Whither China and the Communist Party Regime? Reflections on the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Tiananmen Incident

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Abstract
It does not appear that the new Chinese leadership is ready to initiate serious political reforms. Even if Xi Jinping is a Mikhail Gorbachev-type of leader (he does not appear to be so), he still needs time to consolidate his power base. As the core political elites agree on maintaining the Party’s monopoly of power, there is no consensus on political reforms. The new leadership realizes that corruption is a serious threat, and will try to make the cadre corps clean and responsive to the people’s needs and grievances. The formula of the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration to maintain political stability had been economic growth plus a basic social security net covering the entire population plus good governance in the absence of democracy.

Keywords: Tiananmen Incident, political reforms, civil society, corruption, “colour revolutions”, non-governmental organizations

JEL classification: H11, H12, Z13, Z18
1. Introduction: Surviving the Tiananmen Incident

The year 1989 not only marked the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution; in future centuries it will celebrate the fall of the Berlin Wall and commemorate the Tiananmen Incident. At that time, some of the leading dissidents like Liu Binyan predicted that the Party regime would not last more than three months. The incident shattered Western illusions about China, and Western countries imposed sanctions; the European Union’s ban on weapon exports lasts until today. The tragic event generated much skepticism about many of China’s achievements in the recent past and a deep pessimism about its future.

Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in early 1992 turned the tide. The leftism which emerged in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident perhaps symbolized by Jiang Zemin’s statement “to bankrupt the household entrepreneurs” was arrested. Chinese leaders too had identified the most threatening challenge – dissatisfaction in the countryside. Economic stagnation plus maladministration by corrupt cadres could easily create an explosive situation because the status quo would then be no longer “acceptable” nor would the leadership of the Party be tolerable. The leadership succession process could be, to borrow an economic term, a soft-landing if it coincided with a period of respectable growth and low inflation.

The Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992 will go down in Chinese history as the first Party Congress after 1949 which ordinary people could afford to ignore. The post-Mao leadership appreciated that the legitimacy of the regime would henceforward depend on its ability to deliver the goods. While the Four Cardinal Principles could be reduced to one – leadership of the Party, people were willing to accept it because it managed to improve their living standards.

About three years after the Tiananmen Incident, most intellectuals in China acquiesced to the military crackdown, though they still condemned the deployment of tanks and machine-guns. They saw what had happened in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and came to the conclusion that there was no alternative to the leadership of the Party. There was nothing like the Catholic Church or the Polish
Solidarity movement in China and it would remain so in the foreseeable future.²

While Chinese leaders and the mainstream media have been avoiding mentioning the Tiananmen Incident, so much so that many young people in China today may not even be aware of the tragedy, the leadership’s sense of insecurity remains strong. Li Jingjie, the director of the former Soviet-Eastern Europe Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, was interviewed by David Shambaugh in 2003; and Li indicated that the break-up of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Soviet Communist Party regime “had haunted the Chinese leadership ever since.” Li said that Chinese leaders tried “to understand the implications and lessons, so that they don’t make the same mistakes of Gorbachev…”³

Another focus regarding the Chinese leadership’s concern for the survival of the Chinese Communist regime is the “colour revolutions” in the former constituent republics of the Soviet Union in the early years of this century, i.e., the “rose revolution” in Georgia in 2003, the “orange revolution” in Ukraine in 2004, and the “(yellow) tulip revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. David Shambaugh believes that the Chinese leadership is very worried about the causes and implications of the “colour revolutions” for the Chinese Communist regime. He identifies six major aspects of the Chinese analyses of the “colour revolutions” in his survey; the nature of the “revolutions”, the role of the U.S., the role of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the potential for more “colour revolutions” in Central Asia, the implications for Russia, and those for China.⁴

In response to the “colour revolutions”, the Chinese authorities adopted certain measures to limit their potential impact. In general, Chinese media did not report these events. The Chinese government also suspended a plan to allow foreign newspapers to be printed in China. It was observed that when George Soros visited China in October 2005, local media did not cover the event, and his scheduled lectures and meetings were all cancelled.⁵ It was also said that President Vladimir Putin warned Hu Jintao at a 2005 Shanghai Co-operation Organization meeting about the subversive potential of the international NGOs; and
partly as a result of this warning, the Chinese authorities began to scrutinize NGOs operating in China.\(^6\)

It appears that Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, despite the country’s impressive economic growth, have been worrying about the survival of the one-Party regime and would not entertain the introduction of democracy. The present leaders are ready to follow the hitherto line of enhancing Party organization, propaganda work and thought work among cadres, intra-Party supervision, the cultivation of cadres, etc. They repeat the same line of economic development before political reforms. They also caution against separatism among China’s national minorities; and especially the Western world’s “peaceful evolution” strategy, the “Westernization” strategy and the “division” strategy against China.\(^7\)

2. Stability and Prosperity: Achievements and Challenges

China’s economic growth, however, has been most impressive. Before China’s launch of its programme of economic reform and opening up to the external world at the end of 1978, its total trade value was only US$20.6 billion, ranking 32nd among all trading nations and accounting for less than one per cent of the world’s total. Since then, its economy has grown more than a hundredfold, at an average annual rate of 10.1 per cent. China surpassed Germany as the world’s largest exporter in 2009, and surpassed Japan as the world’s second-largest economy in 2010. In 2012, it leapfrogged the U.S. to become the world’s biggest trading power. In 2012 alone, China secured a trade surplus of US$231 billion with the U.S. By mid-2013, China’s foreign exchange reserves reached US$3.56 trillion, the largest in the world, nearly three times that of the next largest holder, Japan (US$1.3 trillion).\(^8\)

Moreover, Beijing held the Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai Expo in 2010. Chinese people really feel that they have stood up, as claimed by Mao on October 1, 1949 when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded. Though Chinese leaders avoid the use of the acronym “G-2” (the U.S. and China as the only two superpowers in the world), Chinese people are proud of the country’s impact on
international affairs. This national pride has become an important source of the Party regime’s legitimacy too. The fourth-generation leadership under Hu Jintao failed to tackle the problem of corruption, but it had a much more sober understanding of the challenges of rapid economic growth. Even before the global financial tsunami in 2008 and 2009, the Chinese authorities realized that for sustainable economic growth China would have to reduce its dependence on exports and investment in infrastructural projects, instead it would have to rely more on domestic consumption. More resources were allocated to environmental protection and the enhancement of energy intensity; as the structure of the economy improved and the service sector further developed, there would be a better chance that pollution might be reduced very slowly. The Hu-Wen leadership in its past eight years began building a basic social security net covering the entire population to contain the grievances generated by the widening of the gap between the rich and poor. The emphasis on stability and prosperity was prominent, and the strategy and tactics adopted by the fourth-generation leadership were sophisticated.

The mainstream Chinese media often describes China today as “shengshi 浩世”, a traditional Confucian term for historical eras of peace, prosperity and achievements. Hu Jintao also promoted his models of “harmonious society” and “harmonious world”. These concepts are hardly Marxist-Leninist nor dialectical; and it is significant that the Chinese leadership and intelligentsia no longer care. Further, the “eight honours” and “eight shames” advanced by Hu as ethical standards for cadres were distinctly Confucian. These ideological trends initiated by the fourth-generation leadership were significant, though it was also strengthening traditional Marxist-Leninist ideological studies at the same time.

The Party still has no intention of giving up its monopoly of political power; and in fact in the past decade and more, there have been no significant political reforms. Parallel to this rejection of democratization, the Chinese leadership has been very sensitive to potential unrest. There had been a crackdown on dissidents, independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs), human rights groups, and freedom of information flow on the Internet in the two years or so before
the Beijing Olympics. But there has been no relaxation after the event as 2009 was a year of significant anniversaries. This acute sense of insecurity was best symbolized by the Chinese authorities’ asking the Beijing residents to stay home to watch television during the National Day parade in 2009, the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of the PRC.

Zheng Yongnian describes China in 2011 as “full of anger, political consciousness, anxiety and uncertainty”. High rates of inflation and the problems of access to education, medical services and housing have made the bulk of population at the grassroots level wonder if its quality of life has been improving, despite the rise in monetary incomes. The tertiary institutions produced 6.6 million graduates in the summer of 2011; the government expected an unemployment rate of 10 per cent six months after their graduation, but unofficial estimates are considerably higher.

With the rapid expansion of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which had been much benefitted by the four-trillion-yuan financial stimulus package in the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008, private-sector enterprises have been squeezed out largely because of their difficulties in securing bank credits. Many small and medium-sized enterprises are in crisis.

Even the elites seem to have lost confidence. According to a report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in March 2012, spouses of senior and middle-ranking cadres at the provincial/central ministerial level, prefectural/bureau level and county/section (chu) level who held foreign passports or had permanent residential rights in foreign countries amounted to over 185,700, and children of such cadres enjoying the same status numbered more than 813,000.

The Bank of China released a report in 2011 indicating that in the future, three out of five rich Chinese would hold foreign passports. Among those each with 10 million yuan and more available for investment, 14 per cent had already emigrated, and 46 per cent were planning or in the process of doing so. In another report by the China Merchant bank, among the 20,000 Chinese each with 100 million yuan or more available for investment, 27 per cent had already emigrated, and
47 per cent were considering doing so. The two banks estimated that these rich Chinese had invested 36 trillion yuan overseas, despite strict official controls.\(^\text{13}\)

At the end of 2009, *Renmin Luntan* 人民论坛 (People’s forum), a magazine of the *Renmin Ribao* 人民日报 group, conducted a survey on the “Ten Most Serious Challenges in the Coming Decade”. A total of 82.3 per cent of the respondents chose “the issue of corruption exceeds the baseline of people’s tolerance”; 80.6 per cent of the respondents picked “the widening of the gap between the rich and poor as well as injustice in distribution exacerbate social contradictions”; and 63.2 per cent identified “conflicts between cadres and the masses at the grassroots level”. Soon after the exposure of the Bo Xilai incident, this *Renmin Luntan* article was widely circulated among the micro-blogs in China.

The English edition of *Global Times* (环球时报), which also belongs to the *Renmin Ribao* group, released another alarming survey report in early 2012. Over 15 per cent of the respondents firmly believed that China was “at the edge of a new revolution”; and 34 per cent of the respondents considered that China was possibly in that kind of situation.\(^\text{14}\)

It was exactly this kind of anger which had provided the foundation for Bo Xilai to exploit the “Chongqing model” (重庆模式) as his personal political asset to pursue his career advancement and challenge the central leadership. It is probably the awareness of such anger which supports the tolerance of Chinese leaders including Xi Jinping for the neo-Maoists.

In fact, Xi Jinping attempts to exploit Mao Zedong to enhance the legitimacy of his administration and fill the ideological vacuum. The entire Standing Committee of the Party Political Bureau visited the Mao Mausoleum on the 120th anniversary of Mao’s birthday in late 2013, and Xi delivered an important address at the memorial forum on the same day. Xi emphasized that “we shall forever hold aloft the flag of Mao Zedong Thought” and highly evaluated Mao’s contributions. Earlier on March 20, 2011, shortly before his assumption of the leadership position at the Twelfth Party Congress, Xi visited Mao’s birthplace in Shaoshan, Hunan to pay respects to Mao.
3. Political Reforms

There has been another type of healthy response to this anger. Probably since August 2010, then Premier Wen Jiabao made several open and formal appeals for political reforms. A significant example was Wen’s speech at the Summer Davos Forum in Dalian, Liaoning Province on September 14, 2011. Wen elaborated his ideas in a five-point proposal ranging from the separation between the Party and the state to “expanding people’s democracy” through elections.\(^\text{15}\)

Wen’s appeals, however, while attracting considerable attention of the international media, were not accorded significant treatment by the official media in China. There was no support from the top leadership. In fact, Wu Bangguo, then chairman of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, set the limits for China’s political reforms in his speech at the NPC annual session on March 10, 2011. Wu explicitly said no to the following liberal political ideas: competition and rotation among several political parties to capture government; diversity in ideological guidelines; a system of checks and balances among the three branches of government; a bicameral legislature; a federal system; and a privatized economy.

In 2013, it was reported that the new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping set limits to discussions among university teachers and the official media. Topics including universal values, freedom of the media, civil society, civil rights, independence of the judiciary, the Party’s historical mistakes and the power elite bourgeois class became taboos.\(^\text{16}\)

At the end of April 2013, the Party Central Office released a notice on ideological issues which, among other things, severely attacked “historical nihilism”. The latter referred to the denials and criticisms of the Party’s established positions on various historical questions, especially the attacks on Mao and Mao Zedong Thought. These criticisms were seen as attempts to erode the legitimacy of Party leadership.\(^\text{17}\)

Further, Xi Jinping was said to oppose “using the post-economic reforms and opening to the external world historical era to denigrate that before the reforms, and vice versa”.\(^\text{18}\) The new leadership apparently
wants to strengthen control over the ideological sphere, and limit the liberation of thinking. Meanwhile, the Chinese authorities have been cracking down on dissidents like Xu Zhiyong and other human rights lawyers as well as their “new citizens movement”. In 2013, the liberals in China in general have expressed their disappointment with Xi Jinping and no longer expect that he is going to initiate significant political reforms.

In view of the resistance of vested interests, pushing for political reforms demands strong leadership backed by a broad consensus. Both are absent for the time being, and hence the maintenance of the status quo. The declaration of assets on the part of cadres had been on the political reform agenda for more than a decade, and in recent years specific regulations had been promulgated, yet the actual implementation has been far from satisfactory. This is certainly a significant indicator of the resistance of vested interests as well as the lack of strong leadership and political will, leading to cynicism and anger among the people.

It was decided at the third plenum of the Eighteenth Central Committee at the end of 2013 that two new organs were to be established: the State Security Commission and the Central Leadership Group on the Comprehensive Deepening of Reforms, following the recent trend of concentration on the design of the top leadership structure (ding ceng sheji 顶层设计). As Xi Jinping intends to exploit the combat of corruption and serious economic reforms to enhance the Party regime’s legitimacy and his own popularity, he needs to tackle the resistance of strong vested interests and therefore he has to strengthen his own personal control. Critics believe that Xi wants to follow the example of Vladimir Putin and not that of Mikhail Gorbachev.

4. Economic Challenges
In the era of economic reforms and opening to the external world, economic growth has been the most importance source of legitimacy for the Party regime. Since the beginning of this decade, most economists in China agree that the country has entered a stage of slower or sub-high
economic growth. A study of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences forecast that China’s potential economic growth rate would fall within the range of 7.8-8.7 per cent in 2011-2015, 5.7-6.6 per cent in 2016-2020 and 5.4-6.3 per cent in 2021-2030.19

In the past three decades and more, the primary sector’s share of China’s economy has been falling, the share of the secondary sector (especially manufacturing industries) has been expanding rapidly, while that of the tertiary sector has been increasing relatively slowly. When labour moves from the primary sector to the secondary sector, labour productivity in the case of China rises tenfold, hence labour productivity of the entire economy improves substantially. At this stage, the development of the secondary sector has almost saturated, labour and other resources mainly flow to the tertiary sector in which labour productivity is lower than that in the secondary sector. Research indicates that in Shanghai where labour productivity is highest in China, labour productivity in the tertiary sector is only about 70 per cent that of the secondary sector.20 This is probably the main factor leading to slower economic growth rates in China in the foreseeable future.

Labour, capital and technological advance are the major factors of production supporting economic growth. In the past three decades and more, China’s labour force has been increasing at the rate of about ten million per annum; and it has been the principal factor supporting China’s high economic growth rates. In view of the aging population, this increase in labour inputs is expected to decline; and this is a long-term trend.

China’s extremely high savings rate in the past decades is also anticipated to fall slowly because of the aging population, the approaching termination of the traditional industrialization process, and the gradually climbing consumption rate. Finally, the progress of technological advance has been slow, and the return rate on capital low, as admitted by China’s official think tank. These trends may likely contribute to slower economic growth rates in the future.

High investment rates amounting to 50 per cent of GDP and net exports approaching 10 per cent of GDP have also been important factors supporting China’s economic growth. In the 1980s and 1990s,
ecological degradation and environmental pollution, however, brought economic damages estimated to be around 8 per cent of GDP per annum. This proportion has been decreasing, but still stayed at 4 per cent of GDP in 2011. Hence if the economic loss caused by ecological degradation and environmental pollution was taken into account, China’s real economic growth would be reduced to about 5 per cent.

There are considerable economic wastes in the Chinese economy too. Products produced which cannot be sold only expand the inventory. Excess production capacity is another source of waste. As a result of the four trillion yuan economic stimulus introduced in late 2008 in response to the global financial crisis, substantial excess production capacity has become a serious problem, especially in traditional industries. In 2013, average utilization rate of production capacity in China was below 80 per cent, in some industries even below 70 per cent, compared with the normal international norm of 85-90 per cent. Bankruptcy has become a genuine threat in some industries.

Until recent years, local governments and state-owned enterprises had been obsessed with increasing production and raising the local GDP; the input/output ratio and efficiency were generally neglected. Since 1978, China’s additional capital/output ratio experienced two stages of changes. In the 1979-1995 period, the average annual ratio was 2.3; in the following 1996-2011 period, the average annual ratio rose to 3.5. This compared unfavourably with Japan in the 1950s to the 1970s era, when its corresponding ratio was only 2. The above problems highlight the danger of China falling into the “middle-income trap” in the near future. Chinese leaders have been actually aware of this challenge, as the legitimacy of the Party regime is highly dependent on respectable economic growth, which generates revenue for the central government to maintain control and tackle the deteriorating social contradictions. Economic stagnation plus corruption and incompetent administration present the most threatening scenario for the maintenance of the Party’s monopoly of political power.

The third plenum of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Party issued a document in on the comprehensive deepening of reforms in November 2013. It appears to be a detailed policy platform of the new
leadership, covering even relatively minor issues like university entrance examination and the gradual raising of the retirement age. The contents were not controversial, embodying the consensus reached in the past, though political reforms were conspicuously absent. The real challenge is effective implementation.

As the reforms proposed go against many vested interests, and if local governments and cadres cannot support the reforms from their perceived self-interests, implementation may encounter strong resistance. President Xi Jinping visited Shandong soon after the plenum and appealed to a “proper, accurate, orderly and co-ordinated” approach in the implementation of the reform measures. Xi’s appeal probably reflected the top leadership’s concern that local governments might rush to secure quick achievements while securing their own benefits such as the establishment of free-trade zones.

The setting up of a Central Leadership Group for the Comprehensive Deepening of Reforms has been interpreted as an attempt to further centralize power in the hands of Xi Jinping. Official think-tank scholars argue that this centralization of power is to centralize power for the maintenance of stability, but to decentralize power for development too; however power decentralization has to be premised on an initial power centralization, so as to correct the unhealthy phenomenon of policies do not go beyond the Party headquarters in Zhongnanhai, Beijing.

These scholars admit that an ideology and theoretical framework as well as a political structure supporting reforms are lacking. At this stage, China’s reforms are “authoritarian reforms; the leadership’s authority has to be strengthened to ensure an adequate momentum for the promotion of reforms and the maintenance of their sustainability.

The following broad principles behind the present leadership’s economic reform programme are praiseworthy, i.e., government should decentralize power to society and the market; monopolistic and oligopolistic sectors should be open to the private sector; and the government should limit its functions and reduce its establishment. In view of the powerful resistance of vested interests, Xi may well adopt a strong-man style to raise the efficiency of policy implementation. But
the risks and inadequacies of strong-man politics are obvious too, and China in the past had suffered from its consequences.

Four types of vested interests are perceived to be blocking the realization of social justice: monopolistic and oligopolistic state-owned enterprises; government agencies; interest groups based on collusion between cadres and entrepreneurs; and networks of ties based on family and Party connections. Using rectification campaigns to combat such vested interests may be effective to a certain extent in the short term, but the long-term impact may likely be limited.

Normally reforms cannot be pushed at too many fronts. According to the official documents, broadening market access, deepening social security reforms, and reform of the land system allowing collectively-owned land to be traded in the market are the anticipated breakthroughs. But social security reforms are quite time-consuming, and short-term achievements are hardly conspicuous; the reform of the medical and public health system is a good example. Similarly the difficult legislative work necessary for the reform of the land system has yet to begin.

Broadening market access and reforms of the financial and taxation systems are probably better choices for breakthroughs in the immediate future. Concrete plans are needed to ensure that the latter reforms will benefit local governments and allow them to have sufficient financial resources to improve social services.

Chinese leaders realize that in the absence of serious political reforms, economic growth remains the most importance source of the Party regime’s legitimacy. There is a consensus on the broad directions of economic reforms, and the new leadership under Xi Jinping understands that effective implementation is its real challenge. Its strategy seems to concentrate power to fulfill the objective, but this approach may only exacerbate China’s other political problems and obstruct the democratization process.

5. Conclusion

It does not appear that the new Chinese leadership is ready to initiate serious political reforms. Even if Xi Jinping is a Mikhail Gorbachev-
type of leader (he does not appear to be so), he still needs time to consolidate his power base. This will at least take two or three years; and if he appears to be too aggressive, he may antagonize all other factions prompting them to unite against him. As the core political elites agree on maintaining the Party’s monopoly of power, there is no consensus on political reforms. Many Western governments refuse to tackle their accumulated deficits because tough austerity measures can easily mean their electoral defeats; they therefore procrastinate and hope that the crises would come after their respective tenures. Chinese leaders share a similar dilemma. There is a good understanding of the sharpening social contradictions and accumulating grievance, but the initiating of political reforms is highly risky and may easily lead to their downfall, they therefore opt to delay the reform process and simply adopt measure to contain the grievance and contradictions.

The formula of the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration to maintain political stability had been economic growth plus a basic social security net covering the entire population plus good governance in the absence of democracy. Maintaining an economic growth rate of about seven per cent per annum in the coming five years or so should not be too difficult because the central government has ample resources to spend on infrastructural projects and because the economic take-off has been spreading from the coastal to the interior provinces. There is ample room to improve the social security net and again the central government has the revenues and fiscal reserves to do so. The new leadership realizes that corruption is a serious threat, and will try to make the cadre corps clean and responsive to the people’s needs and grievances.

Meanwhile, civil society will continue to grow quantitatively and qualitatively. Li Fan’s optimistic estimates are that at this stage China has about seven to eight million social organizations involving about three hundred million people, i.e., about one fifth of China’s total population; and he considers this “progressive civil society population”. This critical mass is still inadequate to exert pressure on the Party regime to introduce serious political reforms; but if this “progressive civil society population” expands to 30 per cent or 40 per cent of the entire population in less than ten or ten to fifteen years’ time,
then the threshold may be reached. This may not be a very useful way of defining or examining the threshold, but just an interesting illustration.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which are perceived to pose a threat to the Party regime will continue to be suppressed. United front tactics would likely be adopted, and leaders of these NGOs will be induced to alter their mode of operation into one acceptable to the Chinese authorities, i.e., both carrots and sticks are applied. The Chinese authorities are very sensitive to the emergence of nationwide autonomous civic organizations. At this stage, through the Internet, nationwide campaigns can indeed be organized. In 2010, the Nobel Peace Prize for Liu Xiaobo has made him a national leader, at least a spiritual leader while he is in prison. Ai Weiwei certainly has become a national civil society leader and he has the capacity to call national campaigns.

In sum, in the coming four or five years, it is difficult to anticipate serious political reforms leading to democratization, and civil society is not likely to achieve significant breakthroughs. But the trend is obvious, civil society in China will continue to expand and strengthen, and pressure will build for a dialogue between the Party regime and civil society to avoid crises and violent confrontations.

Notes

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22. Ibid., p. 6.

23. Ibid.


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