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Knowing “China” through a Religious Lens: Engagement, Self-fulfillment, and Scholarship

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Introduction

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In Huntington’s formulation, civilizations are primarily religious. For him, though, the clash of civilizations takes place between sovereign entities. In this light, the end of the European religious war in the Treaty of Westphalia, that substituted sovereign nations for the Church, profoundly shaped the contemporary international relations and global governance. Thus, the subsequent expansion of the European order through colonialism encountered multiple worlds that were embedded in various different cosmological imaginations. These strangers mingled after this continuous process initiated by such expansion. Even so, invaders and defenders have entrenched a self-other, believer-alien, or West-East binary in the mind of the ensuing generations to save the ostensibly pure beliefs of each.

Therefore, in the age of globalization, an intellectual history, informed by religious beliefs and practices, is indispensable for appreciating the irony of strangers in the self and the self in strangers. Amidst the perceived rise of China in the 21st century, however, defending purity is no longer restricted to reproducing the Christian-Islamic binary. However, China is not easily defined in religious terms as the population within the Chinese official borders and nor do Chinese overseas subscribe to a single, dominant religion. Such a land of multiple Gods complicates China’s civilizational identity. With all Gods being plausible, religious multiplicity engenders both the hope for preaching any tenets and the danger of facing heathenhood. One noticeable form of the latter is Communist atheism.

In a nutshell, the religion-informed epistemology in China studies and China policy circles deserves more attention, not least because it complicates, rather than purifies, the binaries. This special issue aims to rediscover some of these religious legacies as a way to understand and appropriate China.1

1 The work described in the special issue was partially supported by grants from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No.:UGC/IDS14/17) and the Research and Educational Center for Mainland China Studies and Cross Taiwan-Strait Relations, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University.
Explicitly or implicitly, these legacies reconstruct, reproduce, and represent China to the effect that China, as a familiar category of reference, is either reinforced or deconstructed. The special issue will, likewise, reveal the prior relations that have commonly constituted, and thus connected, the modern narratives on China in terms of observers and activists’ ethnicity, nationality, colonial experience, modernity, institution, intellectual history, conviction and cosmology, in combination with their religious beliefs. To tackle their ways of thinking and acting, the authors of this volume reflect upon the intellectual liaison provided by the missionaries, revolutionaries, academics, policy-makers, and political activists at different sites, geo-culturally as well as textually.

In this special issue, religion refers broadly to “practices of faith regarding the natural and supernatural forces.” Practices contain many aspects, including running religious organizations, interpreting sacred texts, sending missionaries, engaging in national politics, translating cultural messages, dealing with rival religions, and reflecting upon and enhancing the self, among others. All of these aspects must take place in at least one relational community that undergirds the practices of a particular faith and provides appreciative feedback. Identifying the relational community, to whom observers and activists speak intellectually, reveals how contrasting civilizational narratives can alternatively re/construct the self and the other. These narratives are the source of the relational divides that politicians can evoke to realign the audience for an imagined clash of civilizations.

The special issue explores and considers dubious Chinese religiosity in accordance with the self-positioning asserted by an observer or activist vis-à-vis an imagined China, Chinese culture, or Chinese population. When a scholar or practitioner adopts a religious lens, e.g. Christianity, she may choose to adopt a universal approach to everything in the world. Her approach to Chinese religion in general, and a certain Chinese religion, e.g. Buddhism or Daoism, specifically, would constitute a straight application of that faith. Given the universal approach, there would be no necessity to differentiate the lens applied to the understanding of China or her own community. That said, she can be devoted to the integration and survival of her own community (China or not) alone, rather than converting or averting an external community through a universal lens. This latter focus on local identification would constitute religious nationalism. Finally, she may acquire joint lessons from a few religions on different sides of the alleged fault lines, e.g. Confucianism plus Hinduism, Confucianism plus Christianity, or Confucianism plus Islam, and compose a bridging narrative to improvise a hybrid China, so universalism, nationalism, and relationalism are practically all plausible.

Self-imagined positions reflect the intention of an observer or practitioner to enlist specific religious resources, which at least include beliefs and
institutions. The clash of civilizations can be a legitimate concern only if
the enlisted religious narratives trigger the spread of a relational binary. On
the contrary, a hybridity-conscious narrative undermines the imagination of
the clash of civilizations. Derived from the implicit self-imagined positions
reviewed in the ensuing chapters, three agendae that defy the theme of the
clash of civilizations appear plausible:

1. Engagement, an agenda that studies how religious inspiration prompts the
   active involvement of the religious scholars and practitioners in engaging
   China in their respectively chosen category – (a) the Chinese nation, as
   in Yitzhak’s chapter, (b) the East Asian Sphere, as in Shin’s chapter, (c)
   Chinese civilization, as in Voskressenski’s chapter, as well as (d) the
   Chinese Communist Party, as in Lam’s chapter;
2. Self-fulfillment, an agenda that conceives of religion as resources for the
   self-fulfillment of the scholars and practitioners, that has implications for
   the understanding of Chineseness in their resistance to (a) colonialism,
   as in Shih’s chapter, (b) industrialization, as in Thomas’ chapter, and (c)
   socialist modernity, as in Buyanchugla’s chapter;
3. Scholarship, an agenda that traces and gathers the evolution of the
   religious intellect to bridge the two populations at a distance, through (a)
   linguistic expertise, as in Paternicò’s chapter, (b) classic humanities, as
   in Ertuğrul’s chapter, and (c) psychology, as in Poon’s chapter.

In these chapters, the clash of civilizations is not a dominant narrative.
This is because, at the micro level, the external actors have the religious
incentive to show their goodwill in order to engender trust in the alter
population. Nevertheless, neither is it likely that an external actor would
act on behalf of a universal spirit to become completely exempt from an
imagined clash. This is because a sense of superiority or inferiority, albeit
ambiguous and indirect at times, is inevitably registered in both parties to the
encounter. The missionaries will assimilate Chinese values and ways of life
(Voskressenski) while, concomitantly, at least a portion of the encountering
intellects acquire a new religious lens from China to cope with strangeness or
alienation (Ertuğrul; Thomas). Both sides may feel superior to some extent,
(Poon) especially in the spiritual world, but the materially dependent party
will not always suffer inferiority, for the stronger party has the will to engage
(Thomas; Yitzhak; Paternicò).

Accordingly, no felt clash of civilization looms as inevitable. One
major reason for this is that a call for unity that aims to resolve the political,
social, and cultural split between allegedly indigenous and vicarious forces
is impractical in daily life (Buyanchugla). The vicarious force represents the
foreign civilization. An imagined fault line thus exists inside the indigenous
population while, (Lam) in practice, all designated, vicarious actors are
consciously hybrid and, therefore, not convincingly on the other side. Another consideration is the interlocked imagination of a fault line between the nation and an alien force or resource (Shin; Poon). As such, the alleged clash assumes the political function of forcing the population within to choose sides (Lam). At least, it may serve the politics of identity by reproducing a discursive binary between two imagined entities (Shih). Moreover, politics of identity may reinforce an inferior-superior consciousness (Buyanchugla).

Ultimately, the clash of civilizations is, at best, an insolvent narrative, to the extent that a platform, hub, or bridge, which accommodates both civilizations, is too engaged to justify the use of a binary (Yitzhak; Ertuğrul; Paternicò). This platform enacts mutuality, which is usually symbolized by in-betweenness. It can be an individual, organization, or geographical site. Its function is to maintain the process of continual exchange. The platform, e.g. student, missionary, or treaty port, can be either active or passive (Voskressenski). An active platform enlightens each party to sympathize with their counterparts (Shih). The two sides that find the other in the self will reduce the degree of estrangement and enhance the degree of appreciation (Yitzhak). A passive one absolves differences without forcing a resolution, as if no cognitive incongruence requires a solution (Buyanchugla).

Consequently, no civilizational binary commands popularity in our cases, except where the Chinese indigenous volition asserts a superior scholarship in Chinese psychology by appropriating Buddhism (Poon), or the Chinese authorities force believers to privilege patriotism over universalism (Lam). Pertaining to the relationships between scholars and practitioners, on the one hand, and their imagined China/Chineseness on the other, authors find that at least two alternatives to binary are plausible and relatively stable – (1) relationally hierarchical (Shin; Buyanchugla; Paternicò; Lam) and (2) hybrid/indeterminate (Ertugrul; Shih; Yitzhak; Voskressenski). They reveal that nationalism can contribute to both binary and hierarchical religiosity. In practice, though, universalism cannot help but evolve into pluriversalism. Finally, intersections of civilizations, cosmologies, ethnicities, and populations indicate relationalism.

This special issue contains three sections accordingly. The first section – Engagement – covers four papers that demonstrate how religion inspires practices. Yitzhak Shichor’s presentation on Jewishness, as embedded in *Tikkun Olam*, insists on a connection between activists, despite their ideologically opposing stance. Their respective dedication to the Chinese socialist revolution and capitalist reform testifies to a beneficial commitment to the world that is shared by the disciples of Judaism. A reaching out gesture of this kind is ready to adapt to the Chinese conditions and wishes. It differs from another kind of universalism, that sets out to dissect and convert. Kawashima Shin traces the changing Buddhist perspectives on China before
WWII – from a source of inspiration to an example of inferiority. The latter arose during the Japanese imperialist expansion period. Imperialism obliged the proselytization of Japanese Buddhism to China from a self-regarded higher position. Alexei Voskressenski interrogates the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church regarding the establishment of professional Sinology in Russia. He attempts to offer a plausible answer by painstakingly analyzing the activities and achievements of the first 15 Orthodox missions in China, especially their recruitment of accompanying students, whose learning later proved an invaluable resource for Russian Sinology. Anselm Lam deals with the difficult conditions of Chinese Christianity, under which the Vatican has endeavoured to establish official relations under the prevailing demand of the CCP for the prioritization of patriotism over faith. China’s religious policy has constrained the Vatican’s view of Chinese Christianity but has not compromised the Vatican’s universal concern.

The theme of the second section is self-fulfillment. It contains three papers. Chih-yu Shih’s analysis of Taiwan’s nationalist pursuit results in a less binary identity politics compared to the colonially-embedded anti-China sensibilities that are usually registered in this campaign. He finds that the Taiwan Presbyterian Church has offered an introspective alternative through its advocacy of “contextual theology” that inspired resistance to Japanese colonialism initially and the migrant regime of the Chinese Civil War tradition much later. Michael Thomas then reviews the appropriation of Chinese Daoism by Martin Heidegger to tackle “the meaning of the question of being” and explain his pursuit of Phenomenology in a philosophical struggle against a materialist understanding of being, which industrialization delineates. Buyanchugla Sajirahu’s description of the healing function of Shamanism likewise illustrates this introspective orientation. Shamanism was reduced to a disposable practice under Socialist modernity. It has been permitted since the reform era, since when it has, unexpectedly, thrived because it shields Mongolian believers from the force of alienation inflicted by the overwhelming reform and openness, and ensuing global modernity. Resistance is internally tamed to the extent that reconnection to a supernatural spirit subdues the relevance of Socialist China.

The third section likewise contains three papers, focused on scholarship. Luisa M. Paternicò analyses the contribution of Protestant periodicals, including the *Chinese Repository* and *China Review*, to the study of Sinitic languages. Their authors – mainly Christian missionaries – and their background prove fundamental in understanding their dedication to learning the Chinese dialects, paving the way for modern analyses and perspectives on Chinese. Ertuğrul Ceylan argues that an uncharacteristic force of Hui-Confucians arose at the end of the Ming Dynasty to re-constitute Chineseness. This has proved to be an important legacy that continues to facilitate a mutual
understanding between disciples of Islam and Confucianism. He specifically introduces the indispensable Hui-Confucian scholar, Wang Daiyu, in this tradition. Finally, Joe Poon discovers an ironic string of Buddhist psychology that pursues a binary rather than transcendence. In this particular string, he notices an academic determination to show that Buddhist psychology is superior to Western psychology. However, comparative psychology within the Chinese literature that has emerged from Hong Kong and Taiwan complicates the East-West binary to some extent.

It is noticeable that Buddhism, which is presumably inward-looking, can be both nation-centric, as revealed in the advocacy of Buddhist psychology, and interventionist, as during Japan’s proselytization of Buddhism to China before WWII. In comparison, Christianity, which is presumably interventionist in nature, as practiced within all missionary activities, can also be introspective, as demonstrated by the case of the nationalist pursuit of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church. Moreover, a nationalist religion can either inspire a focus on distinctive Chineseness, as in the obliged patriotism vis-à-vis the Vatican, or leave Chineseness in oblivion, as achieved by the healing through Shamanism. An in-between role is more active and conscious at the micro level, as enacted by Hui-Confucian scholars who reconcile Islam and Confucianism or Judaist intellectuals who seek to bridge ideological gaps of all sorts, compared with the macro level. Religion does not adhere to a particular political agenda, so Judaism primarily encourages engagement rather than specific tenets.

Together, we argue that the importance of religions in facilitating an approach to studying/understanding/enacting China is apparent; but how these religions function as a way to access deeper understanding depends on, in a nutshell, the choices of their believers as well as the perceived conditions of China.

Before closing, a note on hiatus appears appropriate. In the process of this collective project, we lost two papers. One was on the Sikh notion of satnam, which presumably shows how to break the cycle of rebirth, bring equality, and even move beyond the centrality of community. It insinuates an open cosmological order that renders the clash of civilizations inapt. The other was concerned with Chinese scholarship that served as a cultural bridge by translating Hindu texts and ideas for Chinese readers. We hope that these topics will emerge successfully elsewhere. Finally, we failed to recruit a discussant on the role and practice of atheism within the history of Chinese Communism.
SECTION 1

ENGAGEMENT
Combining Contradictions: 
Jewish Contributions to the Chinese Revolution

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University of Haifa and
Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Abstract
Jews were deeply involved in Communist revolutions in Europe, and primarily in Russia, often in leading positions. This is understandable given their demographic location, extensive education and suffering over the years. However, how could we account for the fact that they also played a role in Communist revolutions in Asia, and especially in China? There were practically no Jewish communities to speak of and those few who lived there had been almost totally assimilated, and had no interest whatsoever in Chinese culture, history and politics. Still, Jews (who arrived out of China) not only took part in the revolution but had also helped igniting it and then stayed on or joined later. While dealing with this puzzle in my paper, I’ll try to offer a typology of Jewish activists and revolutionaries in China, to explain their motives (by choice or not), and to evaluate their contributions in perspective. It appears that their Jewish identity did not play a direct role in their revolutionary activism, but it did play an indirect role. Included in this study are Grigorii Gershuni, Grigorii Voitinski, Boris Shumiatsky, Michail Borodin, Adolf Joffé, Pavel Mif, David Crook, Sidney Rittenberg, Israel Epstein, Sidney Shapiro, Solomon Adler, Sam Ginsbourg, Michael Shapiro, and more. Their main value to the revolution was mainly writing, translation, communication and publication. Although they were all deeply committed to the Chinese Communist revolution, some of them were jailed – for years – and occasionally more than once. Nonetheless, they continued to believe in, and even to justify, the Chinese Communist Party.

Keywords: Jewish activists, Chinese Communist Revolution, Jewish identities, Tikkun ‘Olam, Jewish Revolution
1. Introduction

Jewish participation in radical social movements and revolutionary activities is not an exceptional phenomenon in modern history. There is much evidence for it all over the world, especially in Europe. Jews not only joined Leftist and Communist movements, but also assumed leadership positions in many, notably in the Russian Revolution. This is understandable given their share in the population (about three million in Russia in 1917); their infusion with the local language and culture; their political, social and economic persecution and suffering throughout the years under the czars and other oppressors; and their religious background, educational achievements and intellectual level.

At the same time, many Jews firmly opposed communism and upheld capitalism. Occasionally, Jewish families split between those who were for, or against, communism. Common in the West, none of these rivalries had existed in China. There, Jewish communities were not only minute but had no interest in joining a revolution. China became a haven for Russian and European Jews who had escaped persecution and death. In China they gained shelter, freedom and prosperity. Jewish communities that had settled in China before, notably in Kaifeng, assimilated and none survived. Associated with British values, Baghdadi Jews had settled mainly in Shanghai and Hong Kong from the mid-1850s, betraying no interest in revolution, least of all communist. In fact, they had known practically nothing about it. Socialism had been insignificant in late 19th century China. Like most Western doctrines, socialism penetrated Asia via Japan, adopted by expatriate Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese intellectuals and activists.

Initially, of the different kinds of socialism “imported” to Japan, communism (and Karl Marx) were the least attractive to Chinese intellectuals. Considered too violent, the notions of “class struggle” contradicted traditional Confucian values of harmonious and integrative society, and the thought that “workers” represented the “universal” and “revolutionary” class, did not conform to pre-modern Chinese beliefs. Unlike Japan, the forerunner in Asia’s industrialization and urbanization, “modern” China remained backward and agrarian. Its bourgeoisie and proletariat, were too weak and underdeveloped, to create revolutionary conditions and incentives. Therefore, intellectuals preferred Western social democracy or state socialism, which still accorded predominance to the government, to rule by merit, and to social cohesion – according to traditional values. Whatever socio-political opposition and ideological radicalism existed, they were articulated not by Marxist communism, but by anarchism. Mao Zedong, one of the founders and later
leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), regarded himself as anarchist up to the early 1920s (Mao, 1978: 20). Among “importers” of anarchism to Japan and, indirectly, to China (and East Asia), was a Jewish Lithuanian activist, Grigory Gershuni.

Unlike leading Chinese anarchists who were intellectuals and theoreticians (Zarrow, 1990), Gershuni became a professional anarchist. Although, like other Jewish revolutionaries, he totally absorbed Russian culture, he was still proud of his Jewish origins and ability to fight antisemitism, using violence if needed. A founder of the Workers’ Party for the Political Liberation of Russia, in 1901, after his arrest, he became a co-founder of the Social-Revolutionary (SR) Party. In 1902, he launched the Party’s Combat Organization, which engaged in assassinations and terrorist acts. Betrayed by one of his “colleagues”, he was arrested in 1903, and a year later exiled to a prison (a labour camp) in east Siberia in the region of Nerchinsk (Gershuni, 2015: xi, xvi; 1919; Viktor, 1934). Before his arrest, he agreed to a “temporary alliance with the Constitutional Democrats (Geifman, 1993: 339).” In 1906, stuck in a barrel of sauerkraut, he escaped to China and thence to Japan. There, he met 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War prisoners, and Asian activists (like Sun Yat-sen) (Crump, 1983: 218-221, 236). This was perhaps the first time that Asian “revolutionaries” became familiar with practical anarchism. Socialism was less attractive because it did not relate to nationalism and lacked the organizational tools of making revolution. Gershuni offered some of the tools, turning anarchism into the most popular Western ideology in early 20th century East Asia. Yet, shortly, anarchism was outpaced by Leninism, which handed solutions to both hurdles: nationalism and organization – thereby triggering Chinese communism and launching the most remarkable event in Chinese history, to this very day. Gershuni had failed because he promoted only one aspect of the revolution, the destructive rather than the constructive. Initially impressed, Chinese radicals later found it negative and unacceptable.

According to conventional wisdom, Chinese communism originated in the May Fourth Movement (1919) (Chow, 1960; Elleman, 2002). Allegedly, it was the Versailles Conference decision to give part of Shandong, formerly a German concession, to Japan. Disappointed, thousands of demonstrators expressed their anger against the Western powers, and especially against the United States (and particularly President Wilson’s) “betrayal”, which apparently led students and intellectuals to adopt Marxism-Leninism and the Russian Revolution. Thus, “The CCP was a direct product of the intellectual ferment that accompanied the anti-imperialist demonstrations commonly referred to as the May Fourth Movement (1919) (Saich, 2014).” Yet this may have not been the real story. In 1922, Japan returned Shandong to China. Washington’s “betrayal” was forgotten or ignored, and the US
began to associate with the Chinese Republic – and still does. Furthermore, “intellectual ferment”, or ideology, is not a substitute to organization. And, Marxism-Leninism was not the only option available to Chinese intellectuals of the May Fourth era, but there was no other organization to promote alternative ideologies. Indeed, Chinese students and intellectuals favoured Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet option, less voluntarily (or in reaction to the West) and more because of Bolshevik endeavours and activities of the Comintern, coincidentally established in March 1919. Comintern “missionaries” not only distributed Soviet-inspired ideology but, moreover, orchestrated the establishment of communist cells, and ultimately of the CCP (Shichor, 2015: 62-77). It was then that Jewish activists began to play a role in the Chinese revolution. Their “Jewishness” was never directly – or even indirectly – related to their activism or influence. Still, their activism had something in common – if not consciously then maybe subconsciously – that had underlay their mission in China. They have promoted China’s revolutionary goals, in different stages and capacities while trying to overcome contradictions, overarch differences, mediate rivalries and unify opposites, thereby merging Chinese and Jewish traditions, East and West.

This article contains three parts. The first concentrates on the Jewish role in the introduction of communism to China, and overcoming CCP-GMD divergence, in 1919-1949. The second discusses the attempts of expatriate Jews, who had entered China mainly in the 1930s and 1940s, to bridge the gap between China and the outside world. The third part explores the role of Jewish advisers in appropriating capitalism – or free market economy – by post-Mao China, as a predominant component of Deng Xiaoping’s reform but also – perhaps not intentionally – as a precondition to the ultimate accomplishment of Marxist communism.

2. 1919-1949: Bridging Communism and Nationalism

Around the second decade of the 20th century, Jews played a role in communist movements far beyond their share in the population of their countries. This is especially true about the Russian Revolution (Frantzman, 2017). Of the seven members of the first Bolshevik Politburo, on the revolution’s eve – four were Jewish: Trotsky (Lev Davidovich Bronstein), Kamenev (Lev Borisovich Rozenfeld), Zinoviev (Hirsch Apfelbaum), and Sokolnikov (Hirsh Yankelevich Brilliant). Other prominent Jews included Litvinov (Meir Henoch Wallach-Finkelstein), Karl Radek (Karol Sobelsohn), Bela Kun (Béla Kohn). Many of the chief Soviet and Comintern missionaries in China were Jewish: Grigorii Naumovitch Voitinski, Mikhail Borodin (Gruzenberg), Adolf Joffe, Pavel Mif, Nikolsky (Vladimir Abramovich Neumann [Neiman]) (Wilbur & How, 1989: 27-28; Abramov, 2005), Boris
Zakharovich Shumiatsky, and a few others. Without homeland, Jews could overcome nationalist feelings and adopt universalist perspectives. There was also no need to convert and relinquish their religion, which communism rejected anyway; instead, Jews could easily adopt another culture and ideology, especially Marxism-Leninism, a substitute to a genuine national culture they did not have (Slezkine, 2004: 66-70). For them, China’s remoteness, geographically and culturally, did not matter. As a universal ideology, Marxism-Leninism could apply to all countries. Jews, not restricted by exclusive national commitments, could (and some felt – should) play a revolutionary role everywhere, China included. And they did, in their own way.

Borodin and Voitinski were among the leading Comintern “missionaries” to China, whose support for the establishment of the CCP was indispensable. While Borodin is usually associated with the Nationalist Party (GMD, Guomindang), his mission was ultimately and fundamentally to promote the CCP. Born Mikhail Markovich Gruzenberg, aged 16 he joined the Bund (the General Jewish Workers’ Union), an organization of intellectuals who still upheld their Jewish identity. In 1900, it was the largest social-democratic organization in Russia (Jacobs, 1981: 2). Whatever Jewish religious education and cultural values he had received, he later renounced – like most Jewish revolutionaries if not all of them (33). Like them, he sought better life, not just for Jews but also for humankind. This could not be achieve by a weak minority, or by the social democrats. Universally applied, Bolshevism was supposed to cure social evils everywhere.

Borodin’s tools in promoting communism in China were his organizational capabilities, personal impression, and “extraordinary intellect and encyclopedic knowledge”, especially of Marxism and Western philosophy and history (69). Officially, Lenin sent him to China as an adviser to Sun Yat-sen, who led a separate nationalist regime in Guangzhou (Canton). Borodin arrived in Beijing in 1923, proceeding to Guangzhou on October 6. His message to the GMD, only partly accepted, included land distribution; raising workers’ wages; and shortening their workdays. He regarded these land and labour reforms as a basis for uniting the CCP and the GMD – and China. According to Russian sources, a group of Americans, probably antisemitic, asked Sun Yat-sen if he had known Borodin’s real name. Sun reportedly replied: “I Know”, it is “Lafayette” (as cited in Jacobs, 1981, 126). Unlike other Jewish Soviet agents who, while in Kaifeng, established relations with the remnants of the Jewish community there (155), Borodin’s interests lay elsewhere. His efforts focused on the communists whose influence in the GMD grew quickly, also thanks to him.

His insistence on CCP-GMD unity reflected his belief, which he occasionally stated, that China was not ready for communism, and would not be for decades (Jacobs, 1981: 187; Elleman, 1995: 450-480). In a retrospective
view, he was right. In 2020, as these words are written, communism in China
is still far away on the horizon, despite CCP rule since October 1949. But in
March 1926, Chiang Kai-shek turned against the communists in Shanghai, and
Borodin – whose trust in Chiang vanished – had led the revolution in Wuhan
by the end of the year. Without him the Wuhan Government would not have
existed, nor survived. Escaping Chiang’s reprisal, Borodin began his departure
in July 1927, arriving in Soviet soil in late September. Initially backed by
Stalin, he managed, for a while, to stay out of jail, and execution. But, as
Stalin’s antisemitism and suspicions of Comintern activism abroad grew,
Borodin, being both Jewish and internationalist, was targeted. In early 1949,
he was arrested, never seen again, and died in prison in Yakutsk on May 29,
1951, aged 67. To the end, he defended Stalin’s united front policy (Messmer,
2012: 103). While most scholars, as well as CCP leaders, still regard Stalin’s
China policy as a grave mistake, in today’s perspective he may have been
right, certainly in Marxist-Leninist terms, and in Borodin’s view.

His principal contribution to the Chinese revolution was CCP-GMD unity,
which implied that the bourgeoisie is an essential precondition for achieving
communism. Disregarded by Mao Zedong (and later by Stalin and most
“communist” leaders), some Chinese leaders, especially those who had spent
their youth in Western Europe following World War I, agreed (Levine, 1993;
Bailey, 1988: 441-461; Hirayama, 2018: 353-374). They included leaders like
Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yi, Li Fuchun and primarily Deng Xiaoping who,
since the early 1950s, believed that the attempts to accomplish socialism,
and communism, had to be based first on economic development. Yielding to
Mao’s policy, it was these leaders, headed by Deng, who, after Mao’s death,
launched economic reforms and free market policies, to lay the infrastructure
for future communism. While this was not exactly what Borodin had in mind,
he still regarded collaboration with the bourgeoisie, and the capitalists, as
essential to accomplishing communism.

Borodin’s views were shared by Adolph Abramovich Joffé, who was
briefly the Soviet ambassador to the official government in Beijing (1922-
1924). Since his participation in the October 1917 revolution, he had held
several posts (deputy commissar of Foreign Affairs and then ambassador to
Germany). Born in the Crimea to a Jewish-Karaite family (Lindemann, 1997:
430), he tried hard to convince Sun Yat-sen to trust Moscow. Like Borodin,
he believed that a precondition for the success of communism in China (and
elsewhere) is a strong bourgeoisie. For Sun, this was a fundamental policy
because he relied on rich capitalists. Still, Joffe’s appeal, in fact one of the
conditions for Soviet support, was rejected. Sun said that communism and the
Soviet model could not be introduced in China, to which Joffe agreed. Instead,
he emphasized that national unification and independence were essential.
Joffe pursued GMD recognition of the CCP, and GMD-CCP collaboration –
regarded as a precondition for Soviet support to the GMD (Wilbur & How, 1989: 54-63, 80). Indeed, in September 1922, shortly after Joffe’s arrival in China, Sun Yat-sen admitted the first CCP members into the GMD (Pantsov, 2000: 57, 105). Joffe’s policy was accepted by the Soviet politburo. Gravely ill, he left China and, having been an ally of Trotsky, Stalin’s enemy, he committed suicide in November 1927.

While Marxism-Leninism had existed in parts of China as a theory, turning it into an organized activity began with Comintern missionaries, headed by Grigorii Naumovitch Voitinski, who dealt with setting up the CCP. Voitinski was not the first Comintern envoy to China: Maring, Burtman, Popov and Agaryov among others, had preceded him, but he was the most important and, in a sense, “the first”. “Voitinski would exercise an immense influence on the Chinese Communist Movement (Ishikawa, 2012: 95-119: Hu & Li, 2009: 87-92).” Also, the idea of forming a CCP had already circulated by that time, but no actions had been taken, before his arrival, aged 27, in April 1920.

He was born as Grigorii Naumovitch Zarkhin to a Jewish family in Nevel, Russia, in 1893. In 1918, shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution, he joined the Communist Party in Vladivostok. In 1920 he became deputy director of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau and left for China, where he met with Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao, the future CCP leaders. Although Chen toyed with the Communist idea as early as 1918, he had also been attracted by other ideas (like federalism). It was only after he met Voitinski that he became committed to Communism, not just in theory but also, and more important, in practice. It was following his meetings with Voitinski that the first communist cells had been formed – at least seven in different cities and provinces, before the CCP was organized. Voitinski’s promotion of Marxist study groups not only paved the ground for the establishment of Party cells but also for distributing Marxist-Leninist knowledge that Chinese intellectuals had been lacking (Elleman, 2002; Chen, 2016; Lu, 2014). True, socialist and Marxist study groups had existed well before Voitinski’s arrival in China, but there is a huge gap between theoretical study clubs and an actually organized party. To organize a party, external professional support was needed. Comintern agents, headed by Voitinski, provided it. His impact was felt not only in the emergence of anti-US feelings among Chinese intellectuals, but also, and more significantly, in fighting anarchism and in its eventual demise. Voitinski helped Chen to organize the Socialist Youth Corps in Shanghai, in August 1920. Earlier, in May, soon after his arrival, he encouraged a group of intellectuals to establish a CCP, in secret. “This should be considered the true date of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, albeit it later officially set the date as July 1921.”

Finally, Chinese revolutionaries were exposed to Soviet influence not only in China but also in the Soviet Union. With the inauguration of Sun
Yat-sen University in 1925, a first wave of some 340 Chinese students – both GMD and CCP – arrived in Moscow. Born in 1885 (as Karol Sobelsohn) to a Jewish family in Lvov, Karl Radek became its first rector. Although in his youth he had been a hard-core leftist, later he preferred revisionism, understanding the value of the bourgeoisie. In 1922, after joining the Comintern Executive Committee, he drafted the resolution concerning the entry of Chinese communists into the GMD, sent to Maring in China for execution. Implicitly, the resolution recognized the GMD’s and the Chinese bourgeoisie’s revolutionary potential. Many, including Trotsky and Zinoviev opposed the resolution, but Radek not only supported and drafted it, but his vote gave those who favoured, the majority (Pantsov, 2000: 47, 51, 102, 105, 114). By 1925, Radek had been regarded, and was considered by others, as an expert on China, which he studied intensively. Although he never visited China, he taught the history of the Chinese revolutionary movement. As the rector of Sun Yat-sen University, he must have influenced Chinese students – both left and right. To reinforce his call for GMD-CCP collaboration, he claimed that China’s modern capitalism had already begun in the 1840s, under the impact of foreign imperialism, and only in the coastal regions. He also argued that landlordism had been a form of capitalism rather than of feudalism (120-121). This implied that the Chinese bourgeoisie was not as weak as had been supposed, and therefore a GMD-CCP alliance was essential. One of his sentences, published in 1925 and related to the prospects of the CCP to seize power, could be regarded, in retrospect, as a prediction: in the course of its revolutionary struggles, the Chinese proletariat, together with the petty bourgeoisie, “will be forced for the time being to develop the economic power of the land in a capitalist fashion (Radek, 1925: 30, as quoted in Lerner, 1970: 136, 205).” (Emphasis added).

However, in 1926 Radek began (or was forced) to change his mind, at least publicly, both because of the emergence of Chiang Kai-shek’s brutal anti-CCP policy and, not less important, Stalin’s firm opposition. At the university, Radek and his supporters were obliged to follow the “party line”, but they still had some space to express their own views, which they did. Radek’s books and other writings, and those of his supporters (Pantsov, 2000: 171, 175, 178, 183, 295), were still published. However, whatever their influence, it did not last long. On April 6, 1927, Radek was sacked from his university position and expelled from the party. His touch with the Chinese students through the university was cut off. Accused of treason, he was reportedly executed in a labor camp in 1939 (rehabilitated in 1988).

In sum, although the main mission of the Comintern was to promote the CCP and facilitate the communist revolution in China, its emissaries, many of them Jewish, considered CCP unity with the GMD, and the national bourgeoisie and capitalists, on which the GMD relied, as essential for
accomplishing the revolution – definitely in Leninist terms. Although Voitinski had promoted not only the establishment of the CCP, but also its cooperation with the GMD, he still insisted on keeping the CCP’s independence and its right to criticize the GMD, to block a “right deviation” (Zhou, 2016).

Throughout his life, Chiang Kai-shek relied on foreigners, whether Russian, German or American, but never trusted them (and in a retrospective view, for good reasons) (White, 1978: 157). Yet, Jews were different. Aware of the Jewish contribution to the Chinese revolution, this is what he said following his stay in Moscow in 1923:

Most of the Russian leaders holding responsible party and government positions who expressed regard for Dr. Sun and sincere desire to cooperate with China in her National Revolution were Jews, the only exceptions being Kamenev and Chicherin who were Russians [actually Kamenev was also Jewish]. These Jews [...] aroused my special interest. I found that men like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Radek and Joffe were, comparatively speaking, more concerned with the question of cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Russian Communist Party (Chiang, 1957: 22). (Emphasis added).

3. 1949-1979: Bridging China and the West

Since the late 1930s and the early 1940s, over twenty thousand Jewish refugees escaped to China from Europe, mostly, but not only, to Shanghai. Some of them joined the communists, providing all kinds of services, primarily in medical and academic professions (Ehrlich, 2008; Kaminski, 2002; Pan, 2019). Few, who had been born in China, or arrived of their own free will, were involved in Chinese communism, underlined by their ideological beliefs and a vision of promoting revolution, not just in China but, eventually, also in the world.

Among the Jewish activists who associated themselves with Chinese communism were a number of Americans. Sidney Rittenberg was one of them. Influenced by his grandfather (on his mother’s side), who had been a Russian Jewish revolutionary, Rittenberg joined the American Communist Party in 1940 when he was eighteen, and enlisted in the US Army in 1942. Instead of Japanese, he decided to study Chinese, planning to go to China and support the Chinese revolution, hoping to create a better world (Rittenberg & Bennet, 1993: 13, 31, 144)." When he arrived in China in September 1945, the war was over. As a Jew living in South Carolina, he “never felt completely accepted”. Aware of his religion “I found some comfort in Bible stories and old hymns, but I didn’t believe in a personal God (161).” Usually, Chinese he met did not know what a Jew was. He began to meet Chinese communists and, as a soldier free to move, did them modest favours – including helping several underground activists to escape from the police. He noticed that,
occasionally, people preferred the Japanese occupiers to the brutalities of the Nationalist Government. Sometime by late 1946 or early 1947, Rittenberg became a Party member, approved by the top communist leaders, including Mao, Liu Shaoci, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi and Zhu De (92-93). He was the first US citizen to become a CCP member (Charzuk, 2019). His main role was to make information about communist victories – discounted and ignored outside China – available to the West.

In 1949, Rittenberg was arrested, allegedly on Stalin’s orders. Released in April 1955, the Chinese admitted that he had been wrongfully charged and imprisoned. Rittenberg was not the only Jew in Beijing. Others included Jane Sachs Hodes (daughter of Harry Sachs of Goldman Sachs Bank); Josh and Miriam Horn; David Crook; and Sonia, wife of Frank Su, a refugee from Nazi Austria (Hooper, 2016). For a few months in 1967, he was the head of China’s Broadcast Administration (Radio Beijing), when the Cultural Revolution was turning nasty. Envious of his position, Chinese, and foreigners turned against him, using antisemitic comments: “Rittenberg shows all the qualities we have long been accustomed to finding in the Jew (Hooper, 2016: 383).” Arrested yet again, he was interrogated about Israel Epstein and Michael Shapiro, also in jail, as was David Crook, all Jewish. Imprisoned for nearly ten years, Rittenberg was released in November, 1977, and returned to the United States in March 1980. Despite his suffering, he remained committed to Chinese communism and to distributing its message, good or bad, to the outside world. As early as 1949, Beijing considered him “an engineer to build a bridge from the Chinese people to the American people (as quoted in Margolis, 2019).” Indeed, this was his, and his Jewish colleagues’, primary mission.

Later in life, Rittenberg began to criticize the CCP and its increasing corruption. However, after his return to the US he continued his mission, to make China more accessible to the West, not in revolutionary vocabulary as in economic one. “He was interviewed on CBS network’s ‘60 Minutes’ more than any other individual (Charzuk, 2019).” More significant, he founded a consulting firm for American companies doing business in China. He offered his services, personal connections and familiarity with the Chinese system, turning into a full-fledge capitalist, making millions of dollars (McFadden, 2019; Rivlin, 2004). As such, he personally embodied the combination post-Mao China has been attempting, a socialist market economy, capitalism under a communist system. This unprecedented innovation was introduced to China mainly by Jewish economists, discussed below.

Israel Epstein made a similar contribution and endured similar suffering. Born in Warsaw in 1915, his family moved to China, first to Harbin and then to Tianjin. American and British influence in Tianjin led Epstein to education in English, which became his primary language and ultimately led him to
journalism. Nonetheless, his parents’ socialist ideas – and the effects of the 1917 Russian Revolution – shaped his own political orientation for life. To some extent, it was a combination of orthodox Judaism and European enlightened modernism – not all that different from Chinese reformers’ attempt to combine traditional Confucianism (ti) with practical necessities (yong), the difference being that while China was a state (and before that an empire), Jews did not have one of their own. As a child in Harbin, Epstein witnessed brutal White Russian antisemitism against “Bolshevik Jews” who were caught, tortured and killed – along with Chinese communists. Usually rare in China, antisemitism was mainly “imported” by White Russian, Japanese and Westerners, and was “adopted” by some GMD personalities. Epstein recalled that a GMD official, who had accompanied a group of foreign journalists to communist-controlled areas, told their hosts that three of them were Jewish. According to him, they were interested only in money and not really in “news”. Moreover, having no homeland, they failed to understand the meaning of nationalism and national struggle anyway and, therefore, they should rely on him. As expected, his offer and suggestions were rejected (Epstein, 2005: 181-182). A bond was thus created, consciously or subconsciously, between Jews and Chinese communism. Some Jews, who left China to the United States, became trade union activists and members of the Communist Party. Inevitably, as the Russian impact increased, Jewishness faded. Epstein wrote:

Though both [had been] brought up in pious homes, my parents had long since become strong atheists. It was long before I even saw the inside of a synagogue (though Harbin had several I never set foot there). Nor was I taught Hebrew. […] We did not attend synagogue, or fast in Yom Kippur, or keep a kosher or Passover diet, nor did I ever undergo bar mitzvah, the confirmation for Jewish males at the age of 13, when they are supposed to shoulder the moral responsibilities of adults. […] But our atheist household was very Jewish indeed, in a secular way (35, 39). (Emphasis added).

While secular, Epstein studied and knew Jewish religious and historical stories and he – and his family – never concealed their Jewishness nor changed his name. However he, and his parents, rejected theism and Zionism. Instead, he adopted communism, and considered it his mission to propagate China’s version to the outside world. He worked for news agencies like UPI (United Press International) and newspapers (The New York Times). In his writings, Epstein was “a tireless champion of the [Chinese] United Front (Messmer, 2012: 208).” One of China Reconstructs founders, he became, in May 1979, its editor-in-chief. In 1983, he was admitted to the CPPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference). Half of its ten non-Chinese members at one time were Jewish (209). Jews played constructive roles in most of China’s media, directed to the outside world. In addition to
Epstein at the *China Reconstructs*, and Sidney Rittenberg at Beijing Radio and the International Broadcasting Institute, Sidney Shapiro worked at the Bureau of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and then, at the Foreign Languages Press; Michael Shapiro at Xinhua; and David Crook at the Foreign Languages Institute.

Another Jewish-American who helped building bridges between China and the world was Sidney Shapiro. Born in Brooklyn, New York, in late 1915, he studied law and Chinese, sharing a room with Julian Schuman, another Jew who later found his way to China (Schuman, 1979). Shapiro was well aware of his Jewish origins although he, and his parents, had regarded themselves primarily as Americans. His last “encounter” with Judaism was in 1928 when he turned thirteen and made his *Bar Mitzvah* address at the synagogue, in Hebrew. In 1989, he visited Israel, which he had ignored earlier. “But,” he later said, “here was where it started, the primary essence of me as a Jew began here. I found an origin (Shapiro, 1979: 204-205; 2000: 274).” After graduating, he joined a prominent firm of Jewish Wall Street lawyers. He left New York in March 1947, not for any ideological motives or communist inclinations, but hoping to improve his Chinese while seeking a job as a business lawyer for an American firm in Beijing. Through his would-be Chinese wife, he approached the communists, realizing that he wanted more meaningful life (Shapiro, 1979: 24). Shapiro did not reach the communists (like Rittenberg) – they reached him. Having nothing else to do, he used his knowledge of Chinese and began translating Chinese literature to English, “hopefully for the American market”. It turned out to be the first Chinese communist novel to be published in the US. Soon employed by the Bureau of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Shapiro became a translator of books and pamphlets. He still insisted that he “wasn’t much of a Marxist” (39, 42).

In 1953, Shapiro joined China’s just established Foreign Languages Press. Later he wrote: “I had a sense of purpose, and accomplishment, and a goal, for the first time in my life (85).” By 1961, he had translated a dozen novels and scores of short stories, mostly related to the war against Japan. He regularly worked in *Chinese literature* and then in *China Pictorial*. In addition to demonstrating the quality of modern, and classical, Chinese literature, these translations, done for over thirty years,

served a useful purpose in presenting the real China to the world. They supplied the flesh and bone and sinew that many of our articles so sadly lacked. It seemed to me no ordinary person in another land could help but like and admire the Chinese once they got to know them as I did. Short of actually meeting face to face – very difficult in the existing “hate-China” atmosphere – the literary medium was probably the next best thing (200-201).
In the early 1960s, Shapiro finally decided that he had the kind of life he wanted most. He realized he “could do more useful and satisfying work in Peking than in New York”, and in 1963 applied for Chinese citizenship, which he received a few months later.

David Crook was born in 1910 to a Jewish family of Eastern Europe origins, in London (Crook, 1990; Devin, 2000; Zhang, 2015). As a child he received Jewish education, learned some Hebrew, ate Kosher food, celebrated the holidays – and was even slightly infected by Zionism. Influenced by George Bernard Shaw’s writings, he was slowly abandoning religion, a tendency intensified as he was traveling abroad, in Paris, Germany and New York. Instead, his reading, work, and the Great Depression, ignited his interest in the Soviet Union and in socialism, and his criticism of capitalism, unemployment and the spread of fascism in the world. Unknowingly, Crook became involved in communism while at Columbia University (1931-1935). He soon joined the Communist-led National Students League, where he felt comfortable with his colleagues, as well as with their ideology: he read Lenin’s *On the State and Revolution* for the first time. Upon his return to England in 1936, he joined the Communist Party and in early 1937, the International Brigades’ British Battalion Anti-Aircraft Battery, fighting Spanish fascism. Arms, training and support came from the Soviet Union. Western democracies adopted “non-intervention”. Recruited by the KGB, by April, he began spying on leftist ‘elements’ who opposed the Soviet Union, and especially Stalin. Not hiding his Jewishness, he was given a new identity.9

In May 1938, on Soviet orders, he left for Shanghai, influenced by Edgar Snow’s *Red Star over China*. Officially, he was teaching literature at St. John’s University and later at Suzhou University. Unofficially he spied, especially on “Trotskyists”. He used *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* (1938) by Harold Isaacs, then a committed Trotskyist (and Jewish himself). In the summer of 1940, Crook left for Chengdu to teach at the exiled Nanjing University, and in 1942 returned to London where he married Isabel, a daughter of Canadian missionaries from Chengdu. They were socially broad-minded to withstand his communism and his Judaism, long shed anyway. He joined an RAF intelligence course for monitoring and deciphering of Japanese radio communications, becoming an officer. Stationed in India, Ceylon, and Burma (where he was promoted Flight Lieutenant), he finally arrived in Hong Kong, by which time the war was over.

Crook was soon transferred to Singapore. Suspected of spying for the Soviets, he was demoted and by the end of his three years overseas service, returned to England. In 1946, he and Isabel decided to return to China. Crook began to study Chinese (though avoiding the characters until twenty years later when he was in jail), and Chinese history, both at SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London). As these ended, he
was discharged from the RAF and given free passage to China. While Crook continued his activities for the Communist Party, he still felt ill-at-ease with his Jewish identity and failed to join the Association of Ex-Jewish Servicemen.

In Hong Kong, on their way to Beijing, they met Qiao Guanhua, future foreign minister, and his wife Gong Peng, CCP spokesperson in Chongqing, as well as Zhang Hanfu, future vice foreign minister. In Tianjin they met Han Xu, later ambassador to the US. After a short visit to Beijing, in late November 1947 they settled at the Ten-Mile Inn village for eight months, and wrote three books. During their stay in the countryside, they met Liao Chengzhi (then Xinhua head), Bo Yibo, and Deng Xiaoping. In June 1948, they left for Shijiazhuang. There, asked by Wang Binnan – one of China’s leading diplomats – they agreed to teach at the newly initiated Foreign Affairs Training Class, launching a lifetime career. Ye Jianying, then head of the nearby military academy and later a People’s Liberation Army marshal, minister of National Defense and CCP vice chairman, was involved. This assignment delayed the publication of the Crooks’ first book by ten years, to 1959.

By the early 1950s, Crook had become the English Department deputy dean. Few foreign teachers could not overcome their antisemitism, but some Chinese appreciated his Jewishness, and Crook, who had earlier concealed his religion, never again tried to hide, nor to flaunt it. Meanwhile, the school was renamed Beijing Foreign Languages Institute (later Beijing Foreign Studies University). Crook’s teaching concentrated on training interpreters and translators who would escort foreign visitors, rather than “wasting” time on teaching literature he considered “impractical” at best, and “intellectual” at worst. Many of his thousands of students “reached the highest ranks in the foreign ministry and in academia (Devin, 2000; Epstein, 2001: 37).”

In 1957, Crook left for six months in Canada and England, making propaganda speeches in favour of China. In 1958, he returned to China via the Soviet Union and in summer 1966 made a mistake of leaving China on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, and an even more serious miscalculation of returning. Upon his return, in February, 1967, he joined the Red Flag Battalion, and later the Bethune-Yan’an Revolutionary Regiment, composed mainly of foreigners. On October 17, Red Guard students seized and took him to Qincheng, Beijing’s top security jail, blamed as a British spy. While in jail, he finally studied Chinese. He was released in January 1973. Fully rehabilitated, his verdict was reversed three times – each for the better. In a March 1973 speech, Premier Zhou Enlai – already ill and frail – spoke about the injustice suffered by foreigners, mentioning some by name: “David Crook is now free and we express our apologies to him”. Jiang Qing, the ultimate person responsible for the persecution of foreigners in China, was sitting there, probably forced to do so (Crook, 1990: 189). In 1979, the Ministry of Education appointed David (and Isabel) “Advisers to the Institute,” an
equivalent rank to that of a University president (ibid. 190). Resuming his teaching in Beijing, Crook started a six year stint as chief native speaker consultant to the *Chinese-English dictionary*, begun in 1972.

In sum, Crook felt that he had made certain contributions in education and, for want of a better word, “propaganda”; that is, in writing books, articles, circular pamphlets and broadcasting but, most of all, in teaching English at the Beijing Foreign Studies University, one of China’s leading academic institutions (ibid. 203-204). He also proposed reforms of China’s education system and promotion of relations between Chinese and foreigners. His suggestions led to the removal of many signs that prevented foreigners from visiting certain places, open only to Chinese.

Shortly after his release from jail, Crook left on a three months tour where he spoke in favour of the Cultural Revolution and China, to audiences as naïve as he was. Slowly, however, he admitted he was wrong on many issues related to China but, despite his personal suffering, still found it difficult to criticize the Cultural Revolution, let alone Mao. By the late 1970s, and still under the influence of the Gang-of-Four, he enthusiastically condemned Deng Xiaoping. In 1979, he visited national minority areas in Inner Mongolia, and a year later Xinjiang and Tibet. Throughout his China years, Crook remained a British subject and, unlike other “foreign experts”, never applied for Chinese citizenship and, therefore, could not become CCP member. Crook was fully aware of the “unfair” privileges given to “foreign experts” and occasionally protested to the authorities, but silenced (ibid. 23-24).

Although he considered himself an atheist and anti-Zionist, Crook never abandoned his relations with Judaism. In October 1979, although he laughed at the idea of fasting on Yom Kippur and did not have a Jewish prayer book, he still remembered “bits of Shabbat melodies” (Schwarcz, 1984: 174-175). Following the establishment of *The China Daily*, he sent some 25 letters to the Editor, on a variety of issues. A few of his letters were rejected, e.g. on antisemitism, arms sales, and China’s relations with Israel and the Arabs (Crook, 1990: 243-245, 250, 255). On January 17, 1984, Crook sent this letter to *The China Daily*:

> The cartoon in today’s *China Daily* is racist […] The typical Jewish nose on the face and the six-pointed Shield of David on the backside of the hammering plough-shares into swords is doubtless intended to denounce the belligerent expansionism of past and present Israeli governments. It is right to denounce them – especially for a socialist country. But not by resorting to mockery of physical characteristics or emblems which have for centuries inspired the mass of the Jewish people in its struggle against anti-Semitism […] They, the people, should be united with. Not insulted (ibid. 255).
The letter was not printed, nor answered. By that time, China was buying Israeli arms and military technology, some of which was displayed in the 1984 military parade commemorating 35 years to the PRC – though Crook was unaware of it. His (and Michael Shapiro’s) views on China often suffered slanderous allegations in the *Guardian* (by John Gittings), and in the *Daily Telegraph* (ibid. 266).¹⁰

In 1986, not without a sense of guilt, Crook visited Israel, aged 76. Before leaving, he had met an Israeli professor and an Israeli official of the United Nations, in New York. He and his wife travelled to Israel through Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula, reliving his Judaism. In an interview held in 2009, Isabel said: “Our role was to be the West in China (Hooper, 2016: 11).” Yet, this comment exposed a condescending Western and missionary approach. David would have modified: “Our role was to be China in the West,” or to provide a bridge between China and the West. This is what the Chinese said about him in 2010, ten years after his death in 2000, and hundred years after his birth: “He wrote and spoke about China, providing the outside world with an accurate picture of New China against the backdrop of the oversimplifications of the Cold War (Li, 2010).”

Another British Jew who became full-fledged pro-Chinese spokesman, was Michael Shapiro (Redfern, n.d.; Crook, 1990: 160). He was born in East London to a secular Jewish family but, although undoubtedly experiencing anti-semitism in his youth, never referred to his religion in public, or privately. He showed no interest in Jewish affairs and considered class as the main determinant of human beings. After studying at the London School of Economics (LSE), Shapiro joined the British Communist Party in 1934. In 1949, or 1950, he left for China, reportedly “at the invitation of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, and on the assignment of the British Communist Party (as quoted in Redfern, n.d.: 7),”¹¹ and was attached to the China Information Bureau. His book, *Changing China*, published in the West in 1958, led one reviewer to write: “Shapiro has managed to compress not only a concise summary of eight years of change but also an expert analysis of the content of that change (Hinton, 1962).” Unlike his colleagues, his work was directed mostly to foreign communist parties, criticizing Soviet “revisionism” and “reformism”, compared to China’s revolutionary purity. Nevertheless, both he, and Rittenberg, who had officially been members of foreign communist parties, and had for a while participated in Red Guards activities during the Cultural Revolution, suffered more than other expatriates (Brady, 1996; 2002).

Michael Shapiro never returned to the UK. Until his death in 1986, a total of 36 years, he worked at Xinhua News Agency and Foreign Languages Press, copy-editing English commentaries for the Department of Home News for Overseas Service, as well as translating the works of Mao Zedong and
Liu Shaoqi. This was the Western “foreign experts” – many of them Jewish – main mission, as demonstrated in the following episode.\(^{12}\)

In late 1959, the CCP Central Committee decided to form a team to translate a fourth volume of Mao’s *Selected Works* into English, and to revise the outdated English translation of the first three volumes, issued by the mid-1950s. Work began in early 1960 by a team of fourteen, of which nine were Chinese (Oxford-educated scholars, Foreign Ministry, Foreign Languages Press and Foreign Languages Institute officials) and five foreigners: Sydney Rittenberg, Frank Coe, Israel Epstein, Sol Adler, and Michael Shapiro – all Jewish. In January, 1964, after nearly two years of work, Mao hosted the team for dinner, located at the Qing Dynasty Shrine for Diligent Government. Frank Coe, Sol Adler,\(^{13}\) Israel Epstein and Rittenberg arrived together. Anna Louise Strong was also invited. It had been her arrest in Moscow as a spy that led to Rittenberg’s arrest in China. Mao almost apologized to him: “We made a very bad mistake in his case. He is a good comrade and we treated him wrong (Rittenberg & Bennet, 1993: 273; Ginsbourg, 1982).” In 1967, Sam Ginsbourg, born in 1914 in Chita to a Jewish family, which had escaped Byelorussia, spent several months “checking word for word the English and Russian translations of the *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* with the Chinese original and making suggestions for improvement (Ginsbourg, 1979: 39).” While in jail, Crook (excluded from the translators team) tried “to do it better”: “I dabbled in translation, or re-translation, not being satisfied with the stiff style of the authorized version of Mao’s works in English, but wanting one which did justice to his often racy, earthy and even poetic original (Crook, 1990: 181).” It is in this field of journalism (especially translation and editing) as well as teaching foreign languages, that the Jewish expats in China made a significant contribution to the PRC in its first thirty years, exposing it and making it accessible to the world.

4. 1979-2019: Combining Socialism and Capitalism

During its first thirty years, PRC communism followed the assumption, implied in Mao Zedong thought, that it could be achieved by leapfrogging the capitalist stage. Initially Marx regarded capitalism, of which he was an expert, as an indispensable basis and a precondition for achieving communism. Yet, since there was no evidence that a communist revolution had ever originated in a capitalist society, and there was no sign that this was going to happen soon, Marx, impatient toward the end of his life, offered the option of relying on traditional communalism (primarily in Russia) as a shortcut to communism, while sidestepping capitalism (Shanin, 1983).

Forty years later, Lenin tried to tread in Marx’s footsteps and launched the revolution in Russia, but may have realized that it would not work. Russia’s
peasant economy was too backward and weak to create the wealth to be distributed among the society. Consequently, he introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) (Pethybridge, 1990), which allowed elements of free market and trade to reinvigorate economic development. This policy was so successful that it instigated internal Party opposition, much of it Jewish, alarmed that “capitalist restoration” would derail the revolution. Stalin’s Soviet Union abandoned free market, and ultimately disintegrated. Evidently, although there were ups and down in Sino-Soviet relations, basically, the PRC imitated the Soviet way in trying to achieve communism while bypassing capitalism. Mao regarded capitalism and socialism as contradictory concepts, whose combination is reactionary (The Revolutionary Mass Criticism Writing Group of the Party School under the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 1971). Nonetheless, long before the Soviet collapse, Deng Xiaoping and other leaders concluded that without free-market capitalism, communism could not be accomplished. However, they were not sure how to develop a free market economy in a country already ruled by a Communist Party, which from the moment it seized power, steadily stifled any sign of capitalism, and targeted “capitalist roaders” – including among the leadership. Given their limited knowledge of capitalism, and the absence of a solid capitalist basis, China’s post-Mao reformist leaders sought external advice.

In the late 1970s, as soon as Beijing’s post-Mao leaders decided it was time to undertake wide-ranging economic reform (which some had in mind since the early 1950s), discussions were held with leading foreign economic experts, invited to China. Intentionally, or not, most of them were Jewish. Historically, Jews were usually associated with money (capital), for better or for worse. Skilled in commerce and banking, educated, urban yet highly mobile, and with worldwide family connections – Jews represented modernity, and a most significant driving force behind capitalist growth and development (Slezkine, 2004: 60; Sombart, 2001). Marx himself specifically equated capitalism with Judaism (Marx, 1975). Jews also excelled in research: 40 percent of all Nobel Prize winners in economics and 51 percent of all US economics Nobel Prize winners were Jewish. Some of them helped China to become the second – perhaps the leading – world economic power. The first group of experts consisted of Americans, who represented pure capitalism, and the most advanced, respected and prestigious scholarship on free market economics.

Milton Friedman, University of Chicago professor and Nobel Prize laureate (1976), “the world’s leading advocate of free-market fundamentalism (Gewirtz, 2017: 84),”14 was invited to China in late 1979. When he arrived, in September 1980, Friedman realized that the Chinese scholars/economists were not familiar with free market economy. In his second visit, in September 1988, he underscored the need of “free private economy”, and dismissed the “dual
track” system, which combined Soviet “command economy” and “market economy”. Although some of Friedman’s ideas, especially on the need for political reform, were initially rejected, ultimately they were partially accepted. His book, *Capitalism and Freedom* (1962), was published in Chinese in 1993.

Another delegation visited China in 1979. Headed by the University of Pennsylvania Professor Lawrence Klein (who won the 1980 economics Nobel Prize), it included professor Irma Adelman, the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, the Graduate School of the University of California, Berkeley; and Kenneth Arrow of Harvard University (who had won the Nobel Prize in 1972) – all Jewish. They toured China teaching courses and seminars. In 1980, Klein returned to teach an intensive seminar in econometrics for officials and academics, and the year after, was appointed a “technical consultant” to China’s important State Planning Commission (8, 58-59, 78-79, 253). Stanley Fischer, chief economist and vice president for developing economies of the World Bank (and vice chairman of the US Federal Reserve System, later appointed Governor of the Bank of Israel, 2005-2013) met Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang in November 1988. They discussed inflation control and price liberalization (215). In 1991, Franco Modigliani, MIT professor of a Jewish-Italian family, and an expert on household and firm behaviour (who had won the Nobel Prize in economics in 1985), held seminars at the People’s Bank of China (253). Joseph Stiglitz from Columbia University, professor of economics and winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics, also Jewish, gave a speech at the China Development Forum in Beijing in March, 2007. Then, and for some time, he urged Beijing to adopt pragmatism and to adapt their economy to the needs of the global market system. He praised China’s economic achievements and creation of a new and unique economic model (Stiglitz, 2008).

The second experts group included leading East European economists, originally from Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia – where novel economic experiments had been proposed, and undertaken, well before the disintegration of communism. One of the first was Włodzimierz Brus (originally Beniamin Zylberberg), who first visited China in late 1979. An Oxford University Polish exile, he produced a sensation in China when he insisted that the free market concept does not contradict socialism – and would not substitute it either (Brus, 1972). He regarded regulated market mechanisms as a means to make the central plan work better, more efficiently, and make profit. His views greatly affected China’s leading economists, including Sun Yefang (a leading Chinese economist, who had been influenced by Yevsei Liberman, a well-known 1960s Soviet economic reformer, also Jewish).

Another East European socialist reformer, who helped guide China’s post-Mao economic reforms was Ota Šik, a Jewish Czech who had survived a German concentration camp, and later became deputy prime minister and
economics minister under Alexander Dubček’s 1968 Prague Spring (Ota Šik, 1969; Author n.a., 1969). Since the mid-1960s, he was advocating a reduction of central planning and expanding the role of the market. Visiting Yugoslavia in 1968, exactly when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia, he moved to Switzerland where he spent the rest of his life (he died in 2004). In 1981, he visited China and, in line with other foreign advisers, underscored the combination of plan and market. Central planning, he said, could not make correct and efficient decisions with regard to the entire economy – since it ignores the diversity and precision of the market, particularly of prices, which determine supply and demand, thus creating material incentives to increase production – and profits. Yet, unlike in capitalist economies, the socialist market is not entirely free, but operates within limits, determined by central planning (Šik, 1967). Šik’s recommendations attained widespread enthusiasm and were integrated into China’s economic policy, leading to the establishment of a Price Research Center. Šik was more popular in China than in his homeland.

While inviting leading Western and East European economists to China, Chinese experts began to attend international conferences. The Athens forum of the International Economic Association (August, 1981), offered them an opportunity to meet some well-known economists, including Leonid Kantorovich, a Russian Jewish scholar who was the only Soviet ever to win the Nobel Prize in economics (in 1975) – for his contribution to developing a mathematical model of resource allocation. Another delegation of East European economists visited China in July 1982, including Włodzimierz Brus and Julius Struminsky, Polish price commissioner; former Czech deputy prime minister Jiří Kosta (born Heinrich Georg Kohn) and Péter Kende, a Hungarian official and political commentator, all Jewish. They unanimously proposed to reform China’s economy following the East European model (Gewirtz, 2017; Kosta, 1987). But, the one who attracted most Chinese attention in those years was János Kornai.

Among the East European economists, the most prominent, whose ideas influenced post-Mao China’s economic development, was János Kornai. Born Kornhauser to a Jewish-Hungarian family he moved to the US and joined Harvard University in 1984. In 1985, he was a dominant guest at a conference the Chinese held on a cruise ship, the Bashan. His book, Economics of Shortage (1980), was an offensive on the socialist bureaucratically planned economies and the chronic lack of investment for increasing production. “The Hungarian János Kornai is the most famous, and certainly the most influential, economist to have emerged from postwar Communist Europe (Skidelsky, 2007; 2006).” Having met Kornai, China’s scholars–economists now realized the value of Western economics for China’s development, occasionally invoking the Hungarian experience, referring to Kornai’s writings.
Advocating a combined “socialist-market” system as a stage in economic transition, the advisers did not regard this stage as stable or long lasting. Planned economy and market economy could coexist symbiotically for a while, but would ultimately lead to capitalism rather than to socialism. However, Kornai, and his colleagues – who represented the East European transition style, which favoured political reform as an inevitable way to salvage their own countries’ economy – avoided such a solution for China. Kornai’s call to reduce state “paternalism”, or too much intervention in the economy, underscored the Chinese “contract responsibility system”, thereby diminishing compulsory plans, and emphasizing indirect management. Zhao Ziyang’s 1987 “new economic policy” advocated, and adhered to, Kornai’s theory of combining “macroeconomic management” with “microeconomic marketization (Gewirtz, 2017: 188-191).”

China’s leading economists and economic publications praised Kornai’s employment of advanced mathematics, and his synthesis between Western and Marxian economic theory and thereby the applicability of Eastern Europe economic reforms, specifically Hungarian, to the Chinese case. His ideas provided a bridge between West and East. At the same time, he said that this combination of planned economy and market forces is just a “transition”. Over one year, “Kornai’s reputation in China had grown to an astonishing level,” reaching the dimensions of “Kornai Fever” (ke’ernai re) (166). It reflected not only his intellectual abilities and skills (which Western economists also had), but also his experience in Eastern Europe (which Western economists lacked).

Notwithstanding their enthusiasm about combining central planning and free market, not all Chinese leaders, and economists, accepted the socialist reformism model, either East European or Western. Some hardline conservative Marxists (like Chen Yun and Hu Qiaomu), still promoted Soviet-style command economy and relied on other economists. One of them was Ernest Mandel. Born in Frankfurt to Polish-Jewish parents, he relocated to Belgium where he defended Marxism until his death in 1995. Published in 1962, his book, On Marxist Political Economy, was translated into Chinese in 1979, and in the next years was used by those who opposed reform to fight the reformists, unsuccessfully as it turned out (77-78).

In sum, it is unlikely that post-Mao leaders were aware of the Jewish identity of most of their foreign economic advisers, Western or East European. It is similarly unlikely that these advisers considered their Jewish identity as an input, or a tool, in promoting economic reform in China. In fact, some Soviet intellectuals and officials implicated Kissinger and prominent American Jews in a “Zionist conspiracy” to introduce capitalism into China (as well as into the Soviet Union) (Lukin, 2003: 150). However, even if both sides were unaware of, or ignored, the Jewish origins of these
advisers, Jewishness may have shaped the root of China’s post-Mao reform. It reflected unprecedented combinations, never accomplished in a socialist framework, let alone successfully. Whatever economic reforms East European countries had undergone, none of them remained “socialist”, let alone “communist”. It may be that Jewish thinking offered flexible intellectual originality and conceptual innovations, which others could not, and did not, conceive. Transforming China from its backward centralized command and old-fashion economy, to a modern advanced economy that incorporated capitalist elements, has been a huge challenge of the kind Jewish intellectuals dared and were ready to confront. Most scholars, politicians – and the media – doubted if such large-scale transformation was possible. However, so far, its success over forty years is incredible. It is also unprecedented, although its future remains uncertain.

5. Conclusion

All the otherwise diversified contributors to the Chinese communist revolution discussed in this paper have two things in common: one objective, that cannot be argued, is that all were Jewish; the other, subjective, is that, apparently, their Jewishness was not an essential identity. I disagree with the second. True, Jewish revolutionaries in China (or elsewhere) may have never set foot in a synagogue, but they could not but absorb their Jewishness for generations. Kommunism and even Socialism – real rather than utopian – as formulated by Karl Marx (Jewish, in Chinese eyes) may be regarded as an atonement for, or correction of (Tikkun Olam, “putting the world alright”, a Hebrew-Jewish term), capitalist evils. Jewish revolutionaries in China must have been defined as Jewish, consciously or not. Epstein mentions Zhou Enlai who, while at a reception on official visit to Warsaw, asked about Professor Leopold Infeld, a leading Polish mathematician. Excluded at a corner because he was a Jew, Infeld watched Zhou walking across the hall to shake his hand “in an unmistakable gesture of disapproval of anti-Semitism in a socialist country (Epstein, 2005: 242).”

Indeed, the ultimate question is not just how these Jewish activists defined themselves but, not less so, how others defined them. One reason why Jews joined the communist movement had been that it was supposed to be internationalist and universal. Having no homeland, and living mostly as a Diaspora, this suited them perfectly. But, if they had not understood it in the 1920s, they must have in the 1930s, when scores of Jewish revolutionaries were purged and executed, when it finally turned out that the revolution was nationally and particularly Russian. Jews were excluded not only because of traditional antisemitism but also because they rejected the narrow Russian identity of the revolution. Either way, both attitudes underlined their Jewish
religious identity, however far they felt, and were, from its theory and practice (Shapiro, 1961).

What is common to the Jewish contribution to the Chinese revolution in the three periods is their attempts to “correctly” handling ideological contradictions and bridging over differences – inside and outside China. As Alexander Lukin commented, the differences in the Soviet China policies, as well within the Chinese Communist movement, were not institutional but mainly ideological (Lukin, 2003: 82, 109). In essence, in the 1920s as much as in the 1980s, they concerned the gap between a “leftist” view – which dwelt on the communist nature of the revolution, and a “rightist” view – which focused on the bourgeois precondition of the revolution. To be sure, ultimate policies had been made in Moscow, usually by the Party. Yet, considerably more familiar with China’s local situation, Soviet emissaries had a certain leeway, and their own preferences. Very much in line with the Chinese traditions, what the Jewish advisers suggested was “both”, a combination of left and right. This conformed to the Marxian dialectical and materialist weltanschaung, that capitalism is inevitably a precondition for communism. And, even if they were not consciously aware of it – and some definitely were – these ideas conformed also to the fundamentals of Chinese philosophy, namely the unity of opposites, yin-yang principles, and some Western and Hegelian concepts (McGill & Parry, 1948).

In the first period, most Jewish advisers, representing either the Soviet government or the party, underlined the importance of maintaining good relations with the GMD. In line with Marx, and especially Lenin, they appreciated the GMD’s promotion of nationalism and independence – and its reliance on capitalists for the development of China. Both were regarded as a precondition to the achievement of communism. In the second period, while Chinese socialism had supposedly been “achieved”, most Jewish participants in the revolution tried to bridge the gap between the Chinese and the outside world by translating and publishing Chinese documents and writings, in order to make them available abroad. As reforms were about to begin in the third period, Jewish advisers – not necessarily communists themselves – still revived the 1920s’ notions of Marxist-Leninist beliefs that capitalism is an essential base of communism. Like their predecessors, they offered ways to combine socialism with capitalism to bridge the gap, and “correctly” handle the contradictions between the two. Turning Marx upside down, they, probably unintentionally, led the way for a new kind of revolution, whose prospects of success, though still questionable, are the best ever.

Finally, while these “mediators” were, consciously or not, Jewish – to what extent were Chinese leaders and activists aware of it? Again, if they were not – and most probably were – it was the exogenous inputs, which reminded them: antisemitism in the past, and access to media outlets at
present. A recent indication of China’s awareness, and appreciation, of the Judaic role not only in Chinese but in Asian (and world) civilization, is in PRC President Xi Jinping’s opening speech at the Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilizations in Beijing on May 15, 2019: “In building our civilizations over the course of several millennia, we the people of Asia, have made splendid achievements. I think of literary classics such as The Book of Songs, The Analects of Confucius, The Talmud, One Thousand and One Nights, The Rigveda and Genji Monogatari (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2019).”18 (Emphasis added). Interestingly, and perhaps meaningful, Xi mentioned the Talmud and not the Bible. I can think of two reasons. First, that the Bible, although originally and uniquely Jewish, is also shared by Christianity and Islam, which both regard as part of their heritage. And second, because the Talmud, more than the Bible, is not only an exclusively Jewish property, but also represents and reflects better the Jewish spirit, and essence, of arguing and debating, of not accepting things at face value; advocating unification of opposites; reconciliation of differences; and matchmaking of contradictions.

It is expected that Xi would mention Chinese classics (the Book of Songs and Confucius’ Analects) at the top of Asian cultural achievements; it was not expected that he would mention the Jewish Talmud at the second place. Only then, he mentions Arab, Indian and Japanese contributions. If not Xi Jinping himself, someone else among the Chinese leadership, or intellectuals, must have proposed giving such a high prominence to Judaism. And, since little – or nothing – is coincidental in Chinese politics, this is significant.

Notes

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1. Two Comintern agents attended the first CCP congress in July 1921. One was Maring (Sneevliet) and the other was Nikolsky (alias Victor Alexandrovich Berg, Jewish).
2. In early 1952, Zhou Enlai led a team to draft the first Five-Year Plan, which included Li Fuchun and Nie Rongzhen – all witnessed European capitalism in the 1920s.
3. Joffe regarded the GMD as “the organization closest to being a genuine political party in China, serving as the meeting point for nationalism and revolution,” (Wilbur & How, 1989: 57).
4. Chinese sources prefer to say that Chen and Li had discussed the establishment of a Chinese Communist Party before they met Voitinski, to underline the Chinese, rather than the Soviet, origins of the Party (Chow, 1960: 248). “However, we cannot say that Chen and Li discussed forming a Communist party before Voitinsky arrived in China” (Ishikawa, 2012: 103).
5. Initially, Trotsky also supported the resolution “which was correct and progressive for a certain epoch.”
6. Some of them Jewish, like Bella Epshtein, Abram Grigorievich Prigozhin, and Mikhail Volin (Semen Nathanovich Belenky, a well-known Sinologist, and Director of the Scientific Research Institute for Chinese Studies, 1928-1930). At least some of the Chinese students praised them.
7. Much of the information in this section derives from this book.
8. Jane Hodes, a long-time Communist Party member, spent five years in China in the 1950s, editing English-language publications, teaching English and broadcasting over the English-language radio (Hodes, 2009; Su, 1979). She worked at the French Section of the Foreign Languages Bureau.
9. Of the roughly 40,000 volunteers in Spain, it is estimated that about 8,000 were Jews. Of the roughly 2,000 British volunteers, about 200 were Jews – i.e. 10 percent, which was ten times their share in the British population. In December 1996, Crook returned to Spain, with 300 International Brigades veterans, invited by the Spanish Government.
11. According to the main speech at his memorial meeting, Xinhua, October 6, 1986.
12. The following paragraph derives from: Rittenberg and Bennet, 1993, pp. 249-252.
14. Much of the discussion below derives from this book which, however, hardly mentions the Jewish identity of the “Western economists”.
16. Born in 1939 to a Jewish father in Harbin, China, Lord Skidelsky belonged to a family of “oligarchs” (his term) which played an important role in the regional Jewish community and in northeast China’s economics.
17. They were “faithless Jews” (Deutscher, 1968). Having no homeland, Jews were different wherever they stayed, which helped them keep their identity, without necessarily being religious.
is the fundamental compilation of Jewish religious law, theology and ethics. It originated from the 3rd to the 5th centuries and governed Jewish daily life until the modern period, covering history, philosophy, customs, folklore, and rabbinic religious opinions and teachings.

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The Propagation of Japanese Buddhism in China, 1910-40s: Japan as the Guardian of East Asian “Traditions”

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Abstract
This research examines the propagation of Japanese Buddhism in China in the first half century of 20c. From the Japanese government’s point of view, Buddhism is a useful “device” to understand local society and to make propaganda or penetrate into local society in China. In 1920, Japan organized religious groups including Buddhism to make some movements on cultural exchanges and friendship activities with Asian countries and colonies including China. In the 1930s, Japan occupied Manchuria and built the puppet state, Manchu-kuo. Buddhism and its organization were the important “device” to manage the Japanese society there and were expected to penetrate in Chinese society. However, it was so difficult to set some goals on Chinese local society. This research illustrates the processes in the negotiation about the right of propagation of Japanese Buddhism in China, with the Chinese government, and introduces the views and observations on Chinese religious society by Japanese Buddhism, in order to consider the factor of “religion” on Chinese modern history.

Keywords: Japanese Buddhism, Chinese Buddhism, Sino-Japanese Relations, Manchukuo, 21 Demands

1. Introduction
This article examines the relationships and interactions between the propagation of Japanese Buddhism in China and Japanese aggression toward China. A look at the religious aspects of Sino-Japanese relations can shed light on a number of issues, including how the two countries interacted with each other, the nature of cultural aggression, and the ways in which a cultural foreign policy was formulated and implemented.
Several authors have published studies on Japanese Buddhism in China, including Xue Yu’s *Buddhism, War, and Nationalism, Chinese Monks in the Struggle against Japanese Aggression, 1931-1945* (Routledge, 2005) and Brian Daizen Victoria’s *Zen at War* (2nd Edition, Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). A number of Japanese articles also discuss the topic at length, though most of them similarly focus on the wartime period. However, in researching the ties between Buddhism and Sino-Japanese relations, one should not overlook the importance of an even earlier event: the issuance of the “Twenty-One Demands.” On January 18th, 1915, Japan’s Minister to China, Hioki Eki, submitted these demands to Chinese President Yuan Shikai. Two of the Demands were related to Buddhism: the demand that China should recognize the land ownership rights of Japanese hospitals, temples, and schools in China and the demand that China should allow Japanese individuals to preach there. Both demands were included as part of Group 5, which was considered by many, including individuals within the Japanese government, to have contained the most “aggressive” and “imperialistic” of the demands. Japan thus tried to withhold the contents of Group 5 from other major powers, even as they sought and were able to obtain their support for the remainder. After negotiations began in February 1915, China rejected any and all discussions concerning Group 5, and these two demands did not make their way into the resultant treaties and agreements that both countries came to sign in May 1915.

In fact, China acknowledged that it had already allowed Japanese to preach in China after it extended most-favoured-nation status to Japan as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Maguan) in 1895. However, from the Japanese point of view, the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin, which included the right for foreign missionaries to preach in China, had only allowed for the preaching of Christianity. Though Japanese Buddhists conducted missionary work in China throughout the 1910s, the Japanese government felt a sense of unease about the situation, because their right to do so had not been explicitly recognized by China. On April 26th, 1915, Japan proposed revising the Twenty-One Demands to Twenty-Six Demands, which were accepted by China on May 9th. The two demands concerning Buddhism were not included within the new list, with the demand that “China recognize the land ownership rights of Japanese hospitals, temples and schools in China” withdrawn. The other demand, that “China recognize the right of Japanese to preach in China,” was left to be negotiated in the future.

Jumping off from this discussion of the Twenty-One Demands, this article will turn to examine the relationships and interactions between the propagation of Japanese Buddhism in China and Japanese aggression toward China.

Necessary to this analysis is a consideration of the fact that Buddhism was already in China; it had originally been transmitted from India to Japan by way of China and Korea. What, then, could it have meant for the
Japanese to “propagate” Buddhism in China? If this meant the acquisition of new followers, individuals at the time must have perceived there to be differences between Chinese and Japanese Buddhism, leading them to have considered one to have been superior to the other. This article will also consider issues related to this, which allow us to move beyond conducting a basic examination of the points at which Buddhism made an appearance in the realm of modern Sino-Japanese relations.

2. Japanese Buddhist Activities in China after the Meiji Restoration

The mere fact that Japan sought treaty recognition for Buddhist preaching activities in China as part of the Twenty-One Demands is evidence that Japanese Buddhists had already tried to preach in China but had met with a variety of difficulties in their attempts to do so. First, a brief overview of the history of Japanese Buddhist missionary activities in China after the Meiji Restoration is in order.

After the Restoration, a Japanese monk from Kyoto’s Higashi Honganji Temple (東本願寺) which was the head temple (honzan) of the Ōtani-ha sect, travelled to China and ultimately decided to settle in Shanghai. His name was Ogurusu Kocyo (小栗栖香頂), and he subsequently opened a branch temple (betsuin) of the Honganji Temple there, which went on to educate and cultivate Chinese monks and spread its teachings across China. Higashi Honganji thereafter sent additional staff members to China, and they actively proselytized to both Chinese and Japanese followers. Higashi Honganji gradually intensified its efforts throughout the 1900s, and it eventually began spreading across southern China.

In addition to the group from Higashi Honganji, Nishi Honganji (西本願寺) was also active in China, though primarily in Fujian Province. Takeda Tokusho (武田篤初) travelled to Beijing to explore opportunities for exchanges with Chinese Buddhists, but he ultimately died during his journey there. Sotoshu (曹洞宗), one of the sects of Zen Buddhism in Japan, sent the monk Mizuno Baigyo (水野梅暁) to Hunan Province to open the Hunan School for Monks (Sengxuetang/湖南僧学堂), though he was subject to strong pressure from the provincial authorities.

Japanese Buddhists began to proselytize in Fujian Province in 1898, but in 1903, the provincial government claimed that Japan did not have the right to propagate religion, cautioning Japanese consuls not to issue “passports” for travel to central China. That is to say, it was not entirely true that Japan’s right to engage in Buddhist preaching activities had been recognized by the Treaty of Tianjin. The Japanese government therefore had reason to seek official recognition of this right as part of the Twenty-One Demands of 1915. In addition, violent incidents erupted at a Japanese temple in Fujian in
1904, and the Qing government asked Japanese monks and Buddhist leaders to leave the country because Japan did not have a right to proselytize there. Japan claimed that the right to proselytize had been included as part of the “most-favoured-nation status” it had acquired in the Sino-Japanese treaty, meaning that it had the same rights as Western countries in this regard. The Qing government, however, argued that religious rights were not included as part of “most-favoured-nation status,” and they correctly noted that most-favoured-nation status did not necessarily apply universally to all sections of every treaty.¹

In fact, the propagation of Japanese Buddhism caused a number of problems within local societies throughout Fujian province. The Provincial Governor felt compelled to control their activities in order to maintain the “status quo.” The case of Fujian is thus deserving of a closer look. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun wrote about it as follows:

After the Meiji Restoration, Higashi Honganji was the first Japanese Buddhist sect to set its sights on China…. They went about spreading their faith across the southern Qing Empire, with Katō Hiromi establishing a religious club in Macau in Meiji 31 [1898]. They developed contacts with local Chinese individuals and gradually opened up a religious front that passed through Zhangzhou and across southern Fujian Province. One could see their expansion proceed bit by bit as they established congregations and built study halls in gradual succession. At the time, they were in the local Chinese officials’ good graces, and the officials welcomed their activities. Not a single problem emerged…. Before this, in Meiji 31, Higashi Honganji’s church in Macau was set ablaze, and in Meiji 37 [1904], preachers in Zhangzhou and elsewhere were injured, with their study halls coming under repeated attacks by ruffians.²

Higashi Honganji’s Katō Hiromi conducted missionary work in Taiwan after the Japanese occupation, before eventually moving on to Fujian.³ Despite the fact that the article claimed that “not a single problem emerged” in the early days of Higashi Honganji’s activities, it curiously also noted that “Higashi Honganji’s church in Macau was set ablaze” shortly after its founding. Katō started preaching in Zhangzhou (漳州) in 1899, but his activities provoked the ire of local residents, with many joining local Chinese Christians to violently disrupt his activities.⁴ In light of this situation, the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun went on to surmise that opposition to the preaching of Japanese Buddhism may have been primarily because it had been swept up into broader anti-missionary movements that had taken place across China.

The truth behind the matter is that decades of continued anti-missionary activities may have seen a resurgence, though this time directed at Japan. China has suffered because of Western Christianity. Each time a case involving missionaries has arisen, it has turned into an international incident.
Each incident has then ended with the granting of further concessions. Examples of this are too numerous to count.5

After the 1899 Zhangzhou Incident, Japan was the one seeking compensation. In dealing with this incident, the director of the Taiwan branch of Nishi Honganji, Ishikawa Kaoru, proposed several conditions for how compensation should be handled. A letter by Ishikawa stated, “In short, it is clear that Japanese subjects have been openly insulted by Chinese subjects. Please negotiate with the Qing in order to protect our country’s rights and interests.” He proposed two demands: first, the criminals responsible should be caught and punished. Second, the Qing government should provide Nishi Honganji with a parcel of land at least 50 mu in size (畝) and facilities for their missionary activities that had a total area of at least 300 ping (坪).6 The Buddhist organizations were now joining in on the practice of using their national government’s authority to gain concessions from China.

A 1904 incident related to this matter occurred when a monk from Higashi Honganji sought to build a temple in Quanzhou, Fujian. The following record was made of the exchange:

In a letter sent to Ambassador Yano by the Foreign Affairs Bureau (previously the Zongli Yamen) in the tenth month of Guangxu 25 [1899], it was stated that references to churches and missionaries that have been included in various international treaties have only referred to those belonging to the Catholics and Protestants. None of the treaties make explicit reference to Japanese monks. The letter therefore stated that it would be difficult to handle cases involving Japanese monks in the same manner as those involving Western missionaries. The Viceroy of Min-Zhe was also made aware of this via telegraph, and various records of this exist.7

Chargé d’affaires Matsui Keishirō rebuked this claim, arguing that Article 25 of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation had granted Japan most-favoured-nation status. This meant, he argued, that the rights granted to Christian missionaries to conduct missionary activities should also be read as applying to Japanese Buddhist monks. The Qing government, however, did not accept this view.8 As a result, Japanese Buddhists did not have a recognized right to proselytize in China, a matter that the Japanese officials marked as a subject for future negotiations.9

On the other hand, the Qing government adopted a new education act as part of the Guangxu New Policies (光緒新政), which ordered local governments to construct schools within their jurisdictions. Local governments, however, did not have the financial resources to fund the construction of new schools. As a result, they coopted extant temple lands and properties for the new schools. As Chinese temples came under increasing pressure from the local authorities, Japanese Buddhists seized the opportunity to “cooperate” with Chinese temples. These problems then became diplomatic issues, with
Japan insisting upon its right to engage in Buddhist preaching due to its “most-favoured-nation status.” Rumors in Zhejiang Province held that Chinese temples had invited Nishi Honganji to take possession of them in response to having heavy new taxes levied on their lands and other properties.¹⁰

News of this incident reached Japan, with the *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun* reporting the following version of events:

Chinese monks were suffering under official oppression, so they lodged complaints with Japanese preachers and sought a way to escape their plight. The most prominent case occurred in Zhejiang Province, where Itō Kendō of Higashi Honganji was stationed at the time. Dozens of prominent temples in Zhejiang wound up affiliating themselves with Higashi Honganji. Itō, likely responding to the requests of Chinese monks, moved to protect their temples. Local officials, however, considered his actions inappropriate, and they caused further problems. The issue became the subject of negotiations between the governments of China and Japan.

In short, the explanation they offered was that Chinese temples had actively sought the help of Japanese monks in hopes of evading official oppression.¹¹

Through incidents such as this, the propagation of Buddhism became a diplomatic issue, with some Japanese Buddhists becoming more aggressive in seeking recognition of their right to proselytize and more assertive as they conducted their activities in China. But why did Japanese Buddhism seek to expand in China? Writing in 1915, Ando Teccho (安藤鉄膴) gave three reasons: (1) though Western Christianity was actively being propagated across China, it had led to a number of clashes with local Chinese society; (2) Chinese Buddhism had lost its original spirit and ultimate potential; and (3) only Japanese Buddhism could help solve China’s societal problems and help realize true Sino-Japanese friendship.¹²

Roughly the same viewpoints came to appear in a variety of places, including within the *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun* article cited above:

China also claims that it is already home to Buddhism. They say that the different Buddhist traditions from China and Japan might come into conflict. Claims like these are essentially unworthy of refutation. There is not a single lineage of Japanese Buddhism that is new to China, whether it be Tiantai, Huayan, Shingon, Zen, or Nianfō. Even the Nichiren and Pure Land sects, which were originally founded in Japan, work to transmit the teachings of Buddhist masters – such as Zhiyi and Shandao – from the Sui and Tang Dynasties. What sort of conflict could possibly arise? All that remains in today’s Chinese Buddhism is an empty shell, one that continues to exist only in books and buildings. Japan’s Buddhism must be reimported into China. In short, those who hope to revive the spirit of Chinese Buddhism cannot possibly hope to do so solely with the aid of what remains in China today.¹³
Japanese Buddhism was transmitted by the “masters” of the Sui and Tang Dynasties, meaning that there was no reason for there to be any sort of conflict of Chinese Buddhism. The problem instead, the argument went, was that Chinese Buddhism was in tatters. The plan was therefore to reimport Buddhism from Japan in order to bring about its revival. Could it not also have been said that China was in a similar state overall? This kind of perception was at the core of Japanese imperialism: a combination of anti-Western sentiment and respect for oriental traditions. Japan’s urgently felt need to reintroduce oriental culture back to China was one of the bases for Japanese imperialism. Japanese Buddhism came to possess much the same drive.14

3. The Anti-Japanese Buddhism Movement in China

Japanese Buddhists began their missionary work in China during the late Qing, but they came to face many difficulties along the way. The Japanese Minister to China, Ijuhin Hikokichi (伊集院彦吉) reported that their problems became especially acute after the 1912 founding of the Republic of China.15 In 1914, before the beginning of World War I, Baron Makino Nobuaki (牧野伸顕), who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a letter to the Japanese Minister to China, Yamaza Enjiro (山座円次郎). Within, he discussed the right to proselytize Buddhism within China.

When it comes to the matter of requesting that the Chinese government recognize our right to preach Buddhism in China, we have already negotiated with the Chinese government for many years without result. Therefore, I am now working on finding another way to solve the issue. During our previous negotiations, we principally took the stance that the “most-favoured-nation status” granted by Article 25 of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation gave us the same rights to proselytize as those given to Catholicism and Protestantism by the treaties signed between China and the Western countries. However, the provisions of those treaties with the West clearly mention Christianity. In no case do they leave room for a broader interpretation, meaning that we lack a real reason to demand equal treatment on that basis. It will be difficult for us to achieve our objectives by continuing this same approach, no matter how many times we attempt to negotiate. I think that an effective strategy would be to set the issue of “rights” completely aside and seek to resolve the matter as a question of “friendship.”16

Yamaza planned on requesting that China advance “spiritual exchanges” between China and Japan, putting forward the idea that the preaching of Buddhism should be seen as one such exchange. He then intended to expand his request from only covering Buddhism to include all of Japan’s religions.

Subsequent to Yamaza’s proposal, the next Japanese Minister to China, Hioki Eki, issued the Twenty-One Demands to Chinese President Yuan Shikai
Shin Kawashima

on January 18th, 1918. As mentioned earlier, one of the Demands was that Japanese Buddhists have their right to preach in China recognized. Because it was included as part of Group 5, this demand was ultimately not subject to negotiations between Japan and China, as China refused to discuss the entirety of that set of demands. As a result, the treaties and agreements (民四条約) based on the revised proposal that Japan issued on April 26th did not include “the right of Japanese people to preach in China.” The propagation of Japanese Buddhism continued to be an unresolved issue between the two countries.

During World War I, Japanese Buddhist circles were publicly supportive of the Japanese government. They therefore hoped that they could find a way to resolve the issue of their right to preach. However, over the course of his negotiations with the Chinese government, Minister of Foreign Affairs Kato Takaaki came to declare that Group 5 of the Demands merely constituted a set of “requests.” As negotiations continued throughout March and April 1915, Japanese Buddhist groups discovered that their right to conduct missionary work had been demoted to become a lower-priority issue. Subsequently, on April 30th, monks from across the Japanese Buddhist community convened a meeting in Hibiya’s Matsumotoro restaurant. They came to an agreement on May 1st and passed a resolution, stating:

A key element that underpins the development of peace and humanitarianism is the right to conduct missionary work. Christians have long enjoyed this right. However, despite the fact that the Western powers have the right to freely proselytize, we alone are left without the equal right to do so. There is no greater national disgrace than this. We Buddhist followers therefore hope that the question of the right to preach in China finds an appropriate resolution.17

Despite the Buddhists’ demands, however, none of the various agreements that were signed between China and Japan included provisions concerning their ability to conduct missionary work.

After concluding the treaties and agreements (民四条約) with China, the Japanese Minister to China, Hioki Eki, sent a letter concerning Japanese Buddhist activities to Kato Takaaki. Hioki quoted an article from the Manshu Nichinichi-Shimbun (満洲日日新聞), a Japanese newspaper in China, which reported that Mizuno Baigyo (水野梅暁) had led famous and high-ranking Buddhists to China to meet with their Chinese counterparts.18 Hioki, who was responsible for submitting the same Twenty-One Demands that had included two articles about the propagation of Japanese Buddhism, reacted negatively to Mizuno’s activities. Hioki believed that Mizuno was a political activist in the mold of Miyazaki Toten (宮崎滔天) and Kayano Nagatomo (萱野長知), who were famous “friends” of Sun Yat-sen. He speculated that if Mizuno were to lead similar kinds of Buddhist activities in the future, the diplomatic situation
had the potential to become much more complex and politicized. Hioki was conscious of China’s growing anti-Japanese movement, and Japanese Buddhism in China did indeed come up against anti-Japanese activities throughout the 1910s, especially after the issuance of the Twenty-One Demands.

4. The Right to Proselytize as Fait Accompli

The right to preach Buddhism in China may have been included as part of the Twenty-One Demands of 1915, but because China had completely rejected Group 5 of the Demands, the issue was ultimately left out of the final Sino-Japanese agreements. Japanese Buddhists lodged significant protests in response. Takashima Beiho, one member of the Buddhist community, summed up their general sentiments by declaring, “In the past, Japan was the beneficiary of much that was imported from China, whether it be in the spiritual or physical realms. Japan has to therefore work to repay the favor in the future.” His argument was that Japan had to reintroduce the same Buddhism it had learned from China back to the Chinese people in order to repay them for the favor of its original transmission. This is a perfect example of the line of thinking that held that China was no longer home to the “original Chinese Buddhism” and that Japanese Buddhism was now a better carrier of its doctrines.

Amidst this pressure, the Japanese government worked to ensure that the right to preach Buddhism in China was to become part of the “facts on the ground.” This was despite the fact that the Chinese government had never acknowledged this right and also despite the emergence of an anti-Japanese movement that resisted Japanese Buddhism’s expansion.

Along these lines, a branch temple of the Higashi Honganji sect that was located in Zhangzhou (漳州) faced a number of difficulties. The temple opened in 1899 and began to conduct missionary work shortly thereafter, but the head Japanese monk suddenly left in the late 1910s without designating a successor. Anti-Japanese movements then targeted the temple as part of their resistance activities, and they created a right-of-way that passed through the temple grounds. The Japanese Consul General and military officer in Xiamen discussed this matter with the commander of the Guangdong Military (粤軍總司令), Chen Jiongming (陳炯明). Chen visited Xiamen in 1920 and ordered that the public not be allowed to pass through the temple grounds. In response, Consul Fujita Eisuke (藤田栄介), proudly declared that Commander Chen’s order meant that China had now recognized Japan’s extant right to conduct missionary work. At the same time, he asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uchida Kosai, to support the renovation of the temple, because it had fallen into disrepair. This case shows the gap between the ideal image and the reality of the status of Japanese temples in China.
Also in the 1920s, the Japanese government began stressing the importance of “cultural exchange,” designing a national project for cultural exchange with China (対支文化事業) that was to use the indemnity payments from the 1901 Boxer Rebellion to fund its activities. After the end of the Hara Takashi administration, Japan changed its diplomatic policy toward China to be more “modest” and “cooperative” with other major powers (with the exception of China). Under the so-called Washington System, Japan sought to avoid the use of military and political power as much as possible, using “economics and culture” to expand its influence within China in their stead. The resultant set of policies came to be known as “Shidehara diplomacy,” as it was identified with then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kijiro Shidehara. Buddhism became a key part of this cultural influence project, though it has generally been more known for its promotion of student exchanges.

At the same time, new religious trends were emerging in China. In major cities, people organized both religious groups and Marxist anti-religion alliances (半宗教同盟). Their criticism of religion was mixed with elements of nationalism, and they identified Christianity as a tool of Western imperialism. Though these groups primarily focused their complaints against the expansion of Christianity in China, Japanese Buddhism had also become a potential target. Anti-Christian movements also helped to cultivate a Chinese Buddhist reform movement. For example, the Fohua Xin Qingnianhui (仏化新青年会) led by two young intellectuals, Zhang Zongzai (張宗載) and Ning Dayun (寧達蘊), launched reform campaigns that spread across most of the country, with most provinces constructing their own branches of the organization. Taixu (太虛), a leader of the Chinese Buddhist reform movement, held study sessions at the Wuchang Buddhist Studies Academy (武昌仏學院) that the group had organized. These advanced new ways of practicing Chinese Buddhism, especially promoting the idea of being a “Buddhist in one’s own home” (在家信者), which represented a stark departure from earlier traditions.

However, from the point of view of many Japanese Buddhists, this new movement offered the perfect opportunity to realize their policy goals, and Mizuno Baigyo (水野梅暁) came to closely follow its activities. When Taixu (太虛) convened the 1924 World Buddhism Convention (世界仏教大会) in Lushan (廬山), a large number of Japanese Buddhist believers and scholars were in attendance, including Saeki Join (佐伯定胤), who was the director of Horyu-ji (法隆寺貫主), University of Tokyo professor Kimura Taiken (木村泰賢), and Mizuno Baigyo. Saeki and Kimura, who received financial support from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to attend, gave lectures on the history of Japanese Buddhism and its fundamental doctrines. After returning to Japan, Kimura noted that Chinese Buddhists were highly interested in Yogachara (Vijñapti-mātratā, 唯識学), such that Japanese Buddhists who were
unable to discuss the topic were likely to have their messages ignored. He also
criticized the activities of Japanese Buddhists in China, remarking that “a large
number of Japanese Buddhists have been sent to China by their sects, but their
academic backgrounds pale in comparison to those of the Chinese Buddhists,
making it difficult to hold any exchanges. The Japanese side has to send
more outstanding individuals to China.”

Saeki, on the other hand, boasted
that Japanese Buddhism was much more advanced, leading him to propose
that Japan open a Buddhist research institute in China. He also wanted each
Buddhist school in Japan to teach their students the Chinese language for the
purpose of continuing exchanges between the two countries.

In 1925, a second convention was held Japan, though this time it was
referred to as an “East Asian” Buddhism Convention rather than a “World”
one. It was sponsored by both the Ministry of Education and the China
Cultural Affairs Bureau. It was held at Zojo-ji in Tokyo, with Mizuno playing a role as messenger between the Japanese
and Chinese participants. Taiwanese and Korean Buddhists also attended
alongside the Chinese delegation, and Taixu gave a speech that stressed the
importance of Buddhist cultural exchanges. The convention was an overall
success, receiving high praise in the media. However, it was also the target
of negative comments issued by several Buddhist activists, including Tanaka
Shashin, who criticized the fact that Buddhists from India, Siam
and elsewhere in Asia had not been invited.

Throughout the mid-1920s, the exchanges continued with complex
intentions and a complicated public image. In Manchuria, for instance,
Harbin continued to lack any sort of Buddhist facilities despite the
fact that Chinese migrants had been continually expanding into Northern
Manchuria. In response, local Chinese leaders, such as Zhu Qinglan, planned to build the “Jile temple” there, but they did not
have the financial resources to do so. Consequently, they asked the Japanese
Consul General, Yamamoto Shiro, and the local director of South
Manchuria Railway Company for support. The South Manchuria
Railway Company agreed, and the consul also asked the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs for its assistance. In his request, Yamamoto contended that, “our
friendly support for this broad and sustainable project will elicit a positive
response to our policies here. The temple itself is also a highly useful facility
for penetrating into Chinese society.”

5. Conclusion

This paper is just a preliminary note, using Japanese sources to explore how
“religion” became a diplomatic issue in Modern China, especially in the late
Qing and early Republican Periods (1890-1920s). A number of scholarly
debates have taken place regarding the spread of Christianity in China, but Buddhism was similarly a hot issue in Sino-Japanese relations.

Of course, there still remains much work to be done on this topic, but based on the research detailed above, we can take away some of the following key points.

First, the expansion of Japanese Buddhism into China was subject to competition between different sects, especially in central and southern China. This also resulted in the simultaneous expansion of Japan’s interests. The Buddhist community within Japan believed that they should have been granted the right to proselytize in China, and they pressured the Japanese government to seek the recognition of that right from the Chinese government. The story of how Shintō expanded alongside the development of the Emperor System within the Empire of Japan is already well known, but Buddhism also worked hand-in-hand with the Japanese government to expand their right to preach in China.

Second, the Chinese government was steadfast in refusing to accept Japan’s view that the most-favoured-nation status granted by Article 25 of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation also gave Japanese Buddhists the right to propagate their religion in China. In addition, because the same demand was included within Group 5 of the Twenty-One Demands in 1915 – a set of demands that China had refused to even negotiate – the matter was not subject to further discussion. However, this does not mean that China’s Foreign Ministry rejected Group 5 because of the Buddhist issue in and of itself. Japan would go on to attempt to have the right to preach recognized as a fait accompli by the Chinese government.

Third, when Japanese Buddhists attempted to preach in China, they did not necessarily hold the belief that Japanese Buddhism was unique or superior. Many Japanese Buddhists understood that Japanese Buddhism began in China, and they held great respect for Chinese Buddhism. However, they did believe that Chinese Buddhism had lost its way and was unable to return to its former glory on its own. They thus understood it to be their duty to reconstruct Chinese Buddhism through their missionary work. This logic was quite similar to later advocacy for an “advance” into China as part of the construction of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. While some Japanese monks sought a different path that existed separate from Chinese Buddhism, such as by travelling to Tibet in search of a form of Buddhism that existed before its transmission to China, most had deep respect for ancient Chinese Buddhism and believed that Japanese Buddhism embodied its original principles.

Finally, Buddhist cultural exchange activities both between China and Japan and across Asia were common, especially after World War I. Every country and region that was pursuing a reform movement saw at least some
level of exchange between their Buddhist communities. The Chinese and Japanese Buddhists were much the same. Chinese Buddhists may have viewed these Sino-Japanese exchanges as unwelcome interference, but it is without question that both the Chinese and Japanese Buddhist communities underwent changes as a result of their relationship. Issues related to this are ripe for further research, especially as they relate to the periods after the founding of Manchukuo and after the end of the Sino-Japanese War. I would like to continue research along these lines in the future.

Notes

* Born in 1968. Graduated in 1992 from the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, where he majored in Chinese area studies. Received his Ph.D. in history from the University of Tokyo. He served as associate professor at Hokkaido University in the Department of Politics, Faculty of Law until 2006 before moving to the University of Tokyo in 2006. He has been a visiting scholar at the Academia Sinica in Taipei (Institute of Modern History, 1995-1996), the Beijing Center for Japanese Studies (vice director, 2000-2001), National Chengchi University in Taipei (Department of History, 2005), Beijing University (Department of History, 2005) and Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars (the Awarded Japan Scholar). His publications include Chugoku kindai gaiko no keisei (Formation of Chinese modern diplomacy, Nagoya University Press, 2004), which won the Suntory Prize for Social Sciences and Humanities in 2004.

1. “Summary of the Issues Related to the Right of Japanese to Preach Buddhism in China (支那内地ニ於ける本邦人仏教布教権問題概要)”, see Asian Division of MOFA (外務省アジア局) eds., The Issue of the Exclusionary or Xenophobic Move to Dismantle Foreign Facilities in China (支那ノ閉鎖的若ハ排外的施設撤廃問題), undated, pp. 58-59; MOFA Archives, reference code: B02130043100, JACAR.


4. “Instructions Regarding the Supervision of Japanese Missionaries in the Qing Empire and Korea (清韓両国＝於ケル日本布教者取締方＝関シ訓令一件)”, MOFA Archives, reference code: B12081601200, JACAR.


6. “Letter from Ishikawa Kaoru to Ueno Sen’ichi, the Consul at Amoy, Apr., 1st, 1899,” MOFA Archives, reference code: B120816200, JACAR.


9. For example, missionary work by Japanese Buddhists also ran into problems in 1908. The Qing government refused to recognize their activities. June 8, 1908 (5/10 Guangxu 34) Letter from Chargé d’affaires Abe Moritarō to the Foreign Affairs Bureau, “Japanese Monks Preaching in China Enjoy the Same Right to Conduct Missionary Work as All Protestant and Catholic Missionaries (本国仏教僧侶在貴国伝教與耶蘇天主各宣教師同享有布教之権)”, Foreign Affairs Bureau Archives (外務部檔案), 02-05-009-02-019. See also, on the same date, Letter from Chargé d’affaires Abe to the Foreign Affairs Bureau, “Equal Treatment between Japanese Buddhist Monks and the Nationals of All other Countries. Please Forward to the Viceroy of Fujian (本国仏教僧侶與各国人一律相待請転粵督由)”, Foreign Affairs Bureau Archives (外務部檔案), 02-05-010-02-017.

10. “Report from the Consul in Zhejiang on the Rumors that 35 Chinese Temples will become Affiliated with the Nishi Honganji Group (清国浙江省内三十五個寺院聯絡シテ大谷派本願寺へ帰属スル風説ニ関シ在中帝国領事館ヨリ具報一件)”, 1903, MOFA Archives, reference code: B12081604400, JACAR.


14. Japanese Shinto (神道), Buddhism, Christianity, Taoism, and Islam were all active within the Kwantung Leased Territory (旅順大連租借地), but it was reported that “Most Japanese and Chinese people do not care much about religion (日支人孰レモ其ノ多数ハ顕ル冷淡且無頓着)”. See “The Report on the General Religious Situation, 1913 Annual Administrative Report of the Kwantung Office (大正二年度 諸般行政施行成績 関東都督府 8 /第六 宗教ニ関スル一般ノ状況)”, MOFA Archives, reference code: B03041562800, JACAR.

15. Letter from Ijuin to Minister of Foreign Affairs Uchida Kosai, “Reports Concerning Pressure from Officials within the New Government on Buddhist Monks and Temples in China (支那仏教僧侶寺院ニ対スル新官憲ノ圧迫ニ)
16. Letter from Yamaza to Minister of Foreign Affairs Makino Nobuaki, “Regarding the Attainment of the Right to Preach within China (支那内地ニ於ケル布教権獲得ニ関スル件)”, February 3rd, 1914. MOFA Archives, reference code: B12081602600, JACAR.


18. Mizuno Baigyo was a monk from the Sotoshu (曹洞宗) sect and famous tairiku rōnin (大陸浪人). Hironaka Kazunari’s article analyzes Mizuno’s activities and ideology, but he focuses on the 1920-40s and does not cover his activities in 1910s. see, Hironaka Kazunari, “Japanese Invasion of China and Baigyou Mizuno (日本の中国侵略と水野梅暁),” Kokken Kiyo (国研紀要), No. 146, November, 2015. See also, “Buddhist Demonstrations: a Group of High-ranking Buddhists plans to visit China (仏教徒の示威運動—名僧知識団の渡支計画)”, Manshu Nichinichi-Shimbun (満洲日日新聞), July 17th, 1915.


20. “Obtaining the Right to Preach within China (支那内地布教権の獲得),” Shin Bukkyō (新仏教) 16, no. 5, 1915. See also Akamatsu, “Politics and Religion in Modern Japan – New Buddhist Movement –.”


22. For example, it is also engaged in the recruitment of Chinese monks to Japan. See “A Reliable and Effective Policy for Cultural Exchange with China (着実で有効な対支文化事業),” Osaka Asahi Shimbun (大阪朝日新聞), April 2nd, 1926.


25. Erik Christopher Schicketanz has pointed out that a schism between the “Buddhist in one’s home” movement and the Buddhist clergy was triggered by the reimportation of esoteric Buddhism from Japan. See Erik Christopher Schicketanz, “The Formation of Historical Consciousness in Modern Chinese

26. “Comments by Dr. Kimura,” The Circumstances Surrounding the Lushan Buddhism Convention (廬山仏教連合会ノ状況), MOFA Archives, reference code: B12081587500, JACAR.

27. “Comments by Saeki Join,” The Circumstances Surrounding the Lushan Buddhism Convention (廬山仏教連合会ノ状況), MOFA Archives, reference code: B12081587500, JACAR.

28. Taixu insisted on continuing to use the word “world,” but the Japanese side was against it. See, “Comments by Dr. Kimura,” The Circumstances Surrounding the Lushan Buddhism Convention (廬山仏教連合会ノ状況), MOFA Archives, reference code: B12081587500, JACAR.

29. Shi Taixu (釈太虚), “Friendly Advice for Asian Buddhists (亜洲仏教徒ニ敬告ス)”, East Asian Buddhism Convention, MOFA Archives, reference code: B050157321, JACAR.


References


The Russian Ecclesiastical Missions (1715-1864) to Peking and their Influence on China Studies in Russia

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Abstract
The aim of the essay is to find out how the Russian Orthodox Church as a religious institution influenced the birth and evolution of China Studies and helped to create a Sinology as a national academic discipline in Russia. The brief analyses of the history of the 14 Ecclesiastical Missions in China helps to figure out what kind of impetus this religious institution gave to Academic Sinology and how it helped to create a university Sinology as a national sinological school.

Keywords: Russian Orthodox Church, Ecclesiastical Mission, China Studies, Sinology

1. Introduction
In this essay, I attempt to illustrate how the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) laid the foundations of Russia’s interest in learning about China and contributed to the founding of Russian academic sinology.

Inasmuch as there is a paucity of secondary material on this topic, there is hardly a treasure-trove of archival material directly linked to the same, either. Primary and secondary material aside, a researcher could have potentially also relied upon conversations with the clergy at the ROC. However, in the ROC, there are currently only two priests – Petr Ivanov and Dimitriy Pozdyaev – who know some Mandarin and have written relevant academic essays; their publications (Ivanov, 2005; Dionosiy, 2016) however are not secular. There is also a literature that helps to understand views of religious people on Christianity and China, the role of religion and Christianity in people’s life especially in view of the China connection to compare it to secular views
and Chinese literature on the subject (Samoilov, 2016; Lomanov, 2010; Xiao Yuchun, 2009; Li Weili, 2007; Yan Guochen, 2007; Yue Feng, 2005) thus enabling us to have more clear picture as a whole.

This is the reason why I have ultimately had to rely mostly on secondary material. But I have also consulted some archival materials (AVPRI) as well as the Russko-kitaiskiye otnosheniya (RKO, 1995ab, 2006, 1969, 1972, 1990, 1978) alongside some other diplomatic documents from that period. Particularly interesting is a rare illustrative edition reviving the distant past and including photocopies of the texts and drawings including done by the members of the mission (Russia and China, 2019). Additionally, I have earlier consulted the archives of the London Missionary Society (LMS, 1795-1940): Documents preserved there have allowed me to keep in mind the lives and deeds of Russian and British missionaries in China.

I would discuss the ROC’s first 15 missions to China and highlight how these missions began to develop a Russian knowledge base regarding China that eventually became the foundation for Russian sinology in the proper. What underlies this essay is my believe that when state agencies fail to be proactive in learning about another country then other types of institutions step in to address that gap for pragmatic or specialized reasons of their own. I suggest that the ROC’s intellectual investments in China via its ecclesiastical missions there point up its role as precisely such a non-state institution. To the extent that the ROC’s missions to China were considerably successful in acquiring knowledge about it, reporting their educational activities naturally pushed me into scoping out sinology as a field of knowledge in its early stages of appearance and evolution in Russia.

Based on my personal research experience as well as my discussions with different generations of Sinologists, I have previously formulated a set of criteria for what constitutes sinology and who could be considered a sinologist (Voskressenski, 2018: 115). Echoing those criteria, this essay suggests that through 1715-1864, what the ROC’s missions managed to develop in China was a distinctive Russian body of professionals specializing in various facets of China. These professionals were sinologists – as we might call such people today: 1) They came to have a history of personal research investments into China, and they devoted themselves to expanding those investments into a field of study; 2) They learnt not only one or more languages of China, but they also studied other aspects of that country – and even received some education in them during their stays at the mission; 3) They not only studied but also worked in China; 4) They contributed to developing the pursuit of knowledge about Chinese matters into a distinctive and integrated field of inquiry; 5) They put out peer-reviewed research publications based upon a first-hand knowledge of China.
2. Russia’s Early Contact with China: The First Phase (1608-1727)

One might suggest two key phases to the evolvement of Russia’s early contact with China. The first of these two phases lasted through 1608-1727, and was characterized by Russian attempts at exploring China and establishing a sustained contact with it; these attempts would lead up to the onset of the ROC’s ecclesiastical missions to China. The second phase unfolded through 1727-1805; through this phase, the ROC would lay the foundations of Russian sinology through tours to China under its Ecclesiastical Mission (RKO, 1995ab, 2006, 1969, 1972, 1990, 1978).

The first phase was the time when Russia and China were coming closer to each other geographically – and when Russia would establish its earliest contact with the Ming dynasty in China and attempted to generate its first geographical and political descriptions of China (Miasnikov, 1985). Let me outline below those developments:

1. On 1696, Peter the Great flags off the first Russian “caravans” to China

The Russian caravans were the earliest self-sustaining and professionally organized expeditions to other countries. They were manned by officially designated people (gosudarevy lyudy) who were appointed by the state authorities (and sometimes by the Emperor himself). Some of these people were essentially unranked ambassadors. In some cases, Russians would join these caravans midway; in some other cases, Russians already present in the land of a caravan’s arrival would join it there for their own commercial, religious, or reconnaissance objectives. In the context of Russian history, the word caravan is typically used in reference to a journey to some “oriental” country (Dmitryshyn, 1985; Miasnikov, 1985).

2. In 1692, Eberhard Izbrand Ides (1657-1708) – a Dane on the Russian service – and his secretary, Adam Brand, were sent by Peter the Great as envoys to China with one of these early caravans.

The caravan that took these two to China would turn out to be way more important than the previous ones because these two men were able to meet Emperor Kangxi. We do have access to Ides’ personal memoirs about his voyage to China. First published in Amsterdam in 1704 – and later in Britain (1706), Germany (1707) and France (1718) – Ides’ memoirs comprised an important step in Russian as well as European diplomats’ acquisition of knowledge about China though in Russia the results were broadly known only after 1789 (Skachkov, 1977: 30).

Through 1715-1717, 1719, 1720-1722, 1725, Lorenz Lange – a Swede – served as Russia’s state envoy to China on the orders of Peter the Great and also visited China many times in different capacities (RKO, 1990: 88,
Known in Russia as Lavrentiy, Lange was a Swedish cornet who had been imprisoned by Russia in 1709 at the Battle of Poltava. Before being sent to China as an envoy for Russia, Lange had had a brief career in the Russian service. After his stint in China as an envoy, Lange was appointed the vice governor of Irkutsk, which allowed him to play an important role in promoting Russia-China trade. In 1719, Peter the Great sent another Russian envoy – General Lev Vasilyevich Izmailov (1685-1738) – to China with the objective of having him meet Emperor Kanxi (Skachkov, 1977; Dmitryshyn, 1985; Miasnikov, 1985).

Both Lange and Izmailov managed to access – and map – hitherto unknown routes to China; they also brought to Russia its first collection of Mandarin and Manchu books. Later, Lange donated to the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) these books and they became an important source of knowledge for future Russian sinologists. Lange also procured Russian books from the RAS to be delivered to the authorities in China – and these were the first Russian books that China would see. These Russian books became an important source of knowledge in China about Russia. Finally, Lange was the first on the Russian service to connect Russian diplomats with Western religious missions in China (Skachkov, 1977: 30-34, 37-41). There is no concrete evidence for it in the archives, but it is possible to mention that his communications prompted Russia to use the ROC’s missions to China as a way to learn about that country.

3. As early as in 1683 Russian priests (Maxim Leontiev) and 1695 (Lavrentiy Ivanov) paid their first visits to China and even opened churches; thereafter, in 1715, the ROC decided to set up an ecclesiastical mission there.

While there is no archival information about how this decision was taken, we do know (Skachkov, 1977) that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had provided private teachers to Russian students to prepare them for the mission to China. This gives us a clue that the foreign ministry had played an important role in helping the ROC to prepare missionaries linguistically for their imminent activities in China – and we could assume that this assistance had followed a meeting of high-ranking Russian diplomats, state figures, and the clergy.

The second phase in Russia-China relations – which is the more important phase for this essay – comprised the years 1727-1805. During this phase, Russia begins to intensify its economic and political ties with China’s Qing empire (Chen, 1966). However, through all these years, the ROC’s mission in Peking was the only Russian institution in China – and it had started to develop an understanding of its host country through research.
3. The Russian Orthodox Church in China: The First Five Missions (1715-1771)

After the Tsardom of Russia surrendered Albazin to the Qing dynasty in 1686, the residents of Albazin brought an old Russian priest to Peking (Samoilov, 2016: 32). This priest as well as the people of Albazin were now captives of the Manchu emperor. The priest, however, was very old and unable to perform his priestly duties. Russians in China wrote a letter because of this to a Russian Tsar (RKO, 1978: 50) and Grigoriy Oskolkov, who had arrived in Peking at the time as the head of a Russian commercial caravan, wrote a letter to Lifanyuan (the highest Qing institution authorized to deal with subordinate territories) requesting permission to bring Russian orthodox priests into China. The Kangxi emperor granted Oskolkov his request on the condition that the priests be accompanied by a medical doctor. Eventually, along with a returning Chinese diplomatic mission led by Tulishen, the ROC sent several Russian priests under the command of archimandrite Illarion Lezhaiskiy.

These Russian priests were well accommodated by the Chinese authorities: on the mandarin ranking system, archimandrite Lezhaisky was placed at Level 5; his deputy Filimon was placed at Level 7; and all the other priests were ranked on a par with Manchu soldiers. Given state lodgings near the Russian church building in Peking, all these priests were also sanctioned a considerable daily allowance by the Chinese authorities (Skachkov, 1977: 36-37). All in all, the Russian priests were de facto employees of the Manchu empire – and they enjoyed a status on a par with other imperial employees. This arrangement would continue until 1858, when the Treaty of Tientsin (June 1858) would stipulate that the financial burden of the ROC’s missions in China be borne by the Russian Empire (Samoilov, 2016: 33).

The first Russian ecclesiastical mission to China initially had no official agenda, nor unofficial drive to learn Mandarin or any other languages of China even though some of the mission’s members would live in China for over 20 years and would even die in Peking. Against this backdrop, though, one member – Osip (Yosef) Diakonov – learnt Manchu and Mandarin; he also began teaching Russian in a Language School at the Palace Chancellery (Neige Eluosi Wenguan), a Qing educational institution that had been established by the State Chancellery in Peking in 1708 (Lapin, 2019; another date – 1725, mentioned by Skachkov 1977: 37).

We don’t have any documented explanation for why Diakonov would decide to learn these Chinese languages. However, it is safe to speculate that long-term Russian residents of Peking had to have felt the social need to learn Mandarin, and – for that matter – Manchu. The Chinese, on the other hand, may have felt compelled by diplomatic and commercial reasons to learn Russian, given that the contact between the Qing and the Russian empires had been gaining in regularity. Inasmuch both the Russians and the Chinese would
have hitherto had to depend, for their mutual communication, on frequently imprecise and unreliable intermediaries – uneducated members of liminal communities belonging to the Russian-Chinese borderlands – they would have together aspired to build a proper cross-linguistic capacity for themselves on a permanent basis.

However, the mission’s own continuity in China was not as yet a settled issue. This had to do with the fact that the Manchu authorities had been imperially mandated to forbid foreign caravans from visiting the Qing China on a regular basis. However, once the Treaty of Kyakhta (1727) came into effect (RKDPA, 2004: 41-47), Russia’s commercial caravans got the right to visit China every three years – and the Russian citizens were permitted to lodge as well as to have their own church in Peking. Also, following the enforcement of the Treaty of Kyakhta (RKDPA, 2004: 46), two new Russian priests joined the ROC’s mission in Peking; these additions took the total number of Russian priests in Peking to three.

The Treaty of Kyakhta broadened the scope of commercial and humanitarian interactions between Russia and China; it also led to an uptick in the young Russians’ interest in learning Mandarin and Manchu. The Russian government, on its part, was also interested in deepening its contact with China; it thus decided to attach four young people to the ROC’s ecclesiastical mission to China (RKDPA, 2004: 46). Expected to learn China’s languages, these youngsters were given the formal status of students (uchenik); they were also accorded the right to return to Russia following completion of their education in China (Xiao Yuchun, 2009). This right had been stipulated in a Russia-China agreement that had accompanied the Treaty of Kyakhta (Skachkov, 1977) and later stipulated more precisely by the Treaty of Tientsin (RKO, 2004: 67). Previously, Russian visits to China were governed entirely by the Manchu-Chinese authorities. It appears that this stipulation had been put in place in view of a rising discontent among Russians wishing to travel to China and also by a relatively higher rate of deaths (the mortality rate for the first five missions was approximately 39 per cent: of 56 people sent to China 22 died there).

The second mission to China had seven members: the head; three priests; and three students who had previously studied Mongolian at the Voznesenski monastery near Irkutsk. The head of this second mission had previously led the Voznesenski monastery while also directing the Irkutsk School of Mongolian Studies (Kuzmin, Sokhodolov, Manzhigeev 2015: 235-38). It appears that the ROC had decided to appoint a ranking religious leader (a monastery head) as the main authority for its second ecclesiastical mission to China; it further appears that it had prioritized in such a candidate’s qualifications a better understanding of the local conditions – given that Irkutsk is half way to China.
Now, while this newly appointed head of the second mission knew the local conditions relatively better than other potential candidates for this position, his prior experience as an academic director was that of a school that focused on Mongol. What this suggests is that linguistic priorities had been undergoing a change through the years along with the changes in the Russian understanding of its borderlands and beyond. So, while the initial Russian focus regarding foreign-language acquisition was on Mongol, it had subsequently shifted to Mongol, Manchu, and Mandarin; much later, it would end up shrinking, to some extent anyway, to Mandarin and Manchu.

Out of these seven members of the second mission, only two had succeeded in learning Mongol, Manchu, and/or Mandarin. Apparently noticing this low success rate in its members’ attempts at learning the languages of China, the Peking-based mission head sent a dictionary of Mandarin to Saint Petersburg in 1734 for the purpose of getting it translated into Russian.

The underlying idea behind this dictionary’s aspired translation into Russian was presumably that the eventual bilingual product would help linguistically prepare members of future missions to China ahead of their long stays in that country. Nevertheless, within two years, this dictionary was sent back from Saint Petersburg with the order to translate it – neither Saint Petersburg nor Moscow had anybody to translate Mandarin into Russian; the situation was not any different at Irkutsk, whose foreign-language expertise was limited to Mongol. Against the above backdrop of an unavailability of relevant experts, all attempts made inside Russia to translate the Mandarin dictionary into Russian failed – and there is no evidence that such efforts succeeded in Peking, either, after its return to the mission there (though there is an indirect mention of its second trip to Moscow) (Skachkov 1977: 40).

As time went by, the ROC got better organized and this organizational improvement may have made it possible for somebody like Illarion Rossokhin to come to Peking. One of the two outstanding Russian students at Peking, Rossokhin was a member of the second mission. His command of Mandarin and Manchu so impressed the Lifan Yuan – the Qing dynasty’s government bureau dedicated to the affairs of the borderlands of Inner Asia – that, in 1735, they sought the permission of Lorenz (Lavrentiy) Lange, the Russian official in China, to appoint him as an interpreter.

Taking a deep personal interest in Chinese languages and cultures, Rossokhin also started to teach Russian to the Chinese officials. He also bought the first original map of the Qing China, and sent it to Russia; compiled the first textbook of Mandarin; and was the first to translate Chinese books on Chinese history and culture into Russian. After finishing his education with the mission in Peking, Rossokhin returned to Saint Petersburg, and joined the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) (Skachkov, 1977: 39-53, 60-64, 301-306).
At that academy, Rossokhin established the first school of Chinese and Manchu languages in circa 1741; this school remained operational for 10 years – lasting through 1741-1751. The Russian authorities, however, never sent any of its students to China for further education – either in religion or otherwise – mostly because they had all failed to find employment domestically within the streams in which they had been trained. As for Rossokhin, he translated many books of China into Russian; however, none of his translations was published while he was still alive.

Despite the above apparent failures, Rossokhin should be considered the first professional Russian sinologist (Skachkov 1977, archival addendum: 389-395). Here it seems pertinent to mention that the RAS’ first sinologist – Theophilius (Gottlieb) Siegfried Bayer (1694-1738) – was a German national who knew no language of China, where he also never visited. He did, however, own a collection of Oriental – including Chinese – manuscripts that had been bequeathed to one of his relatives. Never donated to the RAS – whose full membership Bayer enjoyed – this collection ultimately ended up in the library of the University of Glasgow. Referred to as the Bayer Collection, all that material is currently preserved at that university’s Hunterian Library (Weston, 2018).

Bayer was a brilliant scholar; however, his lack of knowledge of China’s languages restricted him to compiling and publishing only French and English writings on China (Museum Sinicum). Meanwhile, a fellow German – a historian named Gerhard Friedrich Müller (whose Russian name was Fedor Ivanovich Miller) – found Rossokhin’s largely forgotten or lost Russian translations of Chinese works and used some of them for his own academic presentations. Müller (1705-1783) was the Secretary of the RAS; apart from Rossokhin’s Russian translations of Chinese works, he also copied in Siberia’s archives many other original Russian documents that have since been lost.

The long and short of the above is that the earliest trained Russian experts on Chinese matters were either ignored or improperly used by Russia’s official research establishment. These experts excelled in Mandarin and Manchu; were able to use primary sources in these languages; used to translate between these languages and Russian; taught these languages to fellow Russians with the objective of preparing the future generations of Russian experts on China; and were even informally consulted by the Russian Collegium for Foreign Affairs (now Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). However, these experts failed to get institutional support from their own country’s research establishment – and remained unknown to the German experts that led the establishment’s sinological branch. As a result, these experts’ Russian students also failed to find employment within sinology; these students were thus lost to (academic) oblivion.

In 1742, Russia sent Mikhail Shokurov to China to notify its authorities of the new Russian tsaritsa, Elizaveta Petrovna. Shokurov brought along...
with him the following three students to attach them to the ROC’s 3rd ecclesiastical mission: Alexey Leontief, Andrei Kanaev, and Nikita Chekanov. The 4th mission brought with it just one student – Efim Sakhnovski; but the 5th mission had no students at all. Only one of the above four students got the chance to study Mandarin; all of them, however, had to return to Russia somewhat abruptly later because a dispute had erupted between the Russian and the Chinese authorities regarding the mission’s education agenda. The Chinese authorities had begun to insist that the operational permission for the mission had included no provisions for Russian students to study in China.

By this time, the mission’s prior students had already put together a Russian-Mandarin dictionary. However, it is thus difficult to assess the quality of sinological training that these students had happened to receive at the mission – or to assess the levels of their personal or collective gains through that training.

After Rossokhin, it was Leontief who was the most talented of the Peking-trained, mission-led Russian students of sinology: he was one of the second generation of mission-led students. Thanks to its rising popularity in Europe, the chinoiserie style had been gaining traction in Russia and the Russian nobility had begun to collect Chinese artifacts rather proudly. This uptick in the domestic Russian interest in Chinese products and stylistic imprints had been spurring an interest in information about China – and thus in sinology itself. Leontief – who excelled in Mandarin as well as Manchu – decided to complete Rossokhin’s unfinished Russian translation of a Manchu text in Manchu history: Rossokhin had met his death before being able to finish it.

For completing this translation, Leontief and Rossokhin’s widow ended up winning an award from the RAS: this was the first award that the RAS had ever bestowed on a sinological work put out by any of the mission’s alumni. Nevertheless, these two individuals failed to publish their awarded translation immediately; indeed, the translation was published as many as 23 years after its completion (Skachkov 1977: 67) because none of the non-Russian personnel holding any academic position at the time in Russia had so much as visited China, leave aside learnt any language of China. However, one may thus retrospectively suggest that, during this time, Russia was witnessing the emergence of its own, national school of sinology.

In 1763, the Russian government sanctioned Leontief the permission to open his school dedicated to teaching Chinese languages. The school (students taken from an Academy of Slavic-Greek-Latin languages and also from seminarii of Peterburgskaya, Novgorodskaya and Moskovskaya gubernii) firstly started out that very year on the strength of some transfer students – with some prior training in the so-called “oriental” languages – from other religious schools. During this time, Leontief also got appointed to the Russian
Foreign Ministry as an interpreter-cum-translator – an appointment that helped him advance the interests of the school he had established. Leontief ended up being the first Russian whose sinological works in Russian were translated into German and French – a turn of events that attests to the quality of his sinological publications.

All in all, the first five missions laid the foundations for Russian sinology, and produced two extraordinary sinologists: Rossokhin and Leontief. Belonging to consecutive generations of the mission’s trainees in Peking, these two men were sinologists in the proper inasmuch as their profiles exhibited a set of common traits that I have previously identified in this essay.

Toward the end of the fifth mission to China, the Manchu-Chinese government terminated their long-standing consideration of the mission’s students as their own paid subordinates; later on, in 1858, the Treaty of Tientsin, mandated that the Russian government pay for the upkeep of these missions in China (RKO, 2004: 67). It is over the course of these first five mission that:

- the first Russian-Mandarin dictionary was compiled (even though it eventually got lost)
- the first well-regarded compendium of Russian translations of Manchu history and creative writing was put together
- the first-ever RAS grant was awarded to facilitate translations from China’s languages into Russian
- the first Russian sinological writings were translated into German and French, thereby confirming their originality and quality from the viewpoint of the European sinological establishment
- the number of Russian students of sinology was gradually increased, but without ensuring any generational continuity to the training of Russian sinologists in China – given that the 5th mission was cut short by the Manchu authorities. Indeed, all the members of the 4th and the 5th missions were together forced to return to Russia.³

4. The Next Four Missions: From Language Studies to Professional Sinological Research on Contemporary China (1771-1821)

Like the 4th and the 5th missions which have only 9 people, the 6th mission to China had ten people – which made it one-third smaller than the first and the third missions; however, it had a greater number of students than any one of the previous missions except the second of which three students died in Peking never returning to Moscow. Arriving in China in 1771, this mission had four students – Fedor Barsheeve, Alexey Parishev, Alexey Agafonov, and Yakow Korin – and it lasted until 1781. Perhaps because of the abrupt
cancellation and unceremonious exit of the 5th mission – and the concomitant return of its students along with those that had stayed over from the 4th one – the students of this 6th mission began to pay attention to the politics of China. For the first time in history of these missions, their Russian students – financially supported this time around by the head of the mission – were not only learning the languages of China but also maintaining a reflective journal on its political events. We cannot trace it, but its mentions indicate that its purpose was to prepare Russian students for a political grasp of China. This journal was thus an important step toward the evolving articulation of Russian sinology.

The students of the 6th mission were keen to compile and send to Russia the first more or less professional Mandarin-Russian dictionary – apparently for the benefit of their future counterparts. These students were also the first batch among all the batches from the previous missions to return to Russia voluntarily. The 6th mission’s batch of students was also the first one to get professional appointments upon their return to Russia as translators of China’s languages. In other words, it took 66 years of the ROC’s ecclesiastical missions to China to prepare four professional, fully employable Russian sinologists – each with a decade’s worth of living and educational experiences in China.

Lasting 13 years, the 7th mission arrived in China in 1781. This mission had four students – Yegor Salertovskiy, Anton Vladikin, Ivan Filonov, and Alexey Popov. Out of these four, only Vladikin made it back to Russia; the other three died in China sometime between 1730 and 1806. Of all the ROC’s sinology students through the first 71 years of its missions in Peking, Vladikin was the first to land a professional appointment within the field upon his return to Russia: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs hired him as a translator of Mandarin into Russian.

Excepting the Russian translations of two articles from Manchu, a translation of Yuan Shi (or the History of Yuan Dynasty), and some other hitherto untraceable Russian translations, Vladikin has left behind no other scholarly sinological publications of his own. However, he also compiled five Manchu vocabularies and several wordlists of Manchu and Mandarin (Skachkov 1977, addendum 4: 398-399). But just like Rossokhin and Leontief, Vladikin campaigned for establishing a language school – albeit in Saint Petersburg rather than Moscow – to teach students Mandarin for further studies in China. Being an employee of the Foreign Ministry, he was able to persuade the ministry officials to support his effort – and the school that he had hoped for was opened.

Vladikin’s school, however, remained operational only until 1801. His school was nevertheless the first successful professional school in Russia dedicated to teaching Mandarin insofar as its graduates would have generally
mastered 1000 hieroglyphs: a level of achievement that would have set them on a par with their contemporary European counterparts. And yet, only one of Vladikin’s school’s graduates was sent to study Mandarin in China – with the 9th ecclesiastical mission.

Arriving in China in 1794 – and staying there until 1807 – the 8th mission had 12 members altogether, of which the following five were students: Pavel Kamenskiy, Karp Kruglopolov, Stepan Lipovtsov, Ivan Malishev, and Vasiliy Novoselov. The second mission was the only other missions that had 5 students. Also, all these missions had around 2 to 5 junior priests (prichetniki) responsible for singing psalms in the church; this mission also had 2 such priests: Kozma Kaganskiy and Vassiliy Bogorodski. However, what was unusual about these types of priests this time around was that they were also mandated to learn Mandarin.

In fact, the mission head – Safroniy Gribovskiy – had gone much further than the above mandate concerning language learning. In a note to the ROC authorities, Gribovskiy insisted that the knowledge of Mandarin was critical to proselytizing in China effectively; he also repeatedly floated the idea of establishing a centre in Irkutsk to help prepare local students for advanced training in Mandarin in China. Even though the mission used the instructional services of Chinese personnel that had been provided by Lifanyuan, Gribovskiy hired additional language instructors privately for the benefit of the students; he also started putting together a library for the mission.

Last but not least, in these missions’ 79 years of existence, Gribovskiy ended up being the first head to write essays on – and summarize other members’ writings about – China. Some of these essays were later published in Russia’s scientific journals (Skachkov, 1977). To have a head who would invest himself in researching and writing about China encouraged other members of the mission to take an interest in sinology. At any rate, from Gribovskiy’s tenure at the mission onward the ROC authorities began to informally favour the idea that mission heads engage in sinology.

All of the ROC’s Peking-based missions had a high mortality rate. Through 1717-1806, these missions lost 33 members – four of whom being heads (which means that 50 percent of all the missions’ total number of leaders perished in Peking). Ten of these 33 members that died in Peking were students (out of a total of 26 students that lived in Peking during these years). Many other students passed away quickly (within a year) after their return to Russia. As it happens, only one of these 26 students from these years ever got a government job.

However, students of the prior ROC missions to China had established private schools to teach Mandarin and Manchu; lacking the state’s support, these schools would remain short-lived. Only Vladikin was able to persuade the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to fund a language school to prepare Russian
students for further sinological training in China; but this school also had to be shut in 1801.

By the end of the 8th mission (1807), the ROC campus in Peking had its own library of Mandarin and Manchu books; a set of Mandarin-Russian dictionaries that had been compiled by former students; and a written journal of important political events in China intended to enable the students to follow and analyze political developments in the country. So, despite their religious nature, the ROC’s missions to China had been able to create, sustain, and develop a full-fledged educational section as part of their self-maintenance; as a way to prepare future Russian sinologists for any subsequent missions; and a way to build mission’s research and pedagogical capabilities.

5. The Next Seven Missions: Creation of Professional Sinology

Under the leadership of Iakinf Bichurin, the 9th mission arrived in Peking in 1807 and stayed there until 1821 plus one year of return which explains differences in dates (see, for example, Skachkov, 1977: 360 and Andreev, Baskhanov & Yusupova, 2018). Among all the previous mission heads, Bichurin was the second one to have a personal interest in China as well as in research and pedagogy generally. Bichurin’s personal devotion to sinology as a mission head became crucial not only for the religious success of the mission itself but also for the growth of sinology within it. The following four students were attached to this mission: Markel Lavrovskiy; Lev Zimailov; Mikhail Sipakov; and Efgraf Gromov. Given that one of these four – Sipakov – had previously been trained by Leontief, this mission marked the start of a trend whereby these missions had begun to receive students with some prior sinological training from the previous missions’ students.

Bichurin put together the first authoritative Mandarin-Russian dictionary. He also read all the books in Latin and French that he could find in the libraries of Western missionaries in China, and translated the Sishu, the Dai-qing yi tongzhi, and the Zizhi Tongjian Gangmu. Using the services of a Lama he had hired as a teacher and translator, Bichurin also translated several Tibetan books, and abstracted many Mongolian ones. While being very critical of all the previous missions’ academic outputs and educational framework, he successfully broadened the scope for the future of sinology in Russia by introducing Tibetan and Mongolian sources into it. Moreover, he sent a report to the Russian government stressing the need for a complex understanding of China – and thus for encouraging research and teaching in the history, geography, medicine, botany, and creative writing of China.

Bichurin lived in China for 16 years; when he returned to Russia, he brought along 12 boxes of Chinese books with him. After his return to Russia, he translated many Chinese historical books into Russian; he also wrote the
first Chinese grammar (first part in 1831 and the second in 1836 (Skachkov 1977: 112)), and authored many books on Chinese themes as well as on Tibet (Skachkov 1977: 99-108). After teaching Mandarin to many students of the mission, he taught it to many others at his Kyakhta language school: the first school to prepare Mandarin-Russian translators for the booming Russian-Chinese commerce.

Bichurin was indeed an extraordinary figure for Russian sinology – for some other reasons as well. He had an extraordinary personal life (which included conflicts with the ROC); he also had deep connections with the Russian intelligentsia – poets, painters, writers, etc. He was a corresponding member of the RAS – the highest research institution in Russia, and a foreign honorary member of the Asiatic society. Because of all this, sinology ended up securing a special place for itself in the Russian humanistic disciplines during his lifetime.

Under the leadership of Petr Kamenskiy, the 10th mission arrived in Peking in 1821 and stayed there until 1830. As somebody who had been a student of the 3rd mission through 1736-1743, Kamenski was the first former student of a ROC mission to China to return as another mission’s head; he thus knew first-hand what it takes to live and study in China as a mission student. As a former student, he was also personally interested in China – and determined to extend the mission’s goals. Given that his father had also being a priest, Kamenski had some influence over ROC institutions – a situational fact that was helpful to him in developing this mission.

After completing his education with the 3rd mission, Kamenski had previously returned to Russia – and worked there as a Mandarin-Russian translator before being appointed as a diplomat within the Aziatskii Departament (Asian Department) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In order to go to China as the head of the 10th mission, he had to become a Russian orthodox priest – and to do that, he had to sacrifice his secular life. Kamenski’s career chart is thus the reverse of what Bichurin had aspired for in his own case (even though each of them lived in China for 16 years): Bichurin had started out as a priest – and he later unsuccessfully sought the Russian state’s and religious authorities’ permissions to leave the church institutions for a secular life. Kamenskiyt translated into Russian the Zizhi Tongjian Gangmu (from Chinese) and the Yuán Shǐ (from Manchu) – and compiled a Mandarin-Mongol-Manchu-Russian-Latin dictionary. His works were reviewed by French sinologists; and he was the first alumnus of the ROC’s missions to China to be made a corresponding member of the RAS (Skachkov, 1977; Li Weili, 2007).

The 10th mission was the first to have been given official instructions before it set sail for China. These instructions were a catalogue of agreements between the mission’s sender – the ROC – and its members (including its students) specifying the educational and research goals for the mission. The
instructions mandated the mission to collect China’s books, and to cross-translate Mandarin and Russian dictionaries; they also mandated that the mission’s head learn Mandarin or Manchu; priests learn Mandarin and translate Russian religious books into it; students not only learn the native languages but also study other sinological topics such as Chinese but as well medicine, natural philosophy, history, geography, statistics, and creative literature.

The 10th mission was the first to have a medical doctor (Osip Voitsekhovskiy), sent to explore Chinese medicine; every mission hereafter had a medical doctor – both as a mission’s healthcare provider and as a researcher of Chinese medicine. This mission had three students: Kondrat Krimskiy, Zakhar Leontievskiy, and Vassiliy Abramov; however, eight out of its total of nine members learnt Mandarin and Manchu – which they used in their research. When returning to Russia, the mission brought a collection of books that were distributed across the libraries in Irkutsk, Moscow, and Saint Petersburg. Two of this mission’s alumni – Lipovtsev and Leontievskiy – made considerable contributions to sinology via their translations and pedagogy (Skachkov, 1977, addendum 4: 406-407, 419-420).

Headed by Veniamin Morachevich – who had been a member (ieromonakh – hieromonk) of the 10th mission – the 11th mission stayed in China until 1840. Given his prior experience, Morachevich knew the ins and outs of these ROC missions; moreover, since he was one of the monks who had studied Mandarin with the 10th mission, he knew the language. By this time, the ROC had enough people from its own religious ranks who had been trained in Mandarin via its previous missions to China; so, it had begun to send them as these mission heads. This 11th mission included a botanist, an astronomer, and a specialist in the Mongol language; this suggests that these predominantly religious missions had begun to deepen as well as widen their educational and research capacities in sinology.

The most important achievements of the 11th mission was: enhanced research into and teaching of Mandarin, and cultivation of sinology as a multidisciplinary field of inquiry (which now included humanistic topics, astronomy, and botany – aside from the conventional linguistic fields). This was the only mission whose pristav (acting head) was a military officer (Colonel Mikhail Ladizhenskiy). An important reason a military officer had been sent as this mission’s acting head was that trouble had been brewing in the Qing China as it was approaching the period of the Opium Wars with the Western powers.7

Largely overlapping with the first Opium War (1839-42), the 12th mission arrived in China in 1840, and stayed there until 1849. This mission had set for itself a new practical objective – on top of all the others that the previous missions had conventionally retained: to collect political and economic information about China’s internal situation. To ensure that this new objective
is duly met, the ROC had appointed Nikolai Lubimov as the mission's pristav, i.e., its acting head and principal. Lubimov was a former vice director of the Asian Department of Foreign Ministry who had resigned to go to China.

Notably, the Asiatic Department of Foreign Ministry had privately hired teachers to train in Mandarin all the would-be members of this 12th mission; as a result, the entire mission knew a level of Mandarin before its arrival in China. Little surprise then, that many members of this mission went on to become prominent Sinologists:

1) Vassiliy Vassiliev, a secular student of this mission, went on to become the first prominent Russian specialist in Chinese Buddhism; he would also become the second-ever former members of these missions to be given the membership of the RAS and the first to be given a full membership.

2) Petr Kafarov (Palladiy) ended up heading the 13th and the 15th missions; he also authored a Chinese-Russian dictionary that is used even today. In fact, his dictionary served as the basis for the Great Chinese-Russian Dictionary (1952 edition – 65K words, 1955 – 70K words, 1983-1984 – 250K words, 4 volumes with a contemporary Internet edition – BKRS and wiki 大 BKRS), compiled by professor Ilya M. Oshanin who received in 1986 the state award in sinology for lifelong achievements of which this dictionary was but an important part.

3) A. Tatarinov – a medical doctor who researched Chinese traditional medicine – went on to publish the first professional articles in Russian on Chinese medicine. He was also appointed by the Russian Foreign Ministry as a Consul General at its consulate in Chuguchak, China.

4) V. Gorskiy went on to publish several articles on early Manchu rulers in China that Russian historians cite even today; he also compiled in Russian the first and the only biography of Wu Sangui.

5) Kandrat Illich Karsavin (or Kondratiy Ilyich Korsalin), who had gone with the mission as a creative painter, made more than a hundred portraits of the Chinese administrative elite. As a representative sample of paintings from this historical period, one of his paintings is currently on display at the Russkyi Muzei (the Russian Museum) in Saint Petersburg.

Aside from Tatarinov, Ivan Zakharov and Ivan Goshkevich were also appointed as Consul Generals; these latter two men were posted to the Russian consulates in China’s Hakodate and Kuldja, respectively.

All in all, the 12th mission was extraordinarily successful as a religious enterprise in preparing future Russian sinologists; it ushered Russian sinology into its truly professional phase. Along the way, however, the need to create secular institutions of higher learning dedicated to sinology was becoming clearer by the day to the Russian authorities.
Headed by Petr Ivanovic Kafarov (Palladiy) – who had gained post-mission professional experience in sinology since returning to Russia – the 13th mission arrived in China in 1850 and stayed there until 1858. This mission’s tenure in China was cut short to 6 years (and, of course, the trip up to China was an additional year as was the trip back to Russia). The mission had four students; three priests of different ranks, who were also required to study Chinese; a medical doctor; and a painter. The students were Nikolai Nechaev, Nikolai Uspenskiy, Konstantin (Constantine) Skachkov, and Mikhail Khrapovitskiy; the priests were Petr Tsvetkov, Yelysei Ivanov, and Mikhail Ovodov; the medical doctor was Basilevskiy; and the painter was Chmutov. The mission had Kovalevski as its acting principal (*pristav*), who was also tasked with resolving any diplomatic disputes. (In his later years, he would sign a commercial treaty with China as part of his diplomatic duties.) All members of this mission had received some preparatory training in both written and oral Mandarin prior to their arrival in China.

There is one curious detail about this 13th mission. To allow him to pursue his research in astronomy, this mission constructed an astronomy laboratory for one of its members – Konstantin Skachkov, a trained astronomer. Skachkov’s articles on astronomy were subsequently published in Britain; he also assembled an extensive library of Chinese books – which is now part of the State Library in Moscow. He was later appointed by the Russian Foreign Ministry as a Consul in Chuguchak, one of Russian diplomatic outposts in China.

The 14th and the 15th missions together mark the end of the practice whereby sinological training to Russians was imparted within the framework of a religious institution. While the ROC’s priests and monks would continue to study China’s languages even after the 15th mission – to help them translate religious texts from Russian into Mandarin, and also to proselytize in China – sinological education itself would hereafter find its permanent home in Russia’s secular institutions. Indeed, the 14th mission (1858-1864) – comprising four priests, four students, a medical doctor, and a painter – would be the last one to include students of China’s languages.

Three of the 14th mission’s students (A. Popov, K. Pavlinov, and D. Peschurov) would eventually join Russia’s foreign service – each as a diplomat, a translator, and/or as an advisor (*dragoman*). As for the 15th mission, its head – Kafarov – organized several research expeditions inside China, and published extensively on sinological topics. One of his most prominent theological publications was an exploration of the roots of Christianity in China.

The 15th mission had only one student of sinology: Pavel Popov. After graduating from the Kursk Seminary, he had been through a five-year training program in Mandarin at the Saint Petersbourg University (SPU). Popov, in
other words, had prepared himself well for his sinological stint with the 15th mission in China; after his mission experience, he would work as an official translator (dragoman) at the Russian diplomatic mission to China. All in all, Popov would successfully integrate his sinological research into his diplomatic career.

Appointed in 1886 as a Consul General in Peking, Popov later became a RAS corresponding member (1890): the third of the mission’s former students to become a RAS member. Apart from publishing Kafarov’s dictionary, translating several Mandarin texts into Russian, and authoring sinological works, Popov also compiled a very good Chinese-Russian dictionary of his own that was also used many years after as a basis for Oshanin’s dictionary. For all that, despite lacking any academic degree, he was appointed by the SPU in 1902 as its Chinese unit’s (kafedra kitaiskoi slovesnosti) acting chair at its School of Oriental languages. In this capacity, Popov taught Mandarin until his death; through this long experience, he also enjoyed the friendly company of Dmitry Peschurov: his fellow trainee in sinology from the mission years in China.

From 1907 onward, the mission started to publish a religious journal called Chinese Evangelist (Kitaiskii Blagovestnik) – which disseminated information about Russian religious life to the Chinese, and about ROC’s activities in China to the Russians back home. In 1861, Russia’s Foreign Ministry had established a formal embassy in China (Rossiiskaya diplomatischekaya missiya) equipped to provide all the necessary diplomatic and consular services, however, only when Russian universities had started to establish formal professorships and chairs in sinology – thereby putting in place secular alternatives for research as well as practical training in the field, intended to prepare Russian citizens and others for positions in the academia, Foreign Ministry, or the General Staff of the Russian Army, the mission started to play lesser and lesser role in training people in Chinese Studies. Under these circumstances, the 14th and the 15th ecclesiastical missions together marked the end of the specific component of sinological training. Without that sinological component, the ROC would continue its religious activities in China until 1956 – by when the communist policies of the Soviet Union as well as China had begun to severely discourage or ban all religious activities, which were considered to be alien (and even antithetical) to their new ideological framework.

6. Academic Institutionalization of Sinology in Russia

The first university chair in Mandarin was established in Kazan in 1837. Preceding that development, at least six proposals had been made concerning academic institutionalization of sinology in Russia.
The first of these proposals, dating 1733, was made by an RAS member, Georg-Yakob Kerr. Stressing the need to establish a secular Asiatic Academy equipped to teach Oriental languages, this proposal included a focus on Manchu and Mandarin. Then, in 1802, the Collegium of Foreign Affairs – the predecessor of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – also proposed setting up a centre to train Russians in Mandarin and Manchu. A similar proposal came up again in 1810 – from Sergei Uvarov, who would eventually become Russia’s education minister. A fourth proposal of some relevance to our topic was floated in 1823: It was about setting up an educational unit within the Collegium of Foreign Affairs except that it made no mention of training in Mandarin or Manchu, per se.

Then, in 1829, Osip Ivanovich Senkovskiy proposed to host a unit on Oriental languages at the SPU, where he taught Arabic. The core of his proposal was to put together an instructional staff jointly comprising European professors and two mission graduates – Iakinf Bichurin and Stepan Lipovtsev. In this arrangement, the European professors were supposed to teach topics in sinology while Bichurin and Lipovtsev were supposed to teach Manchu and Mandarin. Integral to Senkovskiy’s proposal was the requirement for foreign professors working in Russia. The last of all these unimplemented proposals was made in 1832 – to the Russian State Council – by a count Leven. This proposal advocated establishing a unit within the SPU to teach Oriental languages. However, the first chair in Mandarin was established in Kazan at the Imperial Kazan University (IKU) in 1837. With the establishment of this chair, Russia took its first step up from a private, unofficial, or quasi-official system of instruction on any aspect of sinology to a government-sanctioned conventional university.

This first university chair in sinology was graced by Dmitriy (Daniil was his monk name) Petrovich Sivillov (1798-1871), who was a monk in the ROC’s 10th mission to China. Sivillov had learned his Mandarin as part of this mission; and upon his return to Russia, he had compiled several Mandarin-Russian dictionaries, and translated from Mandarin into Russian historical, philosophical, and religious works. In 1840, Sivillov prepared the first “Reader in Chinese,” which was reviewed by Bichurin. After an early course on Mandarin, Sivillov prepared and offered another course on Chinese history; he also wrote and published a textbook General Chinese History and some articles on Chinese history (Skachkov, 1977, addendum 4: 417-419).

After Sivillov, the next person to be appointed to the sinology chair at IKU was also a former mission student and doctor, Osip Pavlovich Voitsekhovskiy. In his classes on Mandarin, Voitsekhovskiy retained the usage of the publications and other material of Sivillov’s and Bichurin’s and also developed and offered a course on Manchu history. Additionally, he compiled several readers of Chinese literary texts as well as a Manchu-
Mandarin-Russian dictionary. In the meantime, along with Sosnitski – another former mission student – Sivillov continued to teach (without a remuneration) Mandarin at IKU’s newly established gymnasium for young people.

In 1850, Vassilyi Vassiliev, a former student of Mongolian at IKU, returned to his alma mater – and was appointed the first acting extraordinary professor of Mandarin and Manchu there (in Russian: ispolniayuschii obyazannosti ekstraordinarnogo professora po kafedere kitaiskoi i man’chzhurskoi slovesnosti). Vassiliev had been part of the 12th mission to China after his graduation from IKU with MA degree equivalent – magistr vostochnoi slovesnosti.

Lasting 18 years, IKU’s Oriental school was closed in 1855, and transferred – with all its faculty, students, library, and numismatic collection – to Saint Petersburg. All in all, an Oriental section of the SPU was transformed into the Oriental school (Vostochniy fakultet) that remains in operation even today.

After being transferred from Kazan to Saint Petersburg, Vassiliev was appointed to a chair in Oriental languages at the SPU. For twelve years he was the only person there who taught Mandarin and Manchu across the four levels of education in these languages. Alongside, he not only developed courses in history, philosophy, geography, literature of China and Manchuria and published readers on literature, history, geography of China, translated several Chinese historical compendia into Russian, but also prepared his magnum opus on Chinese Buddhism. Additionally, he compiled several readers in Chinese literature and history.

At the SPU, Vassiliev prepared his student Ladukhin for a teaching position at the Oriental school. On his part, Ladukhin successfully petitioned the ROC to allow him to join the 13th mission as a secular student of Mandarin. Unfortunately, however, he drowned in a fast and cold Siberian river while on his way to China. Vassiliev then had to hire Skachkov – another mission graduate; and when Skachkov moved on to the position of Consul General in Tientsin, Vassiliev hired another mission graduate Dmitry Peschurov as a professor of Mandarin. Later on, Vassiliev appointed yet another mission graduate – Zakharov – to teach Manchu. Notably, Peschurov taught for 36 years – and one of his students, Vassylyi Alexeev, rose to become the first Soviet member of the Academy of Sciences in sinology and a doyen of the Russian/Soviet sinology. All five of these faculty members put out various sinological publications reflecting their specific interests in this multidisciplinary field.

Before his death in 1900, Vassiliev added to his own list of accomplishments. In 1873, for instance, he published another important work, Religion in the Orient: Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. Apart from training other future sinologists – such as Petr Popov (also a mission graduate) – Vassiliev
contributed to the preparation of students that would become scientific experts on Asian countries and cultures other than China. Included among these latter would-be experts (who had been taught by Vassiliev) and their regions of expertise were the following: A. Pozdneev (Mongolia), V. Kotvich (Manchuria), I. Minaev (India), and D. Pozdneev (Japan). Further down the line, the academic lineage of Vassiliev would be reflected in the future sinological centres of Vladivostok, Moscow, and Chita. Moreover, Vassiliev also prepared no less than thirty students for non-academic sinological careers mostly at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.8

7. Conclusion

The ROC sent fifteen ecclesiastical missions to Peking that included trainees in Manchu, Mandarin, and Tibetan languages. All in all, these missions put in place the philological foundations for what we might rightly refer to as the Russian school of sinology – whose impact went far beyond the ROC’s central objective of religious proselytization.

The missions developed a full linguistic-cum-literary component whereby Chinese classics in creative writing saw their earliest translations into Russian; and historical works in Russian saw their first translations into Mandarin. For 120 years, these missions trained Russians in translating and interpreting the spoken dialects of China; they thus established Russia’s own methodology for teaching these dialects as well as Mandarin, Manchu, and Tibetan. Altogether, these missions nurtured 60 students and medical doctors, and 100 priests. The scope (including geographic) of the priests’ activities, including the missionary one, may be a theme for further research of a comparative nature if taken into consideration Western missionary activities in China.

These missions to Peking included medical doctors, painters, and even an astronomer. Broadening the scope of research pertaining to China, these inclusions helped develop sinology into an authentic, integrated field of inquiry in Russia. Inasmuch as these missions produced translations between the languages of China and Russian, they birthed what we might legitimately refer to as the Russian school of sinological translations. The missions also put out Russia’s earliest systematic research (in Russian) into Chinese history, agriculture, geography, law, ethnology as well as geopolitical and diplomatic relations between China and Russia.

Ergo, as the Asiatic Department (Asiatiskii Departament) of the Russian Foreign Ministry started to publish – after the 13th mission – the four hefty volumes of the Proceedings of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in China, it included in these volumes many contributions from the graduates of all previous missions. The first two volumes of these proceedings were also translated into German – and an English translation of these proceedings
had also been initiated, but it never took shape as a publication. Until 1917, these proceedings were the only professional periodical publication on China in Russia – and they helped a wider contemporary Russian readership learn about China.

Missions also collected textual and other material on China that ultimately served as the foundations for specialized collections on China across several Russian libraries – prominently including the RAS library in Saint Petersburg; the public libraries of Saint Petersburg and Irkutsk; and the library of the Asiatic Department of Foreign Ministry. Former students of these missions also laid the foundations of academic sinology across several public universities of Russia – including the IKU, the SPU, and the Imperial Moscow University.\(^9\) However, these missions produced pioneering Russian specialists not only in Mandarin but also in Manchu language and history; indeed, graduates of these were also the first in Russia to translate Tangut texts into Russian. Moreover, students from the latter years of these missions also wrote about China for the Russian public and youth, thereby spreading awareness about China across Russia.

After the 15th mission, it is the 18th mission (1896-1931), the longest due to historical transformations in Russia, that would include students of sinology. This 18th mission included the following three sinological students: I.P. Vrublevskiy, Vassylyi Mikhailovich Alexeev, and Alexei Ivanovitch Ivanov. No information within the academic literature could be found at the moment regarding Vrublevskiy’s life. As for Alexeev, he became the most prominent sinologist of the early Soviet period ensuring an intellectual continuity in this field of studies through uneasy periods of the Russian history; he also became a full member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. His last book – which was left unpublished before he passed away – was published only in the 2000s by one of his last post-graduate students (Alexeev, 2010).\(^{10}\) Notably, in 2016, Alexeev’s great-nephew established the Institute for Classical Oriental Studies (ICOS) – thereby restoring classical Chinese studies at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) in Moscow.

As for Alexei Ivanov, he is less known in Russia than Alexeev. However, he was no less talented a sinologist than Alexeev. Ivanov graduated in Chinese studies from the SPU; was sent as a student with the 18th mission to China – where he studied for two years. After his return to Russia, he taught Mandarin and Manchu at the SPU – where he also obtained a doctoral degree in Chinese studies in 1913 – and made several trips to Britain, France, and Germany to polish his sonological education. The first Russian to study the Tangut and Chinese books found by the Russian traveler Petr Kozlov in the dead city of Khara-Khoto through 1907-1909, Ivanov became the director of the Practical Academy of Oriental Studies in 1917. This institute served as the de facto alternative to the state universities. In 1922, Ivanov was employed
as an interpreter in the Soviet Embassy at Peking; but on August 26, 1937, he was unlawfully arrested – and then executed on October 8, 1937. Deemed innocent in 1958, he was fully rehabilitated posthumously (Men and Destiny, 2003: 177-178) as many others in Oriental/Asian Studies at that period of the Soviet history.

In a nutshell, the ROC’s ecclesiastical missions to China overcame all sorts of historical challenges as it laid the foundations of Russian sinology. Indeed, the sinological investments of the ROC bequeathed to Russia the core of its disciplinary leadership that would survive all the way up to the mid-1900s. This specific strand of the ROC’s intellectual tradition has taken many turns in response to the historical transformations of which it was but a part; however, the effects of its legacy are here to stay so long as Russia retains sinology in its academic curriculum.

Notes

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7. Differences between Russian and Western understanding of China’s developments (though at a later stage) are reflected in archival materials. See, for example, AVPRI: Fond Kitaiskii Stol, 1891, Delo 109, pp. 228-229; AVPRI: Fond SPb. Glavni Archiv 1-1, 1879, Delo 189, p. 115.
8. Details on university sinology can be obtained in Chapters 4,5,6 (Skachkov, 1977) among other literature.
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True Catholic and Authentic Chinese: The Theologico-Political Polemic in China

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Abstract

After a lengthy negotiation between the Vatican and the Chinese government over decades, both parties signed a provisional agreement on 22 September 2018. Although they did not reveal the details to the public, both sides made a compromise on the appointment of the bishop, which is the crucial part of the conflict. Among those religions in China, the Chinese government paid much more attention upon the Catholic Church. One of the reasons would be the similarity of two entities, that is the centralization of power on one person. The current policies like restricting children going to church, dismantling the cross of the church, no Christmas decoration or promotion during Christmas, which give negative impact upon the Catholic Church, while the Beijing government signed the provisional agreement on the appointment of the bishop. Pope Francis unlike his predecessor does not excommunicate those bishops ordained without the Pope’s approval but resumes their episcopal duties, while the Catholic Church in China is still under persecution. How to understand the underlying reasons of the move of the CCP and the Vatican in this agreement? This paper will investigate the nature and principles of religious policy in China and the Vatican’s stance on China affairs in the light of a theologico-political polemic. This paper will first try to elucidate the theologico-political polemic. Then it will review the Sino-Vatican interaction since 1949 looking at how the CCP and the Vatican responded to this theologico-political polemic. Finally, the Sino-Vatican provisional agreement will be evaluated in perspective or in light of this history. Is the provisional agreement a step towards the solution of the theologico-political polemic in China?

Keywords: Theological-Political Polemics, Sino-Vatican relations, Provisional Agreement, Chinese Communist Party
1. Introduction

After a lengthy negotiation which lasted decades, the Vatican signed a provisional agreement with the Chinese government on 22 September 2018. Although the details have not been made public, both sides seemed to compromise on the appointment of a bishop, the crucial part of their conflict. Over the years the Chinese government has paid more attention to the Catholic Church than to other religions in China perhaps because all Catholics, including bishops and priests, pledge loyalty to the Holy See. The Catholic Church is like another sovereignty in the territories of China therefore the Catholic Church is always a wart of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is not surprising that, in Xi’s era, the CCP forbids children under 18 from attending Mass and demolishes crucifixes. According to the provisional agreement mentioned in the media, it seems that the CCP gives in the power of controlling the appointment of bishops to the Pope. For its part the Vatican continues to uphold its anti-Communism stance and protests against the CCPs interference in religious affairs. However, the Vatican is criticized by some media or commentaries that the provisional agreement is a sign of the Vatican’s kowtow to the CCP (Sinetortus, 2018). How can we understand recent developments in the Sino-Vatican relationship? Does the 2018 provisional agreement represent a change in religious policy in China? Going forward, what will the fundamental questions be in the Sino-Vatican polemic?

The question of how to be a true Chinese and an authentic Christian has been with us since the CCP took over the political power and persecuted Catholics in 1949. An authentic Chinese person is loyal to the country led by the CCP; but a true Catholic is loyal to God represented by the successor of Apostle Peter. Jesus’ principle that rendering unto Caesar the thing that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s cannot be applied in China as Caesar wants to control God’s thing. How can a Chinese Catholic serve two lords at the same time? Both of the CCP and the Vatican proclaims their vision of ultimate happiness or the good life to the Chinese Catholics. But the CCP does not tolerate the visions of happiness according to Gospel but the socialist with Chinese characteristics. The tensions among and between politics, philosophy, and revelation lie in the fundamental question of “good or right life”. Since the law is an instrument to guide the people to strive for the individual and communal happiness in the society, the question of the authoritative foundation of the law in the political community as the norm and the path to the good life arises.

This paper will investigate the nature and principles of religious policy in China and the Vatican’s stance on China affairs in the light of a theologico-political polemic. This paper will first try to elucidate the theologico-political polemic. Then it will review the Sino-Vatican interaction since 1949 looking
at how the CCP and the Vatican responded to this theologico-political polemic. Finally, the Sino-Vatican provisional agreement will be evaluated in perspective or in light of this history. Is the provisional agreement a step towards the solution of the theologico-political polemic in China?

2. The Theologico-political Polemic

Every member of a political community strives for the good life guided by the laws promulgated by their political authority. The “law” and “the good” are two fundamental ideas. Who knows what the good life is? And who is authorized to promulgate the law for the good life? In ancient times, the priests or the prophets came to know the idea of the good life and the commandments through Divine Revelation (Smith, 2013: 389). “The fundamental question was whether man could acquire knowledge of the good, individually or collectively, through the unaided effort of their natural powers, or whether they needed Divine Revelation…. No alternative is more fundamental than this: human guidance or divine guidance?” (Meier, 2006: 6). The ancient symbol of the conflict of philosophy and religion can be found in political life of Athens and Jerusalem. Although Christianity dominated Western civilization for centuries during the Medieval Ages, philosophy dethroned religion during the Enlightenment. However, following the establishment of the modern democratic society, the philosopher was replaced by “the people”. The idea of good life was no longer monopolized by either philosophers or the Church. It became the personal choice of the people in the modern pluralistic society. Although history continues, the social thought of the Catholic Church at the turn of the 20th century was still occupied by the same Augustinian political theology that had held sway the 5th century. Augustine distinguishes two kinds of love with respect to two kinds of ends. “Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self” (Augustine, 1950: 477). The former is called the City of Man and the latter the City of God. It is worth noting that these two cities do not refer to any particular institution on earth. Which City we have depends on the choice of the object of love. The Church and the King play different roles accompanying man towards the City of God. The Church is concerned about the spiritual and moral matters and the King takes care of the temporal matters including the promulgation of laws. For Augustine, humans lost their innate tendency to choose God due to the disobedience of Adam. Since for Christians the ultimate goal of man is God; but man, carrying the punishment of original sin, lives in an earthly society, man needs the coercion of the temporal law and the government to cure the wound of sin. Politics is only tolerated as a remedy for sin; on its own it cannot lead to virtue, the
perfect love of God. Man cannot attain God’s salvation without spiritual grace from God. Consequently, the Church entrusted to dispensing the spiritual power has the supremacy.

Following Augustine, Pope Gelasius in the 5th century developed the “Two Swords Theory”, differentiating the power and responsibility of the Church and the King. Both of the powers serve the salvation of man by Christ. Although the King is endowed with the temporal power, he is also a Christian in need of grace. “Christian emperors are in need of pontiffs for their eternal life, and pontiffs must make use of imperial regulations for temporal necessities” (Dvornik, 1966: 807).

In the 19th century, Pope Leo XIII maintained the same thinking on the separation of powers of the Church and State. With the dream of Christian kingdom, Leo XIII hoped that the European States would work with the Church for the unity of a Christian Europe. He saw liberalism which championed freedom of speech as if there was no God as the parent of the evil of modernity. Following Aquinas’ thought on the hierarchy of beings, the State, even ruling over the secular matters independently, should subordinate itself to the good of God and to work with the Church (Kainz, 1993: 90). According to Pope Leo XIII, the Church of Christ is the true and sole teacher of virtue and guardian of morals (Leo XIII, 1885: 32).²

Now, entering the 21st century, how does the Church, with the two swords theory in mind, guide Christians to the “good life” in this modern liberal society? In China, the CCP holds the idea of the good life to herself as if the CCP was god. How does the Church then strive for religious freedom in Communist China? This paper argues that the Sino-Vatican relationship needs to be viewed in the context of theologico-political polemic. The conflict of human guidance and divine guidance continues in contemporary China.

3. Historical Review of the Sino-Vatican Interaction

3.1. Mutual Hostility in the 50s

The Catholic Church before 1949 was unquestionably anti-Communist. Responding to the threat of Russian Communism, Pius XI released an Encyclical Divini Redemptoris: Atheistic Communism in the Light of the Social Teaching of the Church in 1937, which adopted the harshest language against Communism, describing it as a dangerous enemy, the power of darkness, and a monstrous evil. Pope Pius XI claimed that Communism, based on the law of social evolution, asserts that a new order and a modern civilization will emerge at the end of the history. Communists will make use of the political power of the State and the law as effective instruments to bring society to that goal until the coming of the golden age (Pius XI, 1937: 9-14).
Accordingly, Communism replaces the Church, preaches to all human beings a new gospel, and shows a new way to utopia in this world. The Communist government replaces God as the foundation of the law. Consequently, the Church under Pius XI stated that “Communism is intrinsically wrong and no one who wished to defend Christian civilization against extinction may collaborate with it in any way whatsoever” (Ibid., 61).

The Catholic Church had not misunderstood the stance and the attitude of the CCP towards Christianity. The CCP put many bishops and priests in jail and expelled foreign missionaries after having taken over the political power in 1949. In 1952, a Catholic Three-Self Movement claiming to establish a self-governed, self-financed, and self-propagated Church, was initiated at the instigation of the CCP and resulted in the establishment of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) in 1957. In 1958 the ordination of bishops without the Papal approval cut off the Catholic Church in China from the Pope and the Universal Church.

The approach of the CCP towards the rest of Christianity was no less hostile; even though religious freedom was assured in the Constitution. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 1954 states, “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy the freedom of religious belief.” (Constitution, 1954: 88) It explained that citizens are free to become believers or non-believers without mentioning the freedom of religious practice and proselytization. Li Weihan, the head of the department of the United Front of the CCP in the 50s, explained to the CCP that religious freedom is only a revolutionary slogan. Although the Constitution sanctions the freedom of religious belief, the goal of the religious policy is to convert all the believers to non-believers (Li, 1981: 520-581). Tolerance of religions is provisional, and religions should be extinct over time.

Catholic priests and laypeople were asked to join this new independent Church and accept the leadership of the illegitimate ordained bishops; otherwise, they were regarded as unpatriotic and anti-revolutionary (Bates, 1968: 210-211). Chinese Catholics were caught in a dilemma. If a Chinese Catholic remaining loyal to their faith and kept the allegiance to the Pope, s/he was not a patriotic Chinese. Faithful Catholics could not be authentic Chinese in this context.

3.2. The Darkest Hour of Religions in the 60s

The CCP went to an extreme left position during the Cultural Revolution in 1967 accelerating the extinction of religions by force. All faiths were reckoned as feudal superstitions and came under severe attack. All expressions of religions and rituals were brought to a halt. Many religious buildings including Buddhist temples and Christian Churches were torn down and
demolished. Priests and believers were sent to labor camps for re-education (Zhou, 1991: 101).

In the darkest hour of the Church in China, Pope Paul VI made an *Appeal to China for Liberty and Peace* in 1967. He reiterated that the Catholic Church has no temporal interest but tries to help China develop its natural moral riches and contributes her best to the education, welfare, and prestige of Chinese people (Paul VI, 1967: 155). Unfortunately, the Pope did not receive any positive response from China. All religions without exception were under severe assault during the Cultural Revolution. It was not until the reformation of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 that the Church saw the dawn of revival.

3.3. The Reformation era of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin in the 80s and 90s

China was moving from the extreme left to open reformation in the 80s. In the first part of Religion as a Historical Phenomenon of Document No. 19, the CCP states with clarity, “Religion will eventually disappear from human history. But it will disappear naturally only through the long-term development of Socialism and Communism when all objective requirements are met” (MacInnis, 1989: 9). Was the communist government pushing religions to perish in a short time by force in the past right or wrong?

Those who think that with the establishment of the Socialist system and with a certain degree of economic and cultural progress, Religion will die out within a short period, are not being realistic. Those who expect to rely on administrative decrees or other coercive measures to wipe out religious thinking and practices with one blow are even further from the basic viewpoint Marxism takes toward the religious question. They are entirely wrong and will do no small harm (MacInnis 1989: 9).

Then what is the proper way to treat religions in the reform era for the Communist regime? “Under Socialism, the only correct fundamental way to solve the religious question lies precisely in *safeguarding the freedom of religious belief*” (Ibid., 26, emphasis added). As mentioned in Li Weihan’s speech, freedom of religious belief guarantees the liberty of believing or non-believing in religion, but not the freedom of religious practices.

Article 36 of the *Constitution* in 1982, which is along the line of Document No. 19, promulgates the freedom of religious belief by which a citizen enjoys the freedom of believing in or non-believing in any religions. Moreover, the *Constitution* also points out that:

The State protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that *disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State*. Religious
bodies and religious affairs are *not subject to any foreign domination* (Constitution, 1982: art. 36, emphasis added).

From the perspective of the *Constitution* and Document No. 19, freedom of religious belief pertains to the private realm of the citizen, and this freedom is conditional and subject to the control of the CCP in the public arena. The command that religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination is problematic for Chinese Catholics. It is without doubt that, since the Three-Self Movement in the 50s, foreign interference or domination of religions has been forbidden in China. Chinese Catholics pledge loyalty to no other authority other than the CCP.

However, according to the *Declaration on Religious Liberty* made by the Vatican Council, the Catholic Church has a different understanding of religious freedom.

The Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. Freedom of this kind means that all men should be *immune from coercion on the part of individuals, social groups and every human power* so that, within due limits, nobody is forced to act against his convictions nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his convictions in religious matters *in private or in public*, alone or in association with others. (*Dignitatis Humanae*, 1965: 2, emphasis added).

With the assumption that the Church is dealing with a constitutional government in a liberal democratic society, the Vatican Council demanded freedom from any coercion from the State in private or in public, individually or collectively (Murray, 1966: 585). It is not a right to specific freedom for believers but a matter of civil liberty for all citizens. This right to freedom from coercion in religious matters is not based on an arbitrary law-making; it is based on the intrinsic dignity of the human person.

The Council further declares that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is *known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself*. This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed, and thus it is to become *a civil right*. (*Dignitatis Humanae*, 1965: 2, emphasis added).

Thus, “the function of government appears as the protection and promotion, not of religious truth, but of religious freedom as a fundamental right of the human person” (Murray, 1966: 587). Human dignity is the goal of protection and promotion for both the Church and the government. It is worth noting that the communication of the bishops with the Pope is a religious practice in the eyes of the Catholic Church. The exercise of this power should not be interfered with by the government.
In the performance of their apostolic office, which looks to the salvation of souls, bishops per se possess full and perfect freedom and independence of any civil power. Wherefore it is not permissible to impede, directly or indirectly, the exercise of their ecclesiastical office or to prohibit their free communication with the Apostolic See, with other ecclesiastical authorities, and with their subjects (Christus Dominus, 1965: 19, emphasis added).

In this context, we come to see the underlying reason for the identity conflict of the Chinese Catholic. The Catholic Church in China has faced the charge that Catholicism was a foreign and divisive religion as it came with Western imperialism and colonialism in the nineteenth century. The Catholic Church, for the CCP, was a threat to China’s sovereignty and was not suitable for China (Paul VI, 1967). Different popes have responded to this criticism in their encyclicals or letters. Pope John Paul II, a major actor of the committee drafting Dignitatis Humanae, expressed the idea of the authentic Chinese Catholic throughout his pontiff (Hittinger, 2008: 365).

Pope John Paul II first stated that there is no conflict between the duties of a Christian and that of a Chinese citizen. The religious duties of a Catholic consist in the commandment of love, i.e., to love God with all your heart and love your neighbour as yourself (Mark 12: 30-31). The love of God is specifically expressed in liturgical worship and prayers. Nonetheless, Jesus identifies the love of God with the love of neighbour in the teaching of the judgment. “Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to me” (Matthew 25: 40). Religious duty and moral duty of love become one. Christian faith is the foundation and the source of moral duties. Accordingly, “every Catholic, like other Chinese citizens, will fully contribute to the building up of China, since a genuine and faithful Christian is also a genuine and good citizen. A good Chinese Catholic works loyally for the progress of the nation like all good Chinese” (John Paul II, 1981: 184). A good Chinese Catholic citizen was inspired by the Christian faith and strengthened by the Chinese moral tradition. “Religious faith and practice is a dynamic source of commitment in the spheres of social and civil responsibility. There can be no opposition or incompatibility between being at the same time truly Catholic and authentically Chinese” (John Paul II, 1994: 274, emphasis added). Christian faith became the source of the civil commitment and also the force of unity of the country. Pope John Paul II delineated the Christian faith as the soul and the citizen duties as the body.

Responding to the problem of the connection of Chinese Catholics with the Vatican, John Paul II elucidated the nature of the Universal Church. First of all, the nature of the Christian faith is for all people of all ages. “The Christian message is not the exclusive property of any one group or race; it is addressed to everyone and belongs to everyone. There is, therefore, no opposition or incompatibility in being at the same time truly Christian
and authentically Chinese” (John Paul II, 1981: 185). The Catholic faith is universal for all people. Secondly, the communion of the particular Churches with the Universal Church is based upon the nature of the faith and the command of Jesus. The Pope, as the vicar of Jesus on earth, is entrusted with the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical government. Appointment of the bishops is an internal religious affair of the Church. Therefore, an independent “national” Church cannot exist and continue to be one with the Catholic Church according to the Christian doctrine.4

The CCP did not understand nor care about the theological foundation of the connection of the local Church with the Pope. The Chinese government was concerned with the political implications of this connection. The interference and the domination of foreign sovereignty was a threat to the political power of the CCP. John Paul II, in response to the worries of the CCP, wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping saying, “Chinese Catholics feel a deep loyalty and love for their own land... and at the same time feel united with the Pope and with the Catholic communities of all the other countries. This essential union with the Pope cannot harm the ideal and concrete unity of their own nation or be to the detriment of its independence and sovereignty” (John Paul II, 1983: 202). However, the Pope received only a silent reply from Deng.

Besides, while the Pope was clarifying that the Church is not a threat to the CCP, the Vatican also consoled the suffering underground Church that their sacrifice for faith was well acknowledged and praised. In 1981, Pope John Paul II appointed Bishop Tang Yee-ming Archbishop of Guangzhou and upheld him as a model of a faithful Catholic. His suffering of captivity and prison due to his loyalty to the Successor of Peter made him an outstanding bishop of the Church (John Paul II, 1991a: 330). This appointment was rejected by China immediately. In addition to Tang, Cardinal Kung Pin-mei, was another icon of the suffering Church. The Pope said to Kung in an audience, “I felt that the whole Church could not but honor a man who has given witness by word and deed, through long-sufferings and trials, to what constitutes the very essence of life in the Church.” He continued, “By honoring you the Holy See honors the whole faithful Church in China.... With what prayerful longing and love do I follow the life of the loyal Chinese Catholic communities!” (John Paul II, 1991b: 334). The praise of the suffering underground Church in China was a slap on the face of the CCP. The underground Church, under the jurisdiction of the Vatican, was illegal in the eyes of the CCP. The Catholics suffered or were punished for political crimes, not for religious reasons. The endorsement of the suffering of loyal Catholics seemed to be a condemnation of the CCP. However, the Vatican did not understand why the response of China to the appointment of Tang and Kung was so harsh. The Vatican made another unfortunate move in the
canonization of the Chinese martyrs in October of 2000. The eulogy for these martyr saints was scandalous to the CCP (Chu, 2014: 157).

This surprising cases of conflict of the Vatican with the CCP surfaced the dilemma of the Vatican. How was one to reconcile the desire for dialogue with China and the acknowledgment of the suffering of the underground Church? The underground Church became a living example of the identity dilemma of a Chinese Catholic.

Despite the Vatican’s repeated statements that Christian faith does not harm the society nor threaten the political power of the CCP, religion became an insidious threat to her ruling. Religious belief seemed to be the rival of atheistic Communism. The flourishing of religions was perceived as a severe threat. Since only non-believers are eligible to join the CCP, the Party has a problem when many people of different social classes become converts. (Albert 2018: 4).

Over the 90s, China was eager to rebuild the relationship with the West and to boost economic development. Jiang Zhemin took a more relaxed and tolerant approach to religion (Potter, 2003: 321). The Director of the United Front Work Department, Wang Zhaoguo, made Jiang’s principles known in the national work conference in 1999, “We must first, comprehensively and correctly implement the Party’s religious policy, secondly, strengthen the administration of religious affairs according to law, and thirdly, actively guide religions to adapt to socialist society” (Ibid., 322, emphasis added).

Jiang himself articulated these principles clearly in the National Religions Conference in 2001. Jiang’s three sentences in fact are coherent. According to the Constitution, citizens are free to believe in, or not believe in, any religion as long as the religious practices do not harm society and are not subject to any foreign interference. Laws are an instrument for social and economic development and national security. Hence, believers are guided to the adaptation of the socialist society by law. The degree of freedom of religious practices is controlled by religious laws. Law-making, on that account, is pivotal. In Hu Jintao’s era, the government felt the need to make a more comprehensive and detailed religious law because of the vibrant economic growth and the complexity of social problem. The new religious law aimed to provide a systematic rule to manage religious activities in every aspect (Leung, 2018: 373). The State Council passed the Religious Law in 2004 and revised it in 2007. Religious affairs are political and legal matters at all times for the Chinese government. For the CCP, they do not believe they have infringed on the religious freedom. Religious believers are punished not because of their religious practices but because of their crimes against the law.

In this time of tolerance, Pope Benedict XVI sent a letter to the Catholic Church in China in June 2007. Benedict acknowledged that the misunderstanding between China and the Vatican was an obstacle for the good of
China. The Holy See “hopes for the opening of some form of dialogue with the authorities of the People’s Republic of China. Once the misunderstandings of the past have been overcome, such a dialogue would make it possible for us to work together for the good of the Chinese People and peace in the world” (Benedict XVI, 2007: 4, emphasis added). The Catholic Church viewed the Sino-Vatican issue from the theological perspective, but the CCP considered it from the political perspective. The misunderstanding of the other side caused an impasse. Despite differences, the Pope said that an open dialogue could benefit China and the world.

The primary concern of Benedict’s letter was religious freedom. Following the principles from the Dignitatis Humanae, Benedict clarified the Catholic Church and the State share the same object of service but in a different arena.

It is clear that “The Church cannot and must not take upon herself the political battle to bring about the most just society possible. She cannot and must not replace the State” (Ibid.). Striving for justice by making laws and setting up policy is not the duty of the Church but the State. Nonetheless, it should not be interpreted that the Church keeps silent about the injustices in society. “A just society must be the achievement of politics, not of the Church. Yet the promotion of justice through efforts to bring about openness of mind and will to the demands of the common good is something which concerns the Church deeply” (Ibid., emphasis added). In spite of the clarification by the Vatican, the Church’s promotion of social justice for the CCP was regarded as an offense against their political power. For China, it is the right and obligation of the State to interfere and rule the religious affairs for the common good by law. Benedict admitted that “in the light of these unrenounceable principles, the solution to existing problems cannot be pursued via an ongoing conflict with the legitimate civil authorities; at the same time, though, compliance with those authorities is not acceptable when they interfere unduly in matters regarding the faith and discipline of the Church” (Ibid., emphasis added). Confronting the civil authorities is not a solution to the problem for the Chinese Catholic but neither is submission to the CCP. Benedict urged the Chinese authority to untie the knot by respecting the religious freedom of the Church.

The second concern mentioned by Pope Benedict in the letter was the unity of the Church. Pope Benedict reiterated that the communion of the bishops with the Pope comes through tradition of faith continuing down the centuries through the apostolic succession. This communion is a symbol of the unity of the Church. It has nothing to do with politics nor intervention of foreign domination (Ibid., 5).

Despite his hope for an open dialogue, Pope Benedict did not hide his objection to the interference of the State and he denounced the Chinese
Catholic Patriotic Association and the Bishops Conference of the Catholic Church in China as illegitimate according to the Catholic doctrine. “It is clear that the claim of some entities, desired by the State and extraneous to the structure of the Church, to place themselves above the Bishops and to guide the life of the ecclesial community, does not correspond to Catholic doctrine, according to which the Church is ‘apostolic’” (Ibid., 7, emphasis added). The most provocative issue was the appointment of a bishop without the Vatican’s approval. In Benedict’s time, Father Guo Jincai was ordained bishop without the Vatican’s approval in 2010. Pope Benedict personally criticized Liu Bainian by name, “Chinese government let the leadership of the CCPA, under the influence of Liu Bainian, adopt an attitude which seriously harms the Catholic Church and hinders the dialogue.”5

As both parties insisted on their stances and claimed their principles are unrenounceable, Sino-Vatican dialogue was still a deadlock even in the time of religious tolerance.

4. Xi Jinping and Pope Francis

Xi Jinping, unlike his predecessors, took an aggressive approach to religion. The Chinese government launched a report on national security called “The Blue Paper on National Security: A report on the National Security 2014” on 6 May 2014, in which the government put security in religious matters into the category of the ideological security which comes under national security. It is clear that for CCP “religious” matters are not religious but political (Liu, 2014). In the National Conference on Religion held on 22-23 April 2016 in Beijing, Xi promised: i) to fully implement the Party’s policy of religious freedom; ii) to manage religious affairs in line with laws; iii) to retain the principle of religious independence and self-administration; and iv) to help religions adapt to the socialist society. It is worth noting the independence and self-administration of religions mentioned in Xi’s speech was added on top of Jiang’s three sentences. This emphasis aligned with Xi’s efforts at Sinicizing religions and proclaiming the Religious groups should be developed under the leadership of the CCP. Religions should “merge religious doctrines with Chinese culture, abide by Chinese laws and regulations, and devote themselves to China’s reform and socialist modernization in order to contribute to the realization of the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation” (Xi, 2016). The social function of religions is definitely to serve the CCP and the national dream.

Religions, according to Xi’s address, should be under the guidance of the CCP. Based on the 2004 Religious Law, a revised Religious Law was launched in 2017, aiming to tighten, monitor and control religious affairs in details (Leung, 2018: 373). In the July 2017 issue of Qiushi, the CCP’s official
magazine, the director of the National Bureau of Religious Affairs Wang Zuoan wrote an article, “Politics is indispensable in good work on religions”, as the political directive of religious affairs instructed by Xi. Four aspects of religious matters should be paid more attention. Wang first suggested enhancing political consciousness. CCP cadres should be politically aware that foreigners made use of religions to infiltrate China. Many religious groups did not observe the religious laws, and religious extremists stretched their influence in certain provinces. It is essential to know the underlying complex social and political factors of religions (Wang, 2017). The second aspect is the practice of religious rule. There is no excuse to disobey or comment on the religious policy set by the Party. The third aspect is about the direction of religious policy. The two foundations of the direction are to adapt religion to Socialist society and to gather people around the core of CCP. In a nutshell, the only direction is the sinicization of religions. The fourth aspect is the commitment to the political responsibility of the party cadres. Wang urged the party cadres to handle the thorny religious issues with old and new mentalities and methods. In sum, the cadre should be aware of the political nature of religious matters and is obliged to channel the religions for the good of the socialist society.

Furthermore, after the 19th Party Congress in which Xi affirmed the leadership of the CCP in all political life in China, the Religious Affairs Bureau was transferred to the United Front Department. It signified that religions as the targets of United Front should be led by the atheist political Party (Leung, 2018: 374). In recent years, the CCP controlled religions by promulgating different new laws with brutal force. For instance, the Religious Affairs Bureau issued a document, “Methods of implementing some items in Religious Law 2017” in February 2018 to implement some items listed in the Religious Law 2017 (Religious Affairs Bureau, 2017). The venue of religious education or the appointment of teaching staff needs to get approval from the Religious Affairs Bureau. Furthermore, the religious institutes must seek approval from the Public Security Office 30 days in advance of holding any large-scale religious activities. In order to eliminate the influence of religions on society, in particular the children and youth, religious symbols will not be allowed to be shown on any religious buildings. A campaign for the demolition of the cross on the top of the Church was launched starting in 2013. The demolition act demonstrated that only the CCP is the absolute power leading everything in China. The suppression of Church influences was further intensified by prohibiting children under 18 from entering the Church to attend mass. All youth religious activities were also banned. This policy has been implemented in Wenzhou, Henan and Xinjiang. All the policies, as mentioned earlier, were efforts to suppress external religious behaviours. Although the religious laws are strict, they did not shake the
substance of the Catholic faith at all. However, the Sinicization of Christianity went further forward. The Church was asked to replace Jesus’s icon with Xi Jinping’s portrait in the Church. It is a decisive gesture that Xi would become the only saviour of Catholics and it also implies that politics, not religion, is the only foundation of the good life in the perspective of the theologico-political polemic.8

Facing the forceful suppression of Christianity in Xi’s ruling, the Vatican surprisingly made a friendly move to China. The attitudes towards China of Pope Francis were reflected in the interview of Cardinal Parolin with Avvenire (Chiang, 2019: 297-300). The Cardinal Secretary of State explained the foundational principle of papal diplomacy is building bridges to solve the conflict by promoting dialogue and negotiation. The Pope does not have any other interest other than promoting friendship, overcoming poverty, and building peace. Pope Francis did extend his hand of friendship to Xi Jinping. Francis said in the press conference en route from Korea to Rome as he wrote to Xi on the day Xi was elected president and got Xi’s reply later, which can be regarded as a friendly gesture.9 The negotiation about the appointment of bishop between the Vatican and China has been resumed in 2014 and resulted in a provisional agreement signed in September 2018. Both sides have not disclosed the details of the agreement. According to Vatican’s announcement, the Pope, as part of the agreement, would recognize seven excommunicated Chinese bishops who were illegitimately ordained without the Vatican’s approval. The accord, a source told Reuters, gave the Vatican a say in the naming of bishops and granted the Pope veto power over candidates (Sherwood, 2018).

Pope Francis issued a message to the Church in China and the Universal Church four days after signing the agreement (Francis, 2018). The purpose of the message was to elucidate the principles, the aims, and the instruments for the unity of the Church. The Pope said that after having heard of the signing of the agreement, some people felt confused, and some felt abandoned and were not sure about the meaning of the suffering they endured due to the loyalty to the Holy See (Ibid: 1). The whole tone of the message is spiritual and pastoral, which was different from the theological writing of Pope Benedict’s letter in 2007. Opening a dialogue with China has been sought by the Vatican since Pope Pius XII. However, for the Vatican, the foundation of the dialogue consists in the revealed truth of Jesus and the moral truth known by conscience. Pope Benedict reiterated the importance of love with truth in his 2007 letter. “Truth and charity are the two supporting pillars of the life of the Christian community” (Benedict, 2007: 7). The Church should not neglect the Church law based on the truth in the name of love. The interference of the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the Bishop Conference of China with the Catholic Church Affairs in China was illegitimate. Ordination
of a bishop without the approval of the Holy See was illegitimate, and both the chief celebrant of the ordination and the ordained bishop should be excommunicated according to the Canon Law (Ibid).

In order to break the deadlock in the Sino-Vatican relationship for the unity of the Church in China, Pope Francis made a bold step forward toward a journey of faith. Despite the suppression of the Church in China by the CCP, Francis was willing to place his trust in God and the Chinese Communist government as his ancient Jesuit fellow, Matteo Ricci did. The agreement’s pastoral aims were to support and advance the preaching of the Gospel and to re-establish and preserve the Catholic Community’s full and visible unity in China. Pope Francis believed love is more significant than justice by rule. He reconciled with the seven illegitimately ordained bishops and readmitted their full communion with the Holy See as long as they expressed a concrete and visible gesture of the restored unity. He advised the Chinese Catholics not to apply a justice derived from rules alone but to a power flowing from divine grace (Francis, 2018: 4). By accepting the seven illegitimate bishops and asking the State to accept the bishops of the underground Church in return, Pope Francis worked strenuously for the unity of the Church in China. By the provisional agreement, there is no more underground or official Church but only one Church in China. All members of the Church in China are in communion with the Successor of Peter but also under the control of the CCP. Although the Catholic Church in China is still suffering from the suppression by the CCP, the unity of the Church, which is more essential than religious freedom for the Vatican, is maintained.

5. Conclusion

Is the political truth of the CCP or the religious truth of Christianity the foundation of the idea of good life? The Catholic Church, facing the challenge of the modern liberal society, adopted the reality of the pluralistic idea of the good life. The vision of good life in the light of the revealed truth is only one of the ideas in the contemporary society in which all ideas are tolerated and free to be proclaimed and lived. The principle of religious freedom, according to Vatican II, has been adopted since Pope Paul VI. Both State and the Church work for their own good without the interference from others. The Catholic Church is free to proclaim the Gospel and to live a life according to the moral values envisioned by the faith. Religious freedom is assured by the Constitutional law, which prevents the interference of the State.

For the CCP, there is no room for negotiation. There is only one political truth kept by the Party which is absolute. Regarding the controversy of the power of the law and the CCP, Xi said in a meeting with the provincial officials in 2015 that “the law is the conviction of the Party and the integral
realization of the people’s will. The CCP leads the people to establish and implement constitutional law. The Party herself has to work within the constraint of the constitutional law. The law is the embodiment of the leading power of the Party.”10 The Party, as the core of the leadership, is the embodiment of the people’s will, and she establishes the law in the name of the people for her ruling. In other words, the CCP is the foundation of the law, leading people to the good life. The law is the expression or the actualization of the will of the CCP. The Catholic Church in China practices her faith within the legal constraint, which is established under the leadership of the CCP. Unlike the Catholic understanding of religious freedom, the religious practice in China, including the preaching substance, is bounded by the religious law and is channelled to the good life envisioned by the CCP.

According to her view of religious freedom, the Catholic Church would seem to have more flexibility to live with other ideologies as long as she can maintain the essential parts of her faith, like the unity of the Church. Thus, it is not surprising that the Vatican signed the agreement if the CCP accepts the Papal authority of appointing bishops.

By the agreement, both the CCP and the Vatican cooperated together for the appointment of bishops. From the Chinese side, CCP opened the door to the foreign intervention of internal affairs, but the Vatican accepted the involvement of the State in the papal appointment of bishops. It seems both sides adjusted their stances. In the perspective of the theologico-political polemic, whether politics or religion is the foundation of the appointment of bishops? In fact, the CCP did not share their power with the Vatican. It is clear for the CCP that the appointed bishops should be loyal to the Party instead of the Church. Xi says in the United Front Working Meeting, “The United Front should train strenuously more religious representatives who are politically reliable, excellent in religious faith, have moral authority and can make a difference in a critical moment” (Xi, 2015). The requirement of political reliability is the priority. On the contrary, the bishop candidate in the eyes of Pope Francis should be an authentic shepherd according to the heart of Jesus, a man committed to working generously in the service of God’s people, especially the poor and the most vulnerable (Francis, 2018: 5). An authentic shepherd should follow the hearts of Jesus not the voice of political power ultimately. However, is an authentic shepherd politically reliable for the CCP? A test to the Chinese clergies was coming. The clergies were asked to sign an agreement to join the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and accept the principles of Self-governed, Self-financed, and Self-propagated, should they sign it? The CCPA is an illegitimate institute governing the Catholic Church in China for the Vatican and the three Self-principles violates the Catholic doctrine. Which voice should the clergies follow? For China, a Chinese clergy should go for the CCP in the critical moment. The Vatican, however, leaves
the decision to the individual clergies according to their conscience in this case (*Pastoral Guidelines*, 2019).

It seems that Pope Francis gives in to the political power of the CCP. However, Francis, in fact, placed his trust in God, who is the Lord of history. The ministry of the Church is to bear witness to Jesus Christ and to the forgiving and saving love of the Father. The good life for a Christian is imitation of Christ, sacrificing one’s life for a friend. This is, for Pope Francis, the religious truth, the foundation of human behaviour, and the good life. If the unity of the Church in China can be maintained by the provisional agreement, it is worth suffering from the loss of religious freedom. Pope Francis stipulates a solution based on the revealed truth to the theologico-political polemic in China. Christian faith is the foundation and the norm of human behaviour.

Nonetheless, a Chinese Catholic imitates the model of the suffering servant of Jesus Christ but gives up his prophetic role to criticize the unjust act against the human dignity of the government. The Sinicizing of religion distorts and corrupts the doctrine and the faith of Church. The Church with Chinese characteristics is no longer the authentic Church. Is the agreement a step to the real solution for the Vatican? It is expected that there is no more underground Church after the provisional agreement and the Catholic Church in China is in unity. However, in other words, the whole Catholic Church in China would be under control by the CCP. It is clear for the CCP that the Party is the absolute foundation of the good life and the law.

Both the Vatican and the CCP strive for solving the theologico-political polemic. Nonetheless, the struggle of the true Catholic and authentic Chinese still occupies the mind and heart of the Chinese Catholic. The theologico-political polemic does not fade away in China.

**Notes**

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1. The typical example in the Old Testament is the promulgation of *Ten Commandments* by Moses, who was sent by God. Exodus 19:18-20:21.
3. Andrew Lynch (2014) makes an excellent similar comparison of religious freedom between *Dignitatis Humanae* and Constitution Article 36.
4. Cardinal Tomko asserts five points on behalf of John Paul II to the audiences in Taiwan that the communion with the Pope is essential to being Catholic. “Document #47: Communion with the Pope is Essential to Being Catholic,” pp. 282-283.


9. Ibid., p. 300. Pope John Paul II has written to Deng Xiaoping three times but got no reply.


References


Declaration on Religious Liberty [Dignitatis Humanae] (1981 [1965]) in A. Flannery


SECTION 2

SELF-FULFILLMENT
Beyond China’s Threat: The Contextual Theology of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan

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Abstract
Colonial relations have remained inspiring and vivid in the 21st century. They have provided powerful morale for the Taiwan Independence Movement. In the quest for independent statehood, Taiwan can easily see China’s territorial ambition, economic invasion, and violation of liberalism. To regain self-respect, the postcolonial elite could rely best and conveniently on the colonial modernity brought by Japan. This perspective enabled the persistence of the image of inferior China. However, a particular string in the postcolonial relations did not assume Chinese inferiority. Rather, self-reflection on one’s practical conditions, which was independent from relations with China, inspired the effort to re-constitute Taiwan’s identity. This string of thought is the Presbyterian Church. Contextual theology resulted from the critical reflection and determination emerged to guide the Church’s subsequent approach to China. For the independence advocacy informed by colonial relations, the issue of human rights immediately suggests the image of inferior China. However, for the Church, the issue connotes a mission in China that the Church should have cared about equally. This construction of a non-inferior/threatening China is how religion has brought to the intellectual perspective of Taiwan independence.

Keywords: Taiwan independence, China threat, Presbyterian Church, colonial modernity, contextual theology

1. Introduction
In the 21st century, Taiwan’s increasing aversion to China is apparent (Hickey, 2019; Jacob and Kang, 2018; Corcuff, 2012) because of China’s rise and the concomitant threat of Mainlandization or re-Sinicization (Shih, 2017; Sun,
Actors perceive China’s threat and can understand intellectually the nature of such a threat in various ways. The familiar international relations perspectives of power, interest and identity point to China’s tendency to become an expansionist, economic predator, or incorrectly attractive model (Pillsbury, 2016; Nathan, 2003; Yee and Storey, 2002). Internal reasons exist for an active portrayal of the threat, too, especially in electoral systems where, sometimes, a campaign edge can be achieved, reminding people of China’s threat (Ho et al., 2019; Sullivan and Lee, 2018; Yang, 2017; Chen, 2010: A1). Taiwan is no exception. In the quest for independent statehood, Taiwan can easily detect China’s territorial ambition, economic invasion and violation of liberalism (Lee et al., 2018; Wei and Lai, 2017).

Taiwan’s nostalgia for colonial modernity adds a psychological dimension to its advantage (Lee and Chen, 2014; Barclay, 2016; Jacobs, 2014), in which China appears inferior to Japan, which colonized Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. According to this point of view, China’s offer of reunification connotes a return to a backward regime. In addition, the leaders of Taiwan’s past ruling party, the exiled Kuomintang, had almost passed away 50 years ago fleeing Taiwan in the aftermath of the Civil War. These past leaders believed in reunification. The historical development enables the connection with postcolonial sensibilities among subsequent generations of leaders who have consistently estranged China (Corcuff, 2011).

All the similarities and differences between Taiwan’s perceptions of China’s threat appear to be familiar. However, a strand of the pro-independence force in Taiwan that does not particularly rely on the intellectual construction of the threat either to attain legitimacy for Taiwan’s pursuit or win support from international major powers exists. In other words, the inter-subjective construction of China-Taiwan relations is neither contributive nor determinative of the evolution of a consciousness of independence. Rather, self-reflection on one’s practical conditions, which was independent from any prior cultural resemblance to China, inspired the effort to re-constitute Taiwan’s identity. Such process renders the threat of China a marginal issue, in which an antagonizing China is no longer essential to the legitimacy of Taiwan’s independence.

The paper focuses on the perspective of contextual theology having evolved from Taiwan’s Presbyterian tradition. Owing to its Western origin, the Presbyterian history in Taiwan has bred a completely different relational trajectory, that contrasts sharply with those prepared by the colonial and Civil War relations (Kuo, 2008; Lin, 1999). The latter relations come with moral competition, whereas the indigenous Presbyterian relies little on the view of China to drive the quest for independence. Although this tradition had worked within political relations during various periods, confrontation,
othering, or demonization rarely characterize its strategic practices, as often seen elsewhere. Thus, the marginality of China’s threat in the Presbyterian pursuit of Taiwan’s independence is worth reviewing.

The paper begins with a broader review of the different kinds of relations in which the pro-independence forces have embedded themselves to demonstrate the importance of their intellectual understanding of China to their pursuit. Then, we will demonstrate how the Presbyterian Church evolved differently. This process illustrates how individual prescription can be essential to the evolution of greater relations. These greater relations additionally suggest how a peculiar way of failing to understand China can practically add strength in the formation of approaches to China. The paper argues that religion plays a significant role in this development.

2. Taiwan’s Approach to China Embedded in Colonial Relations

The two earliest Presbyterian priests arrived in Taiwan in 1867 and 1872, prior to Japan’s colonization in 1895. Japan would have a considerable influence with regard to determining Taiwan’s fate in the next half-century. In many aspects, colonial relations with Taiwan were the same as with other colonies (Aguiar, 2011; Shin and Robinson, 1999). Most importantly, Japan imposed colonial modernity which, for the purpose of this paper, refers to the process of modernization to facilitate the extraction of resources according to the need of colonial governance (Chen, 2002; Komagome, 2006; Lo, 2002). Despite Japan’s resorting to suppressive control in general, the Presbyterian Church encountered little intrusion. In contrast, the indigenous population underwent colonization, with the most deeply-rooted influences resulting from education and war. Education and war had reconstituted the political identities of Taiwan, especially in the higher strata of society.

Education was an effective mechanism of assimilation (Peng and Chu, 2017). Young people acquired Japanese values, language, identities, and learned to be loyal to the emperor. The social hierarchy was clear, but the colonized population had the opportunity to rise up from the past Chineseness qua inferiority. The colonial migrants equated Chineseness to slavery in nature, given the conquest of China by northern Manchurian barbarians. The colonized population was inferior not only because they were at the bottom of the colonized society but also because of their Chinese identity.¹ Such cultural configuration had a strong influence on the elite because of the need to demonstrate high culture to attain acknowledgment from the colonizing forces (Ching, 2001; Henry, 2016). An aversion to China was strategically spontaneous to establish self-respect (Huang, 2011). With the colony and Japan joining forces to inflict war on China, this disposition was strengthened.
On the other hand, the war tore the identities of those who perceived and maintained hybrid identities in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the war expanded and deepened “Japanization.”

Having planned to enforce the idea of the Greater East Asian Sphere of Co-prosperity, the colonial government actively recruited Taiwanese youths. The Taiwanese draftees were initially military servants. As the war escalated, these draftees were able to serve officially as soldiers, which gave them an enhanced sense of pride. Many followed the Japanese army to Southeast Asia, Manchuria, Hainan, or other sites in China. This pride was an even stronger inspiration for becoming Japanese. By the end of the war, most of them had never experienced defeat. Some still recalled participating in impressive modernization projects in Southeast Asia. This inspiration explained how the soldiers’ pride continued even in the war’s aftermath. Except for soldiers who were sent to fight in the Chinese Civil War, returnees were unable to apprehend defeat (Louzon, 2017). The arriving Kuomintang appeared similarly inferior to them in the same way as the Chinese troops appeared to the Japanese army during the war. Ironically, because Japan handed Taiwan over to China, the Taiwanese soldiers who unexpectedly belonged to the Allies were suddenly largely exempt from war trials. As a result, the Japanese identity remained superior in Taiwan’s consciousness. Neither was decolonization seriously attempted in Taiwan.

China’s take-over of Taiwan became dramatic yet bizarre after the Kuomintang lost the Civil War to the Communists. The Kuomintang became an exiled regime. The indigenous population had no effective access to governing positions and was deprived of entitlement to the property left by the former colonizing forces. The Kuomintang thus alienated the postcolonial population, especially the elite and the returnees who had adapted successfully to colonial rules. This alienation came about despite the Kuomintang’s educational and economic policies, which provided equality as opposed to discrimination under colonialism. The Kuomintang’s war on Communist China further inflicted politics of suppression. Although suppression is aimed primarily at Communist infiltration, such politics of moral correctness reinforced the alienation of the postcolonial population (Cook, 2005). The same can be said of the education offered to the postcolonial society. The education was full of Chinese patriotism, which helped neither the decolonization necessary for the postcolonial population to reflect critically upon their assimilation into the Japanese system nor the connection between the colonial and Chinese conditions (Chang, 2015; Morris, Shimazu and Vickers, 2013).

These historical events explain effectively the emergence of the aversion to China after the passing away of the Kuomintang migrant leadership. Liberalism has replaced the Japanese emperor to undergird Taiwan’s
civilizational superiority. Liberalism first appeared to legitimize political reforms that ended the Kuomintang regime. Subsequently, extensive electoral practices benchmarked the difference in sovereign scope between Taiwan and China (Lien, 2014). Taiwan has also been active in establishing solidarity with the Alliance of Liberties to involve India and Australia, in addition to Japan, in containing China. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, their resemblance to one another in terms of liberalism continues to inform the emotional attachment of pro-independence forces to territory consciousness rather than liberalism per se (Pan, 2015; Shih, 2007), which was embedded when defending Japan during WWII. In fact, the reenactment of Taiwan’s defeat at the end of World War II in an ironically celebrative narrative has been a popular tactic of pro-independence politicians to avow their allegedly non-Chinese identities (Shih, 2017).

Note the Taiwan Statue, on which former President Lee Teng-hui has inscribed his words, in the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Park. The Statue indicates that Taiwan and Japan resemble to each other in terms of a shared destiny and nationhood that is doomed to estrange China. The statue was installed in 2018. The park displays prefectural statues from all over Japan to memorialize the dead, originating from their respective domains. Lee wrote on the statue established by the then President-elect, Tsai Ing-wen, “Testimony to Nationhood” (為國作見證) (Morgan, 2018). Several observations have been made. First, Taiwan is not a prefecture of Japan. Second, the President of Taiwan is, in every sense, higher than the level of Prefectural Governor of Japan. Third, the names of Taiwanese soldiers who died during the Invasion of Ryukyu, if any, have not been researched or inscribed in the statue as done by the Japanese prefectures. Finally, the term “nationhood” in Lee’s inscription on the Taiwan statue summarizes his identification with Japanese nationhood. In fact, for a short time, Lee served in the Japanese military during WWII. Briefly, none of these political sensibilities resonate with the two leaders’ quest for independent statehood. That said, their inexpressible comfort with discursively becoming part of the Japanese nation insinuates their aversion to China.

3. Church Relations versus Colonial Relations

On the Taiwan Statute, Lee wrote “testimony.” Implicitly, this wording reflects the Presbyterian influence on his discourse. Presbyterian indoctrination clearly had a very different trajectory to colonial relations. If the latter portrayed an inferior China to be excluded, the Church was compulsorily inclusive. Lee’s hybrid characteristics of Christianity and colonial modernity enabled him intellectually to sequence his career along bifurcating paths and place China in dramatically different images, simultaneously backward
and worthy of appreciation (Tsai, 2005: 91-109). Lee’s adaptive style attests to a highly unstable religious practice. Lee’s hybrid identity has been emblematic of Presbyterian followers in Taiwan and, together, they implied the other distinctive approach to the politics of identity that is unavailable to colonial relations. In fact, the evolution of the “contextual theology” of the contemporary Presbyterian Church has not taken inferior China or China’s threat as its premise. Eventually, it is this improvised notion of “context” that inspires the exclusionary sense of resemblance among residents of Taiwan and the strangeness of Chineseness.

A separate trajectory that paralleled colonial relations could not be Chinese because this would have invited shaming. The European origin of the Presbyterian Church or, more precisely, the Scottish origin of its contemporary institution, bestowed a superior image on Japan, which once strove to adopt a UK-style of identity. For example, Thomas Barclay (1849-1935), a Glasgow-born Presbyterian missionary, was able to mediate between the colonial troops and the residents of Tainan in 1895 to achieve the Capitulation of Tainan peacefully (Cheng, 2005: 1-2). He received an award from the Japanese Emperor for his services. In the same vein, the Japanese colonial government generally failed to restrict the spread of gospel that originated and was spread prior to the colonial period. James L. Maxwell (1836-1921) started preaching in Southern Taiwan in 1865 and George L. Mackay (1844-1901) in Northern Taiwan in 1872. The colonial government only began to expel Western missionaries from Taiwan when World War II broke out. By then, the Western missionaries had successfully trained over two generations of local priests who could continue the Church’s work (Wu, 2003: 172-178).

Christian identity was a possible remedy for transcending colonial relations or explicit scorn toward the inferior. The Church’s focus on medical sciences and humanities contrasts with the colonial modernity, which focused mainly on the infrastructure, weaponry, navigation, medicine and extraction. Assimilation only began at a far later stage. As Presbyterian missionaries were from the Calvinist traditions and Protestant Reformation, the humanist and enlightening tendencies in their pedagogical orientation were assured. The bulk of the Church’s work in colonial Taiwan was Western-style schooling and medicine (Cheng, 2005: 201). Moreover, the missionaries executed their reform and religion, to a large extent, in local languages whereas the colonial government was eager to substitute the “progressive” Japanese for the allegedly backward Chinese. Acquiring Japanese subjected the colonized more deeply to the colonial system whereas acquiring English distanced them from the system. Thus, Church modernity appeared to be heading in a direction that was categorically different from colonial modernity. Neither the Chinese identity of the Han residents nor the primitivity of the aboriginal communities created a barrier to accessing the revelation of Christ.
The important development that made the Presbyterian Church an indigenous religion was the adoption of local conventions and language in teaching and training (Huang, 1999: 20-21). The Church recruited local talents who were more effective in the improvisation of linguistic and racial resemblance to the local. Eventually, an indigenous consciousness could evolve after the Western missionaries had to leave because of pressure from the colonial authorities. An indigenous Church served as the foundation for the indigenous theology. In comparison with postcolonial indigeneity, Church indigeneity was hardly confrontational. Postcolonial indigeneity targeted the exiled Chinese regime by enlisting the identity of colonial modernity. On the contrary, Church modernity that supported Church indigeneity attended to the intrinsic value and solidarity that believers perceived in their service to God. In addition, such service would have to include liberating the Chinese people, even though they did not belong to the postcolonial society. Their exile qualified them for more, rather than less, attention.

The growth of the Presbyterian Church underwent a long cycle of political regimes. The literature has considered the political complexity that is unique and essential to the quest for the indigenization of the Church (Lin, 2009: 41-83; Kang, 1999: 156). Presbyterian missionaries arrived during the Manchurian period. The Church encountered the colonial regime first, then the Chinese regime in exile. The last involved the Chinese Civil War and Cold War. The Church and migrant Kuomintang jointly opposed Communist China, despite their otherwise incongruent purposes. In any case, each regime presented some difficulties regarding the quest for universal Christianity. Especially the colonial and the Civil War regimes were established after the Church already had its own network in Taiwan. The resulting lesson was that the Church was compelled to develop an indigenous consciousness for the sake of resisting externally-imposed restrictions. In face of the obstacles imposed by these regimes, a cognitive fault line emerged between inside and outside territorially.

Colonial relations inevitably set the most important parameters of Presbyterian identity in Taiwan in this realized territoriality. The simple practice that demarcated Taiwan as a distinctive site or category, independent of China and Japan, comprised the geographical scope of indigenous identity. Such scope not only enabled the colonizers to look down upon the population that could only resist in the name of Taiwan but also enabled the colonized population to acquire a perspective from within the pre-determined boundary. Given that China fell outside this boundary, the exiled Kuomintang could not help but act upon an alien character, which made little sense to its leaders, who conceived of the party as a force for the liberation of the postcolonial society. In the same vein, the Cold War relations, informed by the practice of Containment, reinforced the separation of Taiwan from China as a distinctive site.
of geo-strategic significance. These territorially-oriented parameters prepared the emergence of “context” in contextual theology. The colonial modernity and church modernity as two externally bred civilizations have been able to support each other after WWII because of this resemblance of territoriality.

4. The Rise of Contextual Theology

Shoki Coe (1914-1988 or Huang Chang-hui, 黃彰輝, Huang Zhanghui), the founder of contextual theology, distinguished himself from contemporary pro-independence advocates due to his attitude toward colonial Japan. Instead of relying on colonial modernity to offset the migrant regime’s obsession with Chinese patriotism and anti-communism, he derived his indigenous sensibilities from critical reflections of his own identity vis-à-vis colonial Japan. Coe’s family background, academic training, and career development contrasted from other important pro-independence leaders since it was not embedded in the colonial system unlike Presbyterian political leaders, such as Lee Teng-hui (1923-), who was the first President of the ROC that supported Taiwan independence, Peng Ming-min (1923-) who led a pro-independence campaign in the States, or Ng Yuzin Chiautong (1932-2011黃昭堂), the former leader of the world’s Taiwan Independence Movement. These leaders grew up in the colonial system and took a strong view of China. Coe resembled Liao Wen Kwei (1905-1952 Joshua Liao 廖文奎), who was called the “Father of Taiwan Independence,” in the sense that neither were trained in the colonial system and their pro-independence position did not rest upon loathing China.

Liao, likewise a Presbyterian follower, came from an established noble family, was educated in the United States, and returned to China to teach. Liao’s approach and preaching were deeply embedded in liberalism, which was in line with his dissertation subject on liberal philosophy (Liao, 1929; 1933). Liao was married to an American, which was already unusual at the time. His turn to Taiwan independence was the result of the suppression of the Kuomintang during the February 28, 1947 uprising and the loss of election due to the perceived fraud contrived by the Kuomintang (Liao, 1950). The exiled regime from China was blamed for all its political manipulation. However, grievances were not held either against China or Liao’s own Chinese cultural embedding. Liao drafted a declaration for Taiwan’s independence. In his pursuit, the appeal to universal human rights reflected a religious conviction to bring the gospel to all. Nevertheless, his public activities reflect directly the liberal string. In comparison, Coe’s prescription was predominantly religious.

In the beginning, Coe’s personal encounter was influential in his quest for an answer regarding his identity (Chang, 2012: 74-75). He recalled the
enlightening bitterness that he had suffered and reflected critically upon in his younger years. One was a fistfight with Japanese classmates while at school. He was called “the salve of the barbarian” (qingguo nu), referring to a social level lower than barbarian. This denotation was imposed by Japan on the colonized population, who were predominantly migrant Han previously ruled by the Manchu, a barbarian regime in the eyes of Japan. Coe was unsure what the terms meant to his folks until his father reversely consented to his fighting upon hearing the insulting label. His father, a second-generation Presbyterian priest, usually insisted on the norms of peace. For Coe, this label created a strong impression that he was an inferior object in colonial relations.

More explicit was the second incident, when he unexpectedly ran into his brother on a cruise to Japan. Both felt elated and burst into their mother tongue. His brother was punished severely by his teacher for speaking the inferior language. Coe was compelled to dress in the most solemn Japanese style and explained to the teacher how the surprise reunion provoked his greeting in his childhood language intuitively. The local dialect and Taiwanese identity were rigorously connected in this experience.5

Unlike the quest for independence within the logic of colonial relations, Coe’s indigenous sensibility arose from opposition to the colonial relations. His Presbyterian appeal to the universal human rights provided a discursive remedy to the sense of inferiority thus inflicted. For Coe’s reflections to prevail, several events took place. First, Western priests were forced to leave during the War, urging more local priests to develop a practice informed by their indigenous identity. Coe actually served as the first Taiwanese head of the Tainan Academy of Theology. Second, the same appeal inspired his successors to face the anti-Communist Kuomintang, as well as the People’s Republic in the World Council of Churches. Coe was able to seek a plausible answer in his religious relations. As a third-generation Presbyterian priest, he was well acquainted with the Calvinist doctrine of universal enlightenment. However, he reflected upon this doctrine. He came to the conviction that God has a reason to place him in an indigenous context and, thus, he must delve into this context to relieve the indigenous population from their immediate predicament (Huang, 2014).

Despite the Church being able to find a niche in different regimes in history, the anti-Communist Kuomintang once again reminded the determined priest that an indigenous identity was essential for him to continue his work within this context. The migrant Kuomintang practically treated the indigenous population as secondary citizens. The restriction on the use of the Funkiness dialect in school was particularly poignant and symbolic in this regard, reminding him of the alien character of the former authorities. The strong emotion that had accumulated since childhood re-emerged powerfully. This emotion was a feeling of “unwillingness” (mī-goān) (Coe
Such feeling accompanied each practical surrender to insult. This feeling prompted a desire eventually to enjoy “chutoutian” (which means “sticking one’s head out under the sky”) (Coe, 1993: 235), an expression that consistently inspired pro-independence forces in subsequent generations.

Coe began to reassess the Western style and institution of preaching. He concluded that what was proper for Western colonies was no longer suited to the postcolonial independent nations (Coe (Hwang), 1963a: 60-62; Coe (Hwang), 1963b: 1-14). Coe believed that the Church must interact with its nuanced environment everywhere. The Church reached remote mountains and small villages to appreciate the critical relevance of the context to the spread of the gospel. The land and faith purportedly constituted each other. The theory of Contextual Theology was the result (Coe, 1993: 248). In 1972, Coe drafted the Working Policy Statement – Third Mandate of the Theological Education Fund. He suggested that the first step for local churches in the Third World was to de-contextualize theology from the West and re-contextualize it in the postcolonial societies (Pobee, 1995: 61). As God creates various contexts in which man attains his image, according to Coe, priests cannot help but learn and gain inspiration from their contexts. All theological understandings are contextual in nature (Cheng, 2001: 30-33). Contextual theology frees up priests to use indigenous legends, folk stories, and songs to expound and exemplify the gospels. In the context of Taiwan, contextual theology led to “Chutoutian” theology (Huang, 1990). From there, three declarations came emerged in the 1970s: A Public Statement on Our National Fate (1971), Our Appeal Concerning the Bible, the Church, and the Nation (1975), and Human Rights Declaration (1977). Together, these declarations culminated in the Confession of Faith (1985) (Huang, 1991).

5. Approaching China from the Perspective of Contextual Theology

None of the documents took on China directly as a subject or target. Indirectly, devotion to the land and faith in context has apparent implications regarding the question on China. In a nutshell, all of these religious movements increasingly marginalized China. For the Presbyterian Church, China’s threat is perceived intellectually as being very thin. The threat began with the Kuomintang, who claimed leadership of all China, including Taiwan, and intervened in the Church’s relations accordingly. In the name of anti-Communism, the Kuomintang strongly requested that the Church of Taiwan should become less involved in the World Council of Churches. The Kuomintang was anxious that the Council kept in touch with the Communist areas and the presence of a Taiwanese member could compromise its anti-Communist stance (Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, 1967: 17; Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, 1970: 167; Chin, 2015). This request forced the Church
to face China, if only implicitly, by confronting the Kuomintang’s Chinese identity, which justified its anti-Communist policy.

Ironically, the Kuomintang reproduced the contextually-oriented Church through the binary of Communism and anti-Communism embedded in the politics of the Civil War and Cold War. The binary compelled the residents of Taiwan to take a mutually exclusive perspective on the Chinese Mainland, which reproduced the same binary that has existed since the concession of Taiwan to Japan in 1895. The transition from the colonial to the exiled regime did not change the geographical border of the island of Taiwan, which encircled a self-sustaining population with its own regime. The two regimes have shown a superior self-image. The Presbyterian Church was, contrarily, not too embedded in the binary politics of the higher versus the lower. Instead, the Church was preoccupied from the very beginning with how universal gospels could make better sense in the context of Taiwan. The lacuna of a civilizational or religious relationship vis-à-vis China negatively was apparent.

The lacuna revealed an unstated alienation from the subsequent colonial and Civil War/Cold War regimes, with each claiming a geographically greater role for Taiwan either as a bridge of colonial modernity for Japan to expand into Greater East Asia or as an unsinkable carrier to contain Communist China. In fact, the Manchukuo established by Japan in China’s Northeast was staffed by colonial officials from Taiwan. In contrast, the Presbyterian Church’s inattention to China due to the introspective views of contextual theology presented a distinctive perspective, which was that China was outside Taiwan’s context. China deserved no immediate attention as opposed to an alarming threat to a territorially broader self, i.e. Japan and China, that these regimes represented. For these regimes, China, as it was perceived by them each according to their values, was an ideological or civilization threat.

This innocent perspective was insufficient to cope with the imminent participation of the Chinese Church in the World Council. Even though the Chinese Church had no intention of harming the Taiwanese Church’s religious activities, the Chinese Church had been instructed by its government to request the Taiwanese Church to adopt the Chinese nationality. For the Beijing authorities, the political premise of the Chinese Church to join the World Council was the reassurance of the One-China principle, according to which, the name of the Taiwan Church must reflect its Chinese status. Direct interaction with the Chinese Church, therefore, exerted pressure to ponder the China issue. Nevertheless, the reception of contextual theology among the members of the World Council engendered strong support for the Taiwan Church to remain independent from a Chinese nomenclature. A publication of the Tainan Academy of Theology recorded the position on the China issue in 1985:
...We believe that in Christ the Church is one, holy and catholic. It should transcend division of politics, culture and race. At this time when the church in China is beginning to make increasing contacts with churches in other countries, we affirm the self-hood of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and its role in international church organizations. Moreover, we continue to support its participation in the worldwide mission of the church.6

Accordingly, the Taiwanese Church declared that it would not accept the placement under the “C” category in the country listing of the Council. The Church must belong to the “T” category, or would have to withdraw from the Council. In cooperation with the other 13 Churches7 that arrived in Taiwan at the invitation of the Church, another joint statement was issued in 1987 to welcome the Chinese Churches upon the foundation of Church autonomy in Taiwan:

We deeply hope that the Taiwan Church, with its continuously renovating spirit and on the aforementioned premise of autonomy, along with all the Churches in the world, including the Chinese Church on the Mainland, shares God’s love and benevolence in a mutually respectful attitude in our joint effort to establish God’s kingdom (Taiwanese Church Mission Association, 1987: 1).

The Church was becoming increasingly keen to emphasize the sovereign status of Taiwan as a nation-state. Accordingly, Taiwan has already entered the world of the Church to be protected by state sovereignty and China is a potential object to be converted. The public statements maintained specifically that sovereignty was the access to universal human rights, for which all Churches work. The other side of the coin was the alert sent to the Chinese Church that the Chinese authorities had violated human rights. The Church demanded that the World Council should react to the Chinese Church’s failure to articulate these issues faithfully on behalf of the suppressed, in accordance with their belief. The Church also urged that the World Council should refrain from assigning an important role to the Chinese Church. However, the quest for sovereignty and attention to Chinese human rights did not occur within the same colonial relations that pro-independence forces in Taiwan usually arise. In short, the issues do not accompany the aversion to Chinese believers or the Chinese Church. The relationship between the two Churches was situated painstakingly within religious relations. (The 10th Assembly of the World Council of Churches, 2013: 4.)

6. Conclusion

Colonial relations necessarily bred a view of China for the colonized population in Taiwan that confirmed Japan’s civilizational superiority. Taiwan was a hybrid of China and Japan under this circumstance. Decolonization
did not take place after Japan was defeated and Taiwan was returned to China. The abortion of decolonization was due to multiple reasons. First, the regime in exile that took over failed to appreciate the fact that the postcolonial population lacked the prior sense of Chinese ethnicity as the regime, though it could represent legitimately. The regime imposed Chinese patriotic education qua equal Chineseness, as it would have done in China had it not lost the Civil War. This education failed with its audience, who had already adapted to colonialism. The latter did not join the new leadership because the Chinese officialdom was absolutely alien to them. In addition, the property left by the Japanese was confiscated by the Chinese regime in exile. As a result, the postcolonial elite was consistently disadvantaged politically, institutionally and in terms of inheritance. To regain self-respect, the postcolonial elite could rely most conveniently on the colonial modernity brought by Japan. This perspective promoted the persistence of the image of an inferior China.

On top of the postcolonial politics that aborted decolonization, the postcolonial elite, as well as the returning soldiers loyal to the Japanese Emperor, were exempt from war criminal trials because of their membership of the victorious Republican China. Hence, they were not under any pressure whatsoever to engage in critical self-reflection. In fact, many had never been defeated on the battlefront and could not accept the reality that superior Japan surrendered to inferior China. Their experiences ensured that the prior relations informed by colonial modernity would be the perpetual lens that undergirds the image of inferior China. Colonial relations constituted by an antagonistic kind of civilizational Chineseness have remained inspiring and vivid in the 21st century. They have provided a powerful morale for the Taiwan Independence Movement. This is the reason why alienation and aversion from China have been strong in the politically correct Taiwan independence. For Taiwan independence forces, China had posed a threat as an inferior civilization driven to engulf a more progressive Taiwanese civilization.

However, a particular string in the postcolonial relations did not assume Chinese inferiority, even though it had recognized the contemporary human rights problems in China that were unacceptable to the subscribers of this particular string. This string of thought is the Presbyterian Church, which entered Taiwan three decades ahead of the arrival of Japanese colonialism. The Church had continued its preaching and operations during the colonial period and provided vibrant support for independence only after the Chinese migrant regime compelled it to withdraw from the world Christian network lest the Communist participants in the network should harm the legitimacy of the anti-Communist regime. Thereafter, the Presbyterian Church was determined to overcome this ostensible representation of China by the regime in exile.
Contextual theology resulted from the critical reflection and determination that emerged to guide the Church’s subsequent approach to China.

The new theological epistemology was initially an individual inspiration, but was upgraded to a prescription for the civilizational identity of politically independent Taiwan. It has its ironic origins in Coe’s childhood encounters with the colonizing Japanese. The encounters reproduced a feeling of “being unwilling” to adapt to suppressive control. This feeling explained, partially, why colonial modernity estranged the Presbyterian tradition of Taiwan independence, which established its own rationale. Instead, the tradition engendered “chutoutian,” as well as indigeneity in its pursuit of independent sovereignty for Taiwan. These concepts resonate easily with the universal value of liberty and human rights. For the independence advocacy informed by colonial relations, the issue of human rights immediately suggests the image of inferior China. However, for the Church, the issue connotes a mission in China that the Church should have cared about equally. This construction of a non-inferior China is how religion has contributed to the (non-)Chineseness of Taiwan’s independence.

Notes

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1. Interview with Chen Peng-jen, year n.a.
2. One typical example is Tsai, 1971; also see the comparable case of Korea in Fujitani, 2011.
3. This has been the Presbyterian tradition (Sanneh, 1993: 17).
4. Note, though, the first leader of the exiled Kuomintang – Chiang Kai-shek – was a faithful Christian, as were many of his associates, too.
5. Both incidents were recorded in Coe, 1993: 235.
7. Including the Council for World Mission, Basel Mission, Overseas Missionary Fellowship, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in the US and Canada, Presbyterian Church (USA), United Church of Christ in the USA, Taiwan Christian Church Council of North America, Taiwan Christian Church Council of North America, United Church of Christ in Japan, Jesus Christ Church in Japan, Taipei Korean Community Church of Presbyterian Church of Korea, and Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (Taiwanese Church Mission Association 1987: 1).
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Heidegger’s Legacy for Comparative Philosophy and the Laozi

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Abstract

The ancient text known as the Laozi Daodejing is a treasure of Chinese culture and civilization, and it also represents one of the world classics of religion and philosophy. However, it is also a notoriously difficult work to interpret, and modern scholars have exerted tremendous energy in attempting to make an overall sense of just what the text is all about: is it religious or philosophical? Is it a synthetically coherent work with a unified perspective, or an anthology of disparate ideas compiled from multiple sources? Is its main character, the anonymous sage, a master of bodily techniques living in mountain reclusion, or an enlightened ruler who manipulates the Dao from his royal throne to order an empire? The famous German philosopher, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), himself dabbled in the thought of the Laozi, and in doing so he opened a novel phenomenological reading of the text that rejected the metaphysics traditionally read into it, but his approach had little impact until the discovery of several excavated versions of the ancient manuscript that appear to confirm his phenomenological interpretation. Since then, a growing number of contemporary scholars are accepting, absorbing, and furthering this phenomenological reading of the Laozi, allowing them to make great progress in exploring its religious and philosophical foundations that have deeply influenced Chinese culture and society for more than two thousand years. This paper examines this legacy bequeathed by Heidegger to Laozi studies as well as comparative philosophy more generally.

Keywords: Laozi, Martin Heidegger, Daoism, Ontology, Phenomenology
1. Orientations to Heidegger and the Laozi

The separate papers of the present volume focus on the variety of religious legacies emerging from the historical interactions between China and the non-Chinese world. The focus of the current paper is directed to the foundational text of Daoism, the enigmatic Laozi, an ancient Chinese text that gingerly straddles the religious and philosophical. More specifically, in contrast to the many excellent studies that document the influence of Daoist philosophy on the thought of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), this study examines his legacy as a decisive figure of the contemporary study of the philosophy of the Laozi as well as a decisive figure of the modern enterprise of comparative philosophy.

Throughout his long and storied career, Heidegger famously asked the following: “What is the meaning of the question of being?” which is the philosophically primordial question that follows from a previous first question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” According to Heidegger, the question of the meaning of Being was originally raised by the pre-Socratic philosophers but was soon forgotten by the metaphysical tradition of Western philosophy. The question of the meaning of Being has been forgotten because Western philosophy has led itself into conceiving Being as itself an entity of absolute being that gives “being” to all beings. The ultimate consequences of this forgetting of Being is that it has ushered human civilization into a world of technological instrumentality in which existing beings are understood as resources.

Heidegger’s thought from early on was decisively influenced by his focus on recovering the meaning of the question of Being, and it directed him back to the pre-Socratics, particularly Parmenides and Heraclitus (see Heidegger, 1975). His intent was to open the way for the inception of a new beginning for the questioning of Being by retrieving their ability to ask the same, but for the purpose of coming to terms with modern technology. His pursuit of the questioning of Being led him to the ancient Chinese philosophy of Daoism and the Laozi.

Heidegger found in this short text a philosophy that was in many ways akin to that of the pre-Socratics in that both were, according to his understanding of them, radically non-metaphysical in distinct contrast to the tradition of Western metaphysics that studies Being in terms of first principles that exist outside and beyond the phenomenal world. In his engagements with the thought of the Laozi, Heidegger sometimes expressed highly reticent and ambiguous remarks concerning a possible East-West dialogue. He was not entirely clear, in his writings and interviews, if he believed that the thought of the Laozi could, like the thought of the pre-Socratics, open the way to raising again the question of the meaning of Being.
For example, in the course of his *der Speigel* interview, he said, “And who of us would be in a position to decide whether or not one day in Russia or China very old traditions of ‘thought’ may awaken that will help make possible for man a free relationship to the technical world?” (Heidegger, 1981: 61), but he then followed this by saying, “My conviction is that only in the same place where the modern technical world took its origin can we also prepare a conversion (*Umkehr*) of it. In other words, this cannot happen by taking over Zen-Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the world” (Heidegger, 1981: 63). Still, his remarks on the issue have provided much fuel for debates that have been on-going now for several decades concerning the possibility for such dialogue, and there remains to this day much controversy as to his final stance. It is within this general philosophical context that Heidegger approached the *Laozi*.

The *Laozi* was composed around 500 BC, dates comparable to those of the pre-Socratics. It was the first Chinese text to introduce the notion of the Dao as the primordial source of existence. Although the *Laozi* has been transmitted to posterity in slightly different versions, for all intents there are two fundamentally different versions, what I call the early *Laozi* and the later *Laozi*.

Oddly, the early *Laozi* is both the most ancient version as well as the most recent. Originally circulating as an oral text, its earliest known transcription dates to the very end of the third century BC. Two excavated versions of it were discovered at Mawangdui, and more recently partial transcriptions in three versions were discovered at Guodian; they are known as the Mawangdui *Laozi* and the Guodian *Laozi*, both of which are taken as representing the early *Laozi*. Its core notion is the *heng dao* 恆道, where *heng* signifies the Dao’s temporalizing nature. This “temporalizing Dao” exists exclusively between the space of Heaven and Earth, where beings come into existence by way of its interplay of *wu* 無 (absence) and *you* 有 (presence) within the world. I characterize its philosophy as phenomenological.

The later *Laozi* is the familiar version that has been transmitted to us today, best recognized by the two most important commentaries that accompany it: one by the second century Heshang Gong that identifies the Dao with Nothingness, and the other by the third century Wang Bi that identifies the Dao with Non-being. The core notion of the later *Laozi* is the *chang dao* 常道, where *chang* signifies the Dao’s constant/permanent/eternal nature. Because this “eternal Dao” exists on a transcendent realm from where it produces Heaven and Earth and the myriad things also through the interplay of *wu* and *you*, but here understood by Heshang Gong as Nothingness and Somethingness and by Wang Bi as Non-being and Being. I characterize its philosophy as metaphysical.

Although the metaphysics of Nothingness is not the same as the metaphysics of Non-being, I do not systematically differentiate them in this paper other than to associate the former with China and the latter with the West.
2. Metaphysics with Heidegger and the Laozi

Heidegger’s overriding interest in the Laozi stemmed from his inquiry into whether its thought spoke directly to the meaning of the question of Being. He believed that the world was threatened by the planetary Ge-stell of modern technology where beings are taken as standing reserve, and he writes, “As the essence of technology, Ge-stell would be absolute. It would reduce man and beings to a sort of ‘standing reserve’ or stockpile in service to, and on call for, technological purposes” (Heidegger, 1977c: 309). Heidegger understood the Ge-stell of modern technology as the destined completion of metaphysics in a world that has entirely forgotten the question of the meaning of Being; as Heidegger remarks, “Not only have the gods and the god fled, but the divine radiance has become extinguished in the world’s history” (Heidegger, 1971b: 89). As the destiny of metaphysics, Heidegger asserted that the movement from the origins of metaphysics to its completion in the Ge-stell was a function of the forgetfulness of Being where existence is shorn of meaning and plenitude (see Heidegger 2012a).

It is in this context that Heidegger raises the possibility of the second beginning that begins by returning to the ancient Greeks in order to reawaken the question of the meaning of Being. Only by doing so will beings once again be allowed to come into the plenitude of their unconcealment by which they shed their status as standing reserve. Thus, Heidegger encouraged the pursuit of this thinking that could uncover a more appropriate way for humans to fruitfully and flourishingly exist in accommodation with the Ge-stell, and this had to begin with once again raising the question of the meaning of Being. Could the Laozi assist in raising the question and thereby play an important role in “the second beginning” and the overcoming of metaphysics? As Ma Lin and Jaap van Brakel note, “Despite Heidegger’s general claim that the allegedly inevitable event of East-West dialogue can only be anticipated before the Western philosophical tradition gains maturity through its own self-transformation, East Asian sources have undeniably played a role in (Heidegger’s) search for ways out of the Ge-stell” (2014: 548).

Heidegger’s suspicion of the Laozi led him to uncover a radically non-metaphysical interpretation of it that resonated with pre-Socratic thought, particularly in its attention to the phenomenological interplay of Being and Nothingness. This is in stark contrast to the metaphysics that was laid over the text with the appearance of the later Laozi, where the metaphysical Dao was understood as an entity strictly identified with wu as either Nothingness or Non-being, which produces phenomenal you as Somethingsness or Being.

For the phenomenology of the early Laozi, the Dao cannot be identified with wu because they are not the same, where wu (as Nothingness considered in terms of absence) can only be conceived in its interplay with you (as Being
considered in terms of presence). Whether Heidegger explicitly recognized the metaphysics of the standard Chinese interpretations of the *Laozi* only to reject it or whether he remained ignorant of it, it played no role in his reading of the text. Further, he saw in the *Laozi* a thought that was comparable to the pre-Socratics in that it was thoroughly pre-metaphysical.

Whereas Western metaphysics separates Being as a first principle from the beings that it produces, Chinese metaphysics (which developed directly from the early *Laozi*) separates Nothingness or Non-being as a first principle from the beings that it produces. On the other hand, phenomenology, whether of the sort articulated by the early *Laozi* or the pre-Socratics, integrates Being and Nothingness within the phenomenal world from where “poetic thinking” explores their interplay. For Heidegger, this involves the active involvement of humans who are able to allow things to be held forth in their unconcealment, and this often takes the form of art and poetry, for example in the verses of the *Laozi*, because of their ability to preserve the disclosures of being in material forms. But the world has not yet overcome this destining of metaphysics, whose overcoming will alone be the result of a return to the originary and primordial thinking that alone questions Being.

The line separating the early phenomenological *Laozi* with its directing notion of “the temporalizing Dao” (*heng dao*) from the later metaphysical *Laozi* with its directing notion of “the eternal Dao” (*chang dao*) was clearly drawn in 157 BC, although the processes that led to its metaphysicalization were already well underway by the third century BC. By a matter of sheer coincidence, the name of the ruling emperor who passed away in that year was Liu Heng. Because the beliefs of the time mandated that upon death the name of the emperor was tabooed, editors of the *Laozi* had to find a different word to substitute for the tabooed term *heng*, and they chose the term *chang* for this.1

Where *heng* connotes notions of a watery presencing or a misty lingering, the term *chang* connotes a very different condition of permanency, even eternity. The substitution of *chang* for *heng* to identify the central feature of the Dao in the *Laozi* wrenched it out of the phenomenal world of the interplay of *wu* and *you* and re-situated it on a transcendent realm where it was identified with original Nothingness outside of time and space that produces Being that in turn produces the myriad things. Thus the metaphysicalization of the Dao of the *Laozi* had achieved completion with this term substitution, and the phenomenological reading of the text was lost to oblivion, where it lay dormant and entirely unsuspected by Western readers until Heidegger, with no training in Chinese language, culture, or history, or even Chinese philosophy, recovered it by first of all approaching it from the perspective of the primordial question of the meaning of Being posed by the pre-Socratics.

Even after the discovery of the Mawangdui *Laozi* with its uses of the temporalizing *heng dao*, sinologists still had not begun to see through the
chinks in the standard metaphysical readings of the text as they continued to assume heng as a synonym of chang. The later discovery of the Guodian Laozi also with its uses of the temporalizing heng dao instead of the eternal chang dao finally started to compel a small handful of scholars (many of whom are briefly mentioned herein) to rethink and cautiously distance themselves from the entire enterprise of interpreting the Laozi according to the metaphysical dictates of “the eternal Dao,” and they more often than not turned to Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretations of the text to direct their own engagements with it.

It is difficult to overstate Heidegger’s legacy in opening the way to overcoming the metaphysical interpretation of the Laozi. At the same time, it is also difficult to overstate the radical difference between the total meaning of the text when read metaphysically by way of the eternal Dao and when read phenomenologically by way of the temporalizing Dao. Examining the recent publication history of phenomenological interpretations of the Laozi, it is also clear that Heidegger’s overcoming of the metaphysical interpretations of it directly lead to and are intimately intertwined with contemporary phenomenological interpretations that persistently line up with the philosophy of the early Laozi, as demonstrated by the Guodian and Mawangdui versions with their guiding notion of the “temporalizing Dao.” Any informed examination of many (indeed if not all) chapters of the Laozi through the application of the phenomenological interpretation easily bears out the radical difference between the two interpretations.

3. Comparative Philosophy with Heidegger and the Laozi

The philosophy of the later Laozi is not usually characterized as metaphysical, at least not explicitly. Interestingly, Ma and van Brakel come very close to making this claim in their brief discussion of “Wang Bi’s philosophical Daoism that advocates the centrality of the Nothing (無 wu) on the basis of the saying in chapter 40 of the [Laozi] that what exists (有 you) comes from nothing,” and they argue that “this approach [to the issue of emptiness in China] has the potential of being developed into an Asian version of metaphysics” (2014: 545).

Still, one cannot make a metaphysics out of something not-yet metaphysics without transforming its core meanings, but it is my contention that Wang Bi’s philosophical interpretation of the Laozi was already metaphysics from the beginning. At the same time, his metaphysical interpretation (together with, for example, Heshang Gong’s earlier metaphysical interpretation) in fact has transformed the core meanings of the early Laozi, and this is nowhere more clear than in its guiding notion of the “temporalizing Dao” in contrast to the later Laozi’s guiding notion of the “eternal Dao.”
As the ideas and methodologies of comparative philosophy that often directly engage the Laozi continue to be developed, it remains a heavy order for scholars of Daoist philosophy, whether Chinese or Western, to manage Heidegger, while it remains a heavy order for Western philosophers to manage Daoist philosophy. For Western philosophers, this is primarily because its traditional metaphysics is based on Nothingness rather than on Being, which the tradition of Western philosophy is not well equipped to manage. Western sinologists, not typically trained in philosophy, also do not normally characterize the philosophy of the Laozi as metaphysical primarily because there is no readily corresponding term for it in the ancient Chinese lexicon; for them, it is just Daoist philosophy.

Much like the non-metaphysical philosophy of the pre-Socratics from which emerged Western metaphysics, the early Laozi too was non-metaphysical and from it directly emerged Chinese metaphysics. Also, much like Heidegger’s work that strove to uncover the pre-metaphysical thought of the pre-Socratics before Western philosophy became metaphysical, Heidegger also was able to see through the metaphysical veneer of traditional readings of the later Laozi with its “eternal Dao” and uncover its pre-metaphysical philosophy that informs the early Laozi with its “temporalizing Dao.”

The legacy of Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of the Laozi has two decisive aspects. The first is for contemporary readings of the Laozi, which was the result of his ability to entirely sidestep the Chinese metaphysics of Nothingness/Non-being traditionally read into the Laozi as he uncovered the ancient, radically non-metaphysical core of its philosophy of the Dao. The second legacy is for the modern enterprise of comparative philosophy, which was the consequence of his engagements with the phenomenology of the Laozi that brought it into deep conversation with his own thinking, thereby establishing the text as canonical for comparative philosophy.

Ronnie Littlejohn characterizes comparative philosophy as “a subfield of philosophy in which philosophers work on problems by intentionally setting into dialogue various sources from across cultural, linguistic, and philosophical streams” (IEP). A relatively undeveloped field of study, for the most part comparative philosophy normally refers to encounters between Western and Eastern philosophy, but primarily Confucianism, Daoism, or Buddhism, where the comparative philosopher normally either brings his/her training in Western philosophy to bear on Eastern philosophy, or vice-versa. Littlejohn points out that the earliest works of comparative philosophy came from the Indian philosophers, Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950) and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975) and also the Japanese philosopher, Nishida Kitārō (1870-1945), whose introduction of the Buddhist notion of Nothingness to Western philosophers was absorbed by Heidegger by way of several of Nishida’s students who studied under Heidegger.2
While many others before Heidegger discussed Eastern philosophy including the *Laozi*, they typically did so to introduce and explain it to the West or to remark on its deficiencies in contrast to Western philosophy. Still, the collective enterprise of comparative philosophy itself as it is practised today with respect to its parameters, methods, and objectives, was largely formed and defined by Heidegger’s understandings of and reflections on intercultural engagements of philosophical conversation between the East and the West, whose most important articulations are dispersed among his later writings, but his 1959 essay, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer” (Heidegger, 1971a) stands out among them.

Heidegger is arguably the founding figure of comparative philosophy in the West. Although few have explicitly stated this in such straightforward ways, Ma and van Brakel come close; they write:

The theme of “intercultural philosophical dialogue” has not received much focused attention…. Everyday examples of intercultural philosophical dialogue include: discussion between Heidegger and the Japanese Buddhist philosopher Hisamatsu Hōseke Shinichi; cooperation between the Chinese scholar Li Zhizao and the Jesuit Francisco Furtado in the seventeenth century; or the contemporary discussion between the American philosopher Rorty and the Indian philosopher Balslev…. In German-language publications from the 1990’s, a group of scholars ascribed to Heidegger’s thinking a unique significance for the foundation, initiation, and orientation of cultural philosophy. According to them, Heidegger is the only great philosopher from the European traditions who took seriously the issue of East-West dialogue and hence something called intercultural philosophy. For example, Wolz-Gottwald argues that Heidegger has presented the “beginning of a ‘creative’ intercultural philosophy as a third way” (2016: 184-187).

Heidegger’s legacy for comparative philosophy is matched by his legacy for the contemporary study of the Daoist philosophy of the *Laozi*. Heidegger’s familiarity with Daoist philosophy was, at least at first, channeled through a series of discussions throughout the 1920s and 1930s with several eminent Japanese philosophers who studied in Germany. Although they were for the most part associated with the Kyoto School with its heavy influence from Buddhist thought, all of them were also familiar with the *Laozi* as a classic of the Far Eastern philosophical and cultural tradition, however the *Laozi* did not capture Heidegger’s philosophical attention until after the Second World War.

When the *Laozi* did so, Heidegger read it without spending much time with its European interpretations other than to reject their tendency to identify *Laozi* as a metaphysician; commenting on the unthoughtful discussions concerning philosophy among Europeans and “contemporary Indians, Chinese and Japanese,” he writes that “everything is stirred up in a gigantic mishmash
wherein it is no longer discernible whether or not the ancient Indians were English empiricists and Laozi a Kantian” (Heidegger, 2012b: 137).

Heidegger relied on several German translations of the *Laozi* that were on hand. While some of whose interpretations were more “philosophical” than others (see Ma, 2008: 121-122), he approached the text directly in his own understanding and, although he had no training in Chinese, he went so far as to “translate” (the term is used with caution) at least eight of its chapters, according to Reinhard May (1996: 6). His colleague in this who assisted him to uncover the meanings of the ancient text was the Taiwanese Paul Hsiao Shih-yi, a Roman Catholic studying theology in Italy who had dabbled with his own translation of the *Laozi* into Italian. Given the state of *Laozi* studies at the time, it was probably more propitious that Heidegger studied with a non-specialist in Daoist studies who likely found it less disagreeable when Heidegger decisively broke with standard metaphysical interpretations of the text in order to think it phenomenologically.

Next to Heidegger's wide-spread reception in the circles of Japanese philosophy, his thoughts on East-West dialogue have until recently been largely passed over by Western Heideggerian scholars who strictly attend to his position in and impact on Western philosophy. However, a watershed moment arrived in 1969 when Chang Chungyuan, among the early Chinese scholars to have attended to Heidegger’s thought, organized an inaugural international conference on comparative philosophy at the University of Hawaii, an important bastion of comparative philosophy, that was devoted to Heidegger’s ideas about East-West dialogue (see Ma, 2008: 17). To date, the work by the Chinese scholar, Ma Lin, has most successfully uncovered Heidegger’s ideas about East-West dialogue, in part because of her advanced training in Chinese philosophy as well as in Heideggerian thought. Current trends of scholarship on East-West dialogue attend much more closely to Heidegger’s ideas on the topic, with a great deal of success.

This paper does not aim to further examine Heidegger’s legacy for the modern enterprise of comparative philosophy to any extent, nor to rethink the influence of Asian thought including the *Laozi* on his philosophy. Rather, it turns its focus to Heidegger’s legacy that laid the foundations for contemporary interpretations of the philosophy of the *Laozi* that are fully cognizant of the dangers of subjecting it to traditional metaphysical interpretations. Although such interpretations are supportive of the metaphysics of the later *Laozi*, they distort and disfigure the original phenomenology of the early *Laozi*. The results of Heidegger’s engagement with that pre-metaphysical philosophy of the *Laozi* are starting to bear fruit in philosophical circles, in large part due to his success in bringing a phenomenological reading to it that eminently accords with the notion of the temporalizing Dao that pervades the Guodian and Mawangdui excavated versions of the early *Laozi*. 
4. Poetic Thinking with Heidegger and the Laozi

Heidegger’s motive in attending to Asian philosophy directly stemmed from his conviction that the pre-Socratic thinkers were the first to think the question of the meaning of Being. By this, he meant that they contemplated the ontological difference between Being and beings, where the interplay of Being intertwined with Nothingness is the original ground from which all beings are brought forth as who or what they are; Heidegger writes, “Bringing-forth brings out of concealment into unconcealment” (Heidegger, 1977c: 317). Heidegger turns to the Greek term *aletheia* (“truth as disclosure”) to refer to this authentic truth of this unconcealment.

The question of the meaning of Being thought by the pre-Socratics was, according to Heidegger, forgotten with the rise of Western philosophy beginning with Plato and Aristotle, and he specifically defines this tradition as metaphysics *tout court*. This metaphysics conceives Being as an independent entity, as with the eidos of Plato, the unmoved mover of Aristotle, or the God of Western monotheism. Heidegger recognized a distinct destiny for metaphysics that has already reached its completion in the planetary Ge-stell (“enframing”), a term Heidegger uses “as the name for the essence of modern technology” (Heidegger, 1977c: 325).

In the Ge-stell, beings are taken out of their lifeworld and fashioned into standing reserve for scientific manipulation. The Ge-stell signifies a condition in which the possibility for beings to be brought into their own unconcealedness is systematically strangled by “calculation, speed, and the claim of the massive” (Heidegger, 2012b: 95). The consequences of this are dire and threaten the well-being and survival of the planet as civilization turns to nihilism; Heidegger writes, “As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve” (Heidegger, 1977c: 332).

When Heidegger often speaks of the overcoming of metaphysics, he refers to a way of thinking that does not wrench beings out of their lived experience “in order to make them objects of investigation and to determine their grounds” (Heidegger, 1977a: 94), but rather allows beings to be brought into their unconcealment. He expects that this way of thinking will offer new paths forward by which humans can find more appropriate relationships to the Ge-stell of modern technology, thereby to save the world. Heidegger writes that “only the greatest occurrence, the most intimate event, can still save us from lostness in the bustle of mere incidents and machinations. What must eventuate is what opens being to us and places us back into being and
in that way brings us to ourselves and face to face with work and sacrifice” (Heidegger, 2012b: 46).

Heidegger conceives this “greatest occurrence” in various ways, but it primarily refers to what he names throughout many of his later works as “inceptive thinking” that significantly differs from the scientific attitude. This inceptive thinking has its direct roots in the pre-Socratics philosophers who originally asked the meaning of the question of Being, an occurrence that Heidegger calls “the first beginning.” For its part, the tradition of Western metaphysics was forged from out of the first beginning of the pre-Socratics and took shape as Being became an objectified essence or entity in the hands of the first metaphysicians.

In addition, Heidegger regularly advised a return to the pre-metaphysical thought of the pre-Socratics because doing so can initially direct us in the endeavour to develop our own ability to raise again the question of the meaning of Being within the Ge-stell of modern technology. The dawn of this inceptive thinking that will overcome metaphysics is what Heidegger calls “the second beginning” or “the other beginning.” He writes, “In this decisiveness [of renunciation as the highest form of possession], the open realm of the transition is sustained and grounded; this open realm is the abyssal in-between [where metaphysics reigns] amid the ‘no longer’ of the first beginning as well as of its history and the ‘not yet’ of the fulfillment of the other beginning” (Heidegger, 2012b: 20).

It is within this philosophical context that Heidegger turned to Asian philosophy to inquire if it too had ever raised the question of the meaning of Being. In line with this, Heidegger often discussed the notion of what it means to think the Same, and by this he referred to whether the question of the meaning of Being that he asked was the same as the question of the meaning of Being that the pre-Socratics asked. His turn to the Laozi (and Asian thought generally) was motivated by this inquiry into whether it too had raised the same question of the meaning of Being, and if so, whether it too could assist in the task of overcoming metaphysics; he asked “whether in the end – which would also be the beginning – a nature of language can reach the thinking experience, a nature which would offer the assurance that European-Western saying and East Asian saying will enter into dialogue such that in it there sings something that wells up from a single source” (Heidegger, 1971a: 8).

The Laozi currently enjoys a renewed position and value in the field of comparative philosophy in large measure due to the prominence that Heidegger gave to it. This is somewhat ironic because he refused to recognize the thought of the Laozi (but also of Asian philosophy more generally) as philosophy in the first place; for Heidegger, philosophy in the strict sense is exclusively and appropriately identifiable with metaphysics, and this of a definite Western sort: “The style of all Western-European philosophy – and
there is no other, neither a Chinese nor an Indian philosophy – is determined
by this duality ‘beings – in being’” (Heidegger, 1968: 224).

In stark contrast to philosophy strictly understood as metaphysics, Heidegger found in the Laozi what he called “thinking,” “poetic thinking,” or even “dwelling poetically” (see, for example, Heidegger, 1971c). Structurally, this thinking holds the same value as pre-Socratic thought as representing a pre-metaphysical philosophy, but given Heidegger’s definition of philosophy, it is more appropriate to call that thinking pre-philosophical and non-metaphysical while remaining aware of the subtle difference between them.

Heidegger’s resistance or refusal to identify the thought of the Laozi as “philosophy” sensu stricto might appear to reflect the bias of Western philosophers that leads many of them to dismiss the Laozi as non-philosophical and unworthy of their attention. However, Heidegger’s recognition of pre-Socratic thought as pre-metaphysical only makes sense with the subsequent formation of the tradition of Western philosophy itself understood as metaphysics. Since Heidegger did not recognize the tradition of Chinese metaphysics that was directly forged from the thought of the Laozi that was implicated in the substitution of the “eternal Dao” for the “temporalizing Dao,” it could not be considered pre-philosophical, only non-metaphysical. But he indirectly established the structural relation between pre-Socratic thought and the thought of the Laozi as “poetic thinking” in the deepest sense as the thinking of the question of the meaning of Being, and he goes on to specifically recognize the Laozi as the product of “Laozi’s poetic thinking” (Heidegger, 1971d: 92).

As non-metaphysical, poetic thinking, at least as demonstrated by the pre-Socratics if not also the Laozi, is that which alone is capable of thinking being, assisting beings in being brought into unconcealment, and preserving them in their unconcealment. In this sense, poetic thinking differs from metaphysics in that it does not objectify beings but rather allows them to come into their unconcealment. The bringing-forth undertaken by thinking is, according to Heidegger, active and productive as a form of poiesis: “Not only handicraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing-forth, poiesis” (Heidegger, 1977c: 317). He also states, “By no means, however, may the event [of the appropriation of Being] be represented as an ‘incident’ or a ‘novelty.’ Its truth, i.e., the truth itself, essentially occurs only if sheltered in art, thinking, poetry, deed. It therefore requires the steadfastness of the Da-sein [human being] that repudiates all the semblant immediacy of mere representation” (Heidegger, 2012b: 201).

Poetic thinking is inceptive in that it gives rise to philosophy in the first beginning, but it is also a future activity that incepts the second beginning, which is capable of effectuating the release of beings (gelassenheit) from their subjection to the Ge-stell of modern planetary technology that reduces beings
to resources as standing reserve. Poetic thinking is inceptive in that it opens the way to the second beginning which marks the overcoming of metaphysics; as Heidegger writes, “The thinking that is to come is no longer philosophy because it thinks more originally than metaphysics – a name identical to philosophy” (Heidegger, 1977b: 265).

It should be clear that Heidegger’s resistance to recognizing the Laozi as philosophy is simply the result of his identifying its thought as non-metaphysical. Although one need not agree with Heidegger’s definition of philosophy as metaphysics that excludes the Laozi, it is important to understand his intent and meaning in making that claim.

5. Interpreting the Laozi with Heidegger

The Laozi is foundational not only for Daoism but for Chinese philosophy as a whole, largely because of its original introduction of a gathering of profound ideas about the Dao (see Michael, 2015). The Laozi conceives the Dao as the fundamental source for the existence of all things, as seen in Laozi chapter 25 that states, “The Dao was born before Heaven and Earth” [道先天地生], and in Laozi chapter 51 that states, “The Dao gives birth to the myriad things” 道生之.

Laozi interpretation generally takes two forms, metaphysical and non-metaphysical or what can properly be called phenomenological. The stark differences between them can be encapsulated by the following comments by Bo Mou, representative of the metaphysical interpretation, and by Roger Ames and David Hall, representative of the phenomenological (or, as they call it, process philosophy). Bo Mou writes:

We first need to make clear what “chang-Dao” (the eternal Dao) means. In my view, what “chang-Dao” denotes is not something that is separate from the (genuine) Dao as a whole but one dimension or layer of the Dao: its eternal and infinite dimension that consists in the Dao going on forever and continuously transcending any finite manifestations of the Dao in “wan-wu” (ten thousand particular, concrete, and individual things of the universe) in the course of its developing and changing process (2003: 249-250).

Against this, Ames and Hall note “the absence of the ‘One behind the many’ metaphysics” of the Laozi before writing:

As a parody of Parmenides, who claimed that “only Being is,” we might say that for the Daoist, “Only beings are,” or taking one step further in underscoring the reality of the process of change itself, “only becomings are.” That is, the Daoist does not posit the existence of some permanent reality behind appearances, some unchanging substratum, some essential defining aspect behind the accidents of change (2003: 13-14).
While it may seem that there is no middle ground between the two interpretations of the Laozi, in fact neither is incorrect, as judged by the separate historical pedigrees of the early phenomenological Laozi and the later metaphysical Laozi, both of which stretch back to the third century BC. Still, although the phenomenological reading of the Laozi substantially predated the metaphysical, in the course of the second century BC it came, for all intents, to obliterate the phenomenological, in large part due to the loss of the textual basis for the phenomenological reading with the textual substitution of “the eternal Dao” for “the temporalizing Dao.”

While there are some few outlier phenomenological readings of the Laozi that do in fact historically appear from time to time, they enjoyed little momentum in the tradition, and the metaphysical reading was made standard as evidenced in the Heshang Gong and Wang Bi commentaries, both of which taken together played a foundational role in the formation of Wei-Jin metaphysics. Already by the start of the Song Dynasty, the metaphysical interpretation of “the eternal Dao” provided the metaphysical basis for the spread and development of Neo-Confucian metaphysics, whose most important notion, namely taiji太极, was directly derived from “the eternal Dao” of the Laozi (see Liu, 2014).

As a term with a particularly loaded content in the history of philosophy and religion in Western civilization, Western scholars have hesitated to directly label the Laozi as a work of metaphysics. This is largely because of the failure to perceive any philosophically stable backbone in its thought that could compete with the logical rationality of Western metaphysics. This is according to the assessments of modern philosophers, who typically judge the classics of Asian philosophy and religion against their own conceptions of what grounds philosophy: primarily a metaphysics of Being, as Heidegger argues. Since twentieth-century sinologists, often recognized as those best qualified to speak about the Laozi, were not particularly trained in philosophy, they too were unable to appropriately manage its philosophical thought, much less properly introduce it into the circles of Western philosophers.

However, the tradition of Chinese metaphysics is very different from Western metaphysics, even from a linguistic standpoint. Two common phrases for “metaphysics” in Chinese philosophy are xing er shang (associated with Heshang Gong’s Nothingness) and xuanxue (associated with Wang Bi’s Non-being), however neither is exactly identifiable with typical Western understandings of the metaphysics of Being. The notion of xing er shang形而上 (“above form” or “not-yet formed”) points to the realm primarily characterized by the absence of forms, the not-yet formed, or the formless. This is in distinction to xing er xia形而下 (“below form” or “already-formed”), which refers to the realm characterized by physical forms or the formed. However, such notions are originally at home in the non-early
Daoist writing called the *Yijing*, which anyway does not establish a strictly transcendental divide between the two realms, since both are situated within the same world, only that the former is higher and earlier than the latter. This is insufficient to stand as a metaphysics in any significant sense.

The title *xuanxue 玄學* refers to a tradition of Wei-Jin thought named with the term *xuan 玄* (“dark” or “mysterious”) that the *Laozi* uses several times in close conjunction with the Dao. This tradition, which is only sometimes, albeit correctly, recognized as a tradition of metaphysics, was spearheaded by Wang Bi, who identifies the Dao with *wu 無* as Non-being from which is produced *you 有* as Being from which in turn are produced the myriad beings. Wang Bi primarily bases his metaphysics on Chapter 40, which in the version of the later *Laozi* states: “The myriad beings of the world are produced from Being, and Being is produced from Non-being” 天下萬物生於有，有生於無.

One might therefore ask, if Wang Bi in fact established a metaphysics at the philosophical core of the later *Laozi*, then why is its philosophy not then normally recognized as metaphysics? The simple answer is that Wang Bi’s metaphysics of Non-being is not easily managed by the Western philosophical tradition with its metaphysics of Being. It typically understands any metaphysics of Non-being (but also any metaphysics of Nothingness such as conceived by Heshang Gong or even a similar metaphysics such as conceived by Buddhism) as a form of nihilism, which the Western tradition prima facie resists entertaining. And Heidegger’s philosophy was also often accused of nihilism.

Wang Bi’s interpretation of the *Laozi* as a metaphysics of Non-being is not, however, original, since it inherited Heshang Gong’s interpretation of the *Laozi* as a metaphysics of Nothingness. Both the metaphysics of Heshang Gong and Wang Bi were grounded on the later *Laozi*’s notion of “the eternal Dao” as referring to a substantive entity, Nothingness for the former and Non-being for the latter, which stands as both the eternal and external source for the production of the world and all of its beings.

Standard interpretations of the *Laozi* were, throughout traditional China, dominated by Heshang Gong’s metaphysics of Nothingness. This situation continued to obtain until modern Western sinologists became interested in the *Laozi*, and they chose to direct their attention to Wang Bi’s commentary instead, since it was somewhat less foreign to the Western tradition of metaphysics. Still, interpretations of the text based on any sort of metaphysics, whether of Being, Non-being, or Nothingness, have perennially struggled to produce viable readings of the *Laozi*. This is because the notion of “the eternal Dao” is very much at odds with the phenomenology of the *Laozi* upon which the text’s comprehensive philosophy is grounded.

Heidegger’s interpretation of the *Laozi* was the first decisive Western interpretation that, due to its apparently deliberate rejection of the notion
of “the eternal Dao,” successfully uncovered the text’s fundamental phenomenology that was grounded on the notion of “the temporalizing Dao.” As Zhang (n.d.) writes, “To my judgment, Heidegger's understanding of Dao is essentially ‘closer’ to the original meaning of ‘Dao’ than any metaphysical interpretations. Dao, as the Way, is ontologically regional-ecstatical rather than conceptual and linear”. This is rather eye-opening because Heidegger had no access to the early *Laozi* that, buried in the earth until well after he had passed away, only ever mentions “the temporalizing Dao” but never “the eternal Dao.”

### 6. Conclusion

After the discovery of the excavated versions with their original uses of *heng* to describe the primary nature of the Dao as temporalizing before *chang* was used to substitute for every instance of it, scholars insistently maintained that the two words were simply synonyms for permanence/constancy/eternity. This stance allowed them to thereby maintain the traditional metaphysical interpretations of the later *Laozi* exemplified by Heshang Gong and Wang Bi with their notions of the eternal Dao.

Between the Western sinologist’s unwillingness or inability to adequately represent the core philosophy of the *Laozi* and the Western philosopher’s dismissal of it as insufficiently philosophical, Heidegger opened a third path to approach the thought of the text, that of comparative philosophy. Traditional metaphysical interpretations have only recently begun to be overcome, and when they are, it is normally by reliance on the application of the phenomenological interpretations brought to readings of the *Laozi* that were originally carried out by Heidegger.

Over the past forty years, a handful of intrepid scholars of Daoist philosophy have attempted to pursue and develop Heidegger’s path through the *Laozi* in terms of comparative philosophy or East-West dialogue. Important studies that demonstrate this begin with Graham Parkes’ 1987 edited volume, *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, that remains a foundational text of Heideggerian comparative philosophy. The 1992 work of Xianglong Zhang, *Heidegger and Daoism*, also delves into the encounter of Heidegger’s thinking and Daoism, as does the work of Charles Wei-hsun Fu (1976).

More recently, the work of Bret W. Davis (2013, 2016), Eric Nelson (2017), and David Chai (2020) go even further in exploring the Daoist influences on Heidegger’s thought and how this matters for engaging the philosophy of the *Laozi*, but they too have been handicapped by not properly attending to the phenomenology of the early *Laozi* with its “temporalizing Dao,” reading instead the metaphysics of Nothingness or the metaphysics of Non-being into their interpretations of its philosophy.
The several works of James Wang Qingjie (2000, 2001, 2003, 2016), a Chinese scholar of Daoist philosophy who has devoted much of his career to translating the original German works of Heidegger into Chinese, stands out for its incisive success in reading the *Laozi* through the lens of “the temporal Dao,” despite the fact that his work remains preliminary and does not offer a systematic reading of the *Laozi*. Much like Wang’s work that attempts to read the *Laozi* through Heidegger rather than pursue the Daoist influences on his thought, the work of Katrin Froese, Steven Burik, and Daniel Fried also breaks additional ground in this project, but they also base their readings on the later *Laozi* with its “eternal Dao” and, therefore, have not gone far enough into the core phenomenology of “the temporalizing Dao.”

None of these studies have systematically approached Heidegger’s interpretation of the *Laozi* through the phenomenological lens of “the temporalizing Dao” that lies at the core of its philosophy. Still, there are two things that all of them have in common: each completely disregard traditional metaphysical interpretations of the *Laozi*, including those by Heshang Gong and Wang Bi, as well as sinological methodologies, even as they unambiguously announce their direct motivation from Heidegger’s introduction of the *Laozi* to comparative philosophy.

Notes

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1. There is a complex ancient history to both of these terms, neither of which originally signified eternity, and the main difference is that the early *Laozi* used *heng* to refer to the temporalizing nature of the Dao, whereas *chang* was used to refer to measurable extension. Due primarily to the influence of the *Laozi* on the philosophical processes that directly led to the creation of Chinese metaphysics, both terms had, by the time of the early second century BC, become synonyms with the meaning of eternity. I do not examine those philosophical processes here and take *heng* as referring to the temporalizing nature of the Dao and *chang* as referring to the eternal nature of the Dao. See my forthcoming monograph (2021) for a sustained examination of those philosophical processes.

2. Ma (2008: 11) writes, “Most of the Japanese students who studied with Heidegger were intellectually related to Nishida Kitarō”. John C. Maraldo writes, “Nishida Kitarō was the most significant and influential Japanese philosopher of the twentieth-century. His work is pathbreaking in several respects: it established
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in Japan the creative discipline of philosophy as practised in Europe and the Americas; it enriched that discipline by infusing Anglo-European philosophy with Asian sources of thought; it provided a new basis for philosophical treatments of East Asian Buddhist thought; and it produced novel theories of self and world with rich implications for contemporary philosophizing.” See Krummel (2018) for a discussion of Nishida’s and Heidegger’s separate notions of Nothingness.


4. Standard resources on Heidegger’s engagement with the Laozi, and Asian thought more generally, include Otto Poggeler (1987), Reinhard May (1996), and Ma (2008).


6. Ma writes, “Although Heidegger was not the first to claim that ancient Greece is the sole and authentic birthplace of philosophy, his work has played the most crucial role in promoting the popularity this idea has come to enjoy” (2008:103). Along these lines, two works that examine Western philosophy’s dismissal of the Laozi as well as Asian philosophy are Carine Defoort (2001) and Bryan van Norden (2017).


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Healing Practices Regenerate Local Knowledge: The Revival of Mongolian Shamanism in China’s Inner Mongolia

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Abstract
Shamanistic healing practices, including divination, have coexisted with other religious and medical practices in modern Inner Mongolia and China for many years. However, scholarly research has yet to investigate the effectiveness of shamanic healing and its physical and psychological benefits.

This paper discusses the practice of shamanic activities, including healing rituals, on the boundaries between the spiritual communities and the masses in Eastern Inner Mongolia, and how the contrasts between the perspectives of healers or practitioners and the lay people’s more fluid understanding of the practices impact health, illness, and ethnic/cultural identity. Why is it that shamanistic healing is not included in any of the official healing systems, despite its importance as a health resource and as a factor in identity formation in Inner Mongolia.

This study will show that shamanistic healing is not included in the official healing systems due to several historical forces and geopolitical events, such as the invasion of exotic cultures and China’s ban on religious activities during and after the 1940s, when land reform, socialist transformation policies, and the Cultural Revolution took hold in Inner Mongolia. In addition, the official recognition of Mongolian medicine as a national medicine in the 1960s left no room for other local healing practices, including shamanistic healing. I argue that the revitalization of shamanism during the decades since China has reformed and opened up is due, in part, to the suffering of both individuals and communities from cultural tensions, eco-cosmological crises, and lost traditions and the effectiveness of these practices in healing these wounds. Healing practices or rituals have continued to exist in this modernizing socialist state because of their effectiveness.

Keywords: Healing practice, Local Knowledge, Shamanism, Inner Mongolia
1. Introduction

Given the limited effectiveness of modern medicine, some people have sought healing for both physical and mental ailments through folk and traditional medicines, which have gradually become popular again in the modern world. In the case of Inner Mongolia, which is medically pluralistic, these folk and traditional medicines include shamanistic healing practices and rituals.

This paper discusses how folk healing and the initiation processes for a böge (male shaman or shaman) or uduyan (shamaness), yasu bariyači (bonesetter), and üǰegeči (diviner) have been practised on the border between shamanism and modern medicine in Eastern Inner Mongolia. This paper also analyzes why the number of shamans have increased in recent decades in the borderlands between the agricultural and nomadic cultures of Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Furthermore, this paper argues that the revitalization of shamanism is due to the suffering of both individuals and the community from cultural tensions, losing traditions, and identity crises in modern Inner Mongolia. The effectiveness of these healing practices or rituals is why they have survived in Inner Mongolia as the world has modernized.

2. Shamanism in Inner Mongolia

2.1. The Definition of Shamanism

After China’s 1982 Constitution granted freedom of religion to all citizens,¹ shamanism revived in the Mongol communities in Eastern Inner Mongolia. Likewise, the numbers of shamans and scholars studying shamanism have also increased. The purpose of this chapter is to determine the definition and position of a “shaman” in Eastern Inner Mongolia and to discuss the interactions between shamanism and identity politics in the region. Then, this paper will position this understanding of the shaman within the framework of shamanism in the Mongolian region.

The term “shaman” originated from “saman,” which indicates a kind of religious profession in the Tungusic language family of northeast Asia, and the religious practices mediated by shaman are called “shamanism” in English (Shirokogoroff, 1935; Harva, 1989). Therefore, early shamanism studies focused on the folk religions practiced among the people of northern Asia, especially among the Tungusic people. For example, Eliade said that “shamanism in the strict sense is pre-eminently a religious phenomenon of Siberia and Central Asia” (Eliade, 1964: 4). In the common sense of shamanism research, shamans are religious professionals who use trance techniques. Japanese scholars have stated that the term “shaman” originated from the Tungusic language family used by the people living in the wide...
area ranging from the northeast of China to the northern Lena River area, the eastern Sea of Okhotsk, the western Yenisei River Basin, and from the south of Lake Baikal to northern Mongolia (Sasaki and Kamata, 1991: 24). Shamans are also found in a wide area of the Eurasian continent and in Africa, the Americas, Oceania, and the Arctic Circle. The subject of shamanism research has become wider now. This is because shaman or shamanistic practices exist in each part of the world.

In Inner Mongolia, especially in the eastern area of the Qorčin and Höölün Buyir regions studied by the author, böge (böö) and uduγan (udγan) act as religious professionals similar to shamans. The words “böge mörgül” (shaman prayer) and “böge-yin šasin” (religion of shaman) are equivalent to the English term “shamanism” and the Chinese words “wu” (巫) and “wu-shu” (巫術).

Given the wide geographic areas in which shamanism is practiced, the subject of shamanism research has become wider. The scope of shamanism research has expanded from a limited region centred on Siberia to a broader sense of shamanism, including similar phenomena existing in various parts of the world. The shaman has the ability to interact directly with gods and spirits and to gain supernatural abilities or play a religious role. This kind of shamanic ability is called the “technique of trance.” For example, shamanism research so far has focused on whether shamans have the technique of possession (Findeisen, 1977) or the technique of ecstasy (Eliade, 1964).

The first of these techniques is the possession type of trance. Findeisen pointed out that shamanism is a phenomenon involving the words and acts of priestly figures possessed by spirits. In his argument, direct contact and interaction between the spiritual world and the human world are enabled through the technique of possession, through which the spirit possesses the shaman and gradually gives him supernatural abilities to play the role of shamanism in the society (Findeisen, 1977: 18).

The second of these techniques is that of ecstasy. In North Asia, shamans only use the ecstasy type of trance. According to Eliade, ecstasy involves the shaman’s soul leaving his body, rising to heaven, and interacting with the supernatural world during his trance (Eliade, 1964: 3-13). Although Eliade’s claim requires a standard definition of shamanism and shaman, the scholars of shamanism research have challenged his definition in favour of one that also incorporates the possession technique.

For example, Japanese scholar Hagiwara, who conducted his field work for shamanism in the northeastern region of China in 1996, questioned Eliade’s theory of ecstasy since he did not find any shaman using the technique of ecstasy among the peoples of Evenki, Dagur, Manchu and Orochon. However, as he pointed out, shamans among these peoples did use the technique of possession (Hagiwara, 1997: 105-124). Certainly, there are
many cases in which a person plays the role of shaman when he enters into a state of possession.

The technique of ecstasy, where the soul of a shaman leaves his body and travels to the spirit world, and the technique of possession, where a spirit or spiritual existence possesses a shaman, have been discussed previously in shamanism studies. Such as Harva pointed out long before these studies that the trance phenomenon in shamanism involves two techniques: ecstasy and possession (Harva, 1989: 478). Japanese anthropologist Sasaki also referred to the anthropological literature on the trance phenomenon when describing the techniques of ecstasy and possession in shamanism and pointed out that the trance phenomenon in shamanism includes both ecstasy and possession (Sasaki, 1980: 34-35). Thus, the phrase “phenomenon of trance” in current studies of shamanism should include two kinds of meanings.

The definitions of “shaman” and “shamanism” are considered to be as follows. A shaman is a religious professional who offers oracles (pontifications), prophecies, the healing of illness, and rituals through direct interactions with gods or spirits. In addition, shamans can gain supernatural abilities by going into a trance state and making direct contact with gods or spirits. Shamanism is a religious practice involving a worldview centred on shamans, rituals, believers and client groups. However, despite these general definitions, how locals define “shaman” is important, and anthropologists need to correctly explain the shaman’s trance state from an etic perspective based on local knowledge. For example, the people in the region of the author’s field work define “böge” (shaman or male shaman) and “uduyan” (female shaman) as religious professionals who perform rituals in shamanistic conventions using trance and give different names to different functions of the shaman, such as “andai böge” and “bariyači böge.” The author will discuss these terms a little later in this article.

In this study, the author will emphasize the local definitions and knowledge of shamanism. According to the author’s field work in the Qorčin and Hölin Buyir regions in Eastern Inner Mongolia, most shamans are possession-type shamanic practitioners. It is also common for Mongols to describe a shaman’s entry into the trance state during a ritual with the modern Mongolian word “orusiqu,” which means possessing the shaman with an ancestral spirit. Therefore, in this study, shamanism is treated as a way of using the technique of possession, which is a state of trance entered into during rituals and shamanic practices.

### 2.2. Shamanism in the Mongolian Region

The Mongolian region considered in this study covers the regions in Russia, Mongolia and China where Mongolian ethnic minorities live. In the Mongolic world, there are three wide areas where different shamanistic practices have
developed based on cultural phenomena, as well as structural, historical and social changes. These three large areas are the residential regions of the well-known groups of ethnic Mongols of Buryat, Darhad and Qorčin in the Mongolic world.

The first shamanism is that of the Darhad people, which has been practised among the ethnic Darhad in Mongolia for many centuries. It is also very influential in the shamanic society of contemporary Mongolia. The second shamanism is that of the Buryat people, which has now been widely adopted by the Buryat Mongols living across the borderlands of the Buryat Republic of Russia, Mongolia and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region of China. The last shamanism is that of the Qorčin people, which has mainly been revived and popularized among the Qorčin Mongols in Eastern Inner Mongolia. In addition, Bargu shamanism, Dagur shamanism, and Evenki shamanism have emerged in the Hölün Buyir region of Eastern Inner Mongolia.

The complicated geopolitical changes that have occurred in the modern history of these Mongolian regions have brought great changes to the indigenous cultures shared by the Mongols and have caused different social problems in different regions. Shamanism is intertwined with many different social issues and reflects the characteristics and identity of the Mongolian people living in that region.

From the perspective of identity politics, the shaman, the religious professional, must protect his identity while performing rituals so that he can symbolize the community or group who are trying to survive within a changing social environment and political space. From a counter-narrative perspective, the social, economic, political, and cultural anxieties and uncertainties of ethnic minorities are often expressed as spiritual expressions in shamanism within multi-ethnic structured societies. In other words, the sense of crisis caused by the pressure or loss of individual or group identities is represented as a personal or group possession. Each region has differences in their perspective on the ideal way to deal with social problems, and their shamanism is practiced as a form of cultural nationalism in response to these problems. In short, as described by Fischer and Pleines, shamanism is a reflection of the ethnic, political, and socioeconomic identity crises in post-socialist societies (Fischer and Pleines, 2008: 11) that often occur in multi-ethnic societies. To solve the mental chaos, pain, and suffering experienced by individuals or societies due to anxiety or uncertainty, a shaman tries to “manage the crisis of identity” (Konagaya, 2013: 425-447] with various rituals or sacrifices that communicate with the spirits. For this reason, healing behaviours in shamanism are considered to be a way to maintain an identity that is being lost.

This article will focus on the healing practices of Eastern Inner Mongolian shamanism, which is a type of alternative medicine and survival tool used in the ethnic Mongol communities in China.
2.3. Shamanism in Inner Mongolia

Qorčin shamanism is typically practiced in the eastern part of the Qorčin region of Inner Mongolia. Shamans are also active among the Mongols living in the Hölin Buyir region. It may be said that both are in the same cultural sphere of the Mongols. However, even in these two areas, there is less and less cultural sharing, perhaps due to the social and cultural changes that have geopolitically occurred in the modern history of Inner Mongolia.

Qorčin Mongols have lived in a broad range of areas, including the city of Tongliao (formerly Jirim League) in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, adjacent to the city of Chifeng (formerly Ju Uda League), as part of the Hinggan League, in the Fuxin Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture of Liaoning Province, and in the South Gorlus Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture of Jilin Province.

Shamanism in the Qorčin region has long been known to involve hereditary shamans, such as böge, uduγan, čayñ eliyε, and qundan or qundun. In addition, syncretism has appeared in the Mongolian area, since Tibetan Buddhists allied with the Qing government to suppress Qorčin shamanism in the early Qing dynasty. As a result, shamans called “laičing,” “gürdem,” and “čoiǰing” emerged who were culturally transformed and represented syncretism. Furthermore, according to their functions in rituals and therapeutic abilities, these shamans were classified as domči, tölgeči or ùjegeči (fortune tellers), bariyači, and andaiči. In addition, Mansang, one of the Inner Mongolian scholars, classified Qorčin shamans as emči böge (doctor shamans), yasu bariyači böge (bone-setting shamans), tölgeči böge (fortune teller shamans), andai böge (shamans who heal andai), and demči böge (magician shamans) based on their profession (Mansang, 1990: 197). Since the 1930s, shamanism has also been studied by Japanese and German scholars, such as Akamatsu and Akiba (1941) and Heissig (1944, 1980). In the second half of the 20th century, shamanism studies have also become popular across the world, particularly in China since the 1980s.

Qorčin shamanism has a common worldview with other forms of shamanism around the world, incorporating ideas about the sky as heaven, the earth as the human world, and the underworld. In addition, “everything has a soul” in the local shamanic world. Within such a worldview, humans also have souls, and their souls will not die even if their body dies. Thus, the Qorčin Mongols believe the heaven and earth, mountains and rivers, sun and moon, fire, oboo, and ancestors have spirits and worship those souls or spirits through rituals.

According to a study by Buyanbatu, shamans can perform rituals for sanctifying animals, rituals for tengri (also tngrи) worship, oboo sacrifices, rituals for calling the soul, fire festivals, and rituals for šangsi modu (the
deified old tree) in addition to initiation and healing rituals (Buyanbatu, 1985: 40-59). However, according to the author’s fieldwork, some of these rituals have almost disappeared in the late half of the 20th century due to the semi-agricultural and semi-pastoral area of the Qorčin region. It is also said that shamanism has been revived in the region, but what can be observed now are initiation rituals, healing rituals, tengri rituals, ancestor rituals, and oboo sacrifices, which are held in only some of the regions.

In the Qorčin region, Qorčin Mongols and ethnic Han Chinese live together. However, in the rural areas of the Höln Buyir region, Buryat Mongols, Bargu Mongols, Dagurs, and Evenkis live together, and ethnic Han Chinese are concentrated in the urban areas. The Mongols who live in the Höln Buyir region, which has a multi-ethnic social structure, have the characteristics of their own ethnic community, though the Mongols, Dagurs and Evenkis share some shamanistic beliefs and often work together. In other words, they may act alone or participate in various rituals collectively. According to the author’s observations, the Mongolian, Dagur and Evenki shamans who participated in one client’s initiation ritual all performed a similar ritual process of ancestral possession, though they interacted with the spirits in their own languages. However, after the ritual, the shamans communicated with each other in a common language of Mongolian or Chinese. In addition, the Mongolian master shaman accepted the disciples from the Dagur and Evenki, and the Dagur master shaman accepted the disciples from the Mongols and Evenki. Thus, in the modern society of the Höln Buyir region, a kind of shamanistic inheritance can transcend ethnic boundaries culturally and socially. What is most interesting is that some shamanic communities will not allow this cross-border inheritance in some cases. For example, one of the Dagur shamans in the Höln Buyir region did not accept a Buryat Mongol client who came as a disciple from the Buryat Republic of the Russian Federation to become an individual shaman.

As mentioned above, the shamanism practiced among Mongols with multiethnic identities is collaborative and has a lot in common across nomadic groups. Therefore, this study mainly uses the term “Höln Buyir shamanism” or “shamanism in the Höln Buyir region” to refer to all of the previously mentioned shamanisms.

The practitioners of shamanism in the Höln Buyir region believe that all things in the universe have souls. Therefore, based on that view of the soul, the shamanic world believes that humans also have souls. Furthermore, the universe is divided into the upper world of heaven; the middle world of humans, animals, and plants; and the shadow world of dead souls and evil spirits. The human world is sandwiched between the two worlds and is helped by divine spirits or cursed by evil spirits. The shaman is the mediator between the three worlds.
The practitioners of shamanism in the Hölün Buyir region have various rituals to worship the *tengri*, *oobo* (the god of earth, especially the god of the mountain), the god of fire, animal spirits and ancestral spirits. In addition, some rituals, such as initiation rituals, rituals for sanctifying animals and healing rituals are held in what Turner describes as the liminality between human lives, the period from birth to death and give the participants new social status. Even the same ritual can follow different conventions, depending on the client.

The shamanism in the Hölün Buyir region is spatially sandwiched between Qorčin shamanism and Buryat shamanism and is culturally complex due to the multi-ethnic society in which it emerged. In addition, the influence of Chinese culture is reflected in its shamanistic practices, as in the Qorčin region, which is located within a marginalized space of Chinese culture.

3. Initiation Ritual as Shamanic Healing

3.1. Shamanic Illness and Its Symptoms

The process of becoming a shaman involves an initial ecstatic experience and a lengthy period of training to gain command of what Eliade called the “techniques of ecstasy” (Eliade, 1964: 3-13). However, possession, another type of trance technique used during the early initial period of Inner Mongolian shamanism in which an ancestral spirit possesses a candidate unconsciously, can bring sickness, dreams, fainting fits, frights, lightning strikes, or car accidents to the candidate or his family members until the spirit is accepted consciously through an initiation ritual. Within shamanic studies, this condition is called “shamanic illness.” The locals in Eastern Inner Mongolia call it “bůge-yin *ebedčin*” (illness of shaman) or “*saγudal-un ebedčin*,” meaning that the initial blow constitutes a physical and psychological ordeal that sends the candidate into a non-routine state where he is absent or isolated from his society. Recurrently, in the case of Inner Mongolian shamanism, this spiritual crisis portends family suffering or community disorder through the individual’s physical and mental pains before a new social status is obtained in his community. The crisis is managed through a healing ritual treating the individual’s illness so that he can become an independent shaman. The social disorder is also resolved after the actor interacts with the spirit.

According to Walsh (1990: 105-108), in modern medicine or state-run traditional medicine, the illness, the “*saγudal-un ebedčin*”, is usually diagnosed after a patient shows symptoms of epilepsy, hysteria, or integration dysfunction syndrome. In contrast, Mongolian medicine diagnoses this sickness as heart disease, *ǰirüken-ü kei ebedčin*, or cardiac neurosis, *ǰirüken-ü*...
Regardless, the more medicine the patient takes, the more his symptoms worsen, and the patient will be unable to control his symptoms when (s)he is attacked by the illness, according to the author’s field work.

In the following section, I will analyze this shamanic healing process and spiritual interaction, especially in terms of the function of the patient, whose spiritual communication with his ancestor’s spirit can bring effective healing. This process can also help an individual become a shaman in Inner Mongolian shamanism.

3.2. The Initiation Ritual Process

The type of initiation ritual can be firstly observed in Qorčin shamanism. In most cases of Qorčin shamanism, the process of becoming a shaman includes experiencing the initial illness and practicing the initiation ritual leading to healing. The initiation rituals in which the client is possessed by the ancestral spirit are practiced almost every day under the instruction of a master shaman until the client becomes an independent shaman. Shamanic healing during the initiation process can be divided into two steps. The first step is the master shaman’s diagnosis and healing ritual. The second and most important step is the healing of the client through a trance state during the ritual that lasts until the symptoms of the illness have disappeared (Saijirahu, 2012: 73-97). This ascetic practice is repeated day after day until the client becomes an independent shaman.

In the first step, the master shaman diagnoses the client’s illness while he is in a trance condition in the ritual. In the second step, the client accepts the possession of the ancestral spirit. This step involves the self-treatment or group-treatment of the client (Saijirahu, 2012: 73-97). The client’s possession is called “qobčalaqu” in Mongolian, which refers to wearing a shaman’s cloak, headdress, and footgear and holding a shaman drum and drumstick to summon and possess the spirit within a shaman group. Shamans believe that the client’s suffering will be healed if the patient repeats the qobčalaqu process. After many incidents of possession and narratives, the client’s illness will be healed and finally he will become an independent shaman. The effects of these healing conditions are similar to the effects of the symbolic acts described by Lévi-Strauss in Structural Anthropology (Lévi-Strauss, 1963: 186-205).

The second is the case of Hölün Buyir shamanism. In the Hölün Buyir region, the cause of shamanic illness is unknown to modern medicine, but it is said to be caused by ancestral spirits mediated by the selected candidate. This illness is related to becoming a shaman, as it is believed that a human being suffering from this psychosomatic disorder will heal if the candidate becomes a shaman. If the sick person undergoes the initiation ritual by accepting the
possession of the ancestral spirit, the illness will be cured gradually. The ritual for becoming a shaman is called “sitügen bosqaqu” or “böge yarjaqu” and refers to an initiation ritual in which a master shaman invites an ancestral spirit to possess a disciple shaman. The shamanistic meaning of the term “sitügen bosqaqu” is to make the client’s ancestral spirit active in the human world. In other words, after the ancestral spirit possesses the client, the ritual gives shamanistic influence to the spirit in the relevant society. For that reason, a master shaman often warns his client that “if you are not possessed by ancestral spirit, your symptoms will worsen.” Then, the master teaches the disciple various performing skills to become a shaman, and the disciple recurrently enters a trance state and interacts with the ancestral spirit to cure the illness. The possessed initiator (disciple shaman) acts as an intermediary between the ancestral spirit and the descendent and conveys the intentions of the tengri to the human being. Therefore, the initiation ritual is an important event that can symbolize that the participant (disciple shaman) has entered the shamanistic world. The ancestral spirit finds his representative in the human world, is reborn to the earth through the new shaman, and performs shamanistic functions in the society of the newborn shaman.

The sitügen bosqaqu ritual begins when the client with the psychosomatic disorder visits a fortune teller or shaman to ask about the cause of his illness or his suffering. The practitioner then states that an ancestral spirit has possessed the client and points out the following:

The spirit of your ancestor is searching for his incarnate among his descendants to gain a sayudal (seat) in this human world. My sitügen (the spirit of the ancestor) told me that the spirit of your ancestor likes you, has selected you, and wants to possess you. So the spirit has made you sick. If you complete the sitügen bosqaqu (initiation) ritual, your illness will be cured.

In the second step of the initiation process, the client confirms which of his ancestors were shamans. After confirming the ancestral shaman, the client decides to join the shamanic group as a disciple and prepares for the initiation ritual. For example, the client must make money to pay for participating in the ritual, visit the master shaman frequently, and receive the shamanic training, which includes kneeling at the front of the altar in which the ancestral spirit of the master shaman is worshipped. During that part of the training, the master chants to the ancestral spirit to accept this disciple while beating a drum rhythmically. Then the date of the initiation ritual is decided by the fortune telling of the master shaman.

In the final step of the initiation ritual, the client’s illness is treated by the master shaman and the client himself. It is a very complicated process that begins with preparing the ritual site, setting up a ger (Mongolian yurt) and an altar to the north of the inside of the ger where the dolls of the ancestral spirits
can be placed, planting seven white birch trees or nine white birch trees around the ger to symbolize the rebirth and reproduction of new shamans, and preparing three sheep as a sacrifice to the ancestral spirits and tengri. Next, the master shaman and the members of the master shaman’s group are possessed in an orderly manner, and the ancestral spirits communicate with the audience through the possessed one and “diagnose” the illness of the clients or teach a lesson to his future generations. Finally, the master shaman trains the disciple shaman (client) on how to enter a trance state. The client beats the drum and chants the shamanic songs with the crowd to invite the sitügen to possess him. During the possession, the ancestral spirit of the client tries to communicate with the audience through the possessed client. During a client’s first possession by an ancestral spirit, the client cannot be completely possessed. At the end of the ritual, all shamans will beat their drums and chant the shamanic songs to send their ancestral spirits. In addition, all the participants will celebrate the birth of the new shaman and chant “qurui, qurui, qurui” repeated three times under the instruction of the master shaman to express their congratulations.

The initiation ritual practiced in the shamanism of the Hölün Buyir region is very symbolic. When the client accepts the possession of the ancestral spirit, his illness is cured symbolically.

4. Shamanic Healing as Alternative Medicine

At the end of the 20th century, China designated traditional medical practices, such as Chinese medicine, Tibetan medicine, Mongolian medicine, and Uyghur medicine, as orthodox medical systems. Ever since, under a state policy of “attaching equal importance to both Chinese and Western medicine,” traditional medicine has coexisted with Western medicine in a pluralistic system and played an alternative and complementary role to clinical practice. However, Chinese academia has ignored the cultural importance of this medical practice in China. In the modernized world, Western scholars have marginalized traditional medicine as “alternative medicine.” As a result, few scholars have considered the real significance and practical value of alternative medical care. In the Western world, any health care approach outside of Western medicine is classified as “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM). This designation includes physical and spiritual regimens that achieve or promote health and vitality in the human body, such as Ayurveda medicine, traditional Chinese medicine, homeopathy, Chinese qigong, Indian yoga, and various food therapies or nutritional supplements. In addition, belief treatments and healing rituals in shamanism or Buddhism are part of alternative medicine. Thus, all medical systems other than Western medicine can be considered alternative medicines.
The American scholar Ross (2012) and Japanese scholars Kamohara Seika (2002) and Ueno Keiichi (2002) have explained what alternative medicine is. They have emphasized from a macro perspective that the knowledge and practices related to human health care outside Western medicine fall under alternative medicine. In their classification, the physical and mental healing methods of shamanism also belong to the category of alternative medicine. A general understanding of alternative medicine can be divided into three sub-cultural categories: the professional medical sector and its theoretical system, material or physical therapy, and ritual therapy related to the supernatural world. Taking the healing of Qorčin shamanism in Inner Mongolia as an example, the shaman diagnoses and implements a ritual therapy from a worldview or calamity theory that incorporates spiritual beings. In the context of shamanism, a ritual treatment occurs when a healer shaman completes the rite without a sacred possession. For example, the andai healing rituals (Saijirahu, 2005: 105-109), bone-setting therapies, rasiyan ukiyalγa rituals, čandan güyüdel-ün jasalγa rituals, oboo sacrifices, and spiritualism practised in the shamanism of Eastern Inner Mongolia are shamanistic alternative therapies. The social and cultural elements of these treatments are supported by individuals or groups who believe in the existence of spirits.

4.1. Andai Therapy

The andai ritual, also called “andai therapy,” “dancing andai,” or “singing andai,” was an integral part of Mongolian shamanic healing practices until the 1950s. The term “andai” denotes both a mental illness and its treatment, and it is both a cultural designation and, today, a kind of folkdance that remains popular among the Mongols in Eastern Inner Mongolia. The andai dance was also included among the first batch of skills for the China Intangible Cultural Heritage list in 2006, and with the folkdances appearing as number III–29.23 Many scholars have paid attention to andai in the last five decades.24 However, recent studies of andai have ignored the shamanic function of the andai ritual and focused only on its cultural heritage. Here, I would like to discuss briefly its ritual process within shamanism. “Andai” in Mongolian refers to a kind of mental disorder within a married or unmarried female who is about 18-25 years old. In andai studies in the second half of the 20th century, andai was divided scholarly into ada andai, eliye andai, and uruy andai, depending on the symptoms of the illness.

The first type, ada andai, includes the term “ada,”25 which means “evil spirit.” Ada čidkür (devils or demonic possession) and ada tüidker (a kind of evil spirit bringing misfortune and turbulence to human beings) use the term “ada” in Mongolian, and both refer to evil spirits possessing human beings
to bring them suffering. If the young female is possessed by *ada*, her desire of mad love will be inspired, and the patient will fall into an abnormal mental and physical state.

The second type is *eliye andai*. The Mongolian term “*eliye*” means “kite” (a bird of prey in the hawk family) in English and, in the context of Mongolian shamanism, symbolizes a sort of evil spirit that is the messenger of hell. If the *eliye* possesses a human being, it will bring a kind of illness called “*eliye andai*” to the relevant persons. Banzarov stated that an *eliye* appears in the form of a bird of the same name and predicts misfortune through its appearance (Banzarov, 1971: 39). In the context of Mongolian shamanism, an *eliye* appears as a cultural symbol that brings disaster and misery to the Mongols. If it possesses a young female, the client will get sick, and the patient will experience symptoms such as madness, self-harm, insomnia, groaning, and shaking of the head and body.

The third type is *uruγ andai*. In contemporary Mongolian, the term “*uruγ*” refers to marriage and the kinship structure constructed by marriage. Therefore, this kind of sickness is related to marriage and feelings of love between young males and females. The symptoms include appetite loss and feeling sick after pregnancy. Moreover, a young pregnant bride with the illness will desire various bitter and sour things and will feel like she is possessed by devil. Alternatively, if a female is married at a young age and is jealous of others or does not receive affection or is unable to marry her loved one, she will not want to talk anymore and will become sick, feel weak, and gradually lose weight (Chigchi et al., 1984: 23-25).

One informant who had *andai* disease in the early 1940s stated that her family took her to see a lama doctor when she had an unexplained sickness around the age of 18. Even acupuncture and Mongolian medicine did not heal her, so her family took her to see a healer shaman. Once her disease was diagnosed as *andai* disease, her family and the healer shaman arranged for an *andai* ritual inside or outside of the family’s house.

The process of the *andai* ritual was divided into three stages: the preparation, healing process, and ending stage. First, the healer shaman selected as his assistants two male young *andai* singers with experience in *andai* rituals and the male crowd were invited to participate. The healer shaman then chose the north or west side of the patient’s house to set up an altar and offered things for worship and prayed for the ancestral spirit to come. At that time, the assistant washed the hair of the patient, combed her hair, and covered her face with hair.

During the healing process, in addition to the singing and dancing of the crowd, the healer shaman beat a drum and swung a whip with a bell to let the patient know when to talk to him about the cause of her suffering (usually the patient keeps silent). Steps for surprising, asking, persuading, impressing,
and swearing were orderly practiced by the healer shaman for the patient during the singing and dancing. The overall healing process can take several days or longer until the patient can say everything to the shaman and stand up for the singing and dancing of the participants under the instruction of the healer shaman.

At the end of the *andai* ritual, performances called “*andai sergügehü***” and “*andai yarγahu***” take place, and a doll called *joliγ* is abandoned instead of the patient, symbolizing the patient’s recovery and return to the community. In short, the aim of the *andai* ritual is to heal the illness with singing and dancing. Without the shaman’s instruction and healing, it is believed that a young woman’s psychosomatic disorder could not be cured.

*Andai* therapy makes use of a number of well-studied Mongolian cultural themes. For example, because this treatment is combined with folkdance and folksongs under the instruction of specialist shamans, there is a link between healing and Mongolian folklore. Likewise, because of the involvement of the shamans, there is a connection to Mongolian religious study. Therefore, *andai* studies cannot make clear the effectiveness of the healing ritual without considering the role of shamanic belief in the process.

### 4.2. Bone-Setting Therapy

Studies have shown that bone-setting is common and popular in Eastern Inner Mongolia (Saijirahu, 2008a: 338-356; 2008b: 19-34; 2009: 31-38; Li and Li, 2006: 237-253; Altanjula, 2006: 163-183), particularly in the Qorčin region, as noted by Mongolian medical historian Jigmed (1985: 49-56; 106-111) and well-known bonesetter Bao Jinshan (1984); in the Hölün Buyir region, as described by Humphrey and Onon (1996); and among the Buryats, as reported in the work of Hruschka (1998: 21-44). In this article, the author will discuss the process of becoming a bonesetter with a shamanistic function.

In terms of its dynamic theory and clinical skills, bone art in Mongolian medicine appears to predate the influence of Tibetan medicine. In modern Mongolian, the practice is called “*Yasu bariqu jasal***” (bone-setting therapy), while the bonesetter is known as “*bariyači***”. The bonesetter uses his hands to reset broken bones while spraying alcohol from his mouth onto the affected body part, which is fixed with small splints. The patient should feel no pain but is usually advised to rest afterwards. The bones heal quite rapidly.

Culturally, bonesetters are closely related to shamanic practitioners, such as the *böge*, *udurγan*, and *üjγeγeči*, whose healing abilities are considered to be a supernatural power bestowed on them by the spirits through worship. Bonesetters have no professional medical training, and their skills are either handed down through their families or, in some cases, believed to be imparted by ancestral spirits through dreams. Currently, bone-setting is considered an
independent branch of Mongolian medicine and, traditionally, the bariyači are not educated in biomedicine or in the Indo-Tibetan-derived tradition of Mongolian medicine.

The author’s research suggests that three factors are essential to becoming a Qorčin folk bonesetter: the borǰigin oboγ (the family of the Chinggis Qaγan’s clan), the illness,29 and the spirit-dream. If one of these three factors is missing, a bonesetter cannot become a true healer, and that shortcoming will usually negatively influence his healing skills (Saijirahu, 2008a: 338-356; 2008b: 19-34; 2009: 31-38].

As a traditional cultural phenomenon, bone-setting has existed at the overlapping points of modern medicine, institutional traditional medicine, and shamanic healing for a long time. It is structured on the basis of a shared religious belief system, a healer, and a client. A yasu bariyači, or bonesetter, is initiated through shamanic illness, dreams, and by udumsil or lineage, drawing the blood relationship from an ancestor. This kind of practitioner benefits from a community’s cultural beliefs in descendent authority and ancestor worship, becoming and serving as a healer while maintaining the social order of the bone-setting system. In addition, clients’ needs protect the bonesetter’s status in a medically pluralistic society.

The author has examined the relationship between a shaman and yasu bariyači in the Qorčin region (Saijirahu, 2015: 201-248). A shaman must be experienced in the shamanic initiation process and must enter a trance state by practicing initiation rituals. Shamans treat mental disorders caused by the possession of any kind of spirit, good or evil. They can control trances after becoming specialists. However, yasu bariyači, after experiencing illness and dreaming about their ancestors’ intentions, heal through their initiation into bone-setting. Instead of undergoing training, as shamans do, yasu bariyači must practice setting broken bones to become specialists. Although both shamans and yasu bariyači are initiated in shamanic communities, the difference between them is whether they will go into a trance or not.

4.3. Rasiyan ukiyalγa Ritual

The rasiyan ukiyalγa ritual, which heals mental disorders or psychological needs, is practiced by shamans in the Hölün Buyir region. This rite has been frequently practiced during other shamanic rituals or at the end of the oboo and ancestor rituals. The term rasiyan means nectar in modern Mongolian, the sacred spring that one can drink the water from or wash himself/herself in to treat any disease, purify the body, and cleanse the heart. The term “ukiyalγa”, derives from the Mongolian verb “ukiyaqu” (to wash), meaning the ritual of washing with rasiyan. Religiously, its meaning is similar to “baptism” in that the rasiyan can purify or cleanse the dirt (sewage) from mental or physical
possession or the stain from a client. The aim in practicing *rasiyan ukiyalγa* is to heal the illnesses of clients if they have mental and physical disorders and to pray for their health and happiness if they do not have any illnesses. During the rite, the shaman does not go into a trance and heals the client with his shaman’s song and melody while hitting the shaman drum.

The method of making *rasiyan* is similar to that of making a spring in the spring treatment (medicated bath) of traditional Mongolian medicine. The difference is that the shaman puts some selected Mongolian medicine plants, special shamanic stones, and bronze mirrors into water and boils them. During the rite, the shaman sprays the special water on the client’s body while chanting the shaman songs.

The Mongols in the Kölin Buyir region often invite a shaman to practice the *rasiyan ukiyalγa* to maintain their psychosomatic health and to heal their illnesses in the summer season. In Inner Mongolia, symbolic healing without interacting with an ancestor’s spirit is a form of alternative medicine.

### 4.4. Čandan güyüdel-ün jasalya Ritual

During the author’s field work in the Kölin Buyir region in 2005, shamanic rituals to drive evil spirits from clients who were considered to be possessed by human or animal evil spirits were observed. One of the rituals, *čandan güyüdel-ün jasalya*, was a healing practice similar in principle to the *andai* ritual. In a local dialect of the Mongolian language, the term “*čandan*” (also called “*šandan*”) refers to a spirit or the place of a grave, especially the spirit of a shaman that protects the mountains or the land. The term “*güyüdel*” in the modern Mongolian language means the flow or current of something. If someone is attacked by the *güyüdel* of the earth while sleeping under a tree in a field, he will get *sa* disease (cerebral infarction in modern medicine) or *ada* disease (a kind of mental disorder caused by an attached evil spirit). The word “*jasalya*” means “therapy.”

When sick with this condition, the client experiences mental and physical disorder. As a part of the body becomes numb, the client suffers from headaches, sweating, or unconscious movements or has a reduced appetite and digestion problems and becomes emaciated. In more extreme cases, the patient may become autistic and speechless or cry wildly with an unknown etiology. Modern medical treatments for this illness have no effect. Then, the client will ask for healing from the Buddhist lama and diviner and see no effect, until finally he will ask for a shaman’s help.

After the patient has been diagnosed as being affected by the current of a spirit in the mountain, the healer will decide to treat his/her illness with *čandan güyüdel-ün jasalya*. First, the shaman and her assistant will prepare a drum, *kei mori-yin dalbaya* (a kind of flag with a picture of a flying horse),
two *kölügs* (horse-headed staffs),[32] bronze mirrors, *erike* (beads), alcohol, milk, tea, and *γangγa ebesü* (a cleansing plant). Then the assistant will purify and sanctify the tools with the alcohol, milk, and tea while the healer chants a shamanic song.

The next step is the healing process. The shaman stands facing the windows in the centre of the client’s house, reports to the woman’s ancestral spirit about the client, and asks him to give her the supernatural power to easily heal the client. Meanwhile, the assistant offers alcohol, milk, and tea to the spirit while the healer hits the drum with a drumstick and sings. Then, the shaman diagnoses the client’s illness with her *erike*. The healer sprays alcohol on her own *erike* and uses it to massage the client’s head, chest, back, sides, and hands and hits the client’s back strongly.

Finally, the assistant sketches and cuts out nine human figures from white paper. The shaman then asks the client to tear those nine paper figures into many pieces and throw them onto a crowded crossroads at a distance from the house.

Shamans in Inner Mongolia believe that the figures will take away the evil spirit that possessed the client through the power of the shaman’s ancestral spirit. This is a common example of a healing ritual, like the *andai* ritual in the Qorčin region, for an illness caused by an evil spirit. In this case, it is believed that the client will recover after the spirit is thrown away by the shaman with human paper figures.

**4.5 Oboo Sacrifice**

*Oboo*, *ovoo*, or *obo*, which is also written “*oboγa*” in the traditional Mongolian transcription, means “heap” and “cairn” and is a sacred stone heap used as an altar or shrine in Mongolian folk religious practice and in the religion of other Mongolic peoples. *Oboos* are usually made from rocks with wood and are often found at the tops of mountains and in high places, like mountain passes or in the middle of plains. They serve mainly as sites for the worship of *tengri* (sky or heaven), the *tengrisim*, mountain gods, and earth gods led by shamans and kin’s elders, though they are also used for Buddhist ceremonies. In addition to these religious meanings, *obo* can refer to a boundary sign and a signpost.

Many scholars have paid attention to *obo* in the world. The representative ones are Agnes Birtalan (1998: 199-210), Christopher Evans and Caroline Humphrey (2003: 195-211), and Urtunasutu (2012) in recent years. These researchers have mainly considered the location, structure, function, text, and ritual process of *obo*.

Every year since ancient times, the Mongols have sacrificed *obo*. In particular, after the end of the Cultural Revolution when the state implemented
a policy of religious freedom, the Mongols in China restored the *oboos* in every administrative region to sacrifice at religiously and administratively. In addition, the author found during fieldwork in the Hölin Buyir region that some Mongol families structured by blood relationship called “*obok*” or “*oboγ*” set up private *oboos* and sacrificed to it with the help of shamans. Whenever Mongols pass near *oboos*, they dismount from their horses or get out of their cars to worship the *oboos* with milk, alcohol, or cigarettes to make the spirit or god of *oboos* happy and bless those who pass by. Thus, the existence of *oboos* in the Mongolic world closely relates physically and mentally to the Mongols’ daily life and symbolizes the Mongols’ reverence for nature and harmonious coexistence with the ecological environment.

Therefore, an *oboos* is a part of the nomadic Mongols’ religious cultural heritage and a site for offering sacrifices to *tengris* and other nature spirits. Inner Mongolian anthropologist Urtunasutu said that in modern times, it is a stone heap with wood set up at the top of a mountain or in the middle of a field for sacrifices that symbolizes the collective mentality, behaviour, spirit, identity, and memory of the Mongolic people. At the same time, an *oboos* also symbolizes sacred ground where the nomadic Mongols can cultivate a collective consciousness and sense of community (Urtunasutu, 2012: 12-13]. Thus, *oboos* and the sacrificial culture of *oboos* are closely related to the social structure and folk religious beliefs of the Mongols.

The Mongols always remain in awe of nature, living in close relationship with nature generation after generation, because the Mongols believe that everything in nature has a spirit. For example, according to the natural law of the Mongol society, no one is allowed to move the rocks of the mountains, cut down forests, or pollute the springs and lakes. If this taboo is committed, *tengri* or the patron saint of the affected item will punish the perpetrator and bring him unexplained diseases, disaster, or misfortune. This kind of worldview affects the ecological and environmental behaviour of Mongols and maintains their physical and mental health, which is quite obvious in *oboos* sacrifices.

The Mongols regard an *oboos* as a sacred place with supernatural power. They believe that they live under the supernatural power and protection of *oboos*. Therefore, if they do not hold *oboos* in awe and veneration correctly, attack it with various words, or move the stones of *oboos* casually, they will encounter disaster. The purpose of setting up and sacrificing to *oboos* is to restore the grasslands and livestock, enrich the rainwater, eliminate disasters, and prevent diseases. In addition, the Mongols believe that the revival of their hometowns and prosperity of their families can be attributed to their correct sacrifice to *oboos*. Therefore, the Mongols are very proud to set up an *oboos* in their hometowns and sacrifice to it because of its supernatural power.
Urtunasutu states that the supernatural power of oboo is divided into the oboo nekekü (holy questing) and oboo qaraqu (holy waiting) according to his case study on oboo in the Üjümüčin region of Inner Mongolia (Urtunasutu, 2012: 561-576). According to his classification, oboo nekekü (holy questing) refers to anyone who attacks or satirizes oboo with inappropriate word or treats oboo with unreasonable behaviour, causing the spirit of oboo to get angry. The patron saint of oboo gives certain signals to the physical body and mind of the person and brings disorder to his everyday life, so that he clearly recognizes he has made mistakes and can correct them immediately (Urtunasutu, 2012: 561-571). Literally, nekekü is to “chase, pursue, run after, and seek” in contemporary Mongolian, meaning in this folk religious context that the spirit of oboo will punish the related person who satirized the oboo, made mistakes, or was irreverent to the oboo.

Oboo qaraqu (holy waiting) refers to when a person makes mistakes in the customs and rules for sacrificing to oboo and encounters misfortune or disorder in his body, mind, and everyday life as a consequence (Urtunasutu, 2012: 572-576). In modern Mongolian, the literal meaning of qaraqu is to “see, look at, watch, and keep under surveillance.” However, in the context of oboo culture, oboo qaraqu is the spirit of oboo always looking at the behaviour of the person who holds his own oboo to ensure he correctly and continuously sacrifices to it. If the holder commits mistakes or exhibits incorrect behaviours, the spirit of the oboo will send signals to warn and remind him to perform the ritual correctly.

Consequently, in the local knowledge naturally formed in Mongolian folklore, many taboos exist about touching or moving the stones, soil, or forest around the oboo. Individuals are also not allowed to exhibit incorrect behaviour during oboo rituals or satirize or speak ill of oboo. Thus, oboo sacrifices have influenced the behavioural health of the Mongols for many years.

5. Conclusion

Shamanism coexists with Buddhism in modern Inner Mongolia. It has maintained its status by syncretizing with Tibetan Buddhism to treat mental and physical disorders in the past (through the andai ritual) and today (through the initiation ritual). Because of its ability to meet clients’ needs and its flexibility under China’s religious policy, shamanic healing or folk religious healing behaviour will continue to play a role in the health care system in Inner Mongolian society by being practised in parallel with other systems.

Anthropology has been concerned with magic, religion, and medicine around the world since the work of British doctor, psychiatrist, and anthropologist Rivers (1924) was first published in the early 20th century. However,
the field did not pay sufficient attention to shamanic healing in Inner Mongolia until the early 21st century. Meanwhile, shamanic studies have discussed the healing function between shaman and client, but only minimally considered the relationship between shaman and client and the patient’s role in the effectiveness of a healing ritual. In fact, the patient plays an important role in the healing ritual.

There is no doubt that shamanism has reemerged in Inner Mongolia since the end of the 20th century and that the number of shamans has increased. According to recent anthropological research on Inner Mongolian shamanism, the reason for shamanism’s revival is China’s loosened policies toward both ethnic minorities and religions under their reforms and open-door policy. However, in the author’s view, the reasons are so complicated that they cannot be so easily described (Saijirahu, 2015). Of note, an identity crisis has developed in multiethnic areas where the people have ethnically and culturally been loosely organized in modern Inner Mongolia. Possession by an animal soul or human spirit is an example. It is believed that one possessed by an animal soul will become a diviner and one possessed by a human spirit will become a shaman. The healing process is the means by which one becomes and serves as a shaman in modern society.

In addition to this folk religious belief, the world views of behavioural health have influenced the ecological, environmental, cultural and social thought of the Mongols for thousands of years. Their healing practices, including bone-setting therapies, rasiyan ukiyalγa, čandan güyüdel-ün ǰasalγa, and oboo sacrifices, all of which are defined as alternative medicines in this article, are closely related to the long-held medical and religious behaviours of lay people. In the context of folk religious belief, their healing practices and ritual sacrifices effectively manage and handle the problems caused by human-made ecological environmental crises.

Notes

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1. All previous Constitutions of the People’s Republic of China have granted freedom of religion to citizens. After the end of the Cultural Revolution in particular, Act 36 of China’s 1982 Constitution was implemented and clearly
stipulated that “citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief.”

2. In modern spoken Mongolian, böö refers to the male shaman. In traditional Mongolian, böö is transcribed as “böge.” Böö is also a collective term for Mongolian shamans.

3. In modern Mongolian, udyan, also called ituγan, refers to the female shaman. In traditional Mongolian, udyan is transcribed as “uduγan.”

4. In modern Mongolian, orusigu is a verb akin to “has,” “exists,” and “lives” and has the same stem as the verb oru, meaning to “enter,” and the noun oru or orun, meaning “position.” As a religious (Buddhist or shamanist) term, it means that a human body has been possessed by a spirit or a god and has entered a trance state.

5. For more details about Darhad shamanism, see Hangartner (2011).

6. For more details about Buryat shamanism, see Shimamura (2014).

7. For more details about Qorčin shamanism, see Saijirahu (2015).

8. These survival areas of Mongolian shamanism have been studied in detail by many scholars from around the world. For example, Humphrey and Onon (1996) discussed the shamanism practised among the Daur Mongols living in the Hölün Buyir region of Inner Mongolia.

9. The čaγan eliye was a kind of Qorčin shaman who mainly healed eliye andai, one of the andai diseases.

10. Although the etymology of the shamanic word “qundan” or “qundun” is unknown, this type of shaman is said to be the most powerful professional among the shamans, as he mainly administers the rituals for worshipping the tengri (sky or heaven) and the god of thunder.

11. “Laičing” is a kind of shaman involved in the healing ritual. This shamanic term is a variation of the Tibetan Buddhist term “gnas chung.” This type of shaman gained the technique of ecstasy from the Tibetan Bon religion, which is considered to be a pre-Buddhist religion. This type of shaman is also said to originate from gürdem, a kind of Buddhist monk who was influenced by Mongolian shamanism (Heissig, 1980: 41-43). According to the author’s field work, the possessed laičing in the Qorčin region strikes two gongs at a ritual and dances beautifully.

12. “Gürdem,” one of the terms for Mongolian shamanism, originated from the Tibetan language sku rten pa and refers to a type of Mongolian shaman influenced by Tibetan Buddhism. When the gürdem enters the trance state, it drives away the devil and treats the disease.

13. “Čoiǰing,” also one of the terms for Mongolian shamanism, originated from the Tibetan language chos skyong. This kind of shaman is also influenced by Tibetan Buddhism and mainly deals with the aftermath of a thunder disaster, performing rituals to determine the destination of the dead at the funeral (Kürelsha et al., 1998: 56).

14. One of the shamanic actors who symbolically heals the mental and physical disorders using folk therapy, such as magic or spells, is called “dom” in Mongolian. This term has been passed down from ancient times.

15. A bariyači, also called yasu bariyači, originally was a bone-setting shaman who uses supernatural power to connect fractures and restore dislocated bones.
16. An andaiči, a shamanic healer, can cure a kind of mental illness called andai that married or unmarried (mainly unmarried) young women suffer from.

17. Sayudal-un ebedčin in Inner Mongolian shamanism is the sickness experienced while gaining the shaman’s status (seat). The Mongolian term “sayudal” means “seat,” so the whole meaning of this shamanic term is the illness experienced while getting the shamanic seat or shamanic status. Depending on the culture, it is interpreted as shamanic sickness, divine illness, or spiritual emergency.

18. The term “qobčalaqu,” also called “qobčasulaqu” in modern Mongolian, means to wear or to dress up something. For more details about the qobčalaqu process, see Hasuntuya (2012: 45-56).

19. “Narratives,” used here means what Kleinman stated the “illness narratives” in his medical anthropological studies, for more details, see Kleinman (1988).

20. One of the seven trees is planted 10 m due south of the ger where an altar is set up and the spirit of the ancestor comes after the ritual starts. Another four trees are planted 3 m southeast, southwest, northwest, and northeast from the ger. The two white birch trees are planted in the middle of the ger, and the trees go through the toγonu (skylight) of the ger to the sky. In the Hölün Buyir region, these two trees are called “egür modu” or “tooroo modu” in the languages of the Mongols and Dagur, respectively. According to Shirokogoroff, tooroo trees have been used frequently in the initiation rituals of the Manju-Tungus people in northeast Asia, and not only the two white birch trees planted in the ger but also the white birch lined up on the outside are called tooroo (Shirokogoroff, 1935: 351-352). Thus, among the Mongols in the Hölün Buyir region, the customs for this initiation ritual have also been influenced by the shamanic culture of the Manju-Tungus people.

21. “Qurui,” is a verb in modern Mongolian meaning the blessing and calling good luck, health and peace for human being.

22. In Mongolian, there is no exact definition for the term “andai.”


25. In modern Mongolian, the term “ada” means evil spirit. Banzarov explained that evil spirits are thought to be the enemies of human beings, good spirits, and tengris. Among them, the ada will fly and act in the sky, surprise people, spread disease, and inspire crazy desires (Banzarov, 1971: 39).

26. The author conducted the field work about andai in 2001 and 2002 at Küriye Banner in the city of Tongliao, China, and visited and interviewed the informants who had the andai illness and were still alive at the time.

27. In Inner Mongolia, a Mongolian medical practitioner was called “lama emči” (doctor) before the 1950s. The Mongolian term “lama” originates from Tibetan and refers to a priest or monk in Lamaism or Tibetan Buddhism. Mongolian medicine, which originated from Indo-Tibetan medicine, was also influenced by Tibetan Buddhism. Throughout the history of Mongolian medicine, most medical practitioners were lamas who were educated in a Buddhist temple.

28. “ǰoliγ,” is a Mongolian word referring to a doll meaning ghost. In the context of Inner Mongolian shamanism, when it seems that something like a demon
possessed a human being, the healer shaman makes a humanoid object in order to remove it from the client’s body and throws it away as a substitute for a patient.

29. For more details on the idea of “shamanic illness” as part of the shaman’s initiation, see Eliade (1964: 28).
30. For more details about rasiyan ukiyalγa, see Saijirahu (2015: 186-190).
31. For more details about čandan güyüdel-ün jasalγa, see Saijirahu (2015: 190-199).
32. A shaman staff, called “kölüg” in Kölün Buyir region, is similar to what Vilmos Diószegi described as a shaman staff in a work on Buryat shamanism. For more details, see Vilmos Diószegi (1998: 83-106).
33. For more details about the reemergence of Inner Mongolian shamanism, see Zhao (2014).

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SECTION 3

SCHOLARSHIP

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Abstract
Since the time of the first Jesuit mission to China (from the late 16th century onwards), learning the locally spoken language(s) was considered a priority. The Protestant missionaries of the 19th century continued this language-focused trend: it was fundamental for them as well to be able to learn the language of the Court together with the dialects spoken in Southern China, the area where they mainly settled, especially after the First Opium War. If, on one hand, they could benefit from a good amount of works compiled in the previous centuries to describe Mandarin, on the other hand, they found themselves in lack of tools to learn Cantonese, Hakka, Wu and other Southern topolects. Therefore, they began compiling all sorts of dictionaries, phrasebooks and grammars to fill in this gap. At the same time, they published their linguistic analyses, and considerations, together with Romanization proposals on the periodical press they had set in China, thus reaching a worldwide audience. After an introduction on the English periodical press in China, its founders and main contributors (both missionaries and laymen), this paper will conduct a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the articles concerning the description of ‘dialects’, better defined as Sinitic languages. The final aim is to show the contribution provided by the authors of two journals in particular, *The Chinese Repository* and *The China Review*, whose papers had the merit to broaden the scope of Chinese language studies, thus promoting western and Chinese scholarship on this subject.

**Keywords:** Chinese dialects, Sinitic languages, China Protestant Missionaries, *The Chinese Repository*, *The China Review*
1. Introduction

Since the time of the first Jesuit mission to China (from the late 16th century onwards), learning the locally spoken language(s) was considered a priority. This was fundamental to ensure the survival of the mission and of the missionaries in the country, and to enable the latter to interact with the population they meant to convert. The Catholic missionaries very early discovered the existence of at least three language levels: the very formal written language, mastered only by the learned men; the so-called Mandarin, or Guanhua 官话, spoken by the literati-officials (not without differences) throughout the empire; the incredible variety of local dialects, or topolects, spoken by the common people. At the same time, the missionaries realized that no grammatical analyses (in the Greek-Latin fashion they were accustomed to) or primers were available for foreign learners and, therefore, they had to create these important tools from scratch. In doing so, the Jesuits mainly devoted their attention to Mandarin,¹ with the aim of converting and reaching the favour of the scholar-officials, while the missionaries of other orders, Dominicans and Franciscans above all, paid more attention to locally spoken language varieties and provided the earliest descriptions of Hokkien dialect, or Minnanhua 闽南话. The linguistic tools they compiled, in terms of lexical repertories and analytical descriptions, proved very useful for the following generations of missionaries and for European lay scholars’ linguistic research (Mungello, 1989: 174-237; Paternicò, 2013: 26-42).

The Protestant missionaries of the 19th century continued this language-focused trend: it was fundamental for them as well to be able to learn the language of the Court together with the dialects spoken in Southern China, the area where they mainly settled, especially after the First Opium War. Even though they could benefit from a large amount of works compiled in the previous centuries to describe Mandarin, they found themselves in lack of tools to learn Cantonese, Hakka, Wu and other Southern topolects. They therefore began compiling all sorts of dictionaries, phrasebooks and grammars to fill in this gap. At the same time, they published their linguistic analyses, and considerations, together with Romanization proposals on the periodical press they had set in China, thus reaching a world-wide audience (Branner, 1997: 235-237; Tiedemann, 2010: 40-43; Su, 1996: 223-284; Paternicò, 2017: 223-243).

After an introduction on the English periodical press in China, its founders and main contributors (both missionaries and laymen), this paper will conduct a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the articles concerning the description of Chinese and the other Sinitic languages spoken in China. The final aim is to highlight the contribution provided by the authors of two journals in particular, The Chinese Repository and The China Review, whose
papers had the merit to broaden the scope of Chinese language studies, thus promoting western and Chinese scholarship on this subject.

2. English Periodical Press of 19th Century China

In 19th century China, setting a mission press was fundamental in order to spread religious publications, Chinese translations of *The Bible* and other liturgical materials. Mission presses also published secular works in Chinese to make the population aware of world history, geography, etc. (Barnett, 1971: 293-295).

Being able to print a text entirely in Chinese or including Chinese characters required huge efforts, especially in the passage from the traditional block printing to modern typography. The early missionaries located in Serampore, India, benefiting from local experience, were the first to print their works with Chinese type cast and European methods, with cutters shipped from the West for this purpose.² Because of the anti-Christian atmosphere of the time, printing outside China was the only option for a while. Serampore, Malacca, Batavia were the first chosen locations. However, printing was very hard in this sort of clandestine conditions and only few copies could be printed for each work (Barnett, 1971: 289-290; Su, 1996: 254).

Robert Morrison (1782-1834), the founder of the Protestant mission in China, advocated the creation of new, but also elegant, typesets from the earliest years of the mission. In 1832, he set up a printing press in Macau, but it was shut down anon. In the same year, the American Protestant missionaries set up “the first western style professionally run missionary printing outfit on Chinese soil” in Canton (Barnett, 1971: 290).

However, only by the mid-1840s, after the end of the Opium War, could the conditions for missionary printing and publishing in China have improvement. Both the London Missionary Society and the American Presbyterians could now finally count on a quite complete metallic movable typeset, thanks to an original project of the Parisian type-founder, Marcellin LeGrand, who had worked on it for a decade (Su, 1996: 246-254; Reed, 2004: p. 43).³

In the 19th century, several mission presses were gradually established throughout the country and began the publication not only of faith-related and secular materials in Chinese, but also of works on different topics related to China and its neighbouring countries, together with tools to learn Chinese language(s), written in western languages (McIntosh, 1895: 6-58; Barnett, 1971: 287-302).

Quite soon, hundreds of periodicals, linked to diverse religious creeds, were printed and distributed by foreign missionaries in English, French, German, Spanish, Italian, etc. (Tiedemann, 2010: 36-44). Most of them included Chinese characters as well, thus taking these kinds of publications
to a higher standard of quality and intelligibility than those providing Romanizations only. These publications had a broad scope and were meant to widely circulate outside China. Many editors were able to see the big picture and understand the cultural, political and economic importance of circulating first-hand reliable information on China in the West.

The periodicals published in English by the Protestant missionaries were mainly three: *The Chinese Repository* (1832-1851), *The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal* (1867-1941) and *The China Review, or Notes and Queries on the Far East* (1872-1901) (Tiedemann, 2010: 40-43).

*The Chinese Recorder*, published monthly, mainly dealt with individual missionaries’ biographies and works, missionary activities, evangelization progress and hardships, whereas *The Chinese Repository* and *The China Review* included papers on a broader range of subjects, and also language and linguistics. For this reason, the present study will now concentrate on these two journals.

### 3. The Chinese Repository

*The Chinese Repository* (*Zhongguo Congbao* 中國叢報) was a monthly periodical published in English in Canton between 1832 and 1851, for the benefit of the Protestant missionaries working in Southeast Asia and of the Westerners interested in China.

Its founder and first editor was Elijah Coleman Bridgman (1801-1861), the first American Protestant missionary in China.

Considered the father of American Sinology, Bridgman was assigned to the China mission in 1829 (Bridgman, 1864: 30), and upon his arrival began to study Chinese with Morrison and a native speaker. Morrison provided him with all the necessary tools and books, including the Chinese translation of the *Bible*, and lent him his Cantonese vocabulary (Bridgman, 1864: 40). Dedicating time to learn the language was specifically requested in the precise instructions Bridgman had received from Jeremiah Evarts of the Prudence Committee before leaving his home country (Bridgman, 1864: 22).

Bridgman soon became very proficient in Cantonese and in 1841 in Macau he published his *Chinese Chrestomathy in the Canton Dialect*, a comprehensive description of Cantonese language including exercises in reading, conversation and writing.

In 1832, Bridgman started a mission press in Canton and, on May 1st, upon suggestion of Morrison, he began the publication of *The Chinese Repository*, which would become the main Western periodical in China of the time (Bridgman, 1864: 74).

From Bridgman’s “Introduction” to the first volume we can learn the reasons for launching this enterprise, its purpose and intended methodology:
One of the objects of this work [...] will be to review foreign books on China, [...] and to distinguish [...] what is, and what is not, now true. [...] Sufficient weight has not, generally, we think, been given to native authorities. While we would allow them their proper influence, we shall try to avoid the opposite extreme [...].

On natural history, inquiries may [...] be directed to the climate, its temperature, changes, winds, rains healthfulness [...]. As to commerce, it will be especially interesting to notice its progress from the past to modern times [...]. Inquiries in regard to the social relations will require a careful investigation of the constitution of society, and in connection with an examination of the moral character of the people [...]. We feel and shall take a very lively interest in the religious character of the people. [...]

We enter on our work unbiased, and influenced rather by considerations of duty than of reward. (Bridgman, 1832: 2-5)

Bridgman therefore had a clear idea of the objectives and the wide range of subjects the journal would cover. Special attention was also to be paid to the local language, since only few foreigners could speak Chinese, and very few Chinese could speak English at the time, and both were forced to resort to some sort of *pidgin*:

Every visitor at Canton must be struck, not to say confounded, with the strange jargon spoken alike by natives and foreigners, in their mutual intercourse; it has been a most fruitful source of misunderstanding; and in not a few instances, it has paved the way for misrepresentation, altercation, detention, vexation and other such evils. (Bridgman, 1832: 21)

Bridgman was editor until he left for Shanghai in 1847, though continuing to cooperate as one of the authors. The following year, Samuel Wells Williams (1812-1884), an American missionary who had been sent to China in 1833 in order to take care of the typography of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in Canton, took over as editor of *The Chinese Repository*, until the journal’s twentieth and last volume (Wells Williams, 1889: 62-63; Tiedeman, 2010: 40). Williams was also proficient in his knowledge of Chinese and especially Cantonese, to the study of which he had dedicated several years, publishing a primer, *Easy lessons in Chinese* (Macao 1842), and a dictionary, *A Tonic Dictionary of the Chinese Language in the Canton Dialect* (Canton 1856).

Over time, *The Chinese Repository* reached a wide audience all over the world. According to Malcom’s findings, in 1836 the journal had 800 subscribers in China, South-Asian countries, Europe and the United States, although some copies were sent out for free (Malcom, 1973: 171-172). Some of the first issues were printed in as many as 1000 copies and some had to be reprinted. Among the subscribers, there were missionaries and religious people, but also merchants, scholars, and writers. The earliest years were
definitely the most successful ones, followed by a slow decline due to several reasons: lack of funds, decreased missionary contribution, and competition with other publications (Malcom, 1973: 173-176).

In bringing the Chinese Repository experience to an end, the editors wrote:

Since its first number was issued, great and unexpected changes have taken place in China, and in its relations with foreign countries […]. These changes have been especially momentous in all that relates to the propagation of Christianity removing the serious penalties before attached to its profession […]. During this period also, facilities for printing have multiplied in China; the two newspapers existing at its commencement have now increased to five; and the five printing presses to thirteen, while the “Mails”, “Registers”, “Heralds” & co., issuing from them, rapidly convey news to all parts of the world. Something more of a Monthly of sixty pages is, therefore, now required for the discussion of important questions, the description of interesting places, the reception of valuable translations, and the preservation of facts, which shall still serve as a Repository of permanent records relating to, and illustrating, China.⁴

Despite its undeniable importance as a mirror on China for the West, not many studies are available on The Chinese Repository, and few of them take into account their contribution to the description and study of Sinitic languages. In the following section, a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the papers related to language topic will be performed.

4. The Sinitic Languages as Portrayed in The Chinese Repository

In nineteen years of activity, twenty yearly volumes of The Chinese Repository were published, each of them including twelve monthly issues (about 60 pages per issue) starting from May 1832. With the twentieth and last volume, a General Index was published to facilitate the consultation. Going through it, the themes under study by its contributors appear in their great variety, spanning from geography and history, to economy, trade and commerce, politics and society; from language and literature, to philosophy and religion; from arts and science, to foreign relations, travel reports and missionary activities. It is also finally possible to learn the authors’ identities, since most of the papers had come out anonymously. In some cases, the initials of the authors were provided, while, in others, pseudonyms were preferred, like “Philo”, “Anglo-Sinicus”, “A Correspondent”, etc.

It must be noted that, probably in order to facilitate consultation, in the General Index we sometimes find rephrased titles, or titles attributed to sections of a longer paper.
4.1. Themes and Topics

Concerning the focus of the present research, in the *General Index*, section 9, *Language and Literature etc.*, we find 95 papers listed. Excluding those on Chinese Literature, on Chinese translation of western classics and vice-versa, on the Chinese education and examination system, the writings on Chinese and other Sinitic languages can be grouped into three different categories:

1. Language description and analysis, including studies on singular features, like the characters or the tones, etc.;
2. Language learning and Romanization proposals;
3. Reviews of older Chinese works or of contemporary publications on Sinitic languages (sometimes with the replies from the authors) published in China or in the West.

Of these three groups, the most interesting ones, because of their innovative and original character, are the first two, which amount to a total of 28 articles. The number rises to 31 if we consider that some of them were continued in a following issue (For a complete list of the papers in these two categories please refer to Appendix 1).

In particular, there are 16 writings dealing with language description and analyses. Of these, at least 6 are explicitly devoted to “dialects” mainly Hokkien and Cantonese, as stated in the title. However, upon careful reading, one may find out that many papers apparently referring to simply “Chinese” in general, are actually on Cantonese. This is quite obvious and natural considering that most of the authors of *The Chinese Repository* were located in Southern China, especially Canton, Hong Kong and Macau.

There are 12 articles dealing with language learning and Romanization proposals. In particular, 5 papers were dedicated to the best methods and facilities for learning the language, while 7 debated on how to best transcribe the sounds of Chinese (Wang et al., 2017: 97-102). In this case as well, the research for a fitting “orthography” for Chinese, also involved the Romanization of dialects’ sounds.

4.2. Length

The lengths of the articles vary from 1 to a maximum of 29 pages. Sometimes the General Index indicates as “article” what would just be a paragraph on a specific topic within a more general paper. For example, this is the case for the article “Dialect of the people in the island of Hainan”, Vol. I (1832-1833), pp. 151-152, which in fact is a section of a longer anonymous paper titled “Religious Intelligence”; or the article “Presses in China, and Study of Chinese”, Vol. II (1833-1834), pp. 1-9, which is actually a topic dealt within the more general “Introductory Remarks” to vol. II.

The lengthiest paper is Marshman’s “Dissertation on the Chinese language, or a particular and detailed account of the primitives, formatives and derivatives”, Vol. IX (1840) of 29 pages.

4.3. Authors, Background and Nationalities

The authors of the 27 contributions on language and linguistics were 12 in total. Eliah C. Bridgman was the most prolific (8 articles), followed by John R. Morrison (4), Samuel Wells Williams (3), Samuel Dyer (2), George T. Lay (2), Ira Tracy (2), J.C. Stewart (1), Samuel Wolfe (1), William Dean (1), Walter M. Lowrie (1) and Joshua Marshman (1), plus anonymous (1).

Only one of the authors was a layman: John. R Morrison (1814-1849), Robert Morrison’s eldest son, who was a British interpreter and Colonial official. All the others were missionaries: aside from the already mentioned Bridgman, Wells Williams, S. Dyer (1804-1843) and S. Wolfe (1811-1837) who were British Protestant Missionaries of the London missionary Society (Davis, 1846; Wylie, 1867: 89-90). George T. Lay (ca. 1800-1845) was a British naturalist who later on became a missionary of the British and Foreign Bible Society (Broomhall, 1981: 235-236). I. Tracy (1806-1875) was an American Protestant missionary sent to China by the American Board together with Wells Williams (Tiedemann, 2010: 143). Very little is known about J.C. Stewart (?-?): only one source refers to him as an American medical missionary in Taiyuan. William Dean (1807-1895) was an American Baptist missionary in Siam and HK (Brackney, 1999: 173). Joshua Marshman (1768-1837) was a British missionary of the Baptist Missionary society located in Serampore, Bengal (India). Walter Macon Lowrie (1819-1847) was secretary of the Western missionary society, predecessor of the Presbyterian Board for foreign missions (Lowrie, 1849).

All of the missionaries were English native speakers, either of British or American nationality, and mainly belonged to the Protestant or Baptist missions to China.

4.4. Qualitative Assessment: Content, Methodology

Due to space limitations, it is not possible to analyse each paper in detail and only a general assessment can be made.

For the first time in the world history of Sinology, The Chinese Repository provided a platform which allowed Western missionary and lay scholars not only to share their language findings and analyses, but also to confront and discuss them with other colleagues. The results of their research or their proposals, once published, would be subsequently commented, amended or
rejected in following issues by the community of expert readers the journal regularly reached. The authors themselves often encouraged feedback and corrections in order to publish an “agreed upon” version in a later volume.

It is important to highlight the extremely innovative character of some of the Romanization proposals for the Sinitic languages’ sounds, the precious insights into their grammar and pedagogy, the sound methodology used in making an unprecedented language data collection of different topolects. This data collection, for both India and China, had been called for by the linguist Nathan Brown (1807-1888) and the editors of The Chinese Repository were immediately responsive to that (Branner, 1997: 250-251).

Significant in this respect are for example the papers by J.R. Morrison, “System of orthography for Chinese words”, Vols. V-VI (Appendix 1) where the author highlights the difficulty in representing the Chinese syllables’ sounds using the English alphabet, especially for Cantonese, and suggests using the sounds as in the Italian alphabet instead, with some modifications. The system he proposes could be easily learned by all the Europeans and Morrison calls for its general approval and adoption. Other papers, in fact, followed with comments on the proposed system which “promoted several orthographic practices that remained in widespread use for a century or more” (Branner, 1997: 250).

It is, on the other hand, also true that the early idea these authors had of the origin of Chinese language and its dialect was still quite imprecise and based more on Chinese ‘chronicles’ and their own perceptions than on historical language reconstructions. Some of them lavished praise on Chinese language “unrivalled antiquity” and the surprising ability to preserve itself “undergoing few alteration” through the centuries (unlike Latin or Greek) and in such a vast territory. The variety of dialects and the different pronunciations were, according to them, due to the logographic nature of the written language, which did not allow proper pronunciation of the characters to be enforced throughout the empire. The sounds are judged “less full and sonorous than most of the Indochinese languages, yet when its measured periods and its tones are carefully observed, it is grateful to the ear” (Bridgman, 1834-1835: 2-3). Other authors, did not hide their feeling of presumable superiority of European languages, “the smooth flow of words, the beauty of a polysyllabic language”, if compared with the “harsh and rough sounds” of certain people, especially in Southern China, which “gives them often the appearance of anger, even in their ordinary conversations” (Morrison, 1834-1835: 484-485).

At any rate, many of the research included in the pages of The Chinese Repository paved the way to larger compilations: primers, grammars and dictionaries of the other so far less recorded Hokkien and especially Cantonese speech. We can here mention the case of S. Wells Williams’ “New
orthography adopted for representing the sounds of Chinese characters” in Vol. XI which prepared the orthography used in his *Tonic Dictionary*.

Finally, in *The Chinese Repository*, comparisons were often made between Chinese and Western languages, or between the different Sinitic languages, but the time was not ripe enough yet for the kind of comparative debates that would animate the linguistic panorama a few years later.

5. The China Review

*The China Review or Notes and Queries on the Far East* (Zhongguo Pinglun 中國評論 also called Yuan Dong Shiyi Bao 遠東釋疑報) was published bi-monthly by the *China Mail* Office in Hong Kong from 1872 to 1901 (Wang, 2007: 21-23). The journal was apparently not supported by any church, but missionaries frequently published articles of sinological interest within its pages (Tiedeman, 2010: 42).

*The China Review* was edited in its initial years by Nicholas Belfield Dennys (1839-1900), a British officer who had joined the Consular Service in China in 1863 as a student interpreter at Beijing. One year later, he resigned and became proprietor and editor of the Hong Kong newspaper *China Mail*, retaining the position until 1876, while he was also serving as Secretary of the City Hall and Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce. In April 1877, Dennys left China because he was appointed Assistant-Protector of Chinese in Singapore and Justice of Peace for the Straits Settlements. He also edited the *North Borneo Gazette*. Dennys was the author of several books on China, including: *Notes for Tourists in the North of China* (1866), *The Treaty Ports of China* (1867), *The Folklore of China* (1876), *A Handbook of the Canton Vernacular of the Chinese Language* (1874) (Dyer Ball 1900: 94-95; Wright and Cartwright, 1908: 750; Paternicò, 2019a: 27-28).

The second editor of the journal was Ernst Johann Eitel (1838-1908), a Protestant missionary of the Basel Mission, who, in 1865 was transferred to the London Missionary Society in Canton. Five years later, he moved to Hong Kong where he began to work as a civil servant with the appointment of Director of Chinese Studies. He took up the editor’s post of *The China Review* in 1876, probably because Dennys was preparing to leave for Singapore (Wang, 2007: 26). From 1878 to 1882, he worked as Supervisor of Interpreters and Translators for the Supreme Court, and from 1879 to 1896 as School Inspector for the Hong Kong Government. In 1897 he moved to Australia, where he remained until his death. He was author of several works on China and Chinese, among which: *Hand-Book for the Student of Chinese Buddhism* (1870), *A Chinese dictionary in the Cantonese dialect* (1877), *Europe in China: The History of Hongkong from the Beginning to the Year 1882* (1895) (Wesley-Smith, 2012: 132-133).
After Eitel’s departure in 1897, it is still not very clear who took up the task of editing The China Review for the remaining four years, presumably one of its main contributors, James Dyer Ball (1847-1919) (Wang, 2007: 27).

In the introductory notice to the first volume, Dennys stated that The China Review would inherit the purpose of his previously edited Notes and Queries on China and Japan (Zhong Ri Shiyi 中日釋疑), a monthly journal published in Hong Kong, which had ceased publications after only four years of activities (1867-1870). Dennys declared that The China Review would encompass:

papers (original and selected) upon the Arts and Sciences, Ethnology, Folklore, Geography, History, Literature, Mythology, Manners and Customs, Natural History, Religion, etc. of China, Japan, Mongolia, Tibet, The Eastern Archipelago, and the ‘Far East’ generally.

The journal would accept papers written in Chinese, Latin, English, German, French, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese. This last information can give the idea of the broadness of people it meant to reach as readers and involve as authors. The final lines read:

Arrangements have been made to procure a complete selection of all the periodicals devoted to Oriental matters [...] so as to present a resumé of their content in each number. Great attention will also be paid to the Review department, eminent publishers in Europe and America having promised to send copies of such works as may bear upon the subjects to the consideration of which this periodical is devoted.10

The China Review did have a large audience all over the world, being the window on China for many Westerners who could gain access to a great amount of first-hand, authoritative information on the ‘Far East’ without leaving their countries.

An aura of mystery surrounds the end of the journal. Unlike The Chinese Repository, there was no closing notice in the last issue. Only in 1902, from the 3rd issue of another journal, T’oung Pao 通报, we learn that The China Review had ‘temporarily’ ceased publications after the 6th issue of volume 25 (1901). Other dates have been proposed for the end of the publications, but they do not seem reliable (Wang, 2007: 24-25).

At any rate, in 29 years of activity, only 25 volumes were published, and not 29 as one would expect. In the period between 1872 until 1890, the issues came out quite regularly: 1 volume per year, 6 issues per volume, with a total of 18 volumes and 104 issues. Afterwards, from the second half of 1890, something went wrong and the last three issues of volume 19 were published only in January 1892. From that moment on, and until 1899, 1 volume was published every 2 years. In 1899, the old manner of 1 yearly volume was
resumed, until the publication ceased. Therefore, the total amounts to 25 volumes and 150 issues (Wang, 2007: 25-26).

6. The Sinitic Languages as Portrayed in *The China Review*

The variety of topics in the papers published in *The China Review* is quite impressive. As Wang calculates in his study, 33 areas of interest can be listed, spanning from architecture to archaeology, from commerce to agriculture, from ethnology to society, from history and geography to language, politics, foreign relations, etc. (Wang, 2007: 26-27). Thanks to an accurate “List of contributors and table of contents of *The China Review*” compiled in 2011 by Helen Wang of the British Museum, the papers pertaining to the field of language and linguistics are easy to find. They amount to a total of 108 (Appendix 2), including those concerning the language in general and Mandarin, but excluding short essays (sometimes just a few lines) on single characters or pronunciations. Papers on Manchu, Mongolian and Muong have been excluded since they are not Sinitic languages. The total is definitely higher in comparison to the same typology of papers in the earlier *Chinese Repository*, and this mirrors the great interest in the studies of ‘Oriental languages’ which had sparked throughout European comparatists in those years.

6.1. Themes and Topics

The amount of papers on Sinitic languages is quite high: 108 (Appendix 2), of which 62 are dedicated to Chinese in general or Mandarin (Appendix 2a) and 46 to Sinitic languages ‘other than Mandarin’ (Appendix 2b). Papers on the same topic and by the same author continuing in the following issue/s have been grouped and counted as one.

The topics covered in the 62 papers on Chinese language and Mandarin include: lexicon (10 papers), comparison with other languages (8), roots/morphology/monosyllabism (7), language in general (7), Old Chinese (6), grammar (5), pronunciation and spelling (5), phonology (3), writing (3), radicals (1), varia (6).

The other Sinitic languages that are objects of study are: Cantonese (12 papers), Chinese vernaculars in general (5) Hakka (4), Hainan dialects (4), Hokkien (3), Formosan dialects (2), Peking dialect (2), Tung-kwun dialect (2), Hankow dialect (1), Amoy (1), Eastern Sz Ch’uan dialect (1), Yangchow dialect (1), Wenchow dialect (1), Ningpo dialect (1), Lancheu dialect (1), Gansu dialect (1), San-wui dialect (1), Macao dialect (1), Shun Tak dialect (1).

The topics covered in these 46 papers include: general description/phonological comparison of dialects (38 papers), lexicon (7), songs (1).
6.2. Length

In *The China Review* there was probably no specific limit for the papers. We can see lengthy papers of 30+ pages in one issue or divided across two or more issues. Many contributions were of one or two pages, some of just a few lines.


From a comparison of the above data, we can affirm that the attention to the so-called “dialects” was not secondary at all to that paid to the language in general, and actually more space was devoted to the study and analysis of single varieties and patois.

6.3. Authors

The papers of linguistic interest were written by a total of 39 authors. Among these, 20 were authors of papers on Chinese language and linguistics in general. This number does not include 4 anonymous papers, while it does include 3 authors who just signed with their initials (N.N., G.H.B.W., W.J. and Z.K.W.), and 1 who used the pseudonym “Jawbreaker”. The most prolific writers were: Joseph Edkins (25 articles) and Edward Harper Parker (14), followed by Alfred Lister (2), E.J. Eitel (2), Friedrich Hirth (2). All the others contributed with 1 paper each.

The authors of papers concerning Sinitic languages other than Mandarin were 21 (2 of them – Edkins and Parker – were also authors of general papers on Chinese). This number does not include 4 anonymous papers, while it includes 1 author who signed with his initial (D.). The most prolific writers were E.H. Parker (16 articles), J. Edkins (5), James Dyer Ball (5), James Stewart Lockhart (2) and Frank P. Gilman (2). All the others contributed with 1 paper each.
It might be worth spending a few words to introduce some of these authors, mainly missionaries and civil servants.

Joseph Edkins (1823-1905) was a British Protestant missionary of the London Missionary society who arrived in Hong Kong in 1848. He spent more than two decades in Shanghai before moving to Beijing, where he resided for 30 years. He resigned from missionary service in 1880 to become an official translator for the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs. He cooperated in the translation of several western scientific works into Chinese (Elman, 2005: 321-328) and wrote several linguistic works on Sinitic languages. Outstanding is his contribution to the study of the Shanghai Wu dialect: *A Grammar of Colloquial Chinese as exhibited in the Shanghai dialect* (1853); *A Vocabulary of the Shanghai dialect* (1869). In *The China Review* he wrote on other Sinitic languages, on the reconstruction of early Chinese and on the issue of the roots and monosyllabism of Chinese language (Orlandi, 2019: 523-527).

Edward H. Parker (1849-1926) was a British Consular official. He had studied Chinese in Liverpool and, in 1869, moved to Beijing as Student Interpreter of the British Consular service. He served in several Chinese cities and travelled China extensively writing books and papers on its history, economy, language(s), and religions. He also published his travel journeys (Branner, 1999: 12-13). Among his works: *Chinese Account of the Opium War* (1888); *China and Religion* (1905); *China, her history, diplomacy, and commerce* (1917). His contribution to the study of Chinese dialects was outstanding and fuelled the ongoing comparatists’ debates. He did not dedicate monographs to his language studies but contributed several articles in *The China Review*.

James Dyer Ball (1847-1919) was a sinologist born in China from a missionary. He worked for the Hong Kong Civil Services for 35 years holding different positions, from security officer to interpreter for the Supreme Court (1878). He was a very prolific writer and reached a certain celebrity for his encyclopaedic work *Things Chinese* (1892). He dedicated several works to Cantonese: the first and most famous is *Cantonese Made Easy* (1883, IV ed. 1924), followed by *Cantonese Made Easy Vocabulary* (1886, III ed. 1908), *An English-Cantonese Pocket Vocabulary* (1886), *How to Speak Cantonese* (1889, II ed. 1902), *Readings in Cantonese Colloquial* (1894) (Paternicò, 2019a: 27-28).

James Stewart Lockhart (1858-1937) was a British Colonial Civil Servant in Hong Kong and Weihaiwei for more than 40 years. He is remembered for bringing a different approach to colonial rule fighting against racism. This attitude gained him the respect of Chinese leaders and institutions. He was also a collector of Chinese coins, art and artefacts (Airlie, 1989). Lockhart authored two main publications: *A Manual of Chinese Quotations* (1893); *The
Stewart Lockhart Collection of Chinese Copper (1915). All his articles in The China Review concern the Cantonese language.

Finally, Frank Patrick Gilman (1853-1918) was an American Presbyterian missionary to Hainan island, where he worked in close contact with the Miao ethnic minority people he meant to convert (Lodwick, 1999: 242). In The China Review he wrote two contributions on Hainan dialects.

6.4. Quality Assessment: Content, Methodology

The linguistic data collection, which was started by the authors of The Chinese Repository, reaches a quite impressive level within the pages of The China Review, where not only the language families but also their variants become objects of attention and analysis.

In this sense, it is interesting to notice how the length of the papers concerning “dialects” is increased to the extent of real essays on their different features, somehow acknowledging their status of “languages”. This extensive work was mainly carried out by Edkins, Parker and Dyer Ball, often in a new comparative fashion.

Through his papers in The China Review, we can see that Edkins had a main research line: reconstructing old Chinese through the analysis of some major dialects and their history in a comparative perspective. For doing so, he can be credited with the “implicit discovery of Sinitic as a linguistic family” and his work “stimulated the growth of a ‘reconstructionist’ approach, represented by the first (though partial) reconstruction of the sound system of early Chinese” (Orlandi, 2019: 530).

In his approach to language classifications and dialectology, Edkins had completely different ideas compared to Parker. Edkins’ entire work was grounded on the assumption that Chinese dated back to the common language of the Babel Tower. He therefore tried to prove this “advancing […] elaborate theories about the common origin of Chinese and Aryan” and, at the same time, tried to reduce all the Sinitic languages to descending lines of one common ancestor (Branner, 1999: 16). Parker, instead, would study the different “dialects” and their relationships and differences without a particular aim, remaining very sceptical about both the Babel’s myth and the traditional Chinese written phonological sources. Parker’s knowledge of the dialects and his extensive fieldwork of data collection in the Chinese provinces persuaded him that a uniform ancient system was not a realistic working hypothesis (Branner, 1999: 16-18).

The third main contributor to the subject was Dyer Ball, who was of the idea of including Chinese topolects under family groups which were to be considered languages on their own. He began to study some of the main Yue
local varieties, publishing their descriptions in the pages of *The China Review* and later on reaching the conclusion that:

Cantonese has its ‘real dialects’ some of which are spoken by tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands of natives, and which, if they were spoken by the inhabitants of some insignificant group of islands in the Pacific with only a tithe of the population, would be honoured by the name of languages (Dyer Ball, 1888, p. XIV).

He also highlighted that previous compilations on Cantonese (like William’s and Eitel’s dictionaries) were made with the help of native speakers who did not utter what he defined “pure Cantonese”, namely the *Sai Kwáng wá* or the West End Speech of the city of Canton. In his later famous work *Cantonese made easy*, praising Parker’s “wonderfully acute ear”, Dyer Ball adopted the syllabary Parker had published in *The China Review* (Parker, 1880: 363-382) for the transcription of Cantonese sounds.¹¹

*The China Review* was therefore the favourite platform for China-based western missionary or lay scholars of the time to publish and exchange their linguistic research findings. The scientific quality of their analyses was of a very high standard, if one takes into consideration the place and time it was carried out. Their data would prove precious for their colleagues working on western soil.

7. Impact and Concluding Remarks

The two journals, their authors and papers contributed to some of the most important research lines and ongoing linguistic debates of the 19th century.

First of all, they advanced interesting Romanization and orthography proposals for Chinese, perfecting the previous missionaries’ systems and trying to find a standard that could be used not only to transcribe Mandarin sounds but also the other major dialects. This research line would finally lead to the creation of the Wade-Giles system – also extensively discussed within the pages of *The China Review* mostly by Parker (Branner, 1999: 13-14) – which would become very popular and remain in use, especially in western publications on China, at least until 1979 (Ao, 1997).

The authors of both *The Chinese Repository* and *The China Review* provided precious first-hand material for research on language classifications and relations. These materials proved fundamental for an entire generation of so-called “armchair sinologists” (S. Julien, A. Bazin, A. Montucci, A. Severini among the others) who were conducting studies on Chinese without moving from their countries in the West, with the limited tools they could find in their libraries and mainly thanks to the “fieldwork” carried out by their contemporaries in China (Branner, 1999: 16-21; Paternicò, 2019b: 129-132; Orlandi, 2019: 527-530).
Last but not least, they initiated the study and comparison of a growing number of Chinese dialect families and their local variants, though almost exclusively from a phonological perspective (Branner, 1997: 242-249). This would slowly lead to a growing interest towards the topolects and their grammatical characteristics, paving the way to their recognition as ‘languages’, which did not all come from a common ancestor, but which developed independently, also thanks to contact with non-sinitic languages. All this would not have been possible without the contribution of the foreign missions to China. Although a few of the most prominent authors of the pages of the two journals were lay scholars, the missionaries must be credited for their role in bringing all the Chinese languages in their variety to the attention of the western readers, collecting data and promoting scholarly research on them.

Notes

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1. Mandarin back in the days was not based on Northern dialects pronunciation but was a Nanjing-based koine.
2. In 1813, Joshua Marshman was able to print with metal type St. John's Gospel and Epistles, followed in 1814 by his Elements of Chinese Grammar, and in 1815 by Robert Morrison’s A Grammar of the Chinese Language.
3. LeGrand had created a set of 3,000 matrices to print the 214 radicals and 1,100 common Chinese characters which could be combined giving a total of 22,741 characters.
4. This passage was written by Bridgman and Williams on Dec. 31st, 1851 in the Editorial Notice opening the 20th volume. Page numbers are not present.
6. His daughter was the wife of the more famous Protestant missionary Hudson Taylor (Broomhall, 1981: 235-236, passim).
7. The information comes from a list of foreign residents in China in The Directory & Chronicle for China, Japan, Corea, Indo-China ... Hong Kong: Daily Press Office, 1888: 249.
8. Despite being located in India, Marshman authored several publications on China and Chinese, among them it is noteworthy to mention: Elements of Chinese grammar, Serampore: Serampore, printed at the Mission press, 1814. On him see also “Biography: Dr. Marshman”, The Mirror of Literature, Amusement, and Instruction, no. 911 (Saturday, September 8, 1838), pp. 166-167.
11. Parker’s work suffered and was shadowed by Kalgren’s critics of inaccuracy for many years until Branner’s recent defence (Branner 1999: 14-16).

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Appendix 1

Papers on Chinese and other Sinitic languages published in *The Chinese Repository*:


Appendix 2
Papers on Chinese and other Sinitic languages published in The China Review.

a) Papers on Chinese


45. W.J., “Uses of 有”, 18.2 (1889): 129


b) Papers on other Sinitic languages

42. J. Dyer Ball, “The Hong Shan or Macao Dialect”, 22.2 (1896): 501-531.
A Review on the Huiru Movement and Key Terms of Traditional Chinese Thought Used in Wang Daiyu’s Work

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Abstract
The locations of some geographies are exclusive in the history of the world. These geographies have a special place with the belief and thought systems that they generated on their own. China, the prominent one among these geographies, is one of the most rooted civilizations in history. Many great philosophers, notably Laozi and Confucius, appeared in Chinese civilization. Another specific geography is the Middle East. This geography has been the cradle of civilization of many religion and belief systems. Islam had arisen in the Arabian Peninsula and shortly became a universal religion spreading throughout the world. In the middle of the 7th century, Islam reached China, a faraway country to the Arabian Peninsula. For an official date, we could claim the year of 651 when Caliphate Uthman sent messengers to China. On this date, Tang Dynasty was ruling in China. Islam, which entered China in the period of Tang Dynasty, has spread throughout China. Especially in the period of Yuan Dynasty, Muslims aggregately migrated from the western border of China to the inner regions of China. Over time, Muslims dropping Chinese lands as a little seed turned into a giant forest. Thus, after centuries, the Huizu ethnic group, an indispensable component of Chinese social structure, emerged. As for the Chinese and Islamic civilizations, they have been in interaction with one another from the very beginning. However, the beginning of the exact intellectual interaction was during the end of the Ming Dynasty. This interaction was then named as Huiru (回儒) in the meaning of dialogue between civilizations. This term is of critical importance for our study since the interaction between these two civilizations caused the Chinese Islam understanding to emerge. Huiru has become the richness of both Chinese Muslims and Chinese society. Huiru movement has been carried to present day by Chinese Muslim Scholars mainly. One of the leading names in the Huiru movement, Chinese Muslim scholar Wang Daiyu is of significant importance.
for our work. Therefore, our study will be in the form of a review and evaluation on the key terms of traditional Chinese thought used by the Huiru movement, in particular by the Chinese Muslim scholar Wang Daiyu. This period, when the intellectual interaction started will be the focus of our study.

**Keywords:** Huiru, Wang Daiyu, Chinese Muslim, Islam in China

1. Introduction

Chinese civilization has been in a continuous interaction with other civilizations throughout the history. In particular, western border of China has been the most important geographical region for China to know western civilization and culture. Although countries have borders on geographical maps, there are no borders on cultural maps. China has been connected to the world continentally and through sea routes ever since. Likewise these two have been the rest of the world’s access channels to China. These two channels generate revenue both materially and non-materially. The material revenue of these channels is trade and non-material revenue is culture. In other words, through these channels, not only trade goods were transported from one point to the other, but also priceless and imponderable “culture” made a journey between civilizations. As a result Chinese culture and other cultures have been in interaction with each other. Therefore, cultural interaction in Chinese history is one of the best examples of the famous saying “The road is civilization.”

Silk Road acted as an important bridge for religions entering China. Religions that were non-existent there were able to enter China thanks to the Silk Road. For example; Shamanism, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, etc. entered China in different periods. The geographical conditions and the course followed by Islam in entering China are very important. During 7th century, Tang dynasty (唐朝) was ruling in China and Islam entered China in that period. Silk Road and sea routes were both effective in the entrance and spread of Islam into China. Two prominent powers of the world in 7th century, Arabic and Chinese empires, got closer economically through the Silk Road and sea routes.

China met Islam for the first time around 618-626 during the era of Prophet Mohammed, and made its’ first official contact in 651 during Caliph Uthman’s era. After the Battle of Talas in 751, the peace period among Chinese and Muslims was interrupted; but the An Lushan rebellion in 755 revived the companionship between Chinese and Muslims. As the An Lushan rebellion was suppressed, Chinese and Muslims became neighbours. In other words, the Muslims were no longer “outsiders” but “natives”. Whether the entrance date of Islam into China is 651 or earlier, the fact that Islam has reached China shortly after its birth in Mecca is undeniable. The entrance of Islam into China is important not only for Islam and Chinese civilizations but
also for the whole world culture. With Islam, “papermaking”, one of the four great inventions of Chinese, arrived first in Samarkand, and then to Arabic world and then to Europe. The encounter and then the subsequent interaction of Islamic culture and the Chinese culture made a significant contribution in blending the western civilization with the eastern civilization.

After a general review given above, it would be useful to briefly touch on the issue of Islam in the Yuan and Ming Dynasty eras in terms of our topic.

The Yuan Dynasty is a different period for Chinese history. This is an interesting period not only because founding members of the dynasty were not Chinese, but because step by step, the body of government officials moved away from Chinese to the Mongolians or to people who were referred simply as foreigners such as Arabs, Persians and Turks. Another aspect of this period is that during this time, China opened up to the world and many foreign nationals entered into China. Muslims, entered into China during this period intensely. In fact, this situation was described in the Chinese History Records with the slogan of “Huihui everywhere” (Zhongguo Yisilan Jiao Xiehui, 2011: 258), and it was emphasized that the entrance of Muslims into China was really fast. The Muslims were generally consisting of Arabs, Persians and Turks. In this period, Muslims were no longer a community around a certain region of China in small groups, and they spread all over China and became one of the building blocks of China’s social structure. This is the period when the foundations of the future Hui nation, which will be a part of China later, is established. We should indicate a striking point here; while the Mongolians are known to be a damaging nation for majority of the Muslim world, for Muslims living in China they are known to be the nation that paved the way. Again, during this period, in addition to building many new mosques, old and unused mosques were restored and Muslims were allowed to live their religion. During the Yuan period, many Muslims not only served as government officials but they also served in good positions.

The period of Ming Dynasty began as Chinese took over after the Mongol rule. Owing it’s foundation to reactions against foreign-led government, the Ming Dynasty adopted a “Sinification” policy to erase the foreign traits in China. This policy was applied to an extent that the emphasis on “Sinification” lied at the heart of many new laws. For example, according to these laws, foreigners had to speak Chinese, marriages among themselves were banned, etc. (Hunyin, Da Minglü Juan 6, n.d.). The motivation behind these prohibitions was the Sinification of foreigners. For this reason, we can say that Muslims were mostly affected by the “Sinification” policies implemented for foreigners during the Ming period. Because of this policy, Muslims have come to a point of forgetting their own native language over time, and have actively experienced the process of Sinification with the traditional education they received. Therefore, an identity problem arose among Muslims.
Given that the Ming Emperor Hongwu was personally interested in Islam so much so that he even wrote a *na’at* (poem for the prophet of Islam), brought some scientists to the point that the Ming era can be described as the golden age for Muslims; I have to admit that I do not agree with this view. The reason for that is, personal interest of Emperor Hongwu was never visible in the state level and so it was never implemented as a state policy, only stayed in a narrow framework. Despite all these developments, Muslims were still appointed in higher ranks during the Ming period. For example; Zheng He, the admiral of Zheng He’s Expeditions to the West carried out during the Ming period, is one of the most well-known examples of this (Ceylan, 2015).

With the spread of the Sinification process all over China during the Ming Dynasty, there have been substantial changes in the lifestyle, language, culture, architecture, social life, education and even the identity of Muslims. This population, gathering around a belief and adopting a lifestyle, has been given an ethnic identity and this ethnic nation has been called “Huizu” in China. The gene map of the Huizu ethnic nation has survived to the present day based on the origins of faith rather than ethnicity (Ceylan, 2015: 113).

Chinese and Islamic civilizations have been in interaction since the first day Islam entered China. However, it was not until the last phase of the Ming dynasty that an intellectual interaction began. This interaction was named as Huiru (回儒) in the following years in reference to both interacting parties; Islamic civilization and Confucian civilization. In terms of this study, the interaction between these two great civilizations is of vital importance, because as a result of the interaction between these two civilizations, Chinese Islamic school was born. Therefore, in addition to being used to describe thought and cultural richness of Chinese Muslims, it was also used to refer to a part of Chinese people’s thought and cultural richness. Today Huiru is defined as a ground where Islamic and Chinese civilizations meet on common values and blend together. In other words, it is seen and valued as an inter-civilization interaction.

The concept of Huiru was born through interaction of Islam with Confucian philosophy. If we were to analyze the term Huiru (回儒); the character “回 (Hui)” represents Islam and the character “儒 (Ru)” represents Confucian philosophy. This interaction between Islam and Confucian philosophy is an inevitable consequence of the long historical process. That is to say, this movement is the projection of worldview of a generation that grew up with cultural accumulations of both ancient Chinese civilization and Islamic civilization. At this point, translating Islamic resources into Chinese was given utmost importance because of the necessity. Some of the Chinese Muslim scholars of the time pioneered in these translations; what’s more some of these scholars wrote their own books in Chinese through reading
and synthesizing. In order to convey Islam properly into a generation that
grew up with Chinese culture, these books took the foundation of Confucian
philosophy as a base, which could be regarded as the pioneer of Chinese
culture. These scholars wanted to bring Chinese civilization and Islamic
civilization closer by finding and highlighting common points in some
concepts and principals of these two civilizations. This situation arose as
a result of both social and academic necessity, because daily languages of
Muslims became important after Islam entered China. Number of languages
that Muslims speak increased concurrently with Muslim population growth,
especially during the Yuan dynasty era. In reference to the languages that
Chinese Muslims spoke, Arabic, Farsi and Turkish would be the leading
ones. However, as a result of the Sinification policy during the Ming dynasty
era, this situation changed. During the Ming era, minorities and foreigners
were banned from speaking non-Chinese languages, using non-Chinese
names, wearing non-Chinese clothes and getting married among themselves.
Subsequently, towards the end of Ming dynasty era, the number of Muslims
that can speak Arabic, Farsi or Turkish decreased by vast numbers and
Muslims were sort of Sinicized. As being a “Chinese” became more dominant
in their identities, Muslims started designing their future around this new
feature of their identity. As a result, emphasis to being “Chinese” could be
seen in every aspect of daily life. In this world, the full feasibility of newly
formed and emerging identities in social life depends on education. As a
result, Muslims had to make significant changes in the existing traditional
Islamic education. With these changes, a systematic education has developed.
This new education system opened a road for Chinese style madrasa. Thus,
Chinese style madrasa education started during the Ming dynasty era.

The concept of Huiru was first introduced by Japanese scholar Kuwata
Rokuro in 1925. Rokuro, defined this concept as Muslim Confucian and
later he extended it to define as Sinicized Islam as well (Murata, 2000:
XI). However, this work did not receive enough attention when it was first
published. As a result, there is very little work on interaction of Islam and
Confucianism before 1990. In the following years, without any doubt, the most
important work conducted outside of China was by Japanese scholar Sachiko
Murata. Regarded as an authority on Chinese Islamic thought, this scholar has
written and published many articles that underlie lots of later academic works,
like “The Vision of Islam” (with William Chittick), “The Tao of Islam” and
“Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light”.

After the 1990s, it was understood that studies conducted on Muslim
Chinese would be lacking an academical foundation without investigating
the Huiru movement, because even though this movement started towards
the end of the Ming dynasty, it had vast effects on Chinese Muslims in the
coming centuries.
In order to emphasize that Chinese Islamic understanding could be clearly regarded as natural, Ma Mingliang, Yisilanjiao de Zhongguo Hua yu uses a seed analogy in his article “Yiru Quanjing”.

Just as the fruit of a seed shows differences in different countries and in different climatic conditions and as it absorbs the essence of the soil of that region and then gives the color, the smell and the taste of it to its fruit; likewise after spreading out to the different corners of the world, Islam has continued to live in those countries with these countries’ Islamic understandings like this. For example Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia have their own Islamic notions and so on. We could understand this as a difference in interpretations of the same essence. The formation of Chinese Islamic style has been bilayered. The first is that over time Chinese Muslims create a style that naturally reflects themselves, and the second is that the Chinese Muslim scholars make the academic background of this general course. All the religions that came into China as outsiders were somehow shaped in a Chinese way. In other words, they were localized. For example; Buddhism entered China in the 6th century BC. India originated Buddhism was influenced by Chinese thought and virtually formed a new Buddhism religion and became one of China’s most popular religions. Thus, Buddhism and China have become two parts that complement each other. Although there are huge differences between Christianity and traditional Chinese thought, even Christianity managed to generate a Chinese style of itself (Ma, 2005: 53-54).

Just as in the seed analogy above, the Muslims that were referred to as “guests” during the Tang dynasty were now being referred as “Huizu” during Ming dynasty era. Starting with this period, Muslims were no longer “guests” but “natives”. Whether we use the term Sinification of Islam, localization of Islam or formation of Chinese style Islam; over the course of nearly 1400 years, i.e. over the period it has spent within the borders of China, Islam has been affected by Chinese thought, culture, literature, philosophy, from the color of China, smell of China, texture of China, etc. This interaction made a peak towards the end of Ming dynasty and the early periods of Qing dynasty.

Madrasa education in China played a crucial role in the formation and continuation of Huiru movement. Therefore, it would be beneficial to take a closer look at the madrasa education in China.

2. Madrasa Education (经堂教育)

The education model that goes back to the suffa school has an important place in Islamic history. This Islamic traditional style of education was continually improved in a certain system all over the world in the following periods and it has been the basis of education in which Islam has been taught for centuries. As a natural result of the elevated levels of social and economic prosperity
during the Ming Dynasty, Muslim population grew rapidly and number of mosques increased. Therefore, need for lecturers and imams increased. By the 16th century, establishing madrasas where Islamic education would be provided became a necessity (Gao and Li, 2013: 22). This necessity could be realised in a single sentence as follows: By the time of Ming Dynasty, Muslims living within the borders of China could not understand the Qur’an. In other words, Islam was likely to become purely ritualistic; prayers did not have a meaning, a couple of Islamic words were the lone group of survivors. The saying that best described this situation was on the wall of a Quanzhou house in 1536: “Muslims no longer understand the Qur’an, the mere fact that they are not willing to understand it is even worse” (Gao and Li, 2013:27-28). The madrasas, founded by Hu Dengzhou (胡登洲) who lived between 1522-1597 in the late periods of the Ming Dynasty, had become a school for imams and scholars, in addition to functioning as places where Muslims learn Islam. These madrasas were like a subdivision of mosques and served as an institution with a certain educational program. In general, education in these madrasas were in two different levels; primary school level and university level. Of these, the general Islamic knowledge is taught to children aged 6-7, which we classify as a primary school; what we classify as a university is an academic department where 13 works such as the Qur’an, hadith, theology, logic, morality, Arabic grammar, etc. were taught Zhongguo Yisilan Jiao Xiehui, 2011: 184). The language of education in the madrasa was Arabic, Persian and Chinese. However, we could say that a different and a new language had arised in addition to these. The main reason for the formation of this language is the fact that many Muslims did not know Arabic and Persian or that those who seem to know these languages actually had a very limited knowledge. Therefore, the madrasa language called “xiaojing (小錦)” or “xiao’er jing (小儿錦)” was formed. Thanks to this language, it was possible to transliterate Arabic letters using symbols in Chinese alphabet (Chen, 2015: 81). Over time, such madrasas were opened in other Muslim-populated areas. In addition to being very important educational institutions for Muslims, these madrasas have contributed greatly to the infrastructure of the future Chinese Islamic academy. However, evaluating the madrasas retrospectively, one can see it’s shortcomings as well as it’s positive aspects. For example, madrasas have been rather slow in renewing themselves. As a result, the education provided was simply out of date and intangible; when compared with requirements of the day (Qiu, 2012: 357).

There are two main components, or two determinants of the formation of the Chinese Islamic style. One of them is Chinese style madrasa education. The other one is a collection of works that is a result of certain accumulation for centuries written in Chinese. These two components are the two pillars of the Chinese interpretation of Islam that has formed from the past to the
present. Chinese style madrasa system has been mentioned above. Now, we will continue with Chinese Islamic works.

The following table contains a list of these works and related information such as author and publication:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wang Daiyu (王岱舆)</td>
<td>Zhengjiao Zhenquan (正教真诠), 1642</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Qingzhen Daxue (清真大学), ?</td>
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<td>Xizheng Zhenda (希正真答), 1658</td>
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<td>Zhang Zhong (张中)</td>
<td>Guizhen Zong Yi (归真总义), 1661</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Si Pian Yao dao (四篇要道), 1653</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ma Minglong (马明龙)</td>
<td>Ren Ji Xingwu (认己醒悟), 1661</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ma Boliang (马伯良)</td>
<td>Jiao Kuan Jie Yao (教款捷要), 1678</td>
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<td>Ma Junshi (马君实)</td>
<td>Wei Zhen Yaolue (卫真要略), 1661</td>
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<td>Wu Zixian (伍子先)</td>
<td>Xiuzhen Ming Yin (修真蒙引), 1672</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guizhen Yao Dao (归真要道), 1678</td>
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<td>Sun Ke’an (孙可庵)</td>
<td>Qingzhen Jiao Kao (清真教考), 1720</td>
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<td>Ma Zhu (马注)</td>
<td>Qingzhen Zhinan (清真指南), 1683</td>
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<td>Liu Zhi (刘智)</td>
<td>Tianfang Xing Li (天方性理), 1704</td>
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<td>Tianfang Dianli Ze Yao Jie (天方典礼择要解), 1708</td>
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<td>Tianfang Zhi Sheng Shilu (天方至圣实录), 1721</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Wu Gong Shiyi (五功释义), 1710</td>
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<td>Tianfang Zimu Jie Yi (天方字母解义), 1710</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tianfang Sanzijing (天方三字经), ?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jin Tianzhu (金天柱)</td>
<td>Qingzhen Shiyi (清真释疑), 1783</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ma Fuchu (马复初)</td>
<td>Si Dian Yao Hui (四典要会), 1859</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bao Ming Zhen Jing Zhi Jie (宝命真经直解), ?</td>
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Source: Li, 2006: 3-4.

These works that are listed in the table above, are the works put forward as a result of a desire to explain Islam in Chinese. When one talks about Chinese Islamic works, the first three names that come to mind are Wang Daiyu, Ma Zhu and Liu Zhi. These three names are very important names in terms of Chinese Islamic history.

The pioneers of Huiru movement interpreted Islam according to framework of the relationship between religion and the human nature, while blending this interpretation with the traditional thinking of China. As a result of this tremendous effort, a framework of Chinese Islam emerged, which is nothing but a multicultural form of Islam (Wain, 2016: 25).
These brilliant names such as Wang Daiyu, Ma Zhu and Liu Zhi have opened a new path by essentially standing at the centre of Islam and blending the teachings of this religion with Chinese traditional culture, i.e. the ideas and teachings of Confucius. Thus, they widened the route to the interaction between Islam and Chinese civilizations (Yang, 2012: 7). The main denominator of this interaction is wisdom and truth.

If we were to define the leading notions of Chinese Islamic school in terms of the concepts of Chinese traditional thought; two of these concepts would be “xiusheng (修身)” and “hongdao (弘道)”. The term “xiusheng (修身)”, means to improve the body and mind in Chinese, which resembles the struggle to rise to the rank of perfect human, or al-Insan al-Kamil, by defeating worldly desires and one’s self, or nafs in Islam. The term “hongdao (弘道)” is to be on the righteous path, and this is nothing but Sirat al-Mustakim (righteous path) in Islam (Sun and Xu, 2005: 27). Consequently, these scholars tried to portray Islamic and Chinese traditional thoughts as two aspects of the same truth. Anybody who reads Islamic works but neglects the works of Chinese traditional thought or just the opposite would not be able to grasp this truth. One must definitely know both sides (Israeli, 2003: 49).

In his article “Established Islam and Marginal Islam in China from Eclecticism to Syncretism,” Raphael Israeli notes the following about the origins of theory of Islam and Confucianism were written on the monument in a mosque:

Sages have one mind and the same truth, so they convince each other without leaving a shadow of doubt…. In all parts of the world, sages arise who possess this uniformity of mind and Truth. Muhammad, the Great Sage of the West, lived in Arabia long after Confucius, the Sage of China. Though separated by ages and countries, they had the same mind and truth (Israeli, 1978: 100).

In the given sentences above, it was emphasized that even though Islamic thought and Chinese traditional thought emerged in different geographies, from the mind and truth point of view, they are products of the same source.

The topic of Huiru is quite wide in terms of its contents. The reason for this vastness is that a lot of Chinese Muslim scholars who embraced this movement and worked in this direction. Naturally, this issue has a wide range in the history of Chinese Islam. Within Huiru studies, not only Islamic thought, but also Chinese traditional thought and Islamic studies around the world are examined from different perspectives (Hua, 2002: 38).

3. Wang Daiyu

Wang Daiyu, a Chinese Muslim scholar, lived in the late period of Ming Dynasty. Wang Daiyu was also known as “The True Old Man of Islam (真回
My ancestors came to China as diplomats from the Arabian Peninsula during the reign of Zhu Yuanzhang (朱元璋), the Emperor of the Ming Dynasty. The Emperor allowed my ancestors to remain in China as a result of their correction in the Chinese calendar, by finding a calculation error. Thereupon my ancestors settled in China and we have a history of 300 years with the surname Wang (Wang, 1999: 34).

Wang Daiyu spent his childhood and youth in Nanjing (南京) (Jin, 2008: 70). In the following years, he moved to Beijing (北京). There are several opinions on his moving from Nanjing to Beijing. However, since there is no definite conclusion on these opinions, none of these go beyond being an assumption. What we know most certainly about the life of Wang Daiyu is that he spent the rest of his life in Beijing and was buried in Sanlihe (三里河) region outside Fuchengmen (阜成门) (Jin, 2008: 70-74).

Even though his ancestors had a history of nearly 300 years, Wang Daiyu did not go through Chinese traditional education as a child. His Chinese was sufficient to write and speak the language in his daily life. He mentions that he learned the traditional Chinese education in his 20s upon his curiosity (Wang, 1999: 34). During this learning process, he read works on Confucius, Daoism and Buddhism, which could be considered three important beliefs and thought systems of the Chinese traditional thought system. He conducted several studies on these works. These readings and studies were built upon the Islamic educational background of Wang Daiyu, which goes back to his childhood and youth. In later years, Liang Yijun (梁以浚) described him as “expert of four religions (四教博通)” (Wang, 1999: 4) in the preface of “A True Explanation of the Right Religion”, referring to Wang Daiyu’s versatile intellectual feeding. As one can understand from this description, Wang Daiyu is a Chinese Muslim scholar who has taken his readings on Chinese traditional thought seriously and has succeeded in blending it with his own world of thought. Wang Daiyu is one of the leading names in the formation of the Chinese understanding of Islam. He was influential on scholars who
Huiru Movement and Key Terms of Traditional Chinese Thought

came after him with his thoughts. For this reason, in a congress titled “Islam and Confucianism” held in Nanjing in August 2002, a Confucianist scientist made the following comment about Wang Daiyu and Liu Zhi: “I realized that, in addition to understanding the Confucian thought, there were deeper impressions and observations about Confucius in Wang Daiyu’s works, and this amazed me. Therefore, names such as Wang Daiyu and Liu Zhi definitely studied on, as they deserve further attention” (Yang, 2012: 7-8).

As discussed above, it would not be wrong to say that information about Wang Daiyu's life merely consists of his autobiography which is a part of his work “A True Explanation of the Right Religion”. Therefore, information on Wang Daiyu’s life is not likely to go beyond that autobiography. We will try to learn the interpretation of Chinese Islam, led by Wang Daiyu, through his own works “A True Explanation of the Right Religion (正教真诠), Great Learning of Islam (清真大学), Rare and True Answers (希真正答)”.

The primary sources that we need to take into account in order to fully understand Wang Daiyu’s Chinese Islamic thought are his works, which are regarded as keystones of Chinese Islam. Each one of these works brings the thought of Wang Daiyu to the present day. When we review previous studies conducted on works of Wang Daiyu, it can be seen that there is no clear chronological order of his writings, exact date of completion for each work is unknown. The only thing we know for sure about the order of his works is that the work titled “Rare and True Answers” is the last one. There are various opinions about which one of the other two works, “A True Explanation of the Right Religion”, or “Great Learning of Islam” was written first. These three works were brought together and published by Ningxia Renmin Publishing House in 1985. The order given in this publication is “A True Explanation of the Right Religion”, “Great Learning of Islam” and “Rare and True Answers”.

When we look at the works of Wang Daiyu, we see traces of the concepts of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism belonging to Chinese traditional thought. However, the fact that these works enclose such terms does not necessarily mean that each concept or expression matches the ideas of Islam, as these concepts were sometimes used to explain the thought of Islam more clearly, and sometimes to emphasize that some of these concepts are completely opposed to Islamic thought. For example, he underlined that the reincarnation belief of Buddhism is not accepted by Islam.


When we say Chinese traditional thought, we are talking about a cultural accumulation of nearly five thousand years. Chinese traditional thought has quite a long history and considering the world thought history, it is one of
the rare thought systems that continues without breaking its connection with
the past. Especially the Chinese writing plays a crucial role in permanence of
Chinese culture, being an indispensable carrier of the culture. Today, studying
the history of Chinese writing alone would make it possible to see the depth
of Chinese traditional thought.

As Islam entered into China and developed there over time, a new social
class emerged. Later, this social class became a nation and was called Huizu.
After this point, Huizu became supra identity of Muslims living in China.
With the formation of this identity, changes in language, culture, thought,
lifestyle and various fields would become inevitable. Language, which is an
indispensable tool for Muslims to learn their religion, has gained importance.
Learning Arabic and Persian languages and their usage diminished rapidly
among Muslims over time. These languages have nearly vanished in China so
much so that excluding the scholar class, there were almost nobody speaking
Arabic or Persian. This led to the need to explain Islam in Chinese. In other
words, this was not an option but a necessity. Wang Daiyu was one of the
first to see this necessity. We give an example of some concepts belonging to
Chinese traditional thought.

4.1. One (一)
The lexical meaning of term “yi” is “one,” and it is one of the most basic
concepts of Chinese traditional thought; many new concepts were derived
from this concept. For example, tongyi (統一), heyi (合一), tian ren heyi
(天人合一), etc. This term is even used to mean the essence of the universe.
Having an important place in the world of Chinese thought, this concept
has been used by many Chinese philosophers. For example, one of China’s
greatest philosophers, Laozi, has used the concept of “one” in many places
(Daode Jing, n.d.).

Wang Daiyu also used the concept of “yi” when describing the concepts
of “zheng yi”, “shu yi” and “ti yi”, which are the main topics of his works.4
By using the term “yi”, Wang Daiyu wanted to explain the essence of
everything, the beginning of everything, by grace of whom everything comes
into existence, that is to say, Allah. Of course, there is not a one-to-one match
between the “yi” used by Wang Daiyu and the “yi” belonging to the Chinese
world of thought. That is because the content and essence of creation and
creator in Islamic thought and existence and creator concepts in Chinese
thought are different. However, with “yi”, one and only God, Allah was
emphasized by Wang Daiyu and it was mentioned that whatever is enclosed
by the term “existence”, it was created by Allah and that all of these creations
would return to Allah, that is, the “one”.

4.2. Wuji (无极) and Taiji (太极)

These two concepts are among the most important concepts of Chinese traditional thought and have taken their place in the works of thought in almost every period. The concept Wuji first appeared in Laozi’s work (Daode Jing, n.d.). The concept Taiji is first mentioned in the “Book of Changes (易经)” (Yi Jing and Taiji, n.d.). In the following years, many philosophers and thinkers worked on these concepts. Among these works, a very important one was written by the great thinker Zhou Dunyi (周敦颐) (Zhou Dunyi, n.d.), who lived during the Northern Song Dynasty. In his work titled “Diagram Explaining the Supreme Ultimate (太极图说)” (Taiji Tushu, n.d.), Zhou Dunyi emphasized that wuji and taiji are the most important concepts in the formation of the universe and things. Wuji and taiji are closely related concepts. These concepts are the formulation of creation and existence in Chinese thought.

Just like the concepts “yin-yang” or “dao”, the concepts wuji and taiji may refer to different meanings on their own. Therefore, we believe that it will be more accurate to use these concepts together in the text as “wuji and taiji”.

The term wuji has several meanings which are; something without polarity, something without any starting point, something with no beginning and no end, something with no limit, infinite, space, etc. (Editorial Board, 2014: 393-887). In addition to these, it may also mean something with no taste, no smell, no color, no shape, no name, etc. The term Taiji means the beginning of existence, the mother of everything, the origin of everything, the symbol of existence, etc. (Li, 2004: 1260).

Taiji, unlike wuji, is visible and known. After giving these definitions, based on the thesis that there can be no taiji without wuji, we can say that the main essence is “wuji”.

Starting with wuji and explaining the existence of the universe, this process continues with taiji (太极), liang yi (两仪) and yinyang (阴阳). This whole process, which looks like concentric circles, is almost like the formula of an order.5

4.3. Two Realms (两仪)

This concept is essentially related to wuji and taiji. The most important part of creation after taiji is liang yi. In essence, the earth and heaven or yin-yang form a magnificent cycle, which are complements of each other.

Taiji is neither one being two nor the method of dividing it by two. It is precisely two coming to life from one (Yuan, 2012: 113). The debate on whether taiji was dividing one into two or one giving birth to two continued
for a long time. Making a synthesis of the discussions on this issue, Yuan Yucheng made the following comment in the concluding section of his work "Taiji Sheng Liang Yi":

On the yin-yang theory set in Yijing, taiji is divided into two. These are yin and yang. Taiji gave birth to yin and yang, (here) one is divided into two. Although there are fundamental differences between these two theories, there is a close relationship at many points. In the first one, taiji is divided into yin-yang, this process is (also) the birth process of yin-yang from Taiji. This is the relationship between the two. If we were to look at this relationship alone, we could not understand the difference. This is wrong (Yuan, 2012: 115).

Debates on whether yin-yang was formed by dividing taiji into two or it was born directly from taiji still continues. However, in both views, the starting point of yin-yang is taiji. Yin-yang is a part of taiji in both cases, whether by division or by birth.

4.4. Yin-Yang (阴阳)

Yin-yang is one of the most important concepts of Chinese philosophy from past to present. In addition to Chinese philosophers, history writers have also expressed their views on yin-yang. In fact, historians’ work on yin-yang has become the focus of new academic studies today (Fang, 2018). These terms sometimes represent the balance in opposites, which exists in all areas of the existence since the initial creation and the subsequent processes, and sometimes they represent male and female. Yin-yang is the name of a balance represented by opposites. In other words, it is the name of the order and balance that occurs when the opposite situations balance each other such as hot-cold, dark-bright, hard-soft, etc. According to this view, anything in the universe can be known only through its’ opposite.

4.5. The Three Cardinal Guides and The Five Constant Virtues (三纲五常)

The three cardinal guides and the five constant virtues value system is another deep-rooted concept of Chinese traditional thinking. This value system, which dates back to Confucius before the Qin Dynasty, was conceptualized by one of the famous philosophers of Han Dynasty, Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒) (Lu, 2018: 64). In the history of Chinese thought, it was proposed that only by practising this value system, society could reach prosperity, both socially and administratively. For this reason, this value system has been promoted and was always kept in the forefront in every period of Chinese history.

The three cardinal guides and the five constant virtues include both essence and existence. In general, the concepts of three cardinal guides
involve ideas of existence. The five constant virtues include more essence-related concepts (Lu, 2018: 69).

The three cardinal guides classify relationships between people. These guides focus on the relations between king-official (supervisor-employee), father-son and husband-wife. These guides propose that if these relationships are intact, social relations can be built on a solid ground (Lu, 2018: 68), because the most fundamental relations of the society are the relations between these three classes and these relationships will last forever.

The concept of five constant virtues is a part of the Chinese traditional thought. This concept belongs to the Confucian school. The road map leading to the desired perfect human was designed by putting the individual in the centre. In other words, we can say that these virtues are what an individual must possess in order to be a virtuous person. These virtues are: benevolence/love (仁), righteousness/justice (义), rituals/propriety (礼), wisdom (智) and faith/fidelity (信). These virtues are very important for finding one’s self. Even today, the modern world still emphasizes the importance of these virtues.

The first four of these five virtues (benevolence/love, righteousness/justice, rituals/propriety, wisdom) were agglomerated in the period of Mengzi (孟子), one of the great thinkers of China, and they were called the “four moral rules (四德)”. Later on, the virtue of “faith/fidelity” was added by Dong Zhongshu, one of the great thinkers who lived in the Han period, and number of virtues became five. Later, these virtues were called “five virtues” (Luo, 2018: 20). Finally, in the following years, they were formulated as the three cardinal guides and the five constant virtues (三纲五常). This formulation involves codes from ideal people to ideal society. Wang Daiyu also used this formulation, which preserves its validity even today. In fact, Wang Daiyu has embraced these concepts so much so that he even wrote a separate chapter titled “five virtues” in his book “A True Explanation of the Right Religion”. In this chapter, instead of using the more common term wu gong (五功), he referred to the five pillars of Islam as wu chang (五常), which has an important place in Chinese traditional thinking (Wang, 1999: 207).

4.6. True Loyalty (真忠) and Dutiful Child (至孝)

Two common points between Chinese traditional thought and Islamic thought would be the concepts of “true loyalty (真忠)” and “dutiful child (至孝)”.

In fact, we could say that these concepts are common points of many civilizations, in addition to these two great civilizations. There is a strong emphasis on these two concepts especially in Confucian thought. Being loyal should be practised towards the Emperor and the State; while being a dutiful child should be practised towards parents. By all means, loyalty is a must for a dutiful child. Therefore, these two concepts are highly correlated. In Islam,
the concept of loyalty is a comprehensive concept from top to bottom, but first to Allah, and to the prophet. The limits and requirements of the concept of dutiful child are clearly drawn in the Qur’an. In the 23rd and 24th verses of the chapter of Isra, Muslims are asked to behave in best manners for their parents: “say not to them (parents) a word of contempt, nor repel them, but address them in terms of honor!”

4.7. Saint/Sage (圣)

Another concept of Chinese traditional culture that Wang Daiyu uses is “sheng (圣)”⁷. This concept means saint/sage/wise man and is used for people who are considered superior people in Chinese culture. For example, this concept is used so frequently for Confucius. Wang Daiyu used this concept also when referring to the Prophet Muhammad in his works. As Wang Daiyu used the concept of “sheng” as a replacement for the prophet, this usage gave rise to some “interesting” comments, or to some speculations and debates even. These comments or debates originate from the fact that: the use of the term “sheng” in Wang Daiyu’s works corresponds to the term “prophet”, therefore, in some comments, it was claimed that Wang Daiyu actually wanted to emphasize that Confucius could be a prophet (Wain, 2016: 33). In fact, there is no such comment explicitly in his works. It is very natural for a Muslim scholar like Wang Daiyu to refrain from making a clear comment here. This is because in Islamic belief, a person cannot be defined as a “prophet” unless there is clear evidence about him being a prophet. Generally, in such situations, the discussion concludes by saying “Allah knows the best”. The possibility of Confucius being a prophet is generally based on the 24th verse of chapter Fatir in Qur’an.

4.8. Sacrifice (宰牲)

Rituals are extremely important in Chinese traditional culture. Especially in Confucian thought, rituals may never be compromised and should always be observed. One day, Confucius gave the following answer to a question of his student about sacrifice: “You cannot sacrifice the sheep while I cannot sacrifice the rituals.” (Lunyu, Ba Yi, n.d.). In emphasizing the importance of sacrifice in Islamic belief, Wang Daiyu made use of this saying from Confucius. There are a number of rules that Muslims must observe during the sacrificial ritual. The last one of these rules, and probably the most important one is to do the sacrifice for the sake of Allah. Sacrifice being a way to express respect for ancestors in the thought of Confucius, it is performed for sake of Allah, or in other words to gain the consent of Allah in Islam. As we can see, Wang Daiyu chose an indirect way for telling Chinese Muslims
why sacrifice ritual is performed and what its significance was, by giving an example from Confucian thought. Thus, he started with an event they were familiar with, and exemplifying from this event he explained the importance of sacrifice worship, one of the five pillars of Islam.

5. Conclusion

As a result of the “Sinification” policy, which was consistently implemented during the Ming Dynasty, Muslims living in China were inclined to learn Chinese and eventually Chinese culture and Chinese traditional thinking. An inevitable consequence of this situation was: Muslims were speaking Arabic, Persian and Turkish less and less, so much so that they come to the point of forgetting these languages totally. The language used by Muslims was no longer the language of a social group, but it was the language of instruction that Muslim scholars knew and used. As a result of these developments, it became a necessity or even an obligation to use Chinese and Chinese traditional thought as a bridge in order to explain and teach Islam to the existing generation and future generations. If that bridge had not been established or that attempt was not successful at all, Islam in China could be a referring to a totally different picture today. However, claiming that this bridge between the two civilizations was used one hundred percent efficiently and correctly, or that everything was transferred smoothly with no problems at all would be far from the reality.

As the Muslim population increased, some madrasas were founded by Hu Dengzhou, in order to educate teachers and professors who will teach Muslims their religion: the language of instruction was Arabic, Persian and Chinese in these madrasas. Thus, Islam started to be taught in Chinese within an education system. Hence, the pillars of the academic infrastructure were established, in which a new interpretation of Chinese Islam would emerge.

With the onset of madrasa education, the movement of translating Islamic works into Chinese has gained speed systematically. To learn their own religion, Muslims who did not speak Arabic or Persian in particular needed Islamic works translated into Chinese or more importantly Islamic works written directly in Chinese. Therefore, this movement initiated by a group of Muslim scholars was called the Huiru Movement. This movement was the result of a necessity, not an option. One of the leading names in this movement is Wang Daiyu, who has been influential on the understanding of Chinese Islam with his work.

By the time of Wang Daiyu, Islam had already spent more than 900 years in China and in this long period of time many dynasties were established and destroyed. Each period has a unique color and texture. While Muslims were regarded mainly as a group of strangers and outsiders during the Tang
period, they were regarded as a social class that was effective all over China during the Ming period. The shaping and formation of today's Huizu ethnic group was realized during the Ming period. Due to the policies implemented in the Ming period, Muslim Chinese evolved towards Chinese Muslims. The cultural and academic infrastructure of this evolution was established by a group of intellectuals who were dedicated to explain Islam with the concepts of Chinese traditional thought. Wang Daiyu is one of the leading names of this intellectual group. Wang Daiyu is a scholar who studied Islam during his childhood and completed Chinese traditional education during his youth. Knowing the bases of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism as well as his own religion Islam, he was called “the expert of four religions”.

Wang Daiyu left three works behind, which are “A True Explanation of the Right Religion”, “Great Learning of Islam” and “Rare and True Answers”. These works were brought together in the following years and published as a single book. These three works are among the earliest works of Chinese Islamic philosophy. While creating his works, Wang Daiyu used key concepts of Chinese traditional thought frequently without sacrificing the basic principles of Islam. However, the key point to keep in mind here is that, Wang Daiyu used some concepts directly while emphasizing that some other concepts were contrary to the basic principles of Islam. For this reason, we can see that by using some concepts he has established a close relationship between these concepts and Islam in his works, but refrained from using some other concepts. From this point of view, one has to admit that his intellectual work cannot be considered an adaptation of Islam to Confucianism. Rather, it is an effort to express ideas and principles of Islam to Chinese Muslims in the most appropriate and efficient way. The most natural and convenient way to achieve this was simply through Chinese traditional thought system, which has been adopted for centuries by the social structure and has become a value.

As a consequence of efforts to explain Islam in Chinese, which started in the Ming period, a new interpretation or a new understanding of Islam, or simply Chinese Islam emerged. This new understanding resulted in Sinification of Muslims living in China as a part of the Chinese social structure. Thus, there was a transformation of identity from Muslim Chinese to Chinese Muslims. It would be safe to say that this situation did not arise only in China, but in all countries where Islam traveled as a stranger, at least initially. The reason of this is, being a universal religion, one of first problems that Islam had to overcome is not to compromise the basic principles in the process of localization. Therefore, just like using a term such as “the understanding of Turkish Islam”, we should also be able to use a term like “the understanding of Chinese Islam”. Thinking of Islam as a seed, it would be natural for Islam to take some properties of the land that it was planted while preserving its essence. If we were to use another metaphor, considering
Islam as a body, then countries’ traditions and worlds of thought would be clothes on this body.

Wang Daiyu is a Chinese Muslim scholar who reflected the traditional face of China onto Islam and he has a deep influence on the formation of understanding of Chinese Islam. It is very important that many studies are carried out about his three works left behind, and that these studies gain more depth with new perspectives. In summary; Wang Daiyu ensured that an academic bridge was established between Chinese and Islamic civilizations which would allow wisdom accumulated over centuries to be transferred bi-directionally.

We have tried to underline an important point in all of the works of Wang Daiyu. This point is: what Wang Daiyu aimed to accomplish in his works was not uniting Islam and Confucianism or coming up with a joint teaching/religion. His aim was; to establish the understanding of Chinese Islam by putting basic principles of Islam to the centre of this establishment. The expression “revelation is the essence, tradition is the face” used by Baki Adam in his study “Religion and Tradition in Jews” (Adam, 1992: 44-51) really summarizes our work in a sentence. In other words, Wang Daiyu has contributed greatly to the understanding of Chinese Islam with a traditional face without touching the essence of Islam.

Notes

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2. Hu Dengzhou (胡登洲) was a Chinese Muslim scholar with both traditional Chinese education and Islamic education backgrounds. He was born in Wei (咸阳渭城) city of Xianyang. It is rumoured that he went out of China and conducted a researched on several Islamic education models. It is also rumored that on his trip he traveled to Central Asia and from there all the way to Mecca. Starting with his return to China, he was involved in an effort to explain Islam in Chinese. The most concrete result of his effort is the establishment of Chinese-style Islamic madrasas (Gansu Sheng Minzu Yanjiu, Xibei Yisilan Jiao Yanjiu, 1985: 230-233).
3. Hu Dengzhou (胡登洲) had a Chinese traditional education at an early age, and later he focused on Islamic studies. In this respect, he is a fully fledged Chinese Muslim educator (Zhongguo Yisilan Jiao Xiehui, 2011: 171).

7. See more details in Wang, 1999: 92.
8. See more details in Wang, 1999: 301.

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A Reflection on the Development of Buddhist Psychology in China

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Abstract
Starting with the creation of the term “Buddhist psychology”, this paper has reviewed the development of this discipline. The review is focused on but not limited to the Chinese academia. The term “Buddhist Psychology” was first used in the Western academia by Rhys Davids (1857-1942) in her book *Buddhist psychology: an inquiry into the analysis and theory of mind in Pali literature* which was published in 1914. Interestingly, checking the Asian academia, the term “Buddhist Psychology” was used even earlier in 1898 by a Japanese scholar called Inoue Enryō (1858-1919). Later, Buddhist Psychology was introduced to China by Liang Qichao (1873-1929) and Master Taixu (1890-1947) around the 1920s. Influenced by the prevalence of Behaviourism in the West, Chinese scholars tended to have a strong mistrust of Western psychology theories at the beginning. This could be seen in the speeches and writings of Liang and Taixu. Such an attitude has a great influence on the later development of Buddhist psychology in China till now. Overall speaking, it is obvious that Buddhist psychology in the Chinese academia is strong in theoretical elaborations but relatively weak in empirical studies. Also, this paper has identified that Buddhist psychology has different trends of development in Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Such differences can be attributed to historical and political reasons. While the main reason for Liang and Taixu to look down upon Western theories was caused by the prevalence of Behaviourism in the West, the continuation of such attitude can be explained by the attempts of Chinese researchers to regain recognition and esteem. This attitude is clearly shown in the discourse of Chinese researchers: “what the Western psychology has, Buddhist Psychology also has such; furthermore, we have the better one.” Based on a critical review of the past, this paper provides some suggestions for the future development of Buddhist psychology.

Keywords: Buddhist Psychology, Zen Buddhism, Humanistic Buddhism, East Asia, East-West dichotomy, Southeast Asia
1. Introduction

“Buddhist Psychology” may seem to be a new term for most of us. Buddhism is an ancient religion which was established by Prince Siddhartha Gautama around 2,500 years ago; psychology, although has a long history, is a recently evolved discipline which uses scientific methods to study behaviours and mental processes. “Buddhist Psychology” is a term which has not appeared in Buddhist Scriptures. Apparently, it is a new term which combines an Asian religion together with a subject emphasized much on scientific methods. So, what exactly is “Buddhist Psychology”?

In fact, the term “Buddhist Psychology” is first created by a researcher from Japan. According to the research by Prof. Chen Bing, Caroline Augusta Foley Rhys Davids (1857-1942) was the first one to use the term “Buddhist Psychology” to name her publication. She had published *Buddhist psychology: an inquiry into the analysis and theory of mind in Pali literature* in 1914 (Chen, 2015: 20). However, Poon suggested that Rhys Davids was not the first one to use this term. Sixteen years earlier, a Japanese scholar Inoue Enryō (1858-1919) had published his *Lectures on Buddhist Psychology* in 1898 (Poon, 2020: 15). It has already been over 120 years since Inoue Enryō’s *Lectures* till now. The advancement of Buddhist psychology has never stopped.

This paper intends to review the development of Buddhist psychology (with the focus of Chinese academia) and give suggestions for its future development. By studying the number of publications, trends and changes of research interests, and some common characteristics among the present writings, it is interesting to point out that the development of Buddhist psychology has significant differences between Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Influenced by the prevalence of Behaviourism at the time Chinese scholars started to explore Buddhist Psychology, they believed that studying psychology in a Western way was not an appropriate way to study Buddhist ideas about the mind. Although there are great advancements in
psychology in the West (for example, the development of Neo-Behaviourism, Humanistic Perspective, Transpersonal Psychology, etc.), a clear East–West dichotomy mindset still exists especially in studies from Mainland China. It is not difficult to find discourses like “what the Western academia has, we have it too”, sometimes we can even find more extreme discourses like “what the Western academia has, we have it also, and ours are better”. As a result, studies from Mainland China focused mainly on elaborating what we can find in the Buddhist Scriptures, doing theoretical inference about the strengths of Buddhist ideas. Relatively few empirical research was done when compared with Taiwan and Hong Kong. One of the reasons is the historical differences which made researchers from Mainland China have an Anti-American Psychology attitude. This paper suggests that the stances and attitudes of the researchers need to be changed. More interdisciplinary studies between Buddhism and psychology are urgently needed in the future. It can be achieved by facilitating more communication and exchange of ideas and experiences between researchers from different parts of Asia.

2. A Quantitative Review of the Development of Buddhist Psychology

It has already been 121 years since the publication of the very first Buddhist Psychology monograph. After Rhys Davids’ *Buddhist psychology*, publication of this academic realm has never stopped. For example, D.T. Suzuki, Erich S. Fromm and De Martino’s *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis* (1960), Rune E.A. Johansson’s *The Psychology of Nirvana* (1969), Edwina Pio’s *Buddhist Psychology: A Modern Perspective* (1988), etc. Even more, there is an obvious increasing trend of relevant monographs being published after the 1970s. This part is a quantitative review about the number of book publications in academia. The literature review was conducted with the aid of Taiwan National Library and Hong Kong Academic Library Link. By searching for publications under 4 subject categories, including “Buddhism–Psychology”, “Zen Buddhism–Psychology”, “Psychotherapy–Religious aspects–Buddhism”, “Psychotherapy–Religious aspects–Zen Buddhism”, Table 1 was constructed.

About the development in Asia, after Inoue Enryō’s *Lectures on Buddhist Psychology*, the studies about Buddhist Psychology also developed gradually. In Japan, an increasing number of relevant publications can be found, for instance: *A Study of Buddhist Psychology* (1916), *A Study of Buddhist Psychology* (1960), *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis* (1960), etc. About the case of China, Liang Qi-chao (1873-1929) was the first one who used the term “Buddhist Psychology”. In 1922, Liang (2001) made a speech for the Psychology Association in China. The topic of the presentation is “A Brief Inspection about Buddhist Psychology”. Later in 1925, Sik Taixu
Kai Chung Joe Poon

Table 1 Number of Publications in English

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number of Publications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1970</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1989</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 till now*</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * The literature review was done in April 2020.

(1890-1947) had also given a speech under the topic “A Study of Buddhist Psychology” (Sik 2004: 209-211). Comparatively, as one of the founders for Buddhist Psychology in China, Taixu had much more contributions to the field than Liang. Besides the speech mentioned above, Taixu had more speeches and articles about Buddhist Psychology, including: “Psychology Revolution”, “Mental Health from Buddhist Point of View”, “Behaviourism and Psychology” etc.

Thanks to the efforts of these two founders in China, the studies about Buddhist Psychology have not stopped ever since. Ma Ding-bo had published a book titled *A Study of Indian Buddhist Theories of citta, manas and vijñāna* in 1974. Pu Yang-pu had published an article titled “Buddhism and Psychology” in the *Dharma Voice* journal in 1988. Shi Yi-yu had published a book called *Talking about citta and vijñāna: In-depth Psychology* in 1993. Among all recent publications, Sik Wei-hai’s (2005) *Pañca-skandha Psychology* and Chen Bing’s (first edition in 2007, second edition in 2015) *Buddhist Psychology* are two masterpieces in the realm. With the same searching criteria and library search engines as in the above, Table 2 was constructed with the statistics of publications written in Chinese.

Table 2 Number of Publications in Chinese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1979</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2009</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 till now*</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * The literature review was done in April 2020.
3. Analyzing the Western Trends of Development

Besides the increasing number of publications, the trends and changes in research interests are also notable if we keep track of the themes of the publications. Interestingly, the trends in Western and Eastern academia are quite different.

The earliest writings about Buddhist Psychology were mainly theoretical in nature. For instance, Rhys Davids’ (1914) *Buddhist psychology*, Guenther’s (1952) *Yuganaddha*, Benoît’s (1955) *The supreme doctrine*, etc. The key objective of these writings was to elaborate the concept of Buddhist Psychology. Just like what Rhys Davids had mentioned in the Preface of her *Buddhist psychology*:

> While scholars are beginning to get at and decipher the long-buried treasure of Buddhist writings brought from Mid-Asia…. My book’s quest is to present summarily some of the thought contained in the mother-doctrine and her first-born child, much of which is still inaccessible to him. (Rhys Davids, 1914: vii-viii)

Similar sayings also appeared in Guenther’s *Yuganaddha*:

> The title “Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma” outlines the scope of this book. It attempts to deal with philosophy as the perennial quest for meaning with psychology as the abstract understanding by which man is engaged in comprehending himself, as presented in the vast literature of the Abhidharma. (Guenther, 1952: vii)

Guenther even reminded his readers not to read his book with a biased mind:

> The topics handled in this book are difficult as they are delicate, and their appreciation presumes a subtle, balanced and unbiased mind. (Guenther, 1952: i)

It is reasonable to infer that the main motivation in writing down such “reminders” was due to the lack of understanding about Buddhist psychological ideas in the West. Thus, early researchers had put most of their efforts in introducing and elaborating the concepts and theories of Buddhist psychology.

Later, around the 1960s to 1970s, researchers shifted their focus to comparing and contrasting Buddhist psychology with existing psychology theories. Suzuki, Fromm and Martino’s (1960) *Zen Buddhism and psycho-analysis*, De Silva’s (1973) *Buddhist and Freudian psychology* and (1976) *Tangles and webs: comparative studies in existentialism, psychoanalysis, and Buddhism*, etc. belong to this category of publications. In the foreword of *Zen Buddhism and psychoanalysis*, Erich Fromm had clearly pointed out the change of attitude in Western academia.
Any psychologist, even twenty years ago, would have been greatly surprised – or shocked – to find his colleagues interested in a “mystical” religious system such as Zen Buddhism. He would have been more surprised to find that most of the people present were not just “interested” but deeply concerned, and that they discovered that the week spent with Dr. Suzuki and his ideas had a most stimulating and refreshing influence of them, to say the least. (Suzuki 1960: 122)

Fromm had mentioned “twenty years ago” in his message. Considering the previous findings about publication status of Buddhist psychology in the West, he was talking about the time between the issue of Rhys Davids’ *Buddhist psychology* in 1914 and Guenther’s *Yuganaddha* in 1952. At around 1960s, Western academics had much more understanding about Buddhist psychology. They shifted their focus in comparing Buddhist psychology with existing psychology theories. For instance, in Fromm’s book, he had made a comparison between Zen and psychoanalysis.

This description of Zen’s aim could be applied without change as a description of what psychoanalysis aspires to achieve; insight into one’s own nature, the achievement of freedom, happiness and love, liberation of energy, salvation from being insane or crippled. (Suzuki 1960: 122)

In the citation above, Fromm tried to discuss Buddhist psychology more deeply by explaining and elaborating it with the existing psychoanalytic theories and concepts. Discussions of similar kind could often be seen in the publications issued within these two decades.

After late-1970s, there are two notable trends in the development of Buddhist Psychology, and such trends continue till now. The first one is scientific studies of Buddhist Psychology, and the second one is the application of Buddhist Psychology into psychotherapy and counselling.

Hayward’s (1987) *Shifting worlds, changing minds: where the sciences and Buddhism meet*, Pio’s (1988) *Buddhist Psychology: A Modern Perspective*, Watson’s (1999) *The Psychology of Awakening: Buddhism, science, and our day-to-day lives*, etc. belong to the former type. For example, in Pio’s book, he tried to use different kinds of scientific findings to verify the effectiveness of Buddhist psychology, like presenting the data from electroencephalography (EEG), blood lactate level and oxygen consumption level to test the effects of practising mediation. Another typical example would be Levine’s (2000) *The positive psychology of Buddhism and Yoga: paths to mature happiness*. In the book, Levine quoted research findings from Harvard medical school to point out the relationship between meditation and blood pressure.

Hall’s (1979) *Buddhism and psychotherapy*, Leigh’s (1987), *A Zen approach to bodytherapy: from Rolf to Feldenkrais to Tanouye Roshi*, Nissanka
Buddhist psychotherapy: an Eastern therapeutical approach to mental problems, etc. belong to the latter category. For instance, Unno’s (2006) Buddhism and psychotherapy across cultures: essays on theories and practices is a collection of essays talking about the application of Buddhist ideas into psychotherapies. One of the essays shared the author’s experiences in conducting Buddhist sandplay therapy. In the essay, Yasunobu introduced the history of sandplay therapy, administrative details and also reviewed the therapy’s effectiveness via case studies (Yasunobu, 2006). Naoki’s sharing in end-of-life caring could be seen as another example from that book which applied Buddhist wisdom into psychotherapy. In the essay, the author shared three case studies in applying the ideas from Pure Land Buddhism into end-of-life caring. After reflecting upon previous experiences, the author presented eight detailed guidelines for the application of Buddhist end-of-life caring (Naoki, 2006). Of course, these two types of study are not mutually exclusive. Most of the studies on Buddhist Psychotherapy are scientific and empirical in nature.

To summarize the development of Buddhist psychology in the West, the whole development can be roughly divided into three phases. From the 1910s to 1950s, it is the “Introduction phase”. Researchers in the West first came across with the ideas of Buddhist psychology. Maybe due to the fact that Buddhist psychology links with a religion that’s foreign to them, early researchers often reminded their readers to keep an unbiased attitude to learn this new knowledge. From the 1960s to late 1970s, it was the “Communicating phase”. Psychologists tried to compare and contrast Buddhist ideas about psychology with the existing concepts and theories in the Western academia. From the early 1980s to now, it is the “Verification & Extraction phase”. During this period, researchers try to extract different ideas from Buddhist scriptures and try to apply them into various kinds of psychotherapy and verify the effectiveness.

4. Analyzing the Chinese Trends of Development

However, compared with the situation in Chinese publications, the development is totally different. Firstly, the most significant and notable trend is, after the 1980s, there is an increasing number of publications which belong to leisure books. This type of publication constitutes a large market share ever since. Secondly, after comparing with the West, there is one more significant difference in Chinese publications. The proportion of Chinese publications in scientific studies and application in psychotherapy is relatively less than the West. Instead of shifting the focus to scientific and empirical studies, philosophical elaborations and theoretical discussions still prevail in Chinese academia. From Liang’s and Taixu’s introduction about Buddhist Psychology
till now, this type of publication has never stopped. In the 1970s, there are 5 books of this type, 3 books in the 1980s, 1 book in the 1990s, 8 books in the 2000s and 2 books in the 2010s. They are books mainly focused on philosophical elaborations and theoretical discussions.

One more interesting phenomenon was found if the literature review takes into account the peer-reviewed journal articles in Chinese academia. There is a noticeable difference between the researches from Mainland China and from Taiwan and Hong Kong. For reviewing the publications in Mainland China, the Academic Journals Full-text Database (CJFD) was being selected. This is the most comprehensive gateway and the largest database in Mainland China, which is run by a state-owned enterprise held by Tsinghua University. For reviewing the publications in Taiwan, the National Central Library Periodical Information Center was being selected. It is run by the Ministry of Education of the Taiwan Government, this is the gateway with greatest credibility and also the largest database in Taiwan. For reviewing the publications in Hong Kong, since there is no representative database for Hong Kong academic journals, the review was conducted by checking the newsletters and research projects of Buddhist study/research centres run by Hong Kong’s universities.

To keep the discussion more focused, a specialized topic was selected in the review. Restricting the search area as “psychology”, “zen” was used as the keyword for searching literature in academic databases and as the theme and topic of research projects searching among the research centres. There are 42 results in CJFD, 12 results in National Central Library’s database, 9 relevant journal articles in the journal issued by Center for the Study of Chan Buddhism and Human Civilization (CUHK) and 1 relevant research project done by Centre of Buddhist Studies (HKU).

After reviewing the existing articles, one of the noticeable differences between these three regions is research methodology. Studies from Mainland China usually adopted theoretical inference or speculative thinking as their methodology and lack of empirical studies (both qualitative and quantitative researches). Empirical study has been regarded as a foundation of psychology studies in the Western academia since the late 19 century after psychology was evolved into a scientific discipline. With theoretical inference as the main research approach, there is a writing structure commonly seen in these studies. Let’s use the application of “Zen” to improve mental health of college students as an example. Shi, Xiao-bei (2018), Wu Cui-jing (2018) and Xiao Qing-yin (2020) had published articles talking about how zen therapy, tea zen and design of zentangle (a kind of drawing) could improve the mental health of college students. Despite the fact that researchers are coming from different colleges, and they are talking about different kinds of zen-related therapy, the discourse of their papers are the same. They first pointed out the contemporary mental health problems of college students from existing
literature; then, they turned to elaborate the benefits of the therapy they recommended theoretically; in the last part of their paper, by merely logical inference, they came to the conclusion that if the therapy could be used on the college students, their mental health should be able to improve. Their conclusions are more likely to be an advocacy of zen as an intervention for psychological health rather than research findings. In fact, researches with such discourse are very common in Mainland China’s academia.

Comparatively speaking, this phenomenon does not appear in Taiwan and Hong Kong academia. Studies from Taiwan and Hong Kong do not lay stress on a particular research approach. Here are a few examples from Taiwan academia. When Hwang Kwang-kuo and Shiah Yung-jong develop their indigenous theory of “Mandala Model of Self”, their study is an all-rounded research series which included discussion on theoretical foundation and elaboration of the model (Hwang, 2011; Shiah, 2016; Hwang, 2019) and empirical approaches via survey and quasi-experimental methods (Shiah and Hwang, 2019). Going back to the same type of research about zen, studies from Taiwan and Hong Kong never lack empirical studies as if what Western academics have been doing. For example, Lee Chi-jen (2018) has conducted a study about Zanadala® Expressive art therapy (a kind of therapy very similar to zentangle) in the psychiatric daycare centre. Lee had adopted a mixed-methods approach (semi-structured interviews in the first phase, survey method in the second phase and semi-structured interviews and individual case study in the third phase) to verify the effectiveness of the programme. Another example from Taiwan academia is, Po Pei-chi (2015) had conducted a study about tea zen. In her study, she had adopted a quantitative method (questionnaire of happiness derived from Oxford Happiness Inventory) to verify the effectiveness of the tea zen programme. Using a meditative intervention project in the Centre of Buddhist Studies (HKU) as an example, Chan Ka-po (2014) had developed an Eastern based meditative intervention for pregnant Chinese women. He hypothesized that the intervention could improve the health of both mother and infant. To verify his hypothesis, he had conducted a randomized control quantitative study to verify the effectiveness of the intervention.

Another noticeable phenomenon is, there is a kind of discourse that’s very common in Mainland China academia but relatively fewer in Taiwan and Hong Kong academia. In the literature review about the topic “zen” in the psychology research area, within the 42 search results there are already 8 pieces of articles related to the topic of indigenization, e.g. Peng Yan-qin (2020), Li Hui and Zhang Tao (2011) and Xiong Wei-rui and Yu Lu (2010), etc. In articles of this kind, they had presented a very similar discourse within: philosophically speaking, zen consists of wisdom and very great insights to humans, research methods coming from Western academia is very limited and cannot fully understand zen, that’s why new indigenized research
methods coming from our own country is urgently needed. In such discourse, researchers intend to point out that “Western research methodology” is incapable to study Buddhist psychology, a new set of methodology developed by Chinese researchers is needed. However, when the researchers presented their suggestions in the “indigenized research methods”, they tend to draw their reference from philosophical discussions instead of empirical data. So, despite the fact that such kind of discussion was started as early as 2009 (Peng and Yang, 2009: 3-6, 50) under the topic of zen, there is no new research method developed and accepted by the later researchers in China. For instance, Peng Yan-qin and Hu Hong-yun (2012) had suggested that “internal evidence” (Peng and Hu, 2012) should be a unique research method of Chinese psychologists. However, after 2012, there’s no researcher which takes their suggestion and works on his/her studies by adopting “internal evidence”. It is obvious that such views have a strong East–West dichotomy mindset. Regarding most existing research methods as “Western research methodology” and abandoning them leaves the researchers no choice but to continue focusing on theoretical discussions.

Although Taiwan and Hong Kong’s researchers are also involved in the discussion of indigenization of psychology, their discourse and attitude towards Western theories and research methods are not the same. It is true that one of the assumptions in the indigenization of psychology is not possible to fully understand the psychology of the people in a particular ethnic or any other social group without a complete understanding of the social, historical, political, ideological, and religious premises that have shaped people of this group (Shiraev, 2010: 21). However, indigenous psychology is still a branch of psychology studies which seek for understanding human behaviours and mental processes under the scientific paradigm (Kim and Young, 2006: 33). In the indigenous studies conducted by Taiwan and Hong Kong’s researchers, instead of holding an attitude of rejecting and looking down on Western research methodology, they tried to incorporate Western research methodology when conducting their own research.

As a brief summary, the above statistics and information show that there is an increasing trend for the studies of Buddhist Psychology. Although in both Western and Eastern academia, Buddhist Psychology is in a fast pace of development, the research interests are not the same. In the West, early researchers focused much on elaboration of the concepts and theories of Buddhist Psychology. The publications at that time were mostly theoretical in nature. As Buddhist Psychology continues to develop, two important trends appear. Researchers have shifted their focus on scientific investigation of Buddhist Psychology, and they also attempt to apply the ideas from Buddhism into psychotherapy. In the East, the development trend had become more complex. The research methodology adopted by the researchers and the
attitude towards Western research methodology become different between researchers from Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. As a result, even up to now, the studies and publications of Buddhist psychology are still mainly focusing on theoretical discussions in the Chinese academia (especially in the studies from Mainland China). Another notable difference between West and East is the rising trend of leisure books about Buddhist Psychology. In the later parts of this paper, reasons behind such a unique phenomenon in the Mainland China academia will be discussed.

5. Analysis of some Common Characteristics in Chinese Writings

After a comprehensive review about the literature in Chinese academia, there are two noticeable discourses among the researchers (especially in the researchers from Mainland China). The paragraphs below will take a closer look into their discourses. Firstly, they believe that Buddhism in itself is psychology. Secondly, they think that Buddhism is better than the Western psychology.

As early as in Liang Qi-chao’s speech, he pointed out that Buddhism in itself is psychology without any hesitation. In his presentation “A Brief Inspection about Buddhist Psychology”, he mentioned that:

If someone asks me: What is Dharma? I would not hesitate to answer: Psychology. (Liang, 2001: 394)

Try finding out what is pañca-skandha, what is Nidāna, what is Astādaśa dhātavah, what is aṣṭa vijñānakāyāḥ, which one is not (a kind of) psychology? (Liang, 2001: 394)

Later, in 1988, Pu Yang-pu had the same discourse in “Buddhism and Psychology”. In the article, he said that:

Buddhism is a special type of psychology which has the longest history. (Pu, 1988: 18)

This kind of discourse exists even in latest publications of recent years. In Sik Wei-hai’s Pañca-skandha Psychology, the author claims that:

This kind of Sādhanā (Buddhist life cultivation), from an objective viewpoint, is a cultivation of mind. Since it’s a cultivation of mind, it is necessary to have adequate understanding about psychology, and equip with knowledge about psychology. (Sik, 2006: 1)

The same discourse also appears in Chen Bing’s Buddhist Psychology. In the book, he clearly asserts that:

From contemporary transpersonal psychology, post-modern psychology, the main contents of Buddhism can be said as a kind of psychology. (Chen, 2015: 2)
As shown in the above, researchers from Mainland China do not only recognize Buddhism as a kind of psychology directly; more notably, they recognize it as a better kind of psychology. In Taixu’s paper “Behaviourism and Psychology”, he claimed that Buddhist Psychology could be divided into three branches, including the study of emotions, thoughts and intellect. He went further to criticize Western psychology (the focus of discussion in this paper is Behaviourism) was too narrow-minded (Sik, 2004: 216). The influence of Taixu’s attitude and discourse towards Western psychology still exists nowadays. Even in the latest publication, the same kind of discourse appears. In a recently published Buddhist psychology book written by Wang Mi-qu, he often compares Buddhist Psychology with “General Psychology” and “Scientific Psychology”. He claimed that Buddhist Psychology is much better among all. Comparatively speaking, Buddhist Psychology is “broad, in-depth, with great vision”, and it is “capable in studying topics which scientific psychology finds difficult to inspect” (Wang 2014: 4).

By revealing the fact that Chinese Buddhist Psychology has discourses as such, they give us the cues to understand why the development of Buddhist Psychology is so different when compared with the West. In Mainland China academia, researchers do not only believe that Buddhism is psychology, but even more a better kind of psychology when compared with the Western and scientific one. With such belief, they tend to dig deeper into what wisdom Buddha’s teachings can contribute to the further development of Buddhist psychology. This is one of the reasons why the publications focusing on philosophical and theoretical discussions continue to prevail till now. Furthermore, it is because researchers also tend to look down on scientific methods in studying psychology, they think that scientific methods cannot study people’s mind as detailed as what the Buddha had revealed to us. That’s why scientific and empirical studies are relatively weak in Mainland China academia when compared with the West. This explains the differences between West and East in the development of Buddhist Psychology.

6. A Discussion about such Phenomenon

The differences between the West and the East are explained through studying the discourses of Chinese researchers. The next question is “why?” What causes the differences between West and East? Why did such kinds of discourse appear in Eastern academia (especially in Mainland China)? There are two main reasons.

6.1. Historical Reasons

Checking the history of psychology, as Liang Qi-chao and Taixu introduced the concept of Buddhist Psychology, it was the era when Behaviourism
was becoming dominant in Western psychology. According to Brennan’s *History and Systems of Psychology*, Behaviourism was increasingly more influential in the academia: This movement was formally initiated by an American psychologist, John Broadus Watson (1878-1958), in a famous paper, “Psychology as the Behaviourist Views It”, published in 1913 (Brennan, 2003: 240). One of the key features of Behaviourism is that it focuses only on the study of observable behaviours: he (here means Watson) dismissed the entire notion of some nonphysical mental state consciousness as a pseudo-problem for science. In its place, Watson advocated overt, observable behaviour as the sole legitimate subject matter for a true science of psychology (Brennan, 2003: 240). No wonder, Liang and Taixu criticized Western psychology as “narrow-minded” and believed that Western psychology was unable to study all the Buddha’s teachings about mind.

This only explains the phenomenon which happened in times of Liang Qi-chao and Taixu, but not the differences between Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Yet, such differences can also be understood by historical reason. If we check the history of psychology after it arrived in China, we are able to understand the differences between these three regions. With reference to two articles written by Yang Guo-shu in 1993 and 2008 (Yang 1993; 2008), there were different development paces in these three regions. When psychology first came to Asia, this newly arrived discipline focused on the introduction of Western theories and concepts and translation of Western works, e.g. William James (1842-1910), Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), John Dewey (1859-1952), etc. Later, it is because of social and political instability, the development of psychology in Mainland China was lagged behind. In the mid-1930s, almost all academic activities ceased because of the Sino-Japanese war and civil wars.

After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the advancement of psychology was resumed in Mainland China. However, unlike the development in Taiwan and Hong Kong, the advancement of psychology in Mainland China was modelled on the Soviet Union’s. It was because of the ideological difference, psychology development in Mainland China took Marxist dialectical materialism as its guiding principle. Thus, Mainland China researchers at that time regarded psychology as “Western oriented” or more specifically “American oriented” and developed a rejecting attitude to “American psychology”. Later afterwards, during the 10 years of Cultural Revolution, psychology was even being regarded as pseudoscience and all psychological studies were banned at that period. Such kind of ideological, political and social background did not happen in Taiwan and Hong Kong. This explains why there are some noticeable differences between Mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong in the study of Buddhist psychology at the moment.
6.2. Attempts to Regain Recognition and Esteem

Reviewing the history of psychology, this discipline has had great advancement within these decades. After the rise of Behaviourism, Humanistic psychology became the Third Force of psychology. Psychologists have put more focus on studying the healthy side of individuals. Different ideas flourish in the field, including cognitive psychology, transpersonal psychology, positive psychology, etc. Psychology has also got much improvement on research methodology. Observation of overt behaviours and experimental design are no more the only choices for research. Psychology has more sophisticated research methods for researchers to choose, including quantitative approaches, qualitative approaches and even mixed methods.

Why do the researchers in Chinese academia still stick to the same discourse with the two founders who lived a hundred years ago? It is not reasonable to say that they do not know the present progress of psychology. A possible explanation for the present phenomenon is, they know the advancement of psychology in the West, they still look down on Western psychology because it is a means for them to get recognition. Especially when we talk about the research and studies in Mainland China. Since the progression and advancement in psychology studies had been hindered because of the social and political instabilities in the last century, this urges the researchers to gain back their status and recognition. Furthermore, as Mainland China has been gaining great advancements in other aspects (e.g. economic aspect, political aspect, international relationship, etc.), the researchers will feel more pressure when compared with the West.

With reference to Wallerstein I., Wang Qi has depicted crisis that may happen in the indigenized process of researches. Researchers who believe themselves as peripheral and inferior than the West. In their researches, it is often found that they may try to regain recognition and esteem from discourse as such: “what the Western tradition has, our tradition also has such” (Wang, 2014: 14-16). This kind of discourse exists in the study of Buddhist Psychology in China. For instance, Sik Wei-hai believed that Zen Buddhism and Jnana yoga are equivalent to Transpersonal psychology in the West (Sik, 2006: 911); Wang Mi-qu claimed that “Buddhist breathing exercises” as a kind of behavioural therapy (Wang, 2014: 7). Another example is in Chen Bing’s Buddhist Psychology, he just put the labels from Western psychology onto the concepts from Buddhism and claims that they are exactly the same. In his book, he claimed that “developing Bodhicitta is logotherapy”, “learning Buddha’s teachings is rational emotive therapy”, “holding precepts is behavioural therapy”, etc. (Chen, 2015: 719).

To be brief, with the support of historical investigation and Wang Qi’s description about the indigenized process and possible crisis, this explains why researchers from Mainland China academia have the discourse that
Buddhism is a better kind of psychology when compared with the West even in today, and why publications mainly focus on philosophical and theoretical discussions but not scientific and empirical explorations. This paper does not intend to obliterate the contributions of existing studies. Philosophical and theoretical discussions are also very important in the development of Buddhist psychology. Without the extraction of Buddha’s wisdom from the Scriptures and without establishing solid philosophical foundations, the development of Buddhist psychology is not a possible mission. This is exactly the tradition left down by Liang Qi-chao and Master Taixu. Revealing the existing literature, researchers from Mainland China have been working hard in following this tradition. A suggestion for their future research direction is: more empirical studies are needed in the future in order to verify what they have proposed in their previous studies. One immediate way to achieve this is by initiating interdisciplinary research between Buddhist studies and psychology studies. For long-term development, researchers can also facilitate more communication and exchange of experiences between academics from different parts of Asia.

7. Conclusion

This paper intends to review the development of Buddhist Psychology systematically. The development of “Buddhist psychology” is an interesting topic worth studying from which we can see the process of indigenization. In the past, the new arrival of psychology was not welcome in China and was being looked down upon. Early in 1922, Sik Taixu and Liang Qi-chao claimed that “Buddhism in itself is psychology”, and even more, a better one when comparing with Western psychology. With great advancement throughout these decades, present Mainland Chinese researcher of Buddhist Psychology still tend to look down on the empirical spirit of modern psychology and also the research methodology of social science.

With reference to historical reasons and Wang Qi’s description about the indigenized process and possible crisis, it seems to be a possible explanation that the present researchers are trying to regain recognition and esteem from discourse as such: “what the Western psychology has, Buddhist Psychology also has such; furthermore, we have the better one.” This also explains why the trends and changes of research interests between the West and the East are different, with the former one having increasing publications on scientific and empirical studies, and the latter one still focusing on philosophical and theoretical discussions.

This paper does not intend to obliterate the contributions of existing philosophical and theoretical studies. They have great contributions in laying down solid theoretical foundation for future studies. However, the point
here is, over-emphasizing theoretical studies is not an ideal development for Buddhist psychology. More empirical studies are urgently needed. Initiating interdisciplinary research between Buddhist studies and psychology studies, facilitating exchange of experiences between academics from different parts of Asia are the suggestions for future directions.

Notes
* Dr Poon received his PhD in Chu Hai University. With a multidisciplinary education background, he is interested in studying art and literature from a psychological perspective. He is currently studying another PhD in the University of Edinburgh which specializes in studying the relationship between reading and mental health. Also, he has a keen interest in studying Humanistic Buddhism and is the author of the book *A reflection upon the development of Buddhist psychology in East Asia* (in Chinese) which is one of the deliverables of a research project funded by the Chinese University of Hong Kong – Centre for the Study of Humanistic Buddhism.

1. R.J. Gerrig, (2013: 5-7) in his *Psychology and Life* used the phrase “the evolution of modern psychology” to describe the development of psychology from a discipline in philosophy to a science of mind and behaviour.

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