Abstract
This research examines the Malayan deportation regime by looking at the banishment of two categories of deportees to Formosa, who could not be deported to mainland China due to their anti-communist outlook. It aims to: 1) analyse an alternative solution to sending alien Chinese to Formosa instead of mainland China, 2) the shifting policy of the British in facilitating the banishment of anti-communist alien Chinese to Formosa, and 3) the attitude of the Federation government in threatening (both the British and Formosa) to send the Chinese to China, if the British consul failed to persuade Formosa to accept them. It asks how the relationship between Malaya, the British and Formosa shaped Malayan banishment practices. This article suggests that the practices were hampered by the absence of diplomatic channels between Malaya and Formosa and the reluctance of Malaya to deal on a non-official basis through the Free China Relief Association. This, then presented the British with the dilemma of whether or not they had a special responsibility to resolve the issue on behalf of its former colony.

Keywords: Banishment, refugees, secret societies, Federation of Malaya, Commonwealth Relations Office, Formosa

1. Introduction
This article surveys the role of the British, who acted as mediators on behalf of pre and post-independence Malaya. Owing much to the British consular post in Taiwan, Malaya was able to banish anti-communist Chinese to Formosa, with whom they did not have diplomatic relations. As they were ideologically un-deportable to the mainland, Malaya continued to seek the graces of the British consul in Tamsui through the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO). In the 1950s, there were signs of the changing attitude of the CRO in assuming the role of mediator due to political risks in their relations
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Acting as mediators presented the British with some considerable political risks. First, the British were risking its relation with Peking in facilitating the banishment of anti-communist Chinese to Formosa. Should the diplomatic venture fail and Malaya decides to send them to Communist China, the British might suffer a serious blow to its international reputation for being part of the desperate alternative. Within the framework of economic interests and national security, Malaya refused to allow them to remain in the country upon completely serving their prison sentence. The shifting policy of the British – represented by the Foreign Office, CRO and the British consulate in Tamsui – then, had to be understood within a wider framework of the attitude of colonial and post-colonial Malaya and the different levels of enthusiasm shown by Formosa.

This paper examines two categories of alien Chinese: members of secret societies and Chinese refugees, whom Malaya had difficulty repatriating. The absence of diplomatic relations hampered the deportation from Malaya to Formosa. As will be discussed below, the Malayan authorities were reluctant to deal directly with Formosa and utilized the British consulate service in Tamsui for repatriating these alien Chinese. Even after achieving independence in 1957, the Federation continued to utilize the Commonwealth Relations Office as mediators on behalf of nations, which did not have diplomatic relations with Formosa.

The battle over the deportation of overseas Chinese is a worthwhile subject of research. Deportation is a concern of the international community, embedded within the broader framework of the Cold War struggles. International politics combined with local dynamics formed the agenda of the Chinese political refugees. The interactions between China, Taiwan, British colonial authorities and Southeast Asian governments, decisively shaped the outcome of the refugee crises (Mark, 2007: 3). The stream of mainland Chinese refugees (Hainanese particularly) in Malaya was an isolated case, compared to the mainstream flow into the British crown colony of Hong Kong (Peterson, 2008; Mark, 2007). While hundreds of thousands of Chinese (from Guangdong and Shanghai), escaped to Hong Kong causing the refugee crisis there (Peterson, 2014: 443), a small group of Chinese from Hainan Island fled to British Malaya. As with members of secret societies and Kuomintang (KMT) thugs, these anti-communist refugees could not be sent to China on ideological grounds. The disability to regularize deportation due to the banishees’ ideological differences left the stranded anti-communist Chinese with nowhere to turn to. This paper is concerned with the “un-deportable” anti-communist Chinese and the discourse of repatriation in British Malaya.

Deportation acts as a “symbol of and mechanism for exclusion” by removing non-citizens from state territory (Paoletti, 2010: 3). Deportation was used as a means of immigration control, in defending state sovereignty and
protecting the national border (Peutz and De Genova, 2010: 1). Deportation policies may be a convenient tool to get rid of unwanted aliens. In reality, however, deportation posed a problem to the local authorities when overseas Chinese were “un-deportable” diplomatically to Taiwan. Deportation is a highly complicated process involving state security and state sovereignty. Peutz and De Genova (2010: 13) are right to point out that, “Indeed, deportation is in most cases time-consuming and expensive, and sometimes politically controversial”. As far as Malaya was concerned, its deportation policy remained problematic when concerning the exclusion of undesirable aliens to a country not even recognized by both Malaya and the British.

The main hindrance of sending overseas Chinese to the Republic of China (ROC) was the non-recognition of Taiwanese statehood. Third countries could not deport overseas Chinese to Taiwan if they did not recognize the Taiwanese passport. Foreign policy goals, national security, and national sovereignty concerns complicated the claim of Taiwan to protect the overseas Chinese. Without diplomatic representation, the ROC found it almost impossible to enforce its protectionist policies in a state, which recognized the PRC. The local authorities and the ROC did not have diplomatic channels to facilitate the return of deportees (Oyen, 2007: 240, Mark, 2007: 11; Tang, 1995: 217). Panhuys (1959: 169) is right to point out that a divided state exists for those states which have recognized it, and does not exist from the viewpoint of states that deny it recognition. The international status of Taiwan demonstrated several hindrances as far as the Malayan attitude was concerned. The politics of recognition did play a major role, if not a determining role in deciding the acceptability of the country. A more decisive factor would be the ideology of the deportees. The Malayan case provides an ideal opportunity to analyze the influence of differing state ideology and diplomacy on repatriating unwanted nationals. In what follows, the paper deals with two categories of Chinese deportees which the Malayan Governments had difficulties dealing with: 1) members of secret societies, and 2) Hainanese political refugees. These two categories were of an anti-communist outlook, and thus could not be repatriated to China.

2. Malayan Deportation Regime: A Historical Overview
Banishment of the “Chinese troublemakers” had become the central preoccupation of Malaya’s immigration control since the 19th century. Chinese criminals, secret society members, and political activists constituted a “security” problem and their banishment was the only workable solution (Blythe, 1969; Yong and McKenna, 1990: 57; Peterson, 2014: 462). The “political undesirables” or the subversive elements of Chinese society had been subject to the Banishment Act. After 1911, Malayan deportees were
closely associated with Sun Yat Sun’s Chinese Revolutionary Party. Between 1912 and 1916, around 400 people were banished in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States, compared to the menial 200 deportations in the past five years. The use of banishment as “an essential arm of political control” continued to rise in the 1930s, owing to the activities of the Malayan Communist Party. Between 1928 and 1931, about 1,500 were banished. Political concerns coupled with economic depression continued to shape the Malayan deportation regime (Yong and McKenna, 1990: 57).

This security threat continued to threaten Malayan security after the Second World War which witnessed the call for stricter control measures. Following a series of lawlessness and criminal events, the aftermath of the Second World War shifted the government’s focus to curbing the activities of secret societies (Blythe, 1969: 355). Banishment legislation was evoked to deal with criminal cases as the most effective tool as “both victims and witnesses were deterred by the general climate of intimidation from reporting to the police or giving evidence in court, with the result that criminals could not be convicted and made to pay the penalty for their crimes” (Blythe, 1969: 358). The Ang Bin Hoey society in Penang and Province Wellesley, for example, were accounted for 30 cases of murder of members of the public, 5 murders of members of the police force, 6 murders of police informers, 8 attempted murders, 46 armed gang robberies, 59 armed robberies, and numerous cases of extortion as well as unreported robberies, between September 1945 and June 1946 (Blythe, 1969: 354-355).

The introduction of the Emergency Regulations 17 (D) in January 1949 gave the authorities wide powers of mass detention and repatriation of alien inhabitants supporting the communists. The history of mass deportation is most notable in Malaya as it signified the forced removal of tens of thousands of alien Chinese suspected of supporting the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). Large-scale deportation, rather than individual deportation, was necessary, as it would be impractical to keep the communist detainees in detention for months. Since January 1949, Malaya aimed to repatriate 2,000 individuals on a monthly basis (Low, 2014: 366-67). Since the declaration of the state of emergency on 16 June 1948, coercive control measures including mass deportation of undesirable aliens were employed under the Emergency Regulation. Hack (2015: 628) shows how deportation (together with detention and resettlement) shaped the British counter-insurgency efforts against the rural Chinese, who allegedly supported the MCP. The number of repatriation including dependants was 380 (1948), 10,262 (1949), 2,804 (1950), 8,719 (1951), 5,575 (1952), 2,098 (1953), 915 (1954) and 496 (1955), of whom 92.7 per cent were ethnic Chinese.

Both Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China were taking responsibility for the post-war political refugees and offered political haven (with
dual nationality as a passport to return). Deportation was central to the
government’s overseas Chinese policy making. Since the Chinese refugees
suffered discrimination based on their common ethnicity, both Chinese
states reacted to ethnic-based deportation and expulsion by formulating laws
based on ethnicity. It was the definition of Chinese nationality based on *jus
sanguinis* that enabled the overseas Chinese a right to return (Shao, 2009;
Zhuang, 2013). In the immediate aftermath of the war, history witnessed the
mass deportation of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese as evidenced
from the cases of Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma, Siam and Malaya.
Between 1949 and 1961, 500,000 overseas Chinese had migrated to the PRC.
Peterson (2014: 102) shows that the mass movement to socialist China was
“one of the most understudied aspects of the Chinese diasporas”.

The overseas Chinese have been subjected to the protectionist policy of
both Communist and Nationalist governments. Among others, deportation
and resettlement were the main policy concerns of their *huaqiao* policy
especially in the late 1950s. Both Chinese states received and resettled
the Chinese political refugees with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Peking
established State Farms for the returned overseas Chinese on Hainan Island,
in Yunnan and in southern China (Williams, 1966: 66-67; Godley, 1989: 342).
Approximately 500,000 repatriated overseas Chinese were resettled in the
PRC between 1949 and 1966 (Fitzgerald, 1972: 69-70). Among the notable
cases of mass deportation and resettlement involved Chinese political refugees
in colonial Malaya (1951), Sukarno’s Indonesia (1958), independent India
(1963) and again in Indonesia (1966) (Fitzgerald, 1972: 146).

Taiwan – acting as the government representing the *huaqiao* – set up the
Free China Relief Association in 1950 to provide “relief and resettlement”
of Chinese refugees across the world. In Hong Kong for example, the
Rennie’s Mill Camp Refugees Relief Committee became the KMT’s agent
in protecting the interests of the Chinese refugees from mainland China. For
the KMT, the plight of the Chinese refugees, especially that of the pro-Taipei
refugees should be addressed accordingly. Taiwan even pushed UNHCR to
resolve the case of the Chinese refugee crisis in Hong Kong (Mark, 2007:
10-11). The government offered assistance for repatriation and resettlement
of Korean-based overseas Chinese in 1950, for 40,000 overseas Chinese from
North Vietnam in 1954, and for 3,000 Vietnamese overseas Chinese in 1957
in Taiwan (To, 2014: 235; Tang, 1995: 210). In the 1960s and early 1970s,
however, the interests of overseas Chinese in Malaya, South Vietnam, and the
Philippines in terms of deportation, could not be sufficiently protected by the
ROC when “ROC’s increasingly weakened diplomatic position rendered it
powerless to offer any practical assistance” (To, 2014: 235).

In the 1950s, a pressing concern for the British colonial authorities
of Malaya was the possible halt in the traffic to mainland China. Another
available option was considering sending the Malayan communist detainees to Taiwan, which was highly unpromising. The prospect of direct repatriation from Malaya to Formosa was minimal. The ideological background of the deportees made it highly unlikely for their acceptance by the Nationalist authorities. Chinese deportees in Malaya were also known as communist sympathisers. Though the deportees were Chinese decent and born in Formosa, the British was sceptical that the Taiwanese authorities would accept them on the basis of their descent and nationality.

There were various categories of deportees: Formosan born persons and foreign born persons. The former category was much easily accepted as Taiwan had agreed to accept Formosan born war criminals that have completed their sentences in Malaya. As for the non-native deportees, it was more problematic as the Nationalist passport was not recognized as a valid travel document by the British. Their resistance was anticipated if the repatriation would be “adding to the number of useless mouths, even if the would-be immigrants are KMT sympathisers of the Chinese race (e.g. Rennies’ Mills refugees).” Anti-communist sympathisers deserved a special consideration, because their lives would be in danger if repatriated to Communist China. The Malayan government was cautioned by the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office of the implication of sending deportees with communist sympathies to Formosa. Such a case might compromise H.M. Consul’s position. Moreover, it would not be proper to ask the Formosan authorities to accept deportees who were not born in Formosa.

3. Case Study 1: Banishment of Members of Secret Societies and Criminals

The Federation Government had been deporting communist agitators who were subject to deportation orders under Emergency Regulation to mainland China. Deporting members of the anti-Communist secret societies was more difficult to deal with as they could not be sent to mainland China. Some secret societies such as the Wah Kee and Chung Won Tong secret societies were anti-Communist and repatriating their members to Communist China would put their lives in danger. Another consideration pertained to the logistical aspects. The existing repatriation programme of communists under the Emergency Regulations was conducted solely by the Wah Seng Shipping Company, who Communist China allowed to carry compulsory repatriates to South China. The Company would not accept deportees of anti-Communist secret societies in the vessels with the other communist deportees fearing the danger of violent incidents occurring during the voyages to China. Segregating the two categories in a different compartment was impossible. Repatriation to Formosa, then, was the “only satisfactory solution”. The
Banishment of Anti-Communist Chinese to Formosa

Federation sought the agreement of the Foreign Office (FO) for: 1) the principle of deportation from the Federation to Formosa of members of anti-Communist secret societies, and 2) corresponding directly with H.M. Consul in Formosa regarding individual cases.6

Failing to get the green light of the FO to send anti-communist deportees to Taiwan, the Malayan government proposed that another category of detainees be sent: the secret society members. The Federation of Malaya believed that secret society criminal activities could not be suppressed unless the weapon of banishment could be used. The Colonial Office supported the Federation “We must, of course, do all we can to assist the Federation in their efforts to suppress the criminal activities of these secret societies.”7 The matter was of some urgency because the detainees were still imprisoned though their terms of imprisonment had expired.8 The FO gave its approval to the Federation Government corresponding directly with the Consul provided that the final decision in each individual case was set by them. Deportation to Formosa might have to be suspended if the developments affected relations with the People’s Government of China.9

In the first case, the proposed banishee (Ng) was a member of a triad secret society called Ang Bin Hoay, which had been responsible for abductions and killings. The ground for his banishment was his conviction on five charges of abduction and murder. The authorities believed that the killings were politically motivated, as at that time a private war was being conducted between anti-communist members of Ang Bin Hoay and former members of the Communist Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army. His strong anti-communist views were a hurdle to repatriate him to China: ‘If he had not compromised himself by his avowed opposition to the Communist cause, we should have no hesitation, and no difficulty, in banishing him to China.” The detainee Ng Cheng Huat was born in the former Federated Malay States, but was not a Federal citizen.10

Another case (Wong) was more complicated as the banishee was not even born in Malaya. He was born in Saigon and was a member of the Communist terrorist organization, involved in criminal activities. After his surrender in 1949, he was employed as a detective in the Special Constabulary. In 1952, he was convicted of being in possession of opium and was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment. He was also suspected of selling opium, running illegal lotteries, taking part in an armed robbery, extorting money from shopkeepers, and planting ammunition on one of these shopkeepers. Efforts were made to banish this person to Vietnam but correspondences with the Vietnam authorities dragged on for over a year without result. As the surrendered terrorist could not be deported to China, the Federation decided that the Formosan authorities should be approached to accept him.11
It was doubted if Taiwan would accept any Chinese criminals, who were not born in Formosa or mainland China. If the Consul were to send Ng (member of a secret society), the British would be suspected of restoring a KMT thug. If the Consul were to send an ex-communist terrorist, Wong to Taiwan, there would be much danger here. The British Consul in Tamsui had his doubts as he opined: “I would go so far as to say that the authorities here would certainly refuse to allow him to come here unless they intended to shoot him. In any case I would much rather not touch the case, as we should undoubtedly be suspected of trying to plant a communist spy in Formosa.”

The Foreign Office also raised considerable doubt about these two cases. There was no obligation for Formosa to accept them since neither of the two Chinese was born in either Formosa or China. Notwithstanding the possible negative reaction of the Formosan authorities, the consul was requested to approach the government on the first case, since it would not cause a serious effect on relations with the Peking Government. The second case should not be brought up so as to avoid harmful repercussion. While the Federation appreciated the difficulties in Formosa, it was concerned to dispose Ng after his prison sentence expired on 11th July 1953. The Government was reluctant to detain Ng in prison indefinitely. The British Consulate in Tamsui, replied that the Nationalist authorities did not show any interest in Ng’s case when he first raised the matter: “there is little prospect of their agreeing to accept him now”.

The banishment route to China was closed. Owing to the difficulties experienced in banishing criminals to China (and also Taiwan), the Federation government suggested to have a penal settlement island. As China was unwilling to accept criminal banishees, the government was considering the idea of a “penal colony” – something akin to a rehabilitation centre – to confine the hard core criminals. Originally mooted in 1958, this island would house dangerous thugs, secret society gangsters and extortionists. Following a two-year survey of several offshore islands off both coasts of Malaya, the Government identified Tioman Island, 70 miles off the Pahang coast, as its penal settlement. Singapore also planned to set up a penal settlement on Pulau Senang for prisoners held under its Criminal Law Ordinance. By 1962, no decision had been reached and no suitable island had been found. In 1964, the government declared that the scheme was put on hold due to the difficulty in finding a suitable island for the proposed penal settlement.

### 4. Case Study 2: Dealing with Political Refugees from Hainan Island

In another separate incident, the Malayan government was dealing with illegal entry of Chinese immigrants, claiming to be “political refugees”. Four PRC nationals landed at Mersing in the Federation of Malaya on 13th May 1955
from Hainan Island. They were “prohibited immigrants” under Section 8(h) and Section 8(0) of the Immigration Ordinance. Under Sections 5(l) and 6(l) of the similar act, they were liable to deportation. Investigation showed that they were not “political refugees in the accepted sense of the term” and the government labelled the case as a “genuine defection”.20 Allowing them the right to stay permanently would open the doors to a further influx of illegals. In due course, the illegals would request for their families and dependants to proceed to Malaya. It would be embarrassing for the Federation to accept them and it would clearly be harsh to deport them to China where they might in fact face death or imprisonment.21 The upmost consideration was to avoid setting “an awkward precedent”. The journey from Hainan to the East Coast of Malaya by means of a sailing junk could be undertaken easily during the North-East Monsoon. If the four illegals were allowed to remain in Malaya, there might be further illegals coming in. In line of the strict immigration policy, the government considered it “embarrassing” and “unwise” to accept the illegals.22

Prior to Malayan Independence, the Ministry of External Affairs had been utilizing the good offices of the Office of the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur for assistance in arranging repatriation to Formosa. A protracted correspondence with the Nationalists government resulted in the issuance of entry permits for the four illegal Hainanese, who arrived in Formosa in October 1956. The Nationalists’ willing attitude was shaped by two factors. First, the Malayan Government proposed to deport the Hainanese to Communist China after having failed to explore other alternatives. Second, the four Hainanese were opponents of Communism and they had asked to be sent to Formosa.23

National Independence in 1957 has not changed the “post-office” role of the British. The British were still willing to act as mediators for the independent Federation of Malaya:

It does not seem to us, in regard at least to this type of case, that Merdeka has any real effect on the duties we undertake on behalf of the Malayan Government and we feel, in fact, that there is advantage in our continuing to handle this type of case on their behalf rather than that they should be advised, as is suggested, to make their approach direct.24

On 21 February 1959, another group of four Hainanese men landed illegally at Sedili, Johore. Prosecuted for illegal entry, they served prison sentences in Johore Bahru Prison until July 1959.25 Since the Hainanese Chinese requested to be sent to Formosa, negotiations for banishment were carried out by the Federation Government through the United Kingdom High Commissioner in the Federation.26 The initial attempt made by the British Consulate, A. Veitch in Tamsui failed. In his conversation with the Consul
on 17 July 1959, the Counsellor for Foreign Affairs of Taiwan refused to accept the “refugees” from the Federation. As 1959 was World Refugee Year, the Federation was expected to take up the responsibility and allow them to remain in its territory. According to the Foreign Office, the Nationalist Government’s response was “a crafty one” and “groundless”. Both Taiwan and the Federation were participants in the World Refugee Year. The extent of their participation however, was open to interpretation: “It therefore seems open to the Federation to maintain, if they wish, that they prefer their ‘participation’ to take the form of financial aid, rather than the relaxation of immigration requirements”.

The Federation was firm in its position. It denied them asylum. As they pleaded not to be repatriated to Hainan (because of the fear of consequences from that regime for fleeing from Hainan), repatriating the four men to Taiwan would be the last solution. In a further attempt to persuade Formosa to open its door, the High Commissioner Office (HCO) in Kuala Lumpur (KL) directed A. Veitch to send a warning message to Formosa, threatening their banishment to Communist China, if Formosa still refused to accept them. Acting on this instruction, the consul sent a warning message to Formosa, thus pushing the Nationalists to take them upon the completion of their prison sentences. Threatening the Nationalists would not work in practice.

Taiwan’s attitude brought up the whole question of the right to “asylum”. The Foreign Office was concerned about the reputation of the Federation in the United Nations if the latter sent those seeking “political refuge” back to China against their will. The international community might look at the case as seeking the status of political asylum in the Federation. The Federation was reminded that the United Kingdom (UK) was a signatory to the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Rather than pushing (or threatening) to persuade the Nationalists to take them, the Federation was advised by the Foreign Office to consider the consequences of sending the men back to China. The UK had the responsibility to caution the Federation authorities that “their action may be liable to misinterpretation in the United Nations and elsewhere”. The Federation’s act would jeopardize the position of the UK. London was much concerned since the Federation had been using the service of the UK consulate posts in connection with repatriating the Chinese. The Commonwealth Relations Office expressed its apprehension that: “it is possible that we might find ourselves the object of criticism if it became known that we participated in the repatriation of these men to China”.

However, the Federation was not alone in handling such cases. Hong Kong appeared to act in contravention of Article 1(2) of the convention relating to the Status of Refugees when they pushed “back illegal immigrants through the fence into China”. The migratory trends among the Chinese
fleeing communist China were: 1) fleeing Hainan to the Federation, and 2) fleeing Kwangtung into Hong Kong. It was questionable whether the term “refugee” could be applied in the context of the Chinese arriving illegally in Hong Kong and Malaya. “Illegal immigrants” is a more proper connotation for these Chinese, who entered the Colony illicitly to join relatives in Hong Kong, or to earn a better living. The use of the word “refugee” was somewhat “misleading” as Hong Kong regarded, treated and dealt with them as “illegal immigrants”. N.C.C. Trench from the Foreign Office admitted that “the case of the four Hainanese is not a perfectly clear-cut one of persons motivated solely by the desire to seek political asylum”. It was not clear whether they left China purely for political considerations or for a better economic livelihood. In the case of uncertainty, Trench suggested “it seemed reasonable to give the Hainanese the benefit of the doubt…”

Hainanese Chinese fleeing China may not be regarded as “refugees” or “genuine political escapees”. The Chinese refugees outlined economic hardship and the difficult life in China, rather than Communist oppression or escaping political persecution, as the main reason of fleeing Red China (Peterson, 2014: 468). As a refugee from Hainan in Malaya (Yang Chung Yim, 65 years old) put it:

We decided to come to your country a month ago. The opportunity came on Feb 25 when our government sent us out to fish…. So we started our mission. We had with us some porridge. We chose your country because we had heard much about Malaya and that the Chinese here were doing fine…. Back home we were living from hand to mouth. Our families are suffering and we cannot bear it any longer…. We would rather die in your country than go back to China.

Yang was one of the eight fishermen who fled from the Communist island of Hainan and journeyed for 11 days before reaching Kuala Besut in March 1961, seeking refuge in Malaya. They were all working as fishermen for the Government of Communist China in a cooperative department in Hainan. A day later, they were transferred to the Prison at Pengkalan Chempa (Kelantan) and stayed in the prison prior to being sent back to China. The refugee group expressed its wish to stay permanently in Malaya and start life afresh in the country. According to one of them, Tan Kia Chin, Malaya was “a paradise” compared to the hard life they had had on Hainan Island: “If only we can make our home in Malaya, we would be the happiest people in the world.” The Hainanese people seeking sanctuary in British Malaya were refused asylum. For Formosa, they were defined as “refugees” but for Malaya, the Hainanese did not fit into Malaya refugee regime simply because there was no refugee regime in Malaya and Malaya was not a signatory to the Convention.
On 24 October 1959, after a protracted discussion, the Taiwan Provincial Government finally agreed in principle to accept them, provided that they applied for entry permits and the Federation bore the costs of repatriation incurred in the course of their journey from Malaya to Formosa and arranged for transit visas for Hong Kong. The case was closed in May 1960. These refugees arrived at Keelung on 24 May and were met by the Free China Relief Association.

5. Turning to the Free China Relief Association: A Non-Official Alternative

The government was quite right that a flood of similar cases soon followed. The flow of “refugees” continued to flourish – in family units. Fifteen refugees fled from Hainan, arrived illegally in Kukup, Johore on 11 March 1960 after a perilous two-month journey of over 1,700 miles. Local Hainanese fishermen brought them to the Kukup police station where they surrendered themselves. The _Straits Times_ reported that their plea for “political asylum” was rejected, following which they were to choose one of two courses: 1) to sail away in the same junk, or 2) to be repatriated to Formosa. Five men were detained in the Johor Bahru police station while the three women and seven children were accommodated in the Social Welfare Home. Negotiations resumed between the Federation Government and the Formosa Government through the UK High Commissioner for their repatriation. As stated by the immigration officer of the Johore state government: “All of them are illegal immigrants. We cannot keep them in Malaya indefinitely.” The working principle behind the rejection of the granting of political asylum was that “any relaxing of the normal Immigration restrictions might lead to a flood of similar cases.”

The refugees declared that they fled from Communist China because of the unbearable living conditions there and pleaded not be repatriated to Communist China. Fearing reprisals, they elected to go to Formosa. Again, the Ministry of External Affairs approached the grace of the British Consulate at Tamsui to make enquiries to Formosa. This party of fifteen Chinese refugees were more complicated to deal with compared with the previous group because they consisted of 3 families (5 males, 3 females and 7 children) of whom the Federation Government refused to give permission to remain in the country.

At a decisive juncture, the Free China Relief Association at Taipei offered its assistance. For all this while, the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) had been helping Commonwealth countries, which did not have their own diplomatic mission in a country. The Foreign Office agreed that Malaya should take up the Association’s offer of help as long as this did not
compromise the Malayan attitude on recognition. The offer was a useful opportunity for the Malayan Government to deal directly with the Association in such cases. However, accepting the offer might imply that Malaya recognized the Nationalists as the Association has its official backing. The Association was well-known for its efficiency not only for resettling Chinese refugees coming from the mainland to Formosa, but also victims of natural disaster. It was through the agency that the Nationalist authorities channelled its relief measures. It was a semi-official organization taking into consideration of the leadership composition of the Association (the president and the general-secretary were the advisors to President Chiang Kai-shek).

Recognition and reciprocation were the main impediments. Kuala Lumpur was reluctant to deal directly with the Free China Relief Association on several accounts. First, the Federation was anxious to avoid any action that might be construed or implied as recognition of the Nationalists. Second, reciprocation might be used as a bargaining chip. KL feared that the Association might seek the assistance of the Federation in future cases of Chinese refugees wishing to seek entry. KL reiterated its preferences to handle this case through the Consul in Tamsui. Kuala Lumpur’s apprehension to deal directly with the Association was shared by the British Consul in Tamsui, who reported that Formosa might regard direct dealing with the semi-official Free China Relief Association as an important step in establishing diplomatic relations with Malaya. Accepting the Association’s offer would be diplomatically “embarrassing” and the Nationalists would publicize the “friendly” attitude of the Federation towards Formosa.

By June 1960, there were signs of reluctance from the Foreign Office in assisting Kuala Lumpur’s repatriation efforts. In the past, the FO helped and intervened when the Association had not offered their assistance. N.C.C Trench in his letter to the Consul in Tamsui stated that:

> We were not altogether happy about the prospect of asking you to take action in the future over such cases. The advantages to the Federation are of course obvious, but, while we do not want to appear unhelpful, we think that it is not altogether reasonable for them to expect us to risk trouble with Peking over such questions, in order to enable the Government of the Federation to keep their own hands clean.

The FO suggested to the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) to request Kuala Lumpur to make use of the Association in the future. In his response, the British consul in Tamsui agreed that it was unreasonable for the Malayan government to expect his office to continue handling such cases with the Nationalists. If the Federation were to recognize Peking in the future, the British would have to resume acting for them. Prior to that, the general consensus was that the handling of these matters should “pass to the Malayan
Government even though it may have to return to us in due course….”54 As events unfolded, the British realized that the issue was a “Malayan” problem. It was the Malayan unwillingness to correspond directly with the Nationalists and its reluctance to offer refuge to the Hainanese themselves. The office of H.B.M Chargé d’Affaires, Peking made the right point that Malaya must try to persuade the Nationalists to accept them or, alternatively, to offer them refuge. In considering any further similar requests from the Federation, the FO was reminded of the political risks they faced in order to help the Malayans out of difficulties.55

In a note dated 3rd October from the Formosan authorities, the fifteen refugees were denied entry. The British was asked to persuade the Malayan government to grant asylum on grounds of humanity and connectivity. The note stated that:

As this group of persons has succeeded in fleeing to Malaya under the leadership of Lim Joo Hooi, a former Singapore resident, and as most of them either were former local residents or were born locally, or have close relations living locally, it might be as well for the Government of Malaya, on the basis of humanity, to give them priority of consideration in granting them refuge and according them protection.56

On grounds of connectivity, at least one member of the party was born in Johore, and at least two others were former residents of Singapore and Hong Kong. Others had close relatives in Malaya. In making a formal approach to the Malayan government, the British were almost certain that they would refuse to allow these people to settle in the country. Ethnic balance played a critical role as admitted by the British: “Overriding all other considerations would be their firm determination to maintain the strictest possible control over the immigration into the country of non-Malays”.57 Moreover, there was a double standard in which Formosa accepted a large number of Chinese from Indonesia, but refused to accept fifteen more from the Federation. This double standard made it more difficult to persuade the Federation. Having to choose between deporting them to communist China and pleading to Formosa, Lovitt (of the High Commissioner’s Office) suggested that the British appeal to Formosa on humanitarian grounds.58

6. Shifting Attitude: Releasing the Commonwealth Relations Office’s Function

Time and again, the Foreign Office reiterated its uncomfortable position in acting as the middle person. KL seemed to have misunderstood the British role in the repatriation of Chinese refugees to Formosa. The Consul in Tamsui acted as a go-between as “a matter of courtesy” rather than “special
responsibility” on behalf of the Federation, which did not recognize both Chinese governments. The FO expressed that, “It was not our intention that we should assume any special responsibility for these refugees.”59 In other words, KL must solve its own problem when the Nationalist Authorities declined to take on these refugees. The British were keen to avoid giving the impression that they had any special responsibility. Any further involvement would cause the FO various “embarrassments”. First, repatriating the political refugees to China, posed an embarrassment to the British when the refugees considered themselves to be anti-communist. The FO would not take up the case with Peking should the Federation put forward such a request. Second, repatriating Chinese nationals to Formosa likewise was equally embarrassing, if the Peking Government knew about it.

We do not want to get ourselves any further involved as apologists for or pleaders for the Malayan Government and the Formosan Government. What should be done with the refugees is primarily a matter for the Malayan Government which they must decide in the light of the Formosan Authorities’ reply.60

Accordingly, the Malayan Government was made to understand that the responsibility for disposing of the persons must rest with KL. Kuala Lumpur must decide whether or not any approach was to be made to Formosa. It was both undesirable and unnecessary for the British to become involved.61 Lovitt’s suggestion that the British must appeal to Formosa on humanitarian grounds was not well received. Formosa was an administration, which the British only recognized as a local authority and the British would not go beyond their role to press Formosa. The British assistance in this matter should mainly be confined to: 1) acting as a post office in posts where the Malayans had no mission, or 2) conveying its request to the Colonial authorities if it wanted the British to receive these people in a Colonial territory. The CRO suggested two alternatives to KL: 1) an official basis (reconsidering accepting the Relief Association’s offer), and 2) a non-official basis (the illegal immigrants themselves petition the Relief Association). In both cases, the Federation role would not amount to recognition of the Formosa Government because its role would be limited to forward the petition to the organization.62

Having given prolonged consideration to the issue, the Commonwealth Relations Office instructed the High Commissioner’s Office to inform the Malayan Government of the Taiwan Provincial Government’s reply dated 3rd October 1960. The CRO did not wish either to “damage” its relations with Peking by pressing Formosa to receive the Chinese refugees or to deport refugees to Communist China since the United Kingdom is signatory to the Convention on the Status of Refugees. The role of the CRO reflected
the usual practice of the United Kingdom to offer diplomatic services to other Commonwealth Governments who were not represented in any given country. It is the practice to offer their services simply as an agent. The CRO ruled out any possibilities of receiving refugees in a British territory (if Malaya were to make such a request). Other possibilities were more promising: communicating with the Free China Relief Association or allowing the refugees to do so.\(^{63}\) In its reply to Abdul Hamid bin Pawanchee of the Ministry of External Affairs, the High Commissioner Office could not be more optimistic except to offer its service “to pass a further message to the Taiwan Provincial Government on your behalf if you wish … if the reply from the Formosan Provincial authorities is still negative I am afraid that we should not be able to help any further”\(^ {64}\).

As expected, the Federation strongly disagreed with Formosa’s argument on connections with the country. Connections alone could not establish their right of entry. There were about three million Chinese in the country and almost every one of them had some relatives in China. Thousands of alien Chinese (and other foreigners) who had closer connections with the country compared to the fifteen Hainanese had been refused entry to the Federation. Allowing the right of entry to alien Chinese from the mainland would “place the Federation Government in an untenable position vis-à-vis its immigration policy”.\(^ {65}\) This would contradict its immigration policy, which served to protect the economic and security interests of its citizens. The Federation wanted to avoid creating a precedent for more Hainanese Chinese to flee to Malaya. Taiwan, in the view of Malaya, had the moral responsibility to accept and resettle Chinese refugees. In a fairly threatening language, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned Taiwan of the damaging consequences should Taiwan still refuse to accept the refugees: “If it is known that they have to return to mainland as a result of the refusal of the Nationalist Government to accept them, the consequent reaction among anti-Communist Chinese will in our opinion be most unfavourable”.\(^ {66}\) Following the Malayan reply, the British Consulate continued to press the Provincial Government for an answer.\(^ {67}\)

The Taiwanese authorities finally succumbed. Upon its acceptance of the fifteen refugees, the Federation proceeded to complete the applications to enter Formosa.\(^ {68}\) The Federation Government repatriated five members of one family for a new life in Formosa on 19 December 1961. A family of five Hainanese, then sailed from Penang (transit point) to start a new life in Formosa. The father, Lim expressed his gratitude: “We are grateful to the Malayan Government for its kind treatment of us since our arrival here in March 1959…. We are indeed thankful that we can be sent to Formosa”.\(^ {69}\) Recalling the 15-day fleeing attempt, the father said, “It was a desperate ordeal. We had made up our minds that if we were chased by the Communists, we would all jump into the sea. We decided we would rather die
than go back”.70 Two weeks later, the remaining ten of the 15 refugees were in Penang awaiting repatriation to Formosa after they escaped to Malaya in March 1959.71

All attempts to persuade the Federation Government to use the Free China Relief Association as a mediator with Taiwan had failed. When another group of eight refugees landed at Kuala Besut in March 1961, the HCO was convinced that deporting them to Taiwan was the only alternative.72 However, the British did not want to involve themselves in any similar cases. Instead of asking their Consul in Tamsui to act as intermediary between the Formosan authorities and the Federation, the Foreign Office suggested utilizing another mediator – the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – to take up future cases with Formosa. The FO stated its readiness to approach the ICRC once the Federation agreed. At this point, it should be noted that the FO still “took the matter in hand” by exploring non-official channels.73 The position of the FO was to relieve their Consul in Tamsui of this function. The British were keen to have the ICRC, rather than the Consul to deal with the group of eight refugees. Malaya should then handle these cases in future through the ICRC.74

In the end, the case of the eight refugees was solved in 1962 with seven of them (one died during detention) arriving in Penang en route to Formosa. It should be noted that the refugees were grateful to Malaya for making a special arrangement to Formosa rather than sending them to China. They expressed their gratitude for being able to start a new life in Formosa, though they were not welcome in Malaya – due to the strict immigration law. While awaiting their repatriation to Formosa, they were staying at the Kheng Chew Association, in which its members and the local community in the efforts of aiding the refugees had collected money in preparation for their trip to Formosa.75

7. Conclusions

The two cases discussed above highlighted the prominent “post-office” role played by the Commonwealth Relations Office in repatriating the Hainanese refugees. Independent Malaya played her diplomatic card and her post-colonial relations card very well with the British. A combination of threat and legal security consideration was used to persuade the CRO to believe that they had a special responsibility to deal with the Formosa government. While the responsibility hypothesis may not be a strong one, bona fide “threats” of sending them to China invoked apprehension, which was sufficient to make the CRO pressured Formosa. The threat was real as the so-called refugees were decisively denied asylum and the right to stay in Malaya. Diplomatic tools were well used in the negotiations. Above all, Formosa was the only dumping ground considering that Malaya did not recognize them as Chinese
political refugees and the British (recognizing their signatories to the Geneva Convention) were mindful of the consequences should they failed to negotiate on behalf of these refugees. Hence diplomatic negotiation continued alongside possible “handovers” to non-official bodies such as the Free China Relief Association and the ICRC beginning in 1960, but to no avail. Malayan strict adherence to the non-recognition of any Chinese governments (until 1974), made the state rely entirely on the British CRO in its dealing with Formosa.

This article also highlights the humane side of their banishment story, besides the emphasis on law enforcement and immigration breach. Beyond the rigid aspect of the law, there were humanitarian consideration shown both by the British and Formosan authorities. A humane touch was reflected in the story of these refugees, in which the British were most reluctant to send them back to communist China. Anti-communist banishees required a special consideration. The practice of banishment did not follow the principle of recognition, but on ideology and pragmatic grounds. The main consideration in establishing their country of destination was the expression of interests by the deportees and the willingness of Formosa to accept them. Even when the Foreign Office cautioned the HCO of the possible political risks if they continued to lend a hand to Tunku’s administration, the considerations had not seemed to affect the British attitude. Various reservations and worries expressed by the Foreign Office to relieve the CRO from its due tasks did not impinge on the British role as an effectual mediator for its former colony.

Notes

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40. Letter from Foreign Affairs Department, Taiwan Provincial Government to A. Veitch, Consul, 24 October 1959 FO 371/141320, FC 1583/5.
41. Letter from British Consulate, Tamsui to High Commissioner Office, KL, 30 May 1960, FO 371/150481, FC 1583/1.
42. Straits Times, “Govt. rejects political asylum plea by 15 refugees,” 30 April 1960.
48. Letter from Foreign Office to Tamsui, 26 May 1960, FO 371/150481, FC 1853/2.
53. Ibid.
56. Note from the Foreign Affairs Department, Taiwan Provincial Government to British Consulate, Tamsui, 3 October 1960, FO 371/150481, FC 1583/7.
58. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
63. Telegram from CRO to KL, 2 February 1962, FO 371/158438, FC 1821/4.
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