörümez’s “Old question revisited: Towards a holistic understanding of 1989” which argues against the academic disentanglement between Chinese and Eastern European revolutions of 1989, and Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh’s “The quarter-century legacy of June Fourth: Prospects and challenges in the struggle of post-1989 dissent and nonviolent action in the People’s Republic of China” that analyses the conflict and reluctant symbiosis across the unfortunate State-society divide, assesses the tribulations and prospects of contemporary Chinese dissent and NVA, and ponders how the struggle of this one fifth of humanity for political rights and civil liberties could be understood in a more global, long-term context, especially in view of the PRC’s increasingly assertive foreign policy manifestation and the momentous global reach of her awe-inspiring economic influence and controversial
“soft power” assertion. Finally, closing this special issue of the *International Journal of China Studies* is Monir Hossain Moni’s review of the 2014 edition of the book *Tiananmen moon: Inside the Chinese student uprising of 1989* by Philip J. Cunningham (2010). This June/August 2014 issue of IJCS is slightly longer than a usual issue for, as a special thematic issue, more leeway has been given to the papers in terms of length, paying heed to Aldous Huxley’s concern that sometimes brevity might not do justice to all the facts of a complex situation.

Before ending this introduction, I would like to thank all the contributing authors and paper reviewers for their invaluable efforts in making the publication of this 2014 *IJCS* special issue of *June Fourth at 25: The quarter-century legacy of Tiananmen* possible. I am also grateful to the journal’s administrative and webpage officer Miss Susie Yieng-Ping Ling and administrative assistants Miss Geeta Gengatharan and Miss Nazirah Hamzah for webpage, printing and distribution arrangements, and Miss Si-Ning Yeoh for her technical help with image-editing and DTP softwares. The responsibility for any errors and inadequacies that remain is of course fully mine.

**Notes**

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4. Or paraphrasing *Yazhou Zhoukan*, “the hundred days of People Power that made one proud to be a Chinese” (“Preface”, 亞洲週刊 (*Yazhou Zhoukan*), Chingt’ientungti te ipai jih 驚天動地的一百日 [a hundred days that shook heaven and earth], Hong Kong, 1989, p. 4).

5. Tiananmen 天安门, i.e. Tian'an Gate (gate of heavenly peace).


7. *Yazhou Zhoukan* 亞洲週刊 (1989), Chingt’ientungti te ipai jih 驚天動地的一百日 [a hundred days that shook heaven and earth]. Hong Kong, p. 80.


10. *ODN*, 19th August 2011. ( 东方日报 / Oriental Daily News / ODN is a Malaysian daily in Chinese, with China news sources mainly from the Hong Kong and Taiwan media.)

11. Or officially the “Communist Party of China” (CPC, 中国共产党).

12. An unknown protester some had identified later, though unconfirmed, as a young man named Wang Weilin 王维林, whose fate remains unknown to date.

13. Pablo Diego José Francisco de Paula Juan Nepomuceno María de los Remedios Cipriano de la Santísima Trinidad Ruiz y Picasso (25th October 1881 – 8th April 1973). *Guernica* (1937), arguably Picasso’s most famous work, is his portrayal of the German bombing of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War.

14. Usually translated as “Blood-stained glory” but literally “Blood-stained elegance”, a song written in 1987 originally to commemorate those who died during the Sino-Vietnamese War, the melancholic tune came to be a
hymn to the determined but forlorn struggle of the hunger strikers during the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.


17. Formed by Wei Jingsheng, the grand avant-garde of post-Cultural Revolution Chinese democracy activism exiled in 1997.


19. Tenzin Gyatso is the 14th Dalai Lama, who was born Lhamo Dondrub on 6th July 1935. “Tenzin Gyatso” is the shortened form of the religious name “Jetsun Jamphel Ngawang Lobsang Yeshe Tenzin Gyatso”.

20. Leading intellectual dissident activist from the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and hunger strikes to Charter 08 – for which he was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment – Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 8th October 2010 but was unable to receive it as he was serving his 11-year sentence. He received his Ph.D. from the Beijing Normal University in 1988 with his thesis “Shenmei yu ren de ziyou [aesthetics and human freedom].

21. Meaning in addition to the pursuit of the “Four Modernizations” of China’s agricultural, industrial, national defense and science sectors declared by Deng Xiaoping at that time.

22. ODN, 4th June 2012, 7th June 2012, 8th June 2012, 9th June 2012, 10th June 2012; 11th June 2012; 13th June 2012; Bajiu Yidai Tongxun 八九一代通讯 [89 generation bulletin], Issue 2, 30th May, 2012; “关于要求严肃调查李旺阳死亡真相的紧急呼吁 / Urgent appeal for credible investigation into the truth of Li Wangyang’s death”, initiated by journalist and human rights activist Bei Feng 北风 (Wen Yunchao 温云超), then Peking University’s economics professor Xia Yeliang 夏业良 and scholar of historic documentation (US) Wu Renhua 吴仁华, 6th June 2012 <http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2012/06/201206070601.shtml>.

23. Zha Weilin was a member of the Mothers of Tiananmen group led by Professor Ding Zilin 丁子霖 whose son, like the children of all other members, was killed by the PLA during the June Fourth massacre. After 23 years of fighting for justice on behalf of his younger son Zha Aiguo 贾爱
who was shot dead by the PLA in the night of 3rd June during the crackdown and suffering from repeated police threats and surveillance, Zha Weilin left home and was found to have hanged himself in a yet-to-open underground car park on 25th May 2012 at the age of 73. The police cordoned off the area, took away his body and had it cremated on 27th May. Zha’s wife and elder son said that they had persuaded Zha not to kill himself, after finding sometime earlier a suicide note in which Zha had written his name and work unit and stated his decision to fight for justice with death after more than two decades of petitioning the government in vain. In its obituary for Zha, the Mothers of Tiananmen group strongly condemned the government’s inhumanity and urged it to immediately return the suicide note, which had been presumably confiscated by the police, to Zha’s family. (ODN, 29th May 2012; “Tiananmen Muqin qunti fugao 天安门母亲群体讣告” [obituary by Mothers of Tiananmen], 27th May 2012, from Mothers of Tiananmen (天安门母亲群体), posted by Ding Zilin (see Bajiu Yidai Tongxun 八九一代通讯 [89 generation bulletin], Issue 2, 30th May, 2012).

24. Besides Zha Weilin who killed himself just before the massacre’s 23rd anniversary and Li Wangyang who was suspected of “being suicided” immediately after, Fang Zheng 方政 who went on stage on his wheelchair during the Victoria Park commemoration that year in Hong Kong which was attended by the largest number ever of 180,000 people also stands to represent a poignant living proof of State cruelty and hypocrisy. A student of the Beijing Academy of Physical Science, Fang Zheng lost both his legs in the early morning of 4th June 1989 in saving a fainted student during their evacuation from the Tiananmen Square from a row of approaching tanks along West Chang’an Avenue. While he successfully pushed the girl out of harm’s way, his own legs were crushed by a tank. Though the authorities had asked him to state instead that he was hit by a car, the gruesome photograph shot by a foreign reporter of his shattered body lying at the crossroads of Liubukou 六部口 stands to symbolize the brutality of the ruthless crackdown and cut through the lies and conceits fostered by the authorities in subsequent decades in whitewashing the unfortunate “incident”. (ODN, 2nd June 2012, 6th June 2012; Bajiu Yidai Tongxun 八九一代通讯 [89 generation bulletin], Issue 2, 30th May, 2012)

25. “But when I open the door to step out into the world, there’s only a tremendous void. A pale gray nothingness that is all my future holds.” (Suzanne Collins, Mockingjay: The final book of The Hunger Games, New York: Scholastic Press, 2010, p. 166)


31. Kuang Da, “Nanjing nüzi Zhenzhu: Wo bushi yingxiong 南京女子珍珠：我不是英雄” [Pearl from Nanjing: I’m not a hero], Yangguang Shiwu 阳光时务, 18th May 2012.

32. Provincial-level administrative units in the People’s Republic of China refer to the country’s 31 *sheng* 省 (i.e. provinces of Anhui 安徽, Fujian 福建, Gansu 甘肃, Guangdong 广东, Guizhou 贵州, Hainan 海南, Hebei 河北, Heilongjiang 黑龙江, Henan 河南, Hunan 湖南, Jiangsu 江苏, Jiangxi 江西, Jilin 吉林, Liaoning 辽宁, Qinghai 青海, Shaanxi 陕西, Shandong 山东, Shanxi 山西, Sichuan 四川, Yunnan 云南 and Zhejiang 浙江), *zizhiqu* 自治区 (i.e. “autonomous regions” – each a first-level administrative subdivision having its own local government, and a minority entity that has a higher population of a particular minority ethnic group – of Guangxi 广西 of the Zhuang, Nei Monggol/Inner Mongolia 内蒙古 of the Mongols, Ningxia 宁夏 of the Hui, Xizang/Tibet 西藏 of the Tibetans and Xinjiang 新疆 of the Uyghurs) and *zhixiashi* 直辖市 (i.e. municipalities directly ruled by the central government – Beijing 北京, Chongqing 重庆, Shanghai 上海 and Tianjin 天津).

33. At that time she began an Internet donation campaign to provide the two jailed activists’ families 1500-2000 yuan monthly for subsistence, as she has also been long doing for other incarcerated activists. She then turned her attention also to the plight of Chen Guangcheng and his family, and made six trips to Linyi 临沂’s heavily guarded Dongshigu 東師古 village to attempt to visit Chen, despite being warned repeatedly by the *guobao* 国保 (national security officers) in Nanjing of the danger and knowing well that other activists including Hu Jia 胡佳 and Wang Keqin 王克勤 had been beaten up by the guards while trying to do so. Others who had been roughed up in their attempts to visit Chen Guangcheng include the Hollywood actor Christian Bale who, accompanied by CNN reporters, tried to reach Chen’s residence on 15th December 2011. (A yuan 元 of remminbi 人民币 is equivalent to about US$0.161.)

34. “Xu Zhiyong, the quiet lawyer holding beijing to account: the campaigner’s demands that officials obey the law have been met with fury” (by Tom

35. “Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one […] man] finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his property to furnish means for the protection of the rest; and this he is induced to do by the same prudence which in every other case advises him out of two evils to choose the least”, said Thomas Paine in the beginning paragraphs of *Common sense* (1776).

36. *http://gradworks.umi.com/33/12/3312615.html*
39. 1 *mu* = 0.0667 hectares.
43. Due to the abnormal size of China’s population and in particular the size of China’s citizens of the Han ethnicity, a distortion or misrepresentation emerges in the application of the term “multiethnic” to China as the country’s large populations of minorities – about 110 million in total, including the 16 million Zhuang, 10 million Manchu, 9 million Hui, 8 million Uygurs, 5 million Mongols and 5 million Tibetans – are practically dwarfed almost to invisibility by the sheer size of the Han population (about 92 per cent of the total population of China). In fact, based on the “critical mass” theory (advanced, among others, by Semyonov and Tyree, 1981), societies are considered multiethnic only if minorities constitute more than ten per cent of their population.
44. *ODN*, 29th May 2011.
46. *Jūjutsu* is a Japanese martial art of close combat, using no weapon or only a short weapon, for defeating an armed and armored opponent by manipulating the opponent’s force against himself rather than directly opposing it with one’s own force. *Jūjutsu*, which dates back to the 17th century, is an ancestor of *Aikido* referred to by Stephen Zunes above, which was developed in the late 1920s.
47. Hu used six characters to summarize his policy suggestion: “*mianshui* 免税, *fangkai* 放開, *zouren* 走人”, i.e. tax abolition, loosening control, and moving Han cadres en masse out of Tibet. (Wang Dan 王丹,

48. As well as the attack on the so-called “Ulanfu Anti-Party Treason Clique” (乌兰夫反党叛国集团) and the ruthless witch-hunt to find members of the fabricated New Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (新內蒙古人民革命党 / 新內人党).


50. Or Qing.


52. ODN, 20th May 2014; “Tiananmen Massacre 25th anniversary: How Chinese triads enabled the Great Escape” (by Malcolm Moore), The Telegraph (UK), 18th May 2014. The difference in number from that given in Jiang Xun’s article above could be due to Jiang’s account of the whole operation being extended from the immediate rescues in 1989 to 1997 just before the “Handover”.

53. Referring to personalities reportedly to have been involved, but unconfirmed, in the covert operation in some way, whether in terms of direct organization and operation, financial support or otherwise.

54. Of the four who died in the rescue operation, two were killed in speedboat accidents in thick fog, two died when their speedboat engine caught fire while being pursued by Chinese police (“陳達鈺披露：黃雀行動幕後英雄還有梅艷芳” [Chan Tat-ching reveals: Anita Mui was also a behind-the-scenes hero of Operation Siskin], 澳洲日報 (Daily Chinese Herald,

55. Ibid.

56. More than 510,000 by organizers “conservative” estimate (which is the highest estimates in a decade); 98,600 by police’s estimate; between 154,000 and 172,000 by Hong Kong University researchers’ estimate. See “Passions run high as Hong Kong marches for democracy” (by James Pomfret and Clare Baldwin), Reuters, 1st July 2014 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/01/us-hongkong-protests-idUSKBN0F632A20140701>; “Police arrest 511 after big HK democracy rally” (by Kelvin Chan of Associated Press), ABC News, 1st July 2014 <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/big-hk-democracy-rally-fuelled-fury-beijing-24375097>.


58. Participated by 40,000 people, according to organizer’s figures.


61. 100,000 by police’s estimates and over 180,000 by organizers’ estimates.

62. ODN, 11th June 2014; “Alarm in Hong Kong at Chinese white paper affirming Beijing control” (by Tim Hume), CNN Global NewsView, 11th


65. Ibid.

66. ODN, 16th April 2014.

67. First formulated by John Foster Dulles, former United States Secretary of State, during the Cold War in the 1950s, the “Peaceful Evolution” theory “envisioned a ‘peaceful’ transition from autocracy or dictatorship to democracy in a communist country” which is seen by the Chinese leaders as the American strategy of infiltration and subversion through the propagation of Western political ideas and lifestyles, incitement of discontent and promoting local challenges against CCP’s one-party political monopoly, and hence represents the biggest threat to CCP’s continuous rule – and for leaders of the CCP, “nothing is more important than safeguarding party rule.” (“Hu warns successors over ‘peaceful evolution’” (by Wu Zhong), Asia Times, 11th January 2012 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NA11Ad02.html>.)

68. Ibid.

69. Besides his declaration that China is at the “initial stage of socialism” which served to clear the way for further market transformations. See “A brief biography of Zhao Ziyang”, in Zhao (2009a: 283-287); “赵紫陽年表” [chronological table on Zhao Ziyang], in Zhao (2009b: 311-316; 2009c: 359-365).

70. Or Guangxu.

71. Or Kang Youwei.

72. Or Liang Qichao.

73. Or Cixi.


75. Cited in Greene (1990: 14).


78. See Bo (2009: 10-11).

79. Cited from 《邓小平文选》第 3 卷 [selected works of Deng Xiaoping, volume 3], Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe 人民出版社, 1993 年版, 第 220 ～221 页。


84. In the epigraph, well-known public intellectual and writer Murong Xuecun 慕容雪村 reflects upon the adamantine, contemptuous comments of the
official news broadcaster on the lone individual who stood in front of and blocked a column of tanks which signified terrifying State power on Chang’ an Avenue in plain view of the world’s news cameras in the morning 5th June 1989 after a night of terror: “稍有常识的人都会看出，如果我们的铁骑继续前进，这个螳臂挡车的歹徒，难道能够阻挡得了吗?”. “Muro ng Xuecun” is the pen name of Chinese author Hao Qun. To hear the cold, steely voice of the State, watch, e.g., video “六四天安门事件《3小时纪录片》大陆禁片” at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vF2YACrLP8w&feature=em-hot-vrecs>. Recently Murong was briefly detained by police officers in Beijing for interrogation from 8th-9th July 2014 when he returned to China – the detention was believed to be related to a June Fourth commemoration held at a gathering at an apartment on 3rd May where an essay he had written about Tiananmen was recited (“Author held in Beijing after a spate of detentions” (by Edward Wong), The New York Times, 8th July 2014 <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/world/asia/chinese-author-is-detained-by-beijing-police.html?_r=1>). Those attended the gathering were detained and later released, but Pu Zhiqiang, the most well-known participant, remains in custody.

85. Starr (2004), cited by the author of the article.
86. Ji (1990: 200), cited by the author of the article.
87. 100,000 by police’s estimates and over 180,000 by organizers’ estimates.
88. “The soul of wit may become the very body of untruth. However elegant and memorable, brevity can never, in the nature of things, do justice to all the facts of a complex situation. On such a theme one can be brief only by omission and simplification. Omission and simplification help us to understand – but help us, in many cases, to understand the wrong thing; for our comprehension may be only of the abbreviator’s neatly formulated notions, not of the vast, ramifying reality from which these notions have been so arbitrarily abstracted.” (Aldous Huxley’s “Foreword” to his Brave new world revisited, Chatto & Windus Ltd, London, 1959, re-published by Grafton Books, London, 1983, p. 7)

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